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**STARVING (OR FATTENING) THE GOLDEN GOOSE: GENERIC ENTRY AND THE
INCENTIVES FOR EARLY-STAGE PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION**

LEE BRANSTETTER

Carnegie Mellon University, Peterson Institute, & NBER

CHIRANTAN CHATTERJEE

Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore

MATTHEW J. HIGGINS

Georgia Institute of Technology & NBER

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Lee Branstetter

Carnegie Mellon University, Peterson Institute, & NBER

Chirantan Chatterjee

Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore

Matthew J. Higgins

Georgia Institute of Technology & NBER

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Starving (or Fattening) the Golden Goose: Generic Entry and the Incentives for Early-Stage Pharmaceutical Innovation

ABSTRACT

Generic penetration in the U.S. pharmaceutical market has increased, providing significant gains in consumer surplus. What impact has this had on the rate and direction of pharmaceutical innovation? While the overall level of drug development activity has increased, our estimates suggest a sizable, robust, negative relationship between generic penetration and early-stage pharmaceutical innovation. A 10% increase in generic penetration is associated with an approximately 8% *decline* in early-stage innovations in the same therapeutic market. When we restrict our sample to novel innovations, we find that a 10% increase in generic penetration is associated with a roughly 6% *decline* in early-stage innovations in the same market. Our estimated effects appear to vary across therapeutic classes in sensible ways, reflecting the differing degrees of substitution between generics and branded drugs. Finally, we document that with increasing generic penetration, firms are shifting their R&D activity towards more biologic-based products and away from chemical-based products. We conclude by discussing potential implications of our results for long-run welfare, policy, and innovation.

1 Introduction

In his provocative paper, “The Health of Nations,” Yale University economist William Nordhaus (1999) argues that the advances in human welfare generated by better medical science over the past half century have been equal in value to the consumption increases from all other sources put together. Victor Fuchs (1982) has suggested that most of the real improvement in human health generated over this period stems from modern medicine’s expanding arsenal of pharmaceutical products. While documenting these claims in a way that meets modern evidentiary standards is challenging, the work of scholars such as Frank Lichtenberg (*e.g.*, 2001, 2004, 2007) has provided evidence suggesting that the gains from pharmaceutical innovation have been very large. In the long run, global investments in pharmaceutical research have proven to be good ones.

These benefits have come with significant costs; pharmaceutical innovation is risky and expensive. Recent estimates of the cost to develop a new drug and win marketing approval are now approaching \$2.6 billion.¹ These costs are passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices for branded pharmaceuticals. In recent years, prescription drug spending in the U.S. has exceeded \$300 billion, an increase of \$135 billion since 2001. Consumption of prescription drugs now accounts for approximately 12 percent of total health care spending (GAO, 2012). However, over this time period, generic products have accounted for an increasing share of prescription drug expenditures, saving consumers an estimated \$1 trillion (GAO, 2012). Current regulation attempts to strike a balance between access to lower cost generics on the one hand and adequate incentives to promote pharmaceutical innovation on the other. While the rise in generic penetration has brought benefits to consumers (Branstetter *et al.*, 2016), some have argued that the regulatory balance has shifted so far in the direction of access to inexpensive drugs that it has undermined the incentives for new drug development (Higgins and Graham, 2009; Knowles, 2010). Such a shift could have strong implications even for non-U.S. drug companies because the global industry relies disproportionately on the U.S. market as a source of its profits. Has the increase in generic entry affected pharmaceutical innovation? Our study attempts to address this question and quantify, for the first time, the impact of generic entry on early-stage pharmaceutical innovation.

We start by constructing a new dataset that allows us to analyze this issue at a disaggregate level. Instead of relying on patents as measures of innovation, we focus on early-stage drug development. While patenting is certainly important in the pharmaceutical industry, it can occur anytime throughout the drug

¹ Based on the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development’s recent cost study: http://csdd.tufts.edu/news/complete_story/cost_study_press_event_webcast.

development process, and it often occurs long before the actual therapeutic value of a compound has been demonstrated. As a consequence, patent counts can be imperfect indicators of the real innovative success of pharmaceutical firms, in terms of bringing new drugs to market. Our outcome variable, on the other hand, allows us to measure what is actually happening in the early stages of the drug development process. We also utilize comprehensive data on branded and generic drug sales across all therapeutic categories in the U.S. market, obtained at the firm-product-year level, such that we can measure the differential exposure of individual firms to generic competition across these different therapeutic markets.² Finally, we seek to control for changes in scientific opportunity by building a comprehensive database of citation-weighted scientific journal articles in the medical sciences and mapping them to our therapeutic product markets.

Using these data, we find that the *aggregate* level of new drug development has *not* declined as generic penetration in the U.S. market has risen; the total number of new compounds (including both small and large molecules) in early stage development has risen over our sample period (Figure 1). However, rising generic competition has had a statistically and economically significant impact on *how* pharmaceutical product development is undertaken and *where* those efforts are focused. We show this by using an empirical framework that models the flow of early-stage pharmaceutical innovations as a function of generic entry and penetration, as well as scientific opportunity and challenges, firm innovative capability and a vector of additional controls. Using this framework, we document a negative and significant relationship between generic entry (penetration) and early-stage innovation at the ATC 2-digit therapeutic category level. The elasticity from our specification implies that a 10% increase in generic penetration in a particular market will *lower* early-stage innovations, in that same market, by about 8%.

The interpretation that an increase in generic penetration within a market lowers early-stage innovation is strengthened by a series of alternative specifications and robustness checks. First, we demonstrate that a statistically and economically significant negative impact of generic penetration on early-stage innovation remains even when we limit our measure of innovation to activity associated with novel drugs. Second, we show that our estimated effect is strongly negative for early-stage innovation, where it is possible to redirect R&D in response to market shifts, but much weaker for late-stage innovation, where firms have stronger incentives to introduce products that have survived the clinical trials process, even if generic competition is limiting the addressable market. Third, we limit our sample to a set of therapeutic categories where substitution between generics and branded products is limited for

² We use the phrases *therapeutic area*, *therapeutic market*, *therapeutic category* and *markets* interchangeably in this paper. In our empirical work, they correspond to 2-digit categories within the World Health Organization's Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system (http://www.whooc.no/atc/structure_and_principles/).

clinical reasons, and we find that our measured effect attenuates to the point of insignificance, as expected. Finally, we show that our baseline effect is robust to inclusion of therapeutic market-year interaction terms (ATC market*Year) that effectively removes all the unobserved market-specific effects that change in a common way across firms over time.

Next, we consider the possibility that, within therapeutic markets, a *shift* is occurring out of chemical-based (small molecule) products and into biologic-based (large molecule) products. The regulatory mechanisms that have accelerated generic entry in chemical-based drugs did not extend to biologics during our sample period; biologic-based generics (known in the industry as ‘biosimilars’) did not enter the U.S. market until 2015.³ Exploiting this regulatory difference between chemical-and biologic-based innovations, we find a positive relationship between generic entry and a *shift* towards biologic-based products within therapeutic categories. As conjectured by Golec *et al.* (2010), this movement suggests that the *nature* of innovation taking place in the pharmaceutical industry is changing.

