Hoover Institution (Stanford, CA) — The very nature of warfare is changing rapidly, and the United States and its allies must quickly decide how they will adapt their forces to include artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous weapons.
That’s what Hoover fellows and scholars affiliated with the institution’s Military History in Contemporary Conflict Working Group explored at an annual conference on March 7, 2025.
Presenters discussed the rise of autonomous weapons platforms, including drones and hypersonic missiles; the challenges posed by introducing AI into military decision making; the future of the US nuclear deterrence; and how to translate tactical military victories into lasting strategic resolutions that serve US interests.
“The relevance of the study of history has in many ways forged the world as we know it and is crucial to understanding today’s events,” said Hoover Institution Director Condoleezza Rice of the conference.
The gathering was organized by Research Fellow David Berkey and Program Manager Megan J. Ring under the direction of Senior Fellow Victor Davis Hanson.
Jacquelyn Schneider on the Rise of Autonomous Weapons
Hoover Fellow Jacquelyn Schneider began the day’s events with a roundup of how several emerging weapons categories—including drones, hypersonic missiles, ballistic missiles, mines, and cruise missiles—each with autonomous characteristics, are changing the very nature of warfare.
In recent wars, including Israel’s fight against Hamas, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the shorter Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2022 between Armenia and Azerbaijan, drones, loitering munitions, and other weapons with autonomous characteristics became the most impactful tools on the battlefield.
Schneider questioned whether US defense policymakers have the right approach when it comes to these weapons. Current US doctrine prefers smaller numbers of high-quality (more expensive), longer-range, more survivable weapons, while many US adversaries instead opt for cheaper, shorter-range systems that can be deployed in swarms. She also expressed concern over the current US arsenal being designed to fight “a short and overwhelming war of precision, range, and speed,” as opposed to a longer war of attrition.
Michael Kofman on Ukraine, Drones and the Changing Nature of Warfare
Michael Kofman, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noted that so far in 2025, Ukraine is performing better on the battlefield than expected given observed trends in 2024. Both Ukraine and Russia are producing a significant number of attack drones annually, which are now, for the first time in warfare history, causing the highest number of casualties on the battlefield. Despite the proliferation of drones, traditional artillery like the 120mm mortar and the 155mm artillery shell remain crucial. Over the past six months, both sides have maintained relative parity in artillery power.
Ukraine has adjusted its strategy to address its infantry deficiencies, while both countries struggle with maintaining force quality and generation. The inability to break through prepared defenses has led Russia to focus on grinding its way through the front line. Ukraine’s leading challenge is the manpower asymmetry, with Russia continuously generating replacements for its losses. The conflict is unsustainable for both sides, but Ukraine is more dependent on sustained external support in intelligence, parts, and munitions.
Drones are also being used to counter and destroy other drones, substituting for short-range air defense. Kofman likened the current use of drones to the introduction of combat aviation in the First World War, and its future potential hinges on advancements like AI and autonomous targeting. Kofman also stressed the critical role of precision weaponry, noting that the advent of mass precision poses major challenges for existing maneuver warfare concepts. This is especially so when paired with prepared defenses and legacy capabilities on the battlefield. Attacking air superiority remains critical but is not a solution to the observed problems and should not serve as an alibi to ignore lessons from this war such as the advance of drone warfare.
Adm. James O. Ellis Jr. on Strategic Depth and Nuclear Deterrence
Distinguished Visiting Fellow Adm. James O. Ellis Jr. explored the future of US and foreign nuclear doctrines. Drawing from his extensive background as a commander of a nuclear-qualified, carrier-borne F-18 fighter squadron, Ellis discussed the juxtaposition of traditional nuclear strategies with modern advancements. Referring to the resurgence of past technologies within new paradigms, he underscored the ongoing evolution in nuclear deterrence approaches, pointing out that the United States lags significantly behind its adversaries in the basic task of maintaining existing nuclear weapons and constructing new ones. Ellis tackled the contentious topic of tactical nuclear weapons, identifying the asymmetry in capabilities among global powers, especially Russia, the United States, and now China. He cautioned about the lower acceptability threshold for deploying smaller, tactical nukes as opposed to their long-range counterparts, reflecting on the complex dynamics of deterrence in today’s geopolitical climate.
He also provided a comprehensive breakdown of the strategic depth maintained by global superpowers, particularly through the lens of nuclear capabilities. Drawing comparisons from historical contexts, Ellis questioned the current relevance and limitations of nuclear deterrence, pondering whether weapons of mass destruction have become so excessively powerful that their use is unanimously avoided.
Brad Boyd on the Application of AI to Modern Weaponry
Visiting Fellow Brad Boyd spoke about the use of AI in modern weapons and what limits society would be willing to accept on how much autonomy AI will have in selecting targets, avoiding civilian casualties, and otherwise making decisions that up to this point in history have always been made by humans. For instance, if AI mistakes an enemy tank for a bus full of civilians, even in 1 percent of instances where it is deployed, is that a risk US policymakers and military leaders are willing to take? While military thinkers express a desire for “meaningful human control” of autonomous weapons systems, Boyd said, there is not very much agreement as to what constitutes meaningful human control.
Boyd said the US military establishment is just beginning to tackle this question, and it will need to be resolved most quickly for airborne systems, where the ability for drones and loitering munitions to maneuver and engage targets independently already theoretically exists. Other speakers expressed concerns that this question about meaningful human control will not be settled before these weapons start to be used in large numbers on the battlefield.
Victor Davis Hanson on Translating Military Performance into Strategic Success
Rounding off the day’s deliberations was Senior Fellow Victor Davis Hanson, whose discourse focused on the perennial challenge of converting military brilliance into strategic accomplishments. Hanson analyzed notable historical examples where the US military excelled on the battlefield but struggled with subsequent strategic resolutions. The perception of incomplete victories in conflicts such as the Gulf Wars and the enduring complexities in Vietnam and Afghanistan underscored his argument. He remarked on the necessity for clearer objectives and strategic foresight, urging future military operations to be intricately aligned with overarching policy goals to avoid repeating historical pitfalls. Hanson’s analysis was a somber reminder of the disjunctions that sometimes arise between successful military operations and long-term strategic stability.
More work from Hoover’s Military History in Contemporary Conflict Working Group can be found here.
