

GETTING GLOBAL MONETARY POLICY ON TRACK

EDITED BY

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INDEX

Note: The letter f following a page number denotes a figure; the letter t denotes a table.

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acute institutional anomie (AIA), 65, 84,
                                                     gold standard, 89-93, 152
      104 - 5
                                                     hyperinflation, 123-24, 124t, 125
   Argentina, 70-72, 72t, 74, 78, 89, 91, 93,
                                                     indexation, 154-55
      95, 97, 100-102, 120n28
                                                     Intangibility of Deposits law, 98
   credibility and, 76, 76f
                                                     legacy of Spanish colonialism, 72-73
   defined, 68-69
                                                     monetary reform of 1899, 89-91, 101
   indicators of, 71, 72t
                                                    output during inflation-stabilization
AEA (American Economic Association), 315
                                                        episodes, 132f
Agricultural Development Bank of
                                                     populism, 65, 69-70, 72-74, 83, 157
      China, 144n2
                                                     post-reform return to indiscipline, 92-93
AI (artificial intelligence), xix, 53, 243,
                                                     price statistics, 153-55
     399, 401t
                                                     provincial quasi-money, 82
Alesina, Alberto, 80
                                                     tablita, 154
Alexander II, xviii
                                                     time-inconsistency disease, 70, 74, 76,
Alfonsín, Raúl, 96, 98, 100
Alipay, 26, 28
                                                  artificial intelligence (AI), xix, 53, 243,
Álvarez, Carlos, 96–97
                                                        399, 401t
American Economic Association (AEA), 315
                                                  Asset Purchase Facility, 218, 409n24
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
                                                  Auer, Raphael, 430
      2009, 340, 349
                                                  AUKUS alliance (Australia, United Kingdom,
American Rescue Plan, 360n14, 382
                                                        United States), xxii
Angola, 66, 66f
                                                  Australia
Ant Financial, 26, 28
                                                    alliances, xxi
Antoniewicz, Shelly, 259n38
                                                    bank supervision, 158
Argentina, 153-57
                                                    inflation targeting, 359n3
   acute institutional anomie, 70-72, 72t, 74,
                                                  Austria
      78, 89, 91, 93, 95, 97, 100-102, 120n28
                                                     Raiffeisen Bank's connections with
   annual inflation, 125f
                                                        Russia, 36
   central bank digital currencies, 52
                                                    surrender of monetary sovereignty, 75
   central bank independence, 70-71, 71t, 97,
      102-4, 119n8
                                                  balanced-approach rule, 3t
                                                  Bank for International Settlements (BIS),
   Convertibility, 62, 64–65, 75–76, 85,
      88-101, 102t, 103-4, 119n17, 120n23,
                                                        190, 201, 228, 459
      120n25, 121n35, 155-77
                                                  Bank of Canada, 448
   currency board, 78, 94, 98-100, 155
                                                  Bank of England, 441. See also liability-driven
   dollarization, xii, 61-105, 155-56
                                                        investment crisis
   effective commitment devices, 88-89, 91
                                                     Annual Cyclical Scenarios, 221n5
```

Bank of England (continued) cumulative gilt sales, 209f "dash for cash" episode, 216, 224n30 Financial Policy Committee, 201–2, 212, 216–17, 217t, 225n46, 234 gilt purchases for financial stability, 215f inflation targeting, 448	output during inflation-stabilization episodes, 132f pandemic-era currency weakening, 434 pandemic-era inflation, 10f, 130f stagflation, 66 Bretton Woods, 124, 448 Brexit, 15
Monetary Policy Committee, 202–3, 206, 212, 217–19	Broaddus, Al, 414 Broadgus Markov K. vi. 23, 29, 52, 53
stabilizing intervention, 212–20	Brunnermeier, Markus K., xi, 23–29, 52–53 Bruno, Michael, 154, 158
system-wide exploratory scenario, 211,	Buchak, Greg, 178
219, 223n29	budget deficits, 77, 91, 398
Bankers' Magazine, 90	Italy, 51
Barrero, Jose Maria, 265, 268, 270–72	Spain, 20
Barro, Robert J., 80	US (1962–2032), 400f
Barth, Jim, 158	budget policies
Basel III Endgame, 176, 183, 192, 203	IS curve and, 400, 409n29
Bentham, Jeremy, 260n44 Bernanke, Ben, 190, 316, 333, 380, 383, 393,	pandemic-era deficit spending, 328, 350, 360n14
397f, 407n4, 407n11, 408n19, 409n23,	stability versus continuing resolutions, xxii
409n25, 441, 457, 484	Bukele, Nayib, 86, 102, 104
Biden, Joe, 191, 382, 384	Bullard, James, 7-8, 295-96, 412-13, 416,
BIS (Bank for International Settlements),	419, 462–63
190, 201, 228, 459	Burns, Arthur F., 473t, 476, 478–79, 490–91
bitcoin, 86	C 1 11 P: 1 75
Blinder, Alan, 444	Caballero, Ricardo, 75
Bloom, Nicholas, 265, 268, 270 Blumenthal, Michael, 473t, 478, 481	Cabral, René, 83 Cachanosky, Nicolás, 84, 87, 118, 119n11
Bocola, Luigi, xii, 39–48, 57 Bolivia	cacophony problem, 385–86, 412–13, 419–21, 440, 444
annual inflation, 125f	Calvo, Guillermo A., 61, 80–81
deviation from inflation targets, 127, 128f	CAMELS ratings, 171–73, 172f–73f, 252n14
hyperinflation, 124t	Cameron, Timothy W., 256n29
output during inflation-stabilization	Canada
episodes, 132f	bank supervision, 159
pandemic-era monthly inflation, 130f stagflation, 66	deviation from inflation targets, 426f inflation and interest rates
Bordo, Michael D., 14–15, 51–52, 91, 152,	(2014–2024), 32f
235, 354, 412, 418, 461, 489	inflation targeting, 359n3, 448
Borio, Claudio, 430-31	interest rate hike compared to US, 427f
Boskin, Michael, 152-53, 229-30	pandemic-era inflation, 450
Bowman, Michelle W., 252n13	quantitative easing, 235
Brainard, Lael, 334	real effective exchange rate, 435f
Brazil	capital markets, 240–43, 245–49, 259n40, 391
acute institutional anomie, 72t annual inflation, 125f	Caprio, Gerard, Jr., 158 Carter, Jimmy, 473t, 475, 478–83
devaluation, 101, 121n34	Cartwright, Brian, 253n18
deviation from inflation targets, 128f	Cavallo, Alberto, 155
foreign-exchange crisis, 95	Cavallo, Domingo, 97, 120n22,
hyperinflation, 123, 124t	120n25, 121n32
indexation, 154	CBDCs. See central bank digital currencies
inflation rate minus monetary policy	CBI. See central bank independence
rate, 131f interest rate hike compared to US, 427f	CBIRC (China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission), 157
interest rate line compared to 00, 42/1	Tagaintory Commission, 157

central bank communication, xiv-xv, 345-47, 375-401, 415, 439-45, 455-56, 458, 460-62 cacophony problem, 385-86, 412-13, 419-21, 440, 444 Evans rule, 442-43 FOMC, 440-45 stare-dependent guidance, 442-43 Summary of Economic Projections, 440-42 digital US, defined, 23 digital US, defined, 23 digital US dollar, 28 ensuring uniformity and singleness of money, 24-25 establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25-26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26-27 setting a privacy standard, 27-28 views on control of ledger, 23-24 central bank independence (CBI), 187-200 accountablity, 146-49 acute institutional anomie, 72t annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f, 128-29 exit strategy from crawling peg, 154 hyperinflation, 124t inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f, 128-29 exit strategy from crawling peg, 154 hyperinflation, 124f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f inflation, 125f deviation from inflation, 124f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f, 128-29 exit strategy from crawling peg, 154 hyperinflation, 124f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f inflation, 125f deviation from inflation, 124f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f inflation, 125f deviation from inflation, 125f obstagliation, 124t inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f inflation, 124t inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f inflation, 124t inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f inflation, 125f deviation from inflation, 125f deviation, 124f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f inflation, 125f deviation from inf	CDO (C	Ol 1