Is this shift in the direction and nature of drug development socially beneficial or socially harmful? At this stage in the research process, it is not yet possible to produce a definitive answer to this question. On the one hand, one could argue that current regulation is ‘pushing’ innovation toward therapeutic markets for which significant numbers of viable generics do not exist. In other words, R&D efforts and expenditures could be flowing to therapeutic areas that are relatively underserved, thereby generating welfare gains. On the other hand, our evidence of a significant movement in the data from development of chemical-based to biologic-based products may have important implications for the future, especially since biologics tend to be more expensive, on average, than chemical-based products. These higher prices may persist for long periods of time. As the regulatory playing field tilts sharply in the direction of biologics, and firms respond rationally to the incentives they confront, we cannot rule out the possibility that recent efforts to balance access with incentives for innovation will give us cheaper drugs today, but more expensive drugs tomorrow.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of the U.S. regulatory environment in which pharmaceutical firms operate and a brief description of the rise in generic penetration. Section 3 reviews important features of the drug development process and discusses prior work on the potential impact of rising generic penetration on pharmaceutical innovation. Our empirical

³ The Affordable Care Act created a legal pathway for biosimilars to enter the U.S. market, but it took several years for the FDA to finalize implementing regulations. The first biosimilar (Zarxio) entered the U.S. market in March 2015 (<http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm436648.htm>). Large-molecule drugs will have a much longer period of data exclusivity than small-molecule drugs, and their complexity makes them more difficult to copy even after patents expire. These differences could affect the economic incentives for developing generic versions of biologics, even in the long run.

specification and data are outlined in Section 4. Results are presented in Section 5, and we conclude in Section 6.

2 *The U.S. regulatory environment and the rise of generic penetration*

The current regulatory environment faced by pharmaceutical companies in the U.S. can be traced to the passage of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act in 1984, informally known as the “Hatch-Waxman” Act. One of the hallmarks of this legislation is the balance it tries to strike between access by consumers to inexpensive generic drugs, on the one hand, and the protection of adequate incentives for new drug development on the other. Hatch-Waxman allows expedited Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval for generic entry while extending the life of pharmaceutical patents in order to compensate innovators who lost time on their “patent clocks” waiting for FDA approval (Grabowski, 2007).⁴

When a pharmaceutical company submits a New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA for approval, the law requires the company to identify all relevant patented technologies necessary to create the drug; these patents are subsequently listed in the FDA Orange Book.⁵ Upon approval, the FDA will grant each new approved product regulatory protection lasting for five years (“data exclusivity”) that runs concurrently with patent protection.⁶ During this data exclusivity period, regardless of the status of the underlying patent(s), no generic entry may occur. At the conclusion of data exclusivity only patents protect branded products. This period running from the cessation of data exclusivity to the expiration of the patent(s) is commonly referred to as “market exclusivity.”

Prior to the passage of Hatch-Waxman, generic manufacturers seeking to sell their products in the U.S. market had to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of their products by putting them through clinical trials. While the outcome of these trials lacked the uncertainty involved in the trials of an innovative new drug, the time and expense involved were a significant disincentive for generics manufacturers to put products on the market, since they could not charge a premium price to offset the costs of clinical trials. Before Hatch-Waxman, it is estimated that more than 150 products existed without any patent protection and without any generic entry (Mossinghoff, 1999).⁷ While Hatch-Waxman did not lessen the burden of

⁴ There are limits to this. Pharmaceutical firms cannot receive a patent extension of more than five years, nor are they entitled to patent extensions that give them effective patent life (post approval) of greater than 14 years.

⁵ For biologics the initial application is a Biologics License Application. However, a similar requirement to disclose patents exists, and this disclosure also becomes a matter of public record.

⁶ There are exceptions to the general rule of 5 years of data exclusivity. Drugs targeting small patient populations (*i.e.*, orphan drugs) receive 7 years of data exclusivity. Reformulations of existing drugs receive only 3 years of data exclusivity. New drugs that treat pediatric illnesses receive an additional 6 months of data exclusivity.

⁷ The complexity of biologics, and the likelihood that most “biosimilars” will need to undergo at least limited clinical trials to prove they have the same therapeutic impact as the original drug, raises the concern that

the clinical trials process for branded pharmaceutical companies seeking approval for new drugs, it essentially eliminated the requirement for separate clinical trials for generic manufacturers. All generic manufacturers had to do was demonstrate bioequivalence with branded products by showing that the active ingredient in their product diffused into the human bloodstream in a manner similar to the original product. It is important to emphasize, however, that Hatch-Waxman applies only to chemical-based or small molecule drugs.

Throughout our sample period (1998-2010), there was no legal mechanism (in the U.S. market) through which the manufacturer of a biosimilar demonstrate that its substance was equivalent to the original drug. With no way to establish bioequivalence, any generic version of a biologic-based drug would have to undergo separate clinical trials to receive FDA approval. This historical absence of an entry pathway for biosimilars reflects, in part, the nascent state of the biotech industry when Hatch-Waxman was passed, as well as the real scientific challenges of determining bioequivalence for biologic-based drugs, which are far more complicated than chemistry-based drugs and interact with human biophysical systems in ways that are not always perfectly understood.

Under the Obama Administration, legislation in the form of the Affordable Care Act (2010) provided the legal basis for biosimilar entry, but that legislation guarantees biologic-based drugs 12 years of data exclusivity - a period of legal monopoly 2.4 times longer than that afforded to chemical-based drugs.⁸ In March 2013 the FDA finalized the enabling regulations that would permit biosimilar entry (which did not occur for the first time until March 2015), approximately six years after the first biosimilars were approved in Europe. Generally these regulations require limited clinical trials to confirm bioequivalence and similar clinical effects prior to approval. Additionally, both markets (U.S. and Europe) require post-approval safety monitoring.⁹ The longer European experience with biosimilars suggests that entry will be much less frequent, occur at a later point in the product lifecycle, and offer a much smaller price discount, relative to the innovator drug, than has been the case for generic entry in chemistry-based drug markets.

generic competition in biologics will be limited in the same way that it was for small molecule drugs in the pre-Hatch-Waxman world.

⁸ The section of the Affordable Care Act that details entry provisions for biologics is referred to as the Biologics Products Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA).

⁹ "Guidance for Industry Scientific Considerations in Demonstrating Biosimilarity to a Reference Product." <http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM291128> Accessed 30 November 2015.

While a starkly different statutory treatment of chemical-based and biologic-based drugs has been established in U.S. law since the passage of Hatch-Waxman, the practical impact of these very different regulatory regimes has significantly strengthened in recent years. Generic penetration at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s was constrained by a FDA scandal that temporarily slowed down the processing of new generic drug applications, and by an unusually productive era of new drug introductions by the branded drug companies that extended into the mid-1990s (Berndt *et al.*, 2015).¹⁰ Since then, however, generic penetration has intensified sharply (*e.g.*, Palermo *et al.*, 2015; Higgins and Graham, 2009; Berndt *et al.*, 2007).