central bank communication, xiv-xy, 345–47, 375–401, 145, 439–45, 455–56, 458, 460–62 cacophony problem, 385–86, 412–13, 419–21, 440, 444 Evans rule, 442–43 FOMC, 440–45 state-dependent guidance, 442–43 Summary of Economic Projections, 440–42 central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), xi, 23–29, 52 digital Chinese yuan, 28 digital Um dollar, 28 ensuring uniformity and singleness of money, 24–25 establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountablity, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t rangular inflation, 125f deviation from inflation rare table via US	CBO (Congressional Budget Office), 34, 286,	Chile
deviation from inflation targets, 128f, 128–29 cacophony problem, 385–86, 412–13, 419–21, 440, 444 Evans rule, 442–43 FOMC, 440–45 state-dependent guidance, 442–43 Summary of Economic Projections, 440–42 time-dependent guidance, 442–43 central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), xi, 23–29, 52 digital Chinese yuan, 28 digital money, defined, 23 digital Wisself and the state of money, 24–25 establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomic, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 pank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economics, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 1		
460-62 cacophony problem, 385-86, 412-13, 419-21, 440, 444 Evans rule, 442-43 FOMC, 440-45 state-dependent guidance, 442-43 Summary of Economic Projections, 440-42 time-dependent guidance, 442-43 central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), xi, 23-29, 52 digital Chinese yuan, 28 digital Us dollar, 28 ensuring uniformity and singleness of money, 24-25 establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25-26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26-27 setting a privacy standard, 27-28 views on control of ledger, 23-24 central bank independence (CBI), 187-200 accountability, 146-49 sank supervision, 159-60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145-49 features and factors crucial for success, 146-49 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145-46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145-46 strong governance, 146-47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146-49 US law and, 187-96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36		
cacophony problem, 385–86, 412–13, 419–21, 440, 444 Evans rule, 442–43 FOMC, 440–45 state-dependent guidance, 442–43 Summary of Economic Projections, 440–42 time-dependent guidance, 442–43 central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), xi, 23–29, 52 digital Chinese yuan, 28 digital US dollar, 28 ensuring uniformity and singleness of money, 24–25 establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time–inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36		_
419–21, 440, 444 Evans rule, 442–43 FOMC, 440–45 state-dependent guidance, 442–43 Summary of Economic Projections, 440–42 time-dependent guidance, 442–43 central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), xi, 23–29, 52 digital Chinese yuan, 28 digital US dollar, 28 ensuring uniformity and singleness of money, 24–25 establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountablity, 146–49 acute institutional anomic, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 features and factors crucial for success, 1		
Evans rule, 442–43 FOMC, 440–45 state-dependent guidance, 442–43 Summary of Economic Projections, 440–42 central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), xi, 23–29, 52 digital Chinese yuan, 28 digital money, defined, 23 digital US dollar, 28 ensuring uniformity and singleness of money, 24–25 establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sowereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 11918 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–69 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36		
FOMC, 440–45 state-dependent guidance, 442–43 Summary of Economic Projections, 440–42 time-dependent guidance, 442–43 central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), xi, 23–29, 52 digital Chinese yuan, 28 digital US dollar, 28 ensuring uniformity and singleness of money, 24–25 establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rene extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledget, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 sank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 1466 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governanee, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36		**
state-dependent guidance, 442–43 Summary of Economic Projections, 440–42 time-dependent guidance, 442–43 central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), xi, 23–29, 52 digital Chinese yuan, 28 digital Money, defined, 23 digital US dollar, 28 ensuring uniformity and singleness of money, 24–25 establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36		
Summary of Economic Projections, 440–42 time-dependent guidance, 442–43 central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), xi, 23–29, 52 digital Chinese yuan, 28 digital money, defined, 23 digital US dollar, 28 ensuring uniformity and singleness of money, 24–25 establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36		
time-dependent guidance, 442–43 central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), xi, 23–29, 52 digital Chinese yuan, 28 digital US dollar, 28 ensuring uniformity and singleness of money, 24–25 establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36		
time-dependent guidance, 442–43 central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), xi, 23–29, 52 digital Chinese yuan, 28 digital Us dollar, 28 ensuring uniformity and singleness of money, 24–25 establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36		
central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), xi, 23–29, 52 digital Chinese yuan, 28 digital money, defined, 23 digital US dollar, 28 ensuring uniformity and singleness of money, 24–25 establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36	time-dependent guidance, 442-43	* '
23–29, 52 digital Chinese yuan, 28 digital US dollar, 28 ensuring uniformity and singleness of money, 24–25 establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–69 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36		
digital Chinese yuan, 28 digital money, defined, 23 digital US dollar, 28 ensuring uniformity and singleness of money, 24–25 establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36	, v	
digital US dollar, 28 ensuring uniformity and singleness of money, 24–25 establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 stagflation, 66 China, xii, 135–34, 139–40, 140f, 142–43, 153, 157, 197n4 Ecuador's sale of forward oil contracts to, 82 interest rate liberalization reform, 139 liquidity facility instruments, 137, 138t, 139f Loan Prime Rate, 139–41, 141f objectives of, 135 onshore and offishore renminbi markets, 137, 141–42, 142f, 143, 143f open market operations, 136–37 policy banks, 144n2 private platforms, 26, 28 regulatory agency, 157 reserve requirement ratio, 135–36, 136f technological decoupling with, xx transmission mechanism of, 140, 140f Xi's efforts to restore to pre-colonial state, xviii–xix, xxi youth unemployment, xxi China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), 157 China Development Bank, 144n2 Clarida, Richard H., 336–37, 360n12 Clayton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi–xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131 foutput during	digital Chinese yuan, 28	
digital US dollar, 28 ensuring uniformity and singleness of money, 24–25 establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 China, xii, 135–44 central bank, 135–37, 139–40, 140f, 142–43, 153, 157, 197n4 Ecuador's sale of forward oil contracts to, 82 interest rate liberalization reform, 139 liquidity facility instruments, 137, 138t, 139f Loan Prime Rate, 139–41, 141f objectives of, 135 onshore and offshore renminbi markets, 137, 141–42, 142f, 143, 143f open market operations, 136–37 policy banks, 144n2 private platforms, 26, 28 regulatory agency, 157 reserve requirement ratio, 135–36, 136f technological decoupling with, xx transmission mechanism of, 140, 140f Xi's efforts to restore to pre-colonial state, xviii–xix, xxi youth unemployment, xxi China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), 157 China Development Bank, 144n2 Clarida, Richard H., 336–37, 360n12 Claryton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi—xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output d		
ensuring uniformity and singleness of money, 24–25 establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 central bank, 135–37, 139–40, 140f, 142–43, 153, 157, 197n4 Ecuador's sale of forward oil contracts to, 82 interest rate liberalization reform, 139 liquidity facility instruments, 137, 138t, 139f Loan Prime Rate, 139–41, 141f objectives of, 135 onshore and offshore renminbi markets, 137, 141–42, 142f, 143, 143f open market operations, 136–37 policy banks, 144n2 private platforms, 26, 28 regulatory agency, 157 reserve requirement ratio, 135–36, 136f technological decoupling with, xx transmission mechanism of, 140, 140f Xi's efforts to restore to pre-colonial state, xviii–xix, xxi youth unemployment, xxi China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), 157 China Development Bank, 144n2 Clarida, Richard H., 136–37, 360n12 Clayton, Jay, 253 n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi—xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		China, xii, 135-44
establishing a European payment system, 27 interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36		
interconnected smart digital currencies, 28 reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 features and factors crucial for success, 126 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36	money, 24–25	142–43, 153, 157, 197n4
reducing private seignorage and rent extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 liquidity facility instruments, 137, 138t, 139f Loan Prime Rate, 139–41, 141f objectives of, 135 onshore and offshore renminibi markets, 137, 141–42, 142f, 143, 143f open market operations, 136–37 policy banks, 144n2 private platforms, 26, 28 regulatory agency, 157 reserve requirement ratio, 135–36, 136f technological decoupling with, xx transmission mechanism of, 140, 140f Xi's efforts to restore to pre-colonial state, xviii–xix, xxi youth unemployment, xxi China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), 157 China Development Bank, 144n2 Clarida, Richard H., 336–37, 360n12 Clayton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi–xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 137 toan Prime Rate, 139–41, 141f objectives of, 135 onshore and offshore renminib markets, 137, 141–42, 142f, 143, 143f open market operations, 136–37 policy banks, 144n2 Transmission mechanism of, 140, 140f Xi's efforts to restore to pre-colonial state, xviii–xi, xxi youth unemployment, xxi China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Clarid		Ecuador's sale of forward oil contracts to, 82
extraction, 25–26 securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36	interconnected smart digital currencies, 28	interest rate liberalization reform, 139
securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27 setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36	reducing private seignorage and rent	liquidity facility instruments, 137,
setting a privacy standard, 27–28 views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 objectives of, 135 onshore and offshore renminbi markets, 137, 141–42, 142f, 143, 143f open market operations, 136–37 policy banks, 144n2 private platforms, 26, 28 regulatory agency, 157 reserve requirement ratio, 135–36, 136f technological decoupling with, xx transmission mechanism of, 140, 140f Xi's efforts to restore to pre-colonial state, xviii–xix, xxi youth unemployment, xxi China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), 157 China Development Bank, 144n2 Clarida, Richard H., 336–37, 360n12 Clayton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi–xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization	extraction, 25–26	138t, 139f
views on control of ledger, 23–24 central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governace, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 onshore and offshore renminbi markets, 137, 141–42, 142f, 143, 143f open market operations, 136–37 policy banks, 144n2 private platforms, 26, 28 regulatory agency, 157 reserve requirement ratio, 135–36, 136f technological decoupling with, xx transmission mechanism of, 140, 140f Xi's efforts to restore to pre-colonial state, xviii–xix, xxi youth unemployment, xxi China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), 157 China Development Bank, 144n2 Clarida, Richard H., 336–37, 360n12 Clayton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi–xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization	securing monetary sovereignty, 26–27	Loan Prime Rate, 139–41, 141f
central bank independence (CBI), 187–200 accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 137, 141–42, 142f, 143, 143f open market operations, 136–37 policy banks, 144n2 requlatory agency, 157 reserve requirement ratio, 135–36, 136f technological decoupling with, xx transmission mechanism of, 140, 140f Xi's efforts to restore to pre-colonial state, xviii–xix, xxi youth unemployment, xxi China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), 157 China Development Bank, 144n2 Clarida, Richard H., 336–37, 360n12 Clayton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi–xxxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		
accountability, 146–49 acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 open market operations, 136–37 policy banks, 144n2 requlatory agency, 157 reserve requirement ratio, 135–36, 136f technological decoupling with, xx transmission mechanism of, 140, 140f Xi's efforts to restore to pre-colonial state, xviii–xix, xxi youth unemployment, xxi China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), 157 China Development Bank, 144n2 Clarida, Richard H., 336–37, 360n12 Clayton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi–xxxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		
acute institutional anomie, 69 Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36		
Argentina, 70–71, 97, 102–4, 119n8 bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 private platforms, 26, 28 regulatory agency, 157 reserve requirement ratio, 135–36, 136f technological decoupling with, xx transmission mechanism of, 140, 140f Xi's efforts to restore to pre-colonial state, xviii–xix, xxi youth unemployment, xxi China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), 157 China Development Bank, 144n2 Clarida, Richard H., 336–37, 360n12 Clayton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi–xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		* *
bank regulations, 146–49 bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 regulatory agency, 157 reserve requirement ratio, 135–36, 136f technological decoupling with, xx transmission mechanism of, 140, 140f Xi's efforts to restore to pre-colonial state, xviii–xix, xxi youth unemployment, xxi China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), 157 China Development Bank, 144n2 Clarida, Richard H., 376–37, 360n12 Clayton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi–xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		
bank supervision, 159–60 China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 reserve requirement ratio, 135–36, 136f technological decoupling with, xx transmission mechanism of, 140, 140f Xi's efforts to restore to pre-colonial state, xviii–xix, xxi youth unemployment, xxi China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), 157 China Development Bank, 144n2 Clarida, Richard H., 336–37, 360n12 Clayton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi-xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		
China, 197n4 commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 technological decoupling with, xx transmission mechanism of, 140, 140f Xi's efforts to restore to pre-colonial state, xviii–xix, xxi youth unemployment, xxi China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), 157 China Development Bank, 144n2 Clarida, Richard H., 336–37, 360n12 Clayton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi-xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		