3 *Pharmaceutical innovation and generic entry*

We began our paper with the claim advanced by Nordhaus (1999) that the advances in human welfare generated by better medical science over the past half century may equal in value the consumption increases from all other sources put together. Nordhaus's claim is backed up by evidence documenting the extensive gains in longevity and other dimensions of human health over the period; multiplying these gains by even conservative estimates of the value of a "statistical life" result in very large numbers (*e.g.*, Murphy and Topel, 2006). The work of Lichtenberg (2001, 2004, 2007) and others has lent credence to Victor Fuchs' (1982) assertion that the most important driver of this improvement has been pharmaceutical innovation. Efforts to infer the welfare impact of pharmaceutical innovation using modern models of demand for differentiated products, such as Ellickson *et al.* (2001), Cleanthous (2002), and Dunn (2012), have also yielded large estimates. Coincident advances in nutrition, pollution abatement, diagnostic techniques, and the gradual decline of unhealthy behaviors like tobacco smoking make it difficult to determine exactly what fraction of the observed improvement in health outcomes is attributable to new drugs, but few would contest the unique importance and impact of pharmaceutical innovation. This implies that public policies affecting the rate and direction of pharmaceutical innovation also take on special importance.

3.1 *Pharmaceutical innovation: costs and controversies*

¹⁰ The FDA scandal was widely covered in the media at the time; see for example, *New York Times* (1989). Cockburn (2006) discusses shifts in the measured research productivity of the pharmaceutical industry. A large cohort of new and successful branded products entered in the marketplace in the 1980s and 1990s, limiting the market importance of generic competition. As this wave of products lost patent protection, or was challenged under Paragraph IV, and was not fully replaced by newly introduced branded products, the financial pressure generated by generic competition increased.

Pharmaceutical innovation is not just important. It is also difficult, time-consuming, risky, and expensive. A comprehensive accounting of costs has to include expenditures on drug candidates that fail at some point in the process. Recent estimates by DiMasi, Grabowski and Hansen (2014) suggest that these costs have risen to almost \$2.6 billion (\$1.4 billion in out-of-pocket expenses and \$1.2 billion in opportunity costs). These new cost estimates, along with previous estimates generated through a similar methodology (DiMasi and Grabowski, 2012) have been subjected to considerable criticism and controversy. What we can say with certainty, however, is that costs are high and they continue to increase (Berndt *et al*, 2015). Previous studies have described the various stages of the drug development process, including DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski (1991, 2003), DiMasi and Grabowski (2012), and Mossinghoff (1999).

When drug companies have identified compounds they wish to subject to clinical trials in human subjects, they submit an Investigational New Drug (IND) application to the FDA; this is legally required in order to move drug samples across state lines for the purposes of clinical testing. Firms must then move through three separate phases of clinical trials, each involving a larger number of human subjects. In Phase 1, a small group is tested to determine a safe dosage level and identify side effects. In Phase 2, the treatment is administered to a larger group, to determine effectiveness and also further evaluate its safety. In Phase 3, the treatment is administered to a still larger group and compared to commonly used treatments. When Phase 3 is successfully completed, the drug company submits a New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA, including clinical trials results. The FDA evaluates this information before approving the drug. Once it is approved and sales begin, drug companies continue to do Phase 4 trials to acquire additional information on risks, benefits, and optimal use. DiMasi and Grabowski (2012) contend that only one drug obtains FDA approval for every 5 compounds that enter Phase 1, and it can take 6-7 years for a compound to move through all 3 phases. The total development cycle from discovery through approval can take, on average, nearly 12 years, and the distribution of approved drugs is characterized by highly skewed returns. Pharmaceutical firms rely disproportionately on a small number of very successful products to maintain their financial viability.

Starting in the mid-1990s, however, the number of drug approvals fell sharply, even as industry R&D expenditures continued to increase. This led to an intense debate about the industry's research "productivity crisis" (Cockburn, 2006 and Scherer, 2010). The relatively low level of new product approvals persisted throughout our sample period and beyond. Experts disagree as to the causes or future persistence of this productivity slowdown. Nevertheless, it has created a rising level of concern (and

financial stress) within the industry. Accelerating generic competition has been one factor narrowing the profits of branded firms faster than successful new drug development has expanded them.¹¹

3.2 *The rise of generic penetration and implications for pharmaceutical innovation*

A number of recent studies have studied the intensification of generic competition in recent years and the impact of this shift on branded drug companies. We lack the space here to offer a comprehensive review of all the work in this domain, and, instead, cite selectively the work that is most relevant to our own analysis. Caves *et al.* (1991) offered an influential look at the early impact of Hatch-Waxman. More recent work includes Reiffen and Ward (2005), Saha *et al.* (2006), Grabowski (2007), Grabowski and Kyle (2007), and Berndt and Aitken (2011). Efforts to calculate the welfare impact of generic entry include Bokhari and Fournier (2013) and Branstetter *et al.* (2016). The latter study shows that the rising incidence of Paragraph-IV challenges has increased gains to consumers.¹² Hemphill and Sampat (2011, 2012) also focus on Paragraph-IV challenges, analyzing, among other things, which incumbent firms' patents tend to be challenged.

The possibility that rising generic penetration could undermine the incentives to undertake new drug development has been recognized in prior work. For example, Hughes *et al.* (2002) show in a theoretical model that providing greater access to a current stock of branded prescription drugs yields large benefits to existing customers. However, this access comes at a cost in terms of lost consumer benefits from reductions in the flow of future drugs.¹³ Other papers have also discussed this possibility, including Grabowski and Kyle (2007), Higgins and Graham (2009), Knowles (2010), and Panattoni (2011). This research stream has provided (mostly indirect or anecdotal) evidence suggesting that an intensification of generic competition has undermined incentives for R&D. However, to the best of our knowledge, no published study has yet provided direct econometric evidence demonstrating that generic

¹¹ Berndt *et al.* (2015) suggest additional demand side factors have also chipped away at the economic profitability of new drugs. These factors include: downward pressures on price due to consolidation among payers, wholesalers, and PBMs (pharmaceutical benefits management firms); increased experience with cost containment; and increased focus on incremental value in coverage decisions.

¹² Paragraph IV challenges are a mechanism under Hatch-Waxman that allow generic firms to challenge branded patents after data exclusivity has ended but prior to the expiration of patents. Interested readers are directed to FTC (2002), Branstetter *et al.* (2016) or Palermo *et al.* (2015).

¹³ Empirically this trade-off seems to be supported by Goldman *et al.* (2011). They study the impacts of extending small-molecule data exclusivity to twelve years – the same data exclusivity as large-molecule drugs – and found that by doing so they would expect 228 extra drug approvals over the 2020 to 2060 time period.

entry has caused a change in the rate or direction of new drug development.¹⁴ The extent to which this occurs in practice remains an open question.