commitment devices, 74, 75t comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 transmission mechanism of, 140, 140f Xi's efforts to restore to pre-colonial state, xviii–xix, xxi youth unemployment, xxi China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), 157 China Development Bank, 144n2 Clarida, Richard H., 336–37, 360n12 Clayton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi youth unemployment, xxi Claina Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), 157 China Development Bank, 144n2 Clarida, Richard H., 336–37, 360n12 Clayton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		
comparative measures of, 71t constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success,		
constraining reliance on discretion, 315 emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success,		
emerging economies, xii, 145–49 features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 youth unemployment, xxi China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), 157 China Development Bank, 144n2 Clarida, Richard H., 336–37, 360n12 Clayton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi–xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		
features and factors crucial for success, 146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), 157 China Development Bank, 144n2 Clarida, Richard H., 336–37, 360n12 Clayton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi–xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		
146–49 Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 China Development Bank, 144n2 Clarida, Richard H., 336–37, 360n12 Clayton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi–xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		
Fed supervision versus, 189–93 fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 Clarida, Richard H., 336–37, 360n12 Clayton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi–xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		
fiscal policies, 146 from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 Clarida, Richard H., 336–37, 360n12 Clayton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi–xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		
from government versus from banking system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 Clayton, Jay, 253n18 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi-xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		
system, 152 IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 Cochrane, John H., 17–21, 39, 158–59, 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi-xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		
IMF's view on, 145–46 index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 183–84, 227, 229, 235, 251n9, 295, 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi–xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		
index of, 88t price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 304–9, 411, 415, 417, 439, 456–57 Cold War, xvii, xxi–xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		
price stability, 449 response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 Cold War, xvii, xxi–xxii, 36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		
response to pandemic, 145–46 strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 Colombia annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization	price stability, 449	
strong governance, 146–47 time-inconsistency disease, 63 transparency, 146–49 US law and, 187–96 Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 annual inflation, 125f deviation from inflation targets, 128f inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f output during inflation-stabilization		Colombia
transparency, 146–49 inflation rate minus monetary policy US law and, 187–96 rate, 131f Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 output during inflation-stabilization		annual inflation, 125f
US law and, 187–96 rate, 131f Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 output during inflation-stabilization	time-inconsistency disease, 63	deviation from inflation targets, 128f
Chang, Roberto, 82, 121n36 output during inflation-stabilization	transparency, 146–49	inflation rate minus monetary policy
	US law and, 187-96	rate, 131f
Chari, Anusha, 151 episodes, 132f		
	Chari, Anusha, 151	episodes, 132f

Colombia (continued)	Cukierman, Alan, 77, 79, 103, 119n8, 414
pandemic-era monthly inflation, 10,	Cuomo, Andrew, 390
10f, 130f	currency boards, 67, 75t, 76, 78–79, 82, 86,
real effective exchange rate, 435f Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of	88–89, 94, 98–102, 155 Czech Republic
1977, 251n9	energy dependence, 433
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 34, 286,	interest rate hike compared to US, 427f
475–76	real effective exchange rate, 435f
consensus statement ("Statement on Longer-	rour orrective externange rate, 1831
Run Goals and Monetary Policy	Darwin, Charles, 72
Strategy"), 327-28, 330-31, 343, 347,	"dash for cash" episode, 216, 224n30
351, 360n13, 369, 372, 449, 455	Davis, Steven J., xiii, 56-57, 183-84, 262-77,
Consumer Price Index (CPI), 33f, 264,	296-302, 413-14
273, 273f, 275f, 332, 347, 359n4, 461,	debt-to-assets ratio, 166f, 175f
471–72, 472f, 474, 479f, 487n10	Della Paolera, Gerardo, 91–92, 94, 99
Conti-Brown, Peter, 194	Democratic Republic of the Congo, 66
convertibility of money	Denmark
Argentina, 62, 64–65, 75–76, 85, 88–101,	interest rate hike compared to US, 427f
102t, 103–4, 119n17, 120n23, 120n25,	real effective exchange rate, 435f
121n35, 155–77	deposit insurance
central bank digital currencies, 24–25	CAMELS ratings, 171
Cooper, Russell W., 82	ensuring uniformity and singleness of
Copeland, Adam, 179	money, 25
Corrales, Javier, 94, 120n25 Correa, Rafael, 64, 67, 81–82, 85, 87, 102	government management of bank risk taking, 241
cost-push perspective, 477, 480–82	remedying blurred fiscal-monetary bound-
COVID-19 pandemic	ary in Europe, 21
applying theory and practice during, 450–51	deposit market power, 26
common debt issuance, 51	DeSantis, Ron, 390
credibility and sacrifice ratio, 369-70	Diamond-Dybvig model, 169
credit ratings for government debt, 55	Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP)
currency weakening, 434	model, 284, 301
effects of and response to, 14-15, 145-46,	"Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice"
159, 181, 307, 328, 350, 360n14,	(Taylor), 4, 448
363–67, 372–73, 384–85, 392, 433	disinflation, 31–37, 151, 159, 478, 480–82
ignorance and uncertainty, 378,	Europe, xi–xii, 31–37
390–91, 408n16	Greenspan-era (1990s), 312
inflation, 10, 10f, 14–15, 129–30, 130f, 288–91, 382, 450	inflation gap and unemployment gap, 34, 35f
market-based expectations of interest rates	lag between rate hikes and decrease in
and inflation, 41, 42f	inflation, 31
policy error, 312–15, 314f, 364–65	pandemic-era (2022–2023), 31, 32f–33f,
quantitative easing, 394, 396	263–64, 274, 276, 363, 367, 369
shift away from rules-based policy, 2	small open economies, 428
small open economies, 433–35, 461	Volcker-era (1980s), 31, 33f, 34, 35f, 312, 370, 471
CPI. See Consumer Price Index CRA (Community Reinvestment Act) of	DMP (Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides)
1977, 251n9	model, 284, 301
Crandall, Lou, 229	Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 193–94, 196, 243,
credit cards, 27, 29	245, 331
credit ratings for government debt, 55–56	dollarization
Crowe, Chris, 460	acute institutional anomie, 65, 68-72, 74,
Crump, Richard K., 286	76, 84
cryptocurrencies, 24, 86	Argentina, xii, 61–105

Central American countries, 62, 79	pandemic-era monthly inflation, 130f
commitment level, 77-79, 82	populism, 84
currency boards versus, 78-79, 86	provincial quasi-money, 81-82
de jure versus de facto, 118n2	reversal of dollarization, 102-5
debate over, 63, 77-83	shocks, 84
design and implementation of, 64	time-inconsistency disease, 67
Dominican Republic, 79	Edwards, Sebastian, 52, 152-55, 411-12, 417
Ecuador, 62, 64, 67, 77, 79, 81–87, 88t, 102–5, 156	EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission), 240
as effective commitment device, 63–65, 68, 74–77, 82–84, 88–89, 102	effective commitment devices (ECDs) defined, 74
El Salvador, 62, 64, 79, 83, 86–87, 88t, 102	dimensions of, 74–76, 75t
Panama, 65, 79, 88t	dollarization, 63-65, 74-77, 82-83, 89, 91
populism, 65, 68–70, 72–74, 81, 83 reversal of, 84–88, 102, 104, 119nn13–15	expected probability of reversal, 76, 76f gold standard, 75, 75t
stagflation outliers, 65–66, 66f	time-inconsistency disease, 67–68
time-inconsistency disease, 65, 67-68, 70,	effective lower bound (ELB), 327-28,
74, 76, 81, 84	332–36, 339–41, 350–51
Zimbabwe, 67, 79, 84–87, 88t Dominican Republic, 79, 119n13	Eggertsson, Gauti, 360n11, 382 El Salvador
"doom loop," 20, 206, 211–12 Dornbusch, Rudiger, 75, 80, 84, 96, 100	dollarization, 62, 64, 67, 79, 83, 88t, 89, 104
dot plots, 386–91, 421, 441–43, 455, 463	reversal of dollarization, 86-87, 102
changes in fed funds rate versus economic	Employment Cost Index (ECI), 273-75,
variables, 388, 389t–90t	273f, 275f, 279n6
forecast performance of, 386, 387t	energy
lack of coherent reaction function in,	dependence on Russian energy, 433
387-91	Ecuador's sale of forward oil contracts to
market-based expectations of interest rates	China, 82
and inflation, 42f	green energy transition, 399-400
scenario analysis, 387-88	Italian "super-bonus" toward energy-
turbulence versus flight risk, 170f	related home upgrades, 20, 51-52
Draghi, Mario, 19, 39, 54-55, 57, 306, 379	Russia/Ukraine war and, 36-37
Dudley, William C., 250n5	Ennis, Huberto M., 256n29
Duffie, Darrell, xiii, xv, 164, 179–85, 230–33 Duhalde, Eduardo, 95–96, 98, 100	Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 240
Durkheim, Émile, 68	equilibrium mortgage lending, 176-77, 177f
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, 436	EROP (Economic Report of the President) of 1983, 473f
	EROP (Economic Report of the President) of
ECB. See European Central Bank	1987, 473f, 483, 486n2
ECDs. See effective commitment devices ECI (Employment Cost Index), 273–75,	ESM (European Stability Mechanism), 19, 53–55
273f, 275f, 279n6	Estrella, Arturo, 391
"economic man," 248, 260n43	EU. See European Union
Economic Report of the President (EROP) of	Euro, The (Cochrane, Garicano, and
1983, 473f	Masuch), 17
Economic Report of the President (EROP) of	European Central Bank (ECB)
1987, 473f, 483, 486n2 Ecuador	bank supervision, 159
annual inflation, 125f	blurring of fiscal-monetary boundary, 17–20
deviation from inflation targets, 127, 128f dollarization, 62, 64, 67, 77, 79, 81–87,	central bank independence, 188–89, 193
88t, 156	climate- or sustainability-related
300, 130	goals, 192

European Central Bank (continued) communication, 413, 441 credit ratings for government debt, 55–56 digital euro, 23, 52 European Stability Mechanism, 53–55 inflation targets and preservation of the euro, 39, 48 lack of policy for defaulting economies, 18 lender-of-last-resort policy, 26 liftoff (summer 2022), 46, 48 monetary policy strategy reviews, 304 need for fiscal institution, 21 price-stability mandate, 39–40, 46 reducing balance sheet, 21 response to four major crises, 17, 20 sovereign debt crisis, 18–20, 40 sustainability constraints, 56–57	federal funds rate (FFR), 2–8, 6f–7f, 136, 264, 304–5, 384, 398 changes in, versus economic variables, 388, 389t–90t CPI inflation and, 33f effective federal funds rate, 141, 141f ignorance and uncertainty, 381–82 policy error, 312, 314f, 331, 365 second wave of the Great Inflation, 478, 479f–80f, 487n10 strategic framework, 346–48, 353–54, 359n7, 361n19 Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), 2–4, 179–81, 318–20, 353–54, 365–67, 383–91, 411, 414, 440–45, 449–50, 455, 463–64, 489, 491 balance sheet reduction, 179–81
Transmission Protection Instrument,	central bank communication, 383–86,
54–55 European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 19, 53–55	440–45 clarification and improvement of SEPs, 353–54, 361n19
European Union (EU) blurring of fiscal-monetary boundary,	dot plots, 387t, 388, 389t, 390–91, 441 lack of diversity of thought, 347
17–20	simple rules, 318–20
central bank independence, 188 completing the banking union, 21	slowing down reduction of balance sheet, 179–85
lack of policy for defaulting economies,	strategic reviews, 311, 318-20, 323
18	Federal Reserve (Fed)
LDI strategies, 206 monetary union without a fiscal union, 15, 17–18, 51–52 need for fiscal institution, 21 response to four major crises, 17	asset purchases, 323, 331, 347–50, 382, 392 balance sheet, 179–85, 180f, 182f, 323, 329, 331, 335, 341, 347, 349–50, 354, 393, 395 Bluebook/Tealbook, 312, 318–20, 323, 443 communication, xiv–xv, 345–47, 375–401,
Russia-Ukraine war, 36	412–13, 415, 419–20
sovereign debt crisis, 18–20	consensus statement, 327, 330–31, 342,
Evans, Michael, 473–74 Evans rule, 442–43	360n13, 369, 372 constraining reliance on discretion,
exchange rates	315–17, 347
dollarization, 63–64, 74, 77, 80, 83–84, 99, 101, 103, 119n13, 120n27 provincial quasi-money, 82 small open economies, 425, 434–37, 435f strategic reviews, 411–12, 417–18 TID and AIA, 84	contingency planning, 306–7 credibility, 369–71 dot plots, 385–91, 421 dual mandate, 262, 316–17, 328, 330, 350–51 enhancing resilience with, 311–24 evolution of policy during GFC recovery,
exclusion power, 25–26	330–34
Export-Import Bank of China, 144n2	excessive fears of low inflation and falling
FAIT policy. See flexible average inflation targeting policy Fauci, Anthony, 390 Faust, Jon, 387	inflationary expectations, 340–41 FAIT policy, 41, 306, 330, 337–39, 342, 346, 348, 351, 364, 368–69, 411, 416 falling behind the curve, 5–8, 14, 326n7, 367, 382, 411
FCA (Financial Conduct Authority),	
	fed funds rate, 33f, 314f, 331, 346–48,
213, 217t Fed. See Federal Reserve	fed funds rate, 33f, 314f, 331, 346–48, 354, 359n7, 361n19, 364, 381–82, 388, 389t–90t, 398

"Fed listens" seminars, 334 forward guidance, 304–7, 312, 323, 330, 333–34, 336–37, 340, 343–49, 352–53, 359–6, 390, 392, 84, 391, 92, 408–10	threshold-triggered discretionary redemption gates and fees, 245 transparency, 376–77, 385, 387, 390–91,
359n6, 380, 382–84, 391–92, 408n19,	406n1, 421
415–16, 418–19, 442, 461	Federal Reserve Act, 188, 194, 196, 197n8
higher neutral rate, 398–401, 399f	Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 271, 273
ignorance and uncertainty, 308–9, 378–71, 417	Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 336, 439 Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 346–47
independent supervision of, xiii,	Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 337
187–96, 199n33	Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 4, 346
inflation targeting, 311, 316–17, 327–28,	Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
332, 335, 349, 351, 360n8, 366, 368–69,	320, 323
371–72, 376–77, 380–81, 406n2, 407n6,	Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 475
411–12, 414–16, 420–21	Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 5, 7,
lender-of-last-resort policy, 372–73	489–90
limitations and flaws in, 308, 339–46	Federal Reserve Board (FRB), 2, 190, 381
maximum-employment mandate, 338–39,	FFR. See federal funds rate
342–43, 360n11, 365–68	Filardo, Andrew, 413, 430–31
Monetary Policy Reports, 2–3, 5, 7, 352,	Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), 213, 217t
462–63	Financial Policy Committee (FPC), 201–3,
need for reboot of strategic approach to	212–13, 216–20, 217t, 225n46, 234
monetary policy (CHAPTER 18), xiv, 327–55	financial regulation independent Fed supervision, xiii, 187–200
need for review of inflation process and	liquidity rules, xiii, 179–85
dynamics, 349–50	simplifying, xii–xiii, 165–78
New Strategic Framework, 304–5, 327–29,	UK's LDI crisis, xiii, 201–35
337–55	financial repression, 27, 29
offsetting "misses," 334–36	Financial Services Act of 2012, 225n46
policy and framework, xiv, 363-73	Financial Stability Board (FSB), 201,
policy error, 312-15, 364-65	246–47, 258n36
precommitments, 376–77, 380, 382–85,	Financial Stability Oversight Council
387, 393–95, 407n5, 407nn7–8,	(FSOC), 243, 245–47, 253n19, 254n20,
407n10	257n33, 257n35, 258n36
preemptive tightening, 328, 330, 339,	Finland, xxii
343–45, 364–65, 367–68, 418	fintech, 24
press conferences, 396–98, 397f	first difference rule, 3t, 320, 321f–22f
public-private partnership, 24	First Republic Bank, 167
quantitative easing, 392–96	Fischer, Stanley, 77–78
rules-based policy, 2–8, 352 sacrifice ratio, 369–70	flexible average inflation targeting (FAIT) policy, 14, 41, 306, 330, 337–39, 342,
sharing of information between bank	346, 348, 351, 364, 368–69, 411, 416
supervision and monetary policy,	flexible view, 287
160–61	flight risk, 168–71, 170f, 174f
shocks, 307–8, 312, 346, 369–70, 378	FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee).
shortfalls, 304, 328, 335, 337, 339, 343,	See Federal Open Market Committee
365, 368, 414, 416, 418	Ford, Alec G., 91–92
simple rules, 311, 317-23, 347	Ford, Gerald R., 473t, 478
strategic reviews, 327–29, 334–37,	forward guidance, 304-7, 312, 323, 330,
363, 413	333-34, 336-37, 340, 343-49, 352-53,
stress testing, 307	359n6, 380, 382–84, 391–92, 408n19,
Summaries of Economic Projection,	415–16, 418–19, 442, 461