4 Empirical methodology and data

Previous research in this area has struggled with data limitations. We are fortunate to have access to a range of unique and comprehensive data sets that provide us with a useful degree of leverage over some of the econometric and measurement challenges we confront. Since we seek to measure the impact of rising generic penetration on drug development effort, it is especially important to have high-quality measures of pharmaceutical innovation and of exposure to generic competition. Our data allow us to track both variables by firm (i), therapeutic market (j), and year (t). The disaggregate nature of our data allows us to make a choice in terms of the unit of observation. We could focus on either therapeutic market (j) and year (t) or firm (i), therapeutic market (j) and year (t). We are interested in how *firms* are responding to generic competition, and firms differ significantly from one another in terms of their research capabilities and marketing investments in different therapeutic categories. A firm with strong research capabilities in and heavy financial reliance on a particular drug market may respond to generic competition in that market in a very different way than firms with limited research capacity in that domain and limited economic commitments to it. We want to be able to control for these differences, so we choose to utilize all the dimensions of our data – firm, market, and year.

We depend on the Pharmaprojects classification of drug candidates into the various therapeutic market categories. Unfortunately, this data is most consistently reported only at the 2-digit level. Other key variables are available at a greater level of disaggregation (*i.e.*, ATC 4-digit), but because we are seeking to relate these to innovative effort, we can disaggregate no further than the level of our innovation data. Therefore, in our firm-market-year (ijt) level of analysis, discussed above, our markets will be constrained to the ATC 2-digit level. Finally, firms are included in our sample if they have at least one approved product and at least one early-stage innovation. This limitation excludes some smaller, research-intensive firms that have yet to market their own products.¹⁵ We argue below that the bias introduced by this sample selection, to the extent that it exists, likely weakens our estimated results relative to what holds in reality. The paragraphs below describe our data and our empirical approach.

4.1 Measuring and modeling pharmaceutical innovation

¹⁴ In related work, Budish, Roin, and Williams (2015) provide evidence that variation in effective patent life distorts incentives for investment in cancer drugs. This study does not consider the impact of rising generic competition

¹⁵ Note, the innovation from these research-intensive firms will show up in our data if they have been licensed to one of our sample firms at any time in the development process.

The regulatory structure imposed on the pharmaceutical industry makes early-stage product development relatively easy to track. Because the introduction of new drugs is important for the financial health of drug companies, the progress of new candidate drugs through the development pipeline is closely monitored, and commercial databases contain rich data on these candidates. We draw our measures of drug innovation from one such commercial database, Pharmaprojects. Not only is there nearly universal coverage of all candidate drugs being tested for eventual sale in the U.S. market, but we also know the chemical composition of the drug, the prospective disease targets, the therapeutic market in which it is likely to be sold, and the development history (some drugs are initially developed to fight one disease but then are discovered to have positive effects against others). The database also records information on product development suspensions and discontinuations as well as product withdrawals from the market after introduction.

Attempts to assess the relationship between generic penetration and drug development confront a major challenge. At the same time that generic entry has been rising, the pharmaceutical industry has encountered a widely publicized productivity crisis (Cockburn, 2006). Although there has been no measured slowdown in aggregate early-stage drug development, new drug approvals peaked in the mid-1990s and were stagnant or falling through the rest of our sample period. While this opinion is by no means universally held, there are some inside and outside the industry who suggest that this decline reflects an emerging exhaustion of research opportunities. In this view, the easy-to-discover drugs have already been introduced, and the diseases that are now the focus of research effort are extremely complex and difficult to treat. To the extent that there really is a decline in research productivity, this could lead firms to ratchet back their drug development efforts, even in the absence of a growing generic threat. Our empirical challenge will be to assess the impact of increased generic entry on new pharmaceutical innovation while controlling, as best we can, for contemporaneous changes in research opportunities and other demand-side factors that might influence drug development (Berndt *et al*, 2015).

We propose to do this using a regression specification that models innovation as a function of generic entry, scientific opportunity and challenges, firm innovative capability, downstream co-specialized assets, and a vector of additional controls:

$$I_{ijt} = \alpha_i + \alpha_j + \alpha_t + \beta_1 G_{ijt-1} + \beta_2 O_{jt-1} + \beta_3 Z_{ijt-1} + \beta_4 D_{ijt-1} + \beta_5 P_{ijt-1} + \beta_6 SA_{ijt} + \beta_7 S_{it} + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad (1)$$

where I_{ijt} , measures early-stage innovations by firm i in ATC 2-digit market j in time t . We define early stage innovations as the count of individual compounds in preclinical development or in Phase 1 clinical

trials. If firms are responding to changes in the intensity of generic competition, changes in perceived scientific opportunity, or changes in expected market opportunity, we would expect a measurable impact to show up at this stage. In contrast, drugs that have already successfully moved on to Phase 2 or Phase 3 trials are likely to continue through the development process to the end, even if the firm plans to curtail or eliminate future research in that area in response to rising competition or diminished technological opportunity.¹⁶ Because the outcome variable is a count variable, the statistical model employed in our regression should be one designed to handle count data. As such, we use fixed effects Poisson and negative binomial estimators (Hausman *et al.*, 1984; Woolridge, 1999). Given that not all firms innovate in each therapeutic category in each year, it is possible that the data may contain zeros.¹⁷ Our count data models have the advantage of dealing with this outcome in a natural way.

The specification, as written, includes fixed effects for year (α_t), firm (α_i), and therapeutic (ATC) market (α_j). There are 13 years, 178 firms, and 126 ATC 2-digit categories in our data, and we run into convergence challenges when we seek to estimate our Poisson and negative binomial count data models using the full set of year and ATC 2-digit dummies.¹⁸ In the results we will report below based on count data models, we get around this convergence challenge by estimating ATC 1-digit dummy variables and, in some specifications, we also include a paired fixed effect, interacting therapeutic market dummies with year dummies, ($\alpha_j * \alpha_t$). As a robustness check, we also run linear versions of our models with the full set of 2-digit ATC fixed effects as well as interaction terms of 2-digit ATC fixed effects and year dummies.

The robustness of our results to the inclusion of this full set of fixed effects and interaction terms is quite important. Since Schmookler (1966), economists have understood that changes in expected future market size could influence the distribution of R&D investment across product markets, and recent research has shown this to be true in the pharmaceutical industry (Acemoglu and Linn, 2004; Finkelstein, 2004; Trusheim and Berndt, 2012; Dubois *et al.*, 2015). We maintain that in Equation (1) changes in expected market size across ATC categories over time will be controlled for by the interacted therapeutic market and year fixed effects (ATC market*Year).¹⁹ These interaction terms will also control for changes

¹⁶ We present empirical results later in the paper that are consistent with this view.

¹⁷ In each specification where we utilized a count model we performed a Vuong test to determine the applicability of relevant zero-inflated models. In no case was the test statistic significant.

¹⁸ We note that we have an unbalanced panel because not all firms are active every year in every ATC-2 digit market in terms of their innovative pipeline.

¹⁹ In an earlier version of this paper (Branstetter *et al.*, 2014) we controlled for the expected future market size for new drugs in a particular therapeutic class by averaging total sales from IMS MIDAS™ in therapeutic area j over year t , year $t+1$, and year $t+2$, measured in inflation-adjusted dollars. As it turns out, the sign and significance of the coefficients on our measures of generic penetration are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of this variable, so it is omitted from the current specification and we rely instead on the ATC*Year interaction terms to control for changes in expected market size.

in underlying scientific opportunity or research productivity across product markets that are common to all firms. Finally, to the extent that the demand-side factors impacting drug profitability described by Berndt *et al.* (2015) (and discussed previously in Footnote 11) also vary across therapeutic markets and time, these effects should also be controlled for by the same interaction terms. Additionally, we also present results from instrumental variables and Arellano and Bond system GMM regressions. In all cases, these alternative specifications yield results consistent with those reported in the main text - our measures of generic penetration are negative and statistically (and economically) significant.

4.2 *Measuring generic penetration (G_{ijt-1})*

Hatch-Waxman laid out the modes by which generic manufacturers can enter chemical-based therapeutic markets. This entry leads to rapid deterioration in the sales of branded products (Saha *et al.*, 2006). However, the incidence of rising generic impact is quite uneven across therapeutic categories and time. Firms also differ in terms of their exposure to this competition. Fortunately, we are able to employ disaggregated data from the IMS MIDAS™ database. This database tracks the sales (quantity) of nearly every pharmaceutical product sold in the U.S. by firm, product, and quarter, and the data are mapped to ATC categories. We note that IMS creates a ‘standard unit’ that equates capsules, tablets and liquid dosages that we use as our unit of measure. Our data is limited to the years 1998-2010, and this data restriction determines the time dimension of our study.

Fortunately, this window covers a period of intensifying generic competition. Within this period, we are able to determine the extent of generic penetration that firm i faces in therapeutic area j in time $t-1$. We define our measure of generic penetration, G_{ijt-1} , as the sum of generic sales in therapeutic area j at time $t-1$ divided by the sum of generic and firm i branded sales in therapeutic area j at time $t-1$.²⁰ A negative coefficient implies that as generic penetration faced by firm i , in therapeutic market j increases, the flow of early-stage innovation decreases.

4.3 *Measuring scientific opportunity (O_{jt-1})*

In order to identify the effect of changes in generic competition on innovation, we must also effectively control for underlying scientific opportunities within each therapeutic market j at time $t-1$. Prior research has demonstrated the link between academic research and industrial R&D (*e.g.*, Mansfield,

²⁰ As a robustness check, we defined a second measure of generic penetration, $G_{jt-1}M_{ijt-1}$, as the ratio of generic sales to total sales in therapeutic area j in time $t-1$ multiplied by the ratio of branded sales by firm i in therapeutic area j in year $t-1$ divided by total branded sales of firm i in year $t-1$. Our earlier working paper (Branstetter *et al.*, 2014) demonstrates that this alternative measure yields results qualitatively similar to the ones obtained with G_{ijt-1} . For that reason, we focus on the latter measure in this version of the paper.

1995; Gittelman and Kogut, 2003); these linkages are particularly strong in pharmaceuticals. Similar to Furman *et al.* (2005), we construct a bibliographic measure that captures publicly available academic research in the life sciences.

We start by merging data from IMS MIDAS™, our comprehensive database of pharmaceutical products, with the IMS NDTI™ database, which captures physician prescription behavior. This latter database identifies the diseases for which physicians are actually prescribing the drugs in IMS MIDAS™.²¹ IMS MIDAS™ is categorized by ATC codes and the IMS NDTI™ database is categorized by International Statistical Classification of Disease (ICD-9) diagnostic codes. Merging these two databases enabled us to generate a concordance between ICD-9 diagnostic codes and ATC product codes (at the 4-digit level). Next, we extracted the top 10 ICD-9 diagnostic codes for each ATC 4-digit category. These ICD-9 codes have unified keywords associated with them that were used as search terms in the National Library of Medicine's PUBMED database. This search yielded journal articles published between 1950 and 2010 relating to our various keywords that we were then able to map back to disaggregate ATC 4-digit categories. Ultimately, we identified a unique sample of 6.5 million journal articles. However, some journal articles were mapped to multiple ATC 4-digit categories, thereby yielding 20.9 million raw article counts.

Next, we used the unique PMID identifiers for these articles to gather their forward citations from the year of publication to the end of 2010 in the SCOPUS Sciverse database. Our sample of 20.9 million articles generated over 345 million forward citations. Since our unit of observation in a therapeutic market is at the ATC 2-digit level, we aggregate our annual, citation-weighted counts of journal articles up from the ATC 4-digit level to the ATC 2-digit level. While some science is basic and universal, earlier science tended to be more chemical-based while newer research may be more relevant to biologic-based science. This suggests that older science is likely to be less relevant for current drug development than more recent science, as such, we apply a 15% discount rate, take natural logs, and lag the stock by one year to create our control variable, O_{jt-1} .²²

4.4 *Scientific challenges (Z_{ijt-1})*

In contrast to scientific opportunities that may potentially “pull” firms *towards* a specific therapeutic market, we control for scientific challenges that may “push” firms *away* from a specific

²¹ Because the IMS NDTI™ database is based on surveys of practicing physicians, it captures “off-label” prescribing behavior; that is, the prescribing of medicines for diseases for which they are not officially approved by the FDA as treatments.

²² A 15% discount rate is a standard assumption in the R&D and innovation literature. Results are not sensitive to alternative assumptions regarding the discount rate.

therapeutic market. Utilizing data from Pharmaprojects we identify all suspended, discontinued and withdrawn products across the entire research pipeline from pre-clinical candidates to approved products. Development can be ended and products pulled for a multitude of reasons many of which, at their most fundamental level, are due to some type of scientific challenge. For example, Merck pulled Vioxx® from the market due to negative side-effects, while the Alzheimer disease drug candidate *semagacestat* was discontinued by Eli Lilly in Phase III clinical trials after disappointing results. The failure of one or more leading products within a broader drug development program could indicate the presence of common or related flaws in the products that are still under development. This, in turn, could lead the firm to scale back, terminate, or redirect research and development efforts in response. Seeking to control for this, we define our proxy for the scientific challenges faced by the firm, Z_{ijt-1} , as the number of products suspended, discontinued or withdrawn by firm i , in therapeutic market j at time $t-1$.

4.5 Firm capabilities (D_{ijt-1} and P_{ijt-1}), marketing assets (SA_{ijt}), and firm size (S_{it})

Clearly, pharmaceutical companies differ in the drug development capabilities they have built over time. A given firm is more likely to introduce a new compound in a therapeutic category in which it already has substantial research expertise. In order to control for this persistence of firm-level capabilities we use data from Pharmaprojects to create a three-year moving average of past drug introductions, D_{ijt-1} , by firm i in the same therapeutic market j . This three-year moving average is lagged one period, ($t-1$). In addition to controlling for past products, we also control for late-stage innovations within the product pipeline. Again, using data from Pharmaprojects we define P_{ijt-1} as the number of compounds under development by firm i that are in Phase 2 or Phase 3 clinical trials in therapeutic market j at time $t-1$.