319, 323, 330, 332, 340, 345, 347–48,	FPC (Financial Policy Committee), 201–3,
353–55, 359n6, 361n19, 386, 440–42,	212–13, 216–20, 217t, 225n46, 234
444–45, 456, 460, 462–64	France, 18, 20

Frankel, Jeffrey A., 430	Goolsbee, Austan, xv, 1, 424, 439-45, 455-57,
FRB (Federal Reserve Board), 2, 190, 381	459-60, 462-63, 466
Free to Choose (Friedman and Friedman), 483	Gorodnichenko, Yuriy, xi-xii, 31-37,
Friedman, Milton, xvi, 31, 52, 61-62, 77,	263–64, 458
153–54, 190–91, 312, 315, 326nn2–3,	Grandes, Martin, 83
326n5, 333, 468–84, 470f, 489, 492	Great Depression, 73, 92, 341, 372
	Great Financial Crisis (GFC), 17, 51, 67, 84,
Friedman, Rose, 470, 483	
FSB (Financial Stability Board), 201, 246–47,	189, 201, 259n38, 329, 331–32, 340–41,
258n36	346, 349–50, 376, 378, 383, 394, 401, 444
FSOC (Financial Stability Oversight	Great Inflation, second wave of, xvi,
Council), 243, 245–47, 253n19,	469–84, 489
254n20, 257n33, 257n35, 258n36	cost-push perspective, 477, 480–81
	CPI and, 471–72, 472f, 474, 479f
Gale, Douglas, 82	expectations, 472–74
Galí, Jordi, 286	Friedman's prediction of, 474
Garicano, Luis, xi, 17-21, 39, 51-52, 54-56	GDP deflator inflation rate, 471–72,
GDP deflator inflation rate, 313f, 319,	472f–73f
471–72, 472f–73f	key players in, 473t, 478-83
Georgieva, Kristalina, 145–46	lack of professional consensus on policy,
Germany, xix	475–78
breaking debt and deficit rules, 18	panel discussion, 489–92
energy dependence, 433	PCE inflation rate, 471-72, 472f
European Stability Mechanism, 53	professional consensus on inflation and
refugees, 36	stabilization policy, 475–78
sovereign spreads, 47f, 379	real federal funds rate, 478-79,
stimulus packages, 433	480f, 487n10
Ukrainian refugees, 36	responsibility for, 478–83
uniformity of money, 25	tidal year of 1979, 483–84
Gertler, Mark, 426	wage-push perspective, 481-82
GFC. See Great Financial Crisis	Great Recession, 165-66, 171, 372, 444
Ghana, 66f	Greece
Gibson, John, 119n11	possible exit from eurozone, 56-57
gilts and gilt yields, 202-17, 205f, 207f, 209f,	restructuring of debt, 19
214t, 215f, 220, 223n25, 224nn38-39.	reversal of dollarization, 87
See also liability-driven investment crisis	sovereign debt crisis, 56-57
in UK	sovereign spreads, 46, 47f
"glassy citizens," 27–28	uniformity of money, 25
global and emerging markets	Greenspan, Alan, 312, 316-17, 372, 375, 378,
Argentinian dollarization, xii, 61-105	385, 407n3, 414–15, 421, 461
central bank independence, xii, 145-49	Greenwood, Robin, 394
Chinese monetary policy, xii, 135-44	Gruenberg, Martin J., 254n20, 258n37
implications of digital currencies, 52-53	Grundfest, Joseph A., 253n18
Latin American inflation, xii, 123-33, 151	GSIB (global systemically important
global commodity prices, 430, 433	bank), 170
Global Financial Crisis. See Great Financial	Guardians of Finance (Caprio, Barth, and
Crisis	Levine), 158
global systemically important bank	Guha, Krishna, 295–96
(GSIB), 170	Guidotti, Pablo, 83
globalization, xx	Gunn, John, 465–66
gold standard, 75, 75t, 78, 89-93,	Gürkaynak, Refet S., 426
119n17, 152	Gutiérrez, Lucio, 85, 119n12
González, Tobías Martínez. See Martínez	
González, Tobías	Haber, Stephen, 164, 227-31, 233-35
Goodfriend, Marvin, 360n15	Haiti, 65f

Hall, Jonathan, 205	327-28, 330, 332, 335, 337-39, 342,
Hall, Robert E., xiv, 158, 281, 283, 285, 288,	346, 348-49, 351, 360n8, 364, 366,
295, 301–2, 412, 419	368-69, 371-72, 376-77, 380-81,
Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, xv, xx, 461	406n2, 407n6, 411–16, 420–21, 426f,
Hamilton, Alexander, 51	447–51, 456–57, 459, 464
Hammoudeh, Shawkat, 430	constraining discretion and, 315–17
Hanke, Steve, 94	early adoption of, 359n3
Hanson, James, 94	European Central Bank, 39
Hauser, Andrew, 228	FAIT policy, 14, 41, 306, 330, 337–39, 342,
Hayek, Friedrich A., 23–24, 248	346, 348, 351, 364, 368–69, 411, 416
He, Zhiguo, xii, 60, 135–44, 157	Greenspan's comment on, 378
Hedge Fund Working Group (HFWG),	Latin America, 125–29, 128f–29f
253n19, 254n20	unstable/uncertain social-loss function, 381
Henry, Peter Blair, 60, 151–52, 154–61	initial coin offerings (ICOs), 25
Hezbollah, xx	
Hill, Travis, 251n9	INM (inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance) standard, 188, 197n9
Hong Kong, xviii, xx, 141–43, 142f	interest on reserves (IOR), 331, 335, 340, 349
Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate, 143	interest rates. <i>See also</i> Federal Reserve (Fed); federal funds rate
Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 142	
Houston Rockets, xx	2014–2024, 32f
Houthis, xxi	during COVID-19 pandemic, 307, 312, 315
Hubbard, R. Glenn, 250n5	effective lower bound, 327, 333
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 199n33, 199n36	fiscal limitations, 308 gilt market, 210–11
	IS curve, 409f
Hungary interest rate hike compared to US, 427f	negative, 335
real effective exchange rate, 435f	quantitative easing and, 380, 392–94
surrender of monetary sovereignty, 75	real interest rate (1983–2023), 399f
Hutchins Center, 441	small open economies, 426f–28f
Tutchins Center, 441	UK's LDI crisis, 205, 205f
Iceland, 435f	International Monetary Fund (IMF), 18, 75,
ICOs (initial coin offerings), 25	94, 145–49, 156, 190, 198n15, 201, 400
IMF. See International Monetary Fund	Investment-Savings (IS) curve, 400, 409n29
inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance (INM)	IOR (interest on reserves), 331, 335, 340, 349
standard, 188, 197n9	Iran, xix–xxi, 66f
inflation, xiv, 281–91. See also disinflation;	Ireland, Peter, 350
flexible average inflation targeting policy;	Israel
Great Inflation, second wave of; inflation	deviation from inflation targets, 426f
targeting; Latin American inflation;	Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
unemployment and inflation	model, 436
1965–present, 9f	exit strategy from crawling peg, 154
2014–2024, 31, 32f	Hamas attack and war, xv, xx, 461
actual versus expected (1960-2025), 313f	interest rate hike compared to US, 427f
Argentina, 62	real effective exchange rate, 434, 435f
dollarization and, 62-64	stagflation, 66
Fed being behind the curve, 14	Italy
Latin America (2020-2022), 10f	dependence on energy, 433
post-pandemic, 276	formation of government in 2018, 40, 43,
rules-based monetary policy and policy	45f, 46
actions, 5–8	nominal interest rate and sovereign
small open economies and, 426f-28f,	spreads, 47f
430–35	"super-bonus" toward energy-related home
inflation targeting, 7, 14, 39, 41, 81, 125–29,	upgrades, 20, 51–52
159, 218, 281, 285, 306–7, 311, 316–17,	Ivan IV, xviii

Janson, Wesley, 383	hyperinflation, 123-24, 124t
Japan, xix, xxi-xxii, 159, 417	inflation rate minus monetary policy rate,
Jevons, William S., 62	130–31, 131f
Jia, Chengcheng, 383	output during inflation-stabilization
Jiang, Erica Xuewei, 169	episodes, 130–33, 132f
jobless unemployment, 288–90, 289f–91f, 302	pandemic-era inflation, 10f, 129–30, 130f
Johnson, Simon, 194	Latinobarómetro, 71
Jordà, Òscar, 427	Lau, Larry, 153
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 151	Laubach, Thomas, 286
Justo, Juan B., 90	Lawson, W. H., 90
Justo, Juan B., 70	LCR (liquidity coverage ratio), 203,
Kahn, Alfred, 482–83	221n12, 232
Karadi, Peter, 426	
	LDI crisis. See liability-driven investment crisis
Kehoe, Patrick, 296, 299, 411	
Keljo, Lindsey Weber, 256n29	League of Nations, 75, 92
Kempf, Hubert, 82	Lehman Brothers, 372
Kennan, George, xxi	lender-of-last-resort policy, 25–26, 160, 232,
Kiguel, Miguel A., 77	372–73
King, Mervyn, 441	Levin, Andrew T., 198n22, 233, 354, 394–95,
King, Robert, 301, 360n15, 414–15, 490	455–56
King, Thomas B., 286	Levine, Ross, xii, 60, 145–49, 151–53,
Kirchner, Cristina, 71, 85, 153–54	157–58, 160–61
Knightian uncertainty, 378	Levy, Mickey D., xiv, 14, 228, 327–55, 417–18
Kohn, Donald, 360n11, 382, 407n3, 455	liability-driven investment (LDI) crisis,
Kudlyak, Marianna, xiv, 262, 281–92, 295–97,	201–35
301–2	concentration channel and, 210
Kydland, Finn E., 61, 65, 67–68, 70, 91,	cumulative variation margin on net
152, 196n2	repo borrowing and derivatives
	positions, 209f
labor markets, xiv, 262-77	"doom loop," 206, 211–12
disinflation, xiii, 263-64, 276	forced deleveraging and, 208-10
ECI wage-growth distribution, 273-75	gilts and gilt yields, 207f
hybrid working arrangements, 272	interconnections channel and, 210-11
inflation, 268-69, 276	lessons learned from, 219-20
labor force drag, 265f, 266-67, 267f	leverage through repo borrowing or inter-
labor force withdrawal during COVID-19	est rate derivatives, 205, 205f
pandemic, 264–68, 265f	liquidity channel and, 208-10