Prior research has also documented the connection between downstream co-specialized assets and a strong commitment to research efforts within a particular therapeutic class (Teece, 1986; Chan *et al.*, 2007). The presence of these assets can create a ‘lock-in’ effect, influencing the allocation of research effort across therapeutic categories. Similar to Ceccagnoli *et al.* (2010), we control for the distribution of a firm’s downstream co-specialized assets across therapeutic categories by including a ratio of promotions to product sales, SA_{ijt} , for firm i within therapeutic category j at time t . Promotions and product sales are collected from IMS MIDAS™ and the promotions activity includes detailing, journal advertising and direct-mail. Detailing is the direct promotion of products by pharmaceutical representatives to physicians. Finally, firm size can impact innovation rates. As such, we control for firm size with pharmaceutical sales by firm i in year t , S_{it} . Sales data was gathered from IMS MIDAS™ and natural logs were taken. All financial variables are converted into real dollars using a base year 2000 GDP deflator.

4.6 *The econometric challenges created by unmeasured research capabilities*

It would be convenient to presume that the error term in Equation (1) is independently and identically distributed across firm-market-year observations, once we have included a full set of firm, market, and year fixed effects. However, one can imagine that the error term is potentially more complicated than that.²³ To fix ideas and illustrate the inferential challenges that arise, we presume that the error term takes on the following form:

$$\varepsilon_{ijt} = \omega_{ijt} + \mu_{ijt} \quad (2)$$

The second term in (2) is presumed to be identically and independently distributed, and causes no econometric problems. The first term, ω_{ijt} , can be thought of as a research productivity parameter that determines the effectiveness with which firm i translates research resources into new drugs in market j at time t . It is not fixed – instead, it evolves over time across firms and markets, and is therefore not accounted for by the usual fixed effects. If ω_{ijt} is highly correlated across firms, but varies widely across markets and time, then we could largely control for it by including interacted therapeutic market and year (ATC market*Year) fixed effects, essentially allowing all firms to respond positively over time to therapeutic markets that hold promise, or negatively over time to therapeutic markets where scientific exhaustion and diminishing returns to research are setting in. However, if ω_{ijt} varies across firms as well as markets and time, inclusion of this interacted fixed effect (ATC market*Year) may not be sufficient.

To the extent that the firm is aware of its ω_{ijt} , it will invest more in markets where ω_{ijt} is high and less where it is low, inducing a positive correlation between early-stage drug development activity and ω_{ijt} . Of course, if ω_{ijt} declines significantly, and remains low, then the flow of new drugs will decline, and generic penetration may rise, inducing a negative correlation between our measure of generic penetration and I_{ijt} . To summarize $Cov(I_{ijt}, \omega_{ijt}) > 0$ and $Cov(\omega_{ijt}, G_{ijt-1}) < 0$, so that $Cov(I_{ijt}, G_{ijt-1}) < 0$, but the latter relationship could emerge purely as an artifact of omitted variable bias.

In order to gain any empirical leverage around this problem, we need to presume some functional form for ω_{ijt} . We presume that it takes on the form:

$$\omega_{ijt} = \gamma_1 \omega_{ijt-1} + \gamma_2 \omega_{ijt-2} + \gamma_3 \omega_{ijt-3} + \dots + \gamma_7 \omega_{ijt-7} + \gamma_8 \omega_{ijt-8} + \tau_{ijt} \quad (3)$$

²³ This section was inspired, in part, by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Pavcnik (2002), and the notation used here reflects that influence.

where τ is the usual well-behaved error term and

$$\gamma_1 > \gamma_2 > \gamma_3 > \dots > \gamma_7 > \gamma_8 \quad (4)$$

If ω_{ijt} follows this functional form, then its earlier ($t-1$, $t-2$, $t-3$, *etc.*) realizations will be plausibly correlated with our measure of late-stage clinical activity, P_{ijt-1} . Later realizations will be plausibly correlated with our measure of recent drug introductions, D_{ijt-1} , and, to the extent that marketing expenditures are well targeted, with SA_{ijt} . By explicitly including these covariates in Equation (1), we may effectively eliminate ω_{ijt} from our error term, significantly reducing the possibility that our inference is driven by omitted variables bias. Of course, this line of argument raises the possibility of serial correlation in the error term, so we will want to include a specification that allows for this. We explore two alternatives in an attempt to obtain leverage around this problem. First, we instrument for G_{ijt-1} and include a lagged dependent variable that allows for serial correlation in the error term.²⁴ Second, we can include an interacted firm and year (Firm *Year) fixed effect along with our full set of fixed effects: firm, year, therapeutic market and an interaction between therapeutic market and year (ATC market*Year). Given convergence issues this will only be possible in our linear specifications.

4.7 *An empirical specification for measuring the shift into biologic-based drugs*

Current regulation suggests an alternative approach to estimating the impact of generics on innovation. Chemical-based pharmaceutical products become susceptible to Paragraph III generic entry after patent expiration (*i.e.*, end of market exclusivity). They also become susceptible to early generic entry via Paragraph IV challenges only five years after approval (*i.e.*, end of data exclusivity). As discussed above, the same legal frameworks did not (yet) provide a pathway for biosimilar entry after biologic patent expiration during our sample period, nor was (or is) there the equivalent of a Paragraph IV challenge to biologic-based drugs.

Biologic-based drugs face a different regulatory regime. During our sample period, there was no legal pathway through which biosimilars could enter the U.S. market. This suggests that the difference in regulation during our sample period created an incentive for pharmaceutical companies to favor biologic-based therapies over chemical-based therapies, even if the latter was more effective in a purely

²⁴ We note, however, that the Breusch-Godfrey test fails to reject the null of no first-order serial correlation (prob > F: 0.6483)

therapeutic sense. Even as biosimilars begin to enter the U.S. market, for reasons discussed previously, those incentives are likely to remain in the longer run. This suggests an alternative specification:

$$CI_{ijt} - BI_{ijt} = a_i + a_j + a_t + b_1 G_{ijt-1} + b_2 O_{jt-1} + b_3 Z_{ijt-1} + b_4 (CD_{ijt-1} - BD_{ijt-1}) + b_5 (CP_{ijt-1} - BP_{ijt-1}) + b_6 (CSA_{ijt} - BSA_{ijt}) + b_7 S_{it} + e_{ijt} \quad (5)$$

Here, the dependent variable measures the difference between chemistry-based innovations and biologic-based innovations. Likewise, our controls for firm-specific development capability and market presence are redefined to reflect relative capability in chemistry-based versus biologic-based development. Given these controls, we would not expect generic penetration (G_{ijt-1}) to have an impact on the choice of technology – unless firms’ research choices are being affected by the prospect of generic competition.

4.8 Difference in early-stage innovation ($CI_{ijt} - BI_{ijt}$)

If current regulation is causing biologic-based innovation to be preferred to chemical-based innovation, then we need to modify our innovation measure in order to capture this change. Using the *Origin of Material* field within Pharmaprojects we are able to sort early-stage innovation (I_{ijt}) into either biologic-based (BI_{ijt}) or chemical-based (CI_{ijt}) innovation. In operationalizing Equation (5), the dependent variable is the difference between these two types of innovation, $CI_{ijt} - BI_{ijt}$. A negative coefficient on a right-hand side (RHS) variable (such as G_{ijt-1}) would imply that as that variable increased the difference ($CI_{ijt} - BI_{ijt}$) would decline. In other words, BI_{ijt} is greater than CI_{ijt} or the flow of biologic-based innovations exceeds the flow of chemical-based innovations.²⁵

It is possible for firm i to have more biologic-based innovations than chemical-based innovations in therapeutic market j at time t . In this case, our difference variable ($CI_{ijt} - BI_{ijt}$) will become negative, preventing us from using count data models. We therefore create a new variable, $cat(CI_{ijt} - BI_{ijt})$, that equals 1, 2 and 3 if $(CI_{ijt} - BI_{ijt})$ is negative, zero or positive, respectively. This reclassification allows us to use an ordered logit specification (Hausman *et al.*, 1992). Again, a negative coefficient on an independent variable would imply that as that variable increased, the dependent variable, $cat(CI_{ijt} - BI_{ijt})$, will decline. In this case the difference, $(CI_{ijt} - BI_{ijt})$, will become negative and the interpretation is the same as above.

²⁵ As a robustness check for this specification we also employ a seemingly unrelated regression specification (SUR model) where firms simultaneously decide their innovation decisions in chemicals and biologics (Table 7). Results are consistent between our various specifications and will be discussed more fully in Section 5. We thank Ivan Png for this suggestion.

For our specification in Equation (5), we can use the *Origin of Material* field within Pharmaprojects to decompose our measure of late-stage innovations, P_{ijt-1} , past drug introductions, D_{ijt-1} , and our measure of scientific challenges, Z_{ijt-1} , faced by firm i in therapeutic market j , into their chemical-based (CP_{ijt-1} , CD_{ijt-1} and CZ_{ijt-1} , respectively) and biologics-based (BP_{ijt-1} , BD_{ijt-1} and BZ_{ijt-1} , respectively) components. We can also decompose our ratio of promotions to product sales, SA_{ijt} , for firm i within therapeutic market j at time t , into its chemical-based (CSA_{ijt}) and biologic-based (BSA_{ijt}) components. Empirically, in Table 6 we create the variables $diff(P_{ijt-1})$, $diff(Z_{ijt-1})$, $diff(D_{ijt-1})$, and $diff(SA_{ijt})$ defined as the difference between the chemical- and biologic-based components: $(CP_{ijt-1} - BP_{ijt-1})$, $(CZ_{ijt-1} - BZ_{ijt-1})$, $(CD_{ijt-1} - BD_{ijt-1})$ and $(CSA_{ijt} - BSA_{ijt})$, respectively.²⁶

5 Empirical results

5.1 Descriptive statistics

Descriptive statistics for our variables are presented in Table 1. Our dependent variable, I_{ijt} , captures early-stage innovation and varies between 0 and 36 for firm i , in therapeutic market j , at time t . While our firms had, on average, 0.78 early-stage innovations within a therapeutic market at time t , it should be remembered that not every firm has an early-stage innovation in every therapeutic market in each year. If we focus solely on therapeutic categories with activity, then the average increases to 2.12 early-stage innovations. Firms in the top quartile of firm size had, on average, 3.07 innovations within therapeutic market j at time t , as compared to 1.45 innovations for the smallest quartile firms. ATC N, focusing on the nervous system, had the largest number of innovations, while ATC P, which focuses on anti-parasitic products, had the lowest number of innovations. The relative contribution to total innovations of each broad therapeutic category (ATC 1-digit) over our sample period, as identified by Pharmaprojects, is displayed in Figure 2.

Inspection of the raw data shows that, in the aggregate, there has been no decline in early-stage innovation over our sample period, even as the level of generic penetration has risen and the number of approved drugs has fallen (Figure 1). This suggests that generics have had limited impact on the overall

²⁶ Unfortunately, we have not found a credible way to split O_{jt-1} into chemical-based and biologic-based components. It is extremely difficult to identify all facets of biologic-based research from PubMed. Even after utilizing experts within these respective fields and experts at the U.S. National Library of Medicine (PubMed) to help construct keywords, we still found examples where our biologic-based measure would be undercounted. Such an undercount is problematic since we are trying to control for biologic-based scientific opportunities. Our alternative solution is to discount O_{jt-1} in order to deemphasize older research and emphasize more recent research that would be more relevant (and consistent) with the focus on biologic-based products. Ultimately, this is variation we are pulling out of the interacted therapeutic market and year fixed effect. The removal of O_{jt-1} does not change our core findings.

aggregate rate of early-stage innovation. However, we find strong evidence that generics have had a statistically and economically significant impact on where development activity is concentrated and how it is undertaken.

Our baseline measure of generic penetration, G_{ijt-1} , has a mean value of 54% and a median value of just over 80%. Our measure of technological opportunity, O_{jt-1} , measured by the logarithm of the discounted stock of citation weighted articles in year $t-1$ for therapeutic market j , varied between 0 and 14.4, with an average of 8.04. This translates into an average value of approximately 3.8 million citations for each therapeutic market j in each year. Over our sample period the greatest technological opportunity existed in ATC categories N5 (psycholeptics) and N6 (psychoanaleptics). Our measure of technological challenges, Z_{ijt-1} , had an average value of 0.05. The number of challenges varied between 0 and 6 with the greatest technical challenges experienced in ATC T2, which includes various recombinant-based products, such as interferon.

On average, our firms had a lagged three-year moving average of 0.24 recently introduced products (D_{ijt-1}) and 0.09 drug candidates in the latest stages of product development (P_{ijt-1}) in therapeutic market j at time $t-1$. Our control for downstream co-specialized assets, SA_{ijt} , the ratio of promotions to sales for firm i in therapeutic market j at time t , averaged 48%. This suggests firms are making significant downstream investments in therapeutic areas in which they operate (and plan to operate).²⁷

5.2 *Impact of generic entry on the flow of innovation*

Do changes in generic penetration have an effect on the flow of early-stage drug innovation? We estimate Equation (1) with a fixed effects Poisson specification, and report results in Table 2. We also present results using a fixed effects negative binomial specification in Table 3. The dependent variable in all specifications is I_{ijt} , or the count of firm i innovations in therapeutic market j at time t . Model 1 in both tables (Table 2 and Table 3) presents a baseline regression with firm-level control variables, including our measures of new product introductions (D_{ijt-1}), late-stage product development (P_{ijt-1}), downstream co-specialized assets (SA_{ijt}), sales (S_{it}), and firm, year, and therapeutic market fixed effects (estimated at the ATC 1-digit level). Model 2 in each table adds controls for scientific opportunity (O_{jt-1}) and scientific challenges (Z_{ijt-1}). Finally, in Models 3 and 4, we include our measure of generic penetration (G_{ijt-1}) along with differing sets of fixed effects. Model 3 includes just firm and year fixed effects; Model 4 includes