Phillips curves, 284–88, 291	mini-budget announcement, 204, 206-8
Survey of Working Arrangements and	overview, 201–3
Attitudes, 266, 270	quantitative tightening and, 206-7,
wage-growth pressures and, 269f,	214, 215f
270–75, 279n6	risk and, 204–6
work from home, 263, 269-75	stabilizing intervention, 212–20
Lacker, Jeffrey M., 256n29	liftoff (summer 2022), 40, 46, 323
Lance, Bert, 473t, 475	liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), 203,
lane drifting, 239–49	221n12, 232
large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs), 331, 340	liquidity rules, xiii, 179–85, 232, 243
Latin American inflation, xii, 10, 123–33,	late payments, 183–85
151, 159–60	liquidity crunch, 185f
annual inflation, 124–25, 125f	reducing Fed's balance sheet, 179–83
deviation from inflation targets, 125–28,	Liviatan, Nissan, 77
128f–29f	
four stages, 124–25, 154	local projections approach, 427, 432 López Murphy, Ricardo, 121n31
frequency distribution, 125, 126f–27f	LSAPs (large-scale asset purchases), 331, 340
110quene, ameribation, 123, 1201 2/1	2012 5 (mige searc asset purchases), 551, 540

Lu, Brian L., 394–95	MLF (Medium-term Lending Facility), 137,
Lubik, Thomas A., 436	138t, 139–40, 139f
Lucas, Bob, 230	MMFs (money market funds), 245–47,
Maastricht Treaty, 17–18	254n23, 255n26, 256n27, 257n29, 259n40
Macroeconomic Policy in a World Economy	Monetary and Fiscal History of Latin America,
(Taylor), 448	A (Nicolini and Kehoe), 159
macroprudential regulatory policies, 27,	Monetary Mischief (Friedman), 154
189, 201	Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), 202–3,
Mahoney, Paul G., 253n18	206, 207f, 212, 214t, 217–20
Makarski, Krzysztof, 82–83	monetary sovereignty
Malawi, 66f	central bank digital currencies, 26-27, 52
Malquarti, Michael, 252n11	surrendering of, 75
mark-to-market losses (turbulence), 166-71,	TID and AIA, 76
168f, 170f, 174f, 290–91	money market funds (MMFs), 245-47,
Martínez González, Tobías, 123–34	254n23, 255n26, 256n27,
Masuch, Klaus, xi, 17, 53–54, 57	257n29, 259n40
maximum-employment mandate, 338–39,	Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facil-
342–43, 360n11, 365–68	ity, 255n26
MBS (mortgage-backed securities), 4, 230, 331, 348, 392	Moreno, Lenin, 82 Morley, James, 286
Medium-term Lending Facility (MLF), 137,	mortgage market and lending, 175–78
138t, 139–40, 139f	equilibrium mortgage lending,
Meiselman, David, 52	176–77, 177f
Meltzer, Allan, 78	regulation and, 234
Mendoza, Enrique G., 80	small open economies, 434
Menem, Carlos, 62, 79, 95-96	UK's LDI crisis and, 210-11
Merk, Axel, 227–28	mortgage-backed securities (MBS), 4, 230,
Mester, Loretta, 326n8, 455	331, 348, 392
Mexico	MPC (Monetary Policy Committee), 202–3,
annual inflation, 125f	206, 207f, 212, 214t, 217–20
deviation from inflation targets, 128f	Mr. X Telegram (Kennan), xxi
dollarization model, 81, 119n10	Mundell, Robert, 78–80 "Munder Entury of Managery Policy The"
inflation rate minus monetary policy rate, 131f	"Murky Future of Monetary Policy, The" (Levy and Plosser), 328
interest rate hike compared to US, 427f	Mussolini, Benito, 74
output during inflation-stabilization	ividosomii, Benico, 7 i
episodes, 132f	Nakamura, Emi, xiv, 262, 411, 418, 464, 490
pandemic-era inflation, 10f, 130f	Narain, Namrata, 396
"Tequila Crisis," 79, 95, 97	narrow banking, 120n29
Middle East, xix-xx, 420	NATO, xxii
Milei, Javier, 62	natural growth-targeting rule, 319-20,
Miller, G. William, 473t, 478–83, 490	321f-22f, 323, 326nn5-6
Miller, Stephen Matteo, 251n9	natural rate of unemployment, 284–88
Milton Friedman and Economic Debate	natural/equilibrium real interest rate (r^*) , 5,
in the United States, 1932–1972 (Nelson), 470f	326n4, 371, 379 NBA, xx
Milton Friedman and Economic Debate in the	NBFI (nonbank financial intermediation),
United States, 1973–2006 (Nelson),	202–3, 216, 219, 246
469–70	Nelson, Edward, xvi, 1, 455, 468–84, 489–92
mini-budget announcement, 204,	Nelson, William R., 184, 229, 233, 394–95
206–8, 223n24	net asset value (NAV), 208, 212, 245,
Mishkin, Frederic S., 316, 391	255n24, 256n29
MIT, 155	Netherlands, 206, 435f

New Strategic Framework (NSF), 304-5,	deviation from inflation targets, 128f
327–29, 337–55	output during inflation-stabilization
clarification of dual mandate, 350-51	episodes, 132f
communications, 345–46	pandemic-era monthly inflation, 130f
excessive fears of low inflation and falling	PCE. See Personal Consumption
inflationary expectations, 340–41	Expenditures
FAIT policy, 337–39, 342	Peirce, Hester M., xiii, 1, 238–49, 256n29
flaws in, 339–46	pension funds, 210–11, 216, 222nn15–
forward guidance, 343–45, 352–53	16. See also liability-driven
	•
maximum-employment mandate,	investment crisis
338–39, 342–43	Pensions Regulator, The (TPR), 213
need for review of inflation process and	People's Bank of China (PBC), 135–37,
dynamics, 349–50	139–43, 153, 157, 197n4
performance of, 346–48	Perón, Juan, 71, 73–74, 93, 97, 100,
preemptive tightening, 343–45	120n20, 421
suggestions for research and rebooting, 348–55	Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE), 282f, 285f, 313f, 319–20, 332, 341, 347,
systematic policy rules, 352	359n4, 366, 382, 388, 389t–90t, 457,
New Zealand	471–72, 472f
inflation targeting, 359n3, 447–48	Peru
real effective exchange rate, 435f	annual inflation, 125f
Neyapti, Bilin, 119n8	deviation from inflation targets, 126, 128f
Nguyen, Duc Khuong, 430	hyperinflation, 124t
Nicolini, Juan Pablo, xii, 60, 123–33, 151,	inflation rate minus monetary policy
154–56, 159–60	rate, 131f
Nigeria, 65–66, 66f	interest rate hike compared to US, 427f
9/11, 378, 461	output during inflation-stabilization
Nino, Carlos, 65, 68–70	episodes, 132f
nonbank financial intermediation (NBFI),	pandemic-era inflation, 10f, 130f
202–3, 216, 219, 246	stagflation, 66
Norges Bank, 317	Peter the Great, xviii
Norway	Philippines, xix
deviation from inflation targets, 426f	interest rate hike compared to US, 427f
real effective exchange rate, 435f	real effective exchange rate, 435f
NSF. See New Strategic Framework	Phillips curve, xiv, 34, 284–88, 296, 327–29,
	331, 333–34, 336, 339–40, 342, 344–45,
Ocampo, Emilio, xii, 60-105, 119n11,	349-50, 360n11, 476, 490
154–57	Pitt, Harvey L., 253n18
OMT (Outright Monetary Transactions),	Piwowar, Michael, 256n29
19,53	Pledged Supplementary Lending (PSL), 137,
Ong, Christopher, 375–401	138t, 139, 139f
open market operations (OMO), 136-37	Plosser, Charles I., xiv, 184, 327-55,
open-end funds (OEFs), 247-48,	416–17, 455
258nn36–37, 259n38	plucking model, 365, 368, 412, 418-20
originate and distribute (OTD) model, 176-78	PMI (Purchasing Managers' Index), 429-30,
Orphanides, Athanasios, xiv, 55–56, 311–24,	429f, 432f
350, 415–16, 419, 476	Poland, 427f
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT),	populism, 65, 68–70, 72–74, 81, 83–84,
19,53	104–5, 118n6, 119n11, 157
•	Portugal, 47f
Panama, 65, 79, 87, 88t, 89, 118n3	Powell, Andrew, 83, 94, 102
Papell, David, 411, 417	Powell, Jerome, 2, 7, 190, 328, 336–37,
Paraguay	342–44, 347, 366, 382, 396, 397f, 416
annual inflation, 125f	PPPs (public-private partnerships), 24, 29
,	1 1 1 // / / / /

PRA (Prudential Regulation	Rúa, Fernando de la, 96–98
Authority), 189	Rubin, Robert, 379
precommitments, 376–77, 380, 382–85, 387,	Rumsfeld, Donald, 378
393–95, 407n5, 407nn7–8, 407n10	Russia
preemptive tightening, 328, 330, 339, 343–45,	default, 444
364–65, 367–68, 418	foreign-exchange crisis, 95
Prescott, Edward C., 196n2, 301, 490	Putin's efforts to reestablish empire, xviii
prisoner's dilemma, 386, 408n12	war with Ukraine, xviii, xxi–xxii, 15, 17,
Pristach, Kelsey, 259n40	36–37, 433, 450
Pritchard, Adam, 253n18	war-related risks for Europe, 36–37
Prodan-Boul, Ruxandra, 411 Prodantial Population Authority (PPA) 189	S&I (covings and loan) crisis 153
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), 189	S&L (savings and loan) crisis, 153
PSL (Pledged Supplementary Lending), 137,	Sacher, Andrew, 375–401
138t, 139, 139f	Sack, Brian, 228–29, 426, 491–92
public-private partnerships (PPPs), 24, 29	sacrifice ratio, 369–71
Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI), 429–30,	Salter, Alexander W., 84
429f, 432f	Samuelson, Paul A., 65
Putin, Vladimir, xviii	Sandoval, Santiago, 77
0 1 11 /4 11 1 1 1 1 1	Sangani, Kunal, 396
Quad alliance (Australia, India, Japan, United	Sapienza, Paola, 152, 158
States), xxii	Savanti, Ignacio, 84
quantitative easing (QE), 187, 213–14, 214t,	savings and loan (S&L) crisis, 153
215f, 228, 231, 233, 235, 306, 308, 331,	Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie, 81, 119n10
334–35, 349, 366–67, 372, 377, 380,	Schnabel, Isabel, 441
392–96, 408n19, 409nn22–23	Schorfheide, Frank, 436
quantitative tightening (QT), 206–7,	Schultze, Charles, 473t, 475–76, 481
214, 215f	Schwarcz, Daniel, 254n23
Qureshi, Hammad, 259n38	Schwartz, Anna, 471, 484
Qvigstad, Jan, 317	Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR),
***	180, 180f
r^* (natural/equilibrium real interest rate), 5,	Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
326n4, 371, 379	Financial Stability Oversight Council,
Raiffeisen Bank, 36	243, 245–47, 253n19, 254n20, 254n23,
Ramey, Valerie, 262, 295–96, 299, 301–2	257n33, 257n35, 258nn36–37
real effective exchange rate (REER),	lane drifting, 239–49
435, 435f	mission to protect investors, 242
Recourse Rule, 251n9	rules for private fund advisors,
refugees, 36	243–44, 253n18
Reifschneider, David L., 333, 381	as systemic risk regulator, 243
Reinhart, Carmen M., 80	Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Remes Lenicov, Jorge, 100	Association (SIFMA), 250n5
rent extraction, 24–27	Seila Law vs. CFPB, 194–95
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 447	SEPs. See Summaries of Economic Projection
reserve requirement ratio (RRR),	Seru, Amit, xii–xiii, 160, 164–78, 230–31
135–36, 136f	shadow banks, 175–78, 175f, 177f, 246
Rhodes, Sybil, 71	Shultz, George, 492
Rice, Condoleezza, xi, xvii–xxii, 1	SIFMA (Securities Industry and Financial
Rivlin, Alice M., 473t, 475, 478	Markets Association), 250n5
Rockoff, Hugh, 152	Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), 87, 167-70,
Romelli, Davide, 70	168f–70f, 174, 174f, 203–4, 219,
Romero, Pedro P., 77	221n10, 221n12, 308
Roosevelt, Theodore, 376	Silver, Adam, xx
RRR (reserve requirement ratio),	Simons, Henry C., 241, 249, 252n10
135–36, 136f	Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), 19

singleness of money, 24–25 Skinner, Christina Parajon, xiii, 164, 187–96, 230, 233–34	stress testing, 189, 201–2, 211, 218–19, 232, 307, 331, 443 Sudan, 66, 66f
SLF (Standing Lending Facility), 137, 138t, 139–40, 139f	Summaries of Economic Projection (SEPs), 319, 323, 326, 330, 332, 340, 345,
small open economies (SOEs), 425–37 COVID-19 pandemic, 433–35	347–48, 353–55, 359n6, 361n19, 386, 440–42, 444–46, 460, 462–64
exchange rate dynamics, 434 expansionary fiscal policies, 433–34	Summers, Lawrence H., xiv–xv, 14, 309, 375–401, 412–14, 419, 444
global commodity prices, 430	Suriname, 66f
global PMI, 429–30, 429f interest rates and inflation, 426f–28f,	Survey of Business Uncertainty, 271, 298 Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF),
430–35, 432f	320, 326n6
local projections approach, 427	Survey of Working Arrangements and
mortgage market structure, 434	Attitudes (SWAA), 266, 270, 270f
real effective exchange rate, 435f	sustainability constraints, 39–48
synchronization and divergence in policy	defined, 39
response, 425–28	expectation data, 40, 49n3
Taylor rule, 435–37	expected interest rate and sovereign
weakening global demand, 428–30	spreads, 46, 47f
Smets, Frank, 286	Italian governmental crisis (2018), 40, 43,
SOFR (Secured Overnight Financing Rate), 180, 180f	45f, 46 liftoff (summer 2022), 40, 46
Sousa, Ricardo M., 430	market-based expectations of interest rates
South Africa, 434	and inflation, 41, 42f, 43, 44f
South Korea, xix	price-stability mandate interaction, 39–40
deviation from inflation targets, 426f	self-imposed by European Central Bank,
interest rate hike compared to US, 427f	56–57
Korea discount, 36, 37n1	shocks, 40-41, 43, 45f, 46
real effective exchange rate, 435f	SVB. See Silicon Valley Bank
sovereign debt crisis, 17–21, 24–25, 55–57	SWAA (Survey of Working Arrangements
Soviet Union, xvii–xviii, xix, xxi–xxii	and Attitudes), 266, 270, 270f
Spain " C " C	Swanson, Eric T., 426
"counter-reform" of pension system, 20	Sweden, xxii
nominal interest rate and sovereign spreads, 47f	deviation from inflation targets, 426f inflation and interest rates 2014–2024, 32f
SPF (Survey of Professional Forecasters),	inflation targeting, 359n3
320, 326n6	interest rate hike compared to US, 427f
Spindler, James S., 253n18	real effective exchange rate, 435f
SSM (Single Supervisory Mechanism), 19	stimulus, 433
stablecoins, 24, 28	SWES (system-wide exploratory scenario),
Stackhouse, Julie L., 252n14	211, 219, 223n29
Standing Lending Facility (SLF), 137, 138t,	Switzerland, 92, 409n24, 434
139–40, 139f	central bank independence, 71
state-chartered banks, 173–75, 174f	deviation from inflation targets, 426f
"Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy." See consen-	interest rate hike compared to US, 427f real effective exchange rate, 434, 435f
sus statement	sovereign money referendum, 24
Stebbins, Robert B., 253n18	systemic risk designation, 243, 260n42
Steinsson, Jón, xiv, 306, 363–73, 411–12, 415,	system-wide exploratory scenario (SWES),
417–19	211, 219, 223n29
sticky-and-low view, 287-88	
Stoner Cats web series, 240	Taiwan, xviii, xxi
Streb, Jorge M., 71, 118	taper tantrum, 409n22

Targeted Medium-term Lending Facility	unemployment and inflation, 281-91
(TMLF), 137, 138t, 139, 139f	1967–2024, 289f
Taylor, Alan, 91-92, 94, 99	2000–2024, 282f
Taylor, John B., xi, xvii, 1–11, 235, 238, 304,	aggregate rate of unemployment,
309, 352, 424, 435, 447–48, 455–56,	1970–1979, 477f
459, 461, 464–66, 468	Carter's view of, 481–82
Taylor principle, 312	CBO measure of, 286
Taylor rule, 2–8, 3t, 130–31, 304, 309, 347,	Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides
388, 413–15, 441, 455	model, 284
	Friedman's view of, 481
adjusted, 3t	
birth of, 4	jobless unemployment, 288–90, 289f–90f
effect on monetary policy, 4–5	natural rate of unemployment, 284–88
federal funds rate policy and, 5–8, 7f–8f	during pandemic cycle, 282, 288
post-pandemic reinstitution of, 2	panel discussion, 295–302
simple version of, 6f, 41	Phillips curves, 284–88, 291
small open economies, 435–37	during recoveries, 281–84, 283f
Tealbook variant of, 319–20, 321f–22f,	temporary-layoff unemployment, 282,
323, 326nn5–6	288–90, 289f–90f
temporary-layoff unemployment, 282,	vacancy-jobless unemployment ratio, 291f
288–90, 289f–90f, 295–96	uniformity of money, 24–25
"Tequila Crisis," 79, 95, 97	uninsured leverage, 167–70, 169f, 174f
theory and practice, connecting, 447–51	United Kingdom (UK). See also liability-
COVID-19 pandemic, 450–51	driven investment crisis
future, 451	bank supervision, 158, 188
lessons learned from, 449-50	Brexit, 14
past, 448–50	central bank independence, 70t, 186–88
present, 450–51	deviation from inflation targets, 425f
Thornton, Matt, 259n38	gold standard, 90
time-dependent guidance, 305, 442-43	indexation, 491
time-inconsistency disease (TID), 65, 67-69,	inflation and interest rates
81, 84, 196n2	(2014–2024), 31f
Argentina, 70, 74, 76, 78, 89	inflation targeting, 358n3
central bank independence, 63	interest rate hike compared to US, 426f
Ecuador, 67	mini-budget announcement, 204, 206-8,
TMLF (Targeted Medium-term Lending	223n24
Facility), 137, 138t, 139, 139f	pension crisis, 307
Tobin, James, 476	quantitative easing, 234
TPR (Pensions Regulator, The), 213	real effective exchange rate, 434f
Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI),	reporting mandate rollback, 390
19–20, 46, 48, 53–55	University of Michigan, 34, 346, 359n5,
Trujillo, Rafael, 119n13	361n16
Trump, Donald, 384, 390	Uribe, Martín, 81, 119n10
Tucker, Paul, 69	Uruguay, 68–72
turbulence (mark-to-market losses),	acute institutional anomie, 72t
166–71, 168f, 170f, 174f,	annual inflation, 125f
290–91	deviation from inflation targets, 126, 128f
Turkey	output during inflation-stabilization
pandemic-era inflation, 145	episodes, 132f
stagflation, 66	pandemic-era monthly inflation, 130f
	stagflation, 66
UK. See liability-driven investment crisis;	Uyeda, Mark T., 240, 250n6, 252n12
United Kingdom	- , ,
Ukraine, xviii, xxi–xxii, 15, 17, 36–37, 433,	VCS (vice chair for supervision), 193-96
450	Végh, Carlos, 152

Woodford, Michael, 333–34 work from home (WFH), 263–64, 269–75, 297–301 2019–2024, 270f shift to, 269–71
297–301 2019–2024, 270f
2019–2024, 270f
shift to 269-71
511111 10, 207 71
wage-growth pressures and, 271-75
World Bank, 78
Wouters, Rafael, 286
, ,
Xi Jinping, xviii, xxi
Yang, Yilin, 179
Yaron, Amir, xv, 1, 158–60, 307, 424–37, 459,
461–62, 464
Yellen, Janet L., 2, 258n37, 382, 397f,
399, 414
Yemen, 66, 66f
yield curve, 211, 377, 391–92, 393f
Yrigoyen, Hipólito, 73
mgoyen, mponto, 73
Zarazaga, Carlos E. J. M., 79, 88, 121n33
Zaring, David, 254n23
zero lower bound (ZLB), 305, 371–72, 376,
381, 398
Zhou Xiaochuan, 153
Zhu Rongji, 153
Zimbabwe
dollarization, 67, 79, 84–87, 88t
stagflation, 65–66, 66f
time-inconsistency disease, 67