²⁷ Note that SA_{ijt} ranges from 0 to 2225. The very high maximum value appears implausible, but this simply shows there are market/year combinations where firm i was ramping up advertising significantly prior to introduction. The minimum value of zero reflects market/year combinations where firms lower their advertising to zero – a frequent occurrence after generic entry.

therapeutic market fixed effects and an interaction between year and therapeutic market fixed effects. As discussed previously, this interaction, we argue, controls for unobserved variance in a particular therapeutic market in a specific year. The results presented in this table are obtained using clustered standard errors at the firm level. When we cluster our standard errors at the therapeutic area level, we obtain results qualitatively similar to those shown here.²⁸

Across all specifications and models we find negative and statistically significant coefficient estimates for our measure of generic penetration. This negative relationship suggests that, at the firm level, increases in generic penetration are related to decreases in the flow of early-stage innovation *in that therapeutic area*. Taking the coefficient from our complete negative binomial specification (Model 4, Table 3) as our baseline estimate, we calculate an elasticity equal to -0.796. In other words, a 10% increase in generic penetration experienced by a firm in a particular market corresponds to a 7.96% decrease in early-stage innovation by that firm in that market. To our knowledge this is the first empirical evidence that documents the effect of generic penetration in the U.S. market on early-stage pharmaceutical innovation. If fewer candidates are entering a given therapeutic pipeline within a given firm, then fewer approved drugs will eventually come out.

Generic penetration into a market is clearly harmful for branded producers. From a social welfare perspective, however, the interpretation is more nuanced. If the presence of viable generics in a market rises, our results indicate that innovation will decrease in that market.²⁹ However, the stability of early-stage drug development effort at the aggregate level suggests that much of the decline in innovation within markets facing a high degree of generic competition is offset by increased innovative effort elsewhere. Indeed, Pammolli *et al.* (2011) argues that one of the reasons R&D productivity has declined

²⁸ We have replicated Tables 2 and 3 with clustered standard errors at the therapeutic area level; results are qualitatively similar to those reported here and are available upon request.

²⁹ In theory, generics should be perfect substitutes for branded drugs since they are bioequivalent. Cleanthous (2002) shows that the data do not support this relationship and suggests this is the result of ‘spurious product differentiation’, which he defines as arising, “...when consumers perceive physically identical products to differ in quality.” Recent evidence, however, suggests that consumer perceptions have merit, at least some of the time, and while drugs may be bioequivalent, they may indeed differ in quality. Several articles appeared in the April 17, 2007 edition of the prestigious journal *Neurology* discussing the high incidence of break-through seizures with generic anti-epileptics and recommending new protocols (Berg, 2007). Insurance companies such as Blue Cross Blue Shield of Georgia allow pediatric customers to stay on branded anti-epileptic medications even though generics are available. Differences across generics for the same brand have also been reported. This debate ultimately led the FDA to fund a comparative effectiveness trial between branded and generic epilepsy drugs, which is still on-going (<https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT01733394?term=privitera&rank=4>). We are not suggesting all generics have problems but it appears in some instances where the therapeutic window is very narrow consumer perceptions of a substantive difference between branded drugs and generics may have some merit.

has been a shift into areas with unmet therapeutic needs, which also have higher risks of failure. Our results are consistent with the view that drug development is shifting out of therapeutic areas facing more intense generic competition and into domains facing less generic competition. Furthermore, our results provide one possible explanation for why this shift is occurring. In essence, Hatch-Waxman, by providing mechanisms of entry for generics, creates conditions under which the pharmaceutical industry redirects R&D efforts to markets less served by generics.

If R&D efforts are shifting across therapeutic areas, this can have significant future consequences, with a net impact on social welfare that is difficult to calculate. On the one hand, if the therapeutic category that is seeing research expenditures leave has a different success probability than the therapeutic category to which expenditures are flowing, this could have consequences for the net flow of innovation (either increasing or decreasing). On the other hand, new product development in a domain with few (or no) existing effective therapies may have greater social value than similar development in an area with a broad range of existing effective therapies, even if the R&D success probabilities are lower in the domain with few therapies. In this paper, we do not take a strong stand on the ultimate welfare consequences of this shift. Instead, we seek to document its existence and magnitude. The welfare consequences of the shift remain the focus of ongoing research.

Turning to our controls for scientific opportunity (O_{jt-1}) and scientific challenges (Z_{jt-1}), we find that both positively and significantly influence the flow of early-stage innovation. Using a similar approach in the creation of their scientific opportunity variable, Furman *et al.* (2005) find a positive relationship with pharmaceutical patenting. Our results take this one step further and document a relationship with actual early-stage drug development. Much of the basic science research that is captured in our variable takes place in academic settings; as such this finding is broadly consistent with past work documenting the role of academic research in industrial innovation (*e.g.*, Mansfield, 1995; Cohen *et al.*, 2002).

Interestingly, while our findings are consistent with our *a priori* beliefs with respect to scientific opportunity, the same cannot be said with respect to scientific challenges. Our initial beliefs were that scientific opportunity might serve as a mechanism to ‘pull’ innovative effort into a particular area, while challenges might serve as a mechanism to ‘push’ innovation away from it. That would imply a negative coefficient on our challenges variable; but the coefficient is positive and significant at conventional levels. One interpretation of this positive coefficient is that that failures can serve as a learning mechanism for future endeavors (Chiou *et al.*, 2012). Statin drugs, which today are one of the largest selling therapeutic areas, had a difficult beginning in 1978, with the unsuccessful launch of Mevacor®.

Over time, however, the industry worked through these difficulties as new technologies led to the five types of statin-molecules currently sold in U.S. A different, but related interpretation of the positive coefficient is simply that firms with a significant research commitment to a particular therapeutic category are more likely to have a few failures along the way, and the positive coefficient on our proxy for scientific challenges simply picks up that effect.

We control for firms' research capabilities by using past innovative output in a particular therapeutic market, as measured by the lagged count of products in late-stage product development, P_{ijt-1} , and the lagged count of new product introductions, D_{ijt-1} . As expected, both are positively and significantly related to the flow of early-stage innovations. Across the two baseline specifications (Model 4, Table 2 and Table 3), our measure for firm size, S_{it} , is positive and significant. This result should not be interpreted as necessarily indicating a positive relationship between firm size and 'innovation,' as our dependent variable is a simple count of early-stage pipeline products; we make no distinction between internally generated and externally acquired products.³⁰ Finally, our measure of marketing intensity or downstream co-specialized assets, SA_{ijt} , is statistically indistinguishable from zero.

5.3 *Testing for robustness with four alternative specifications*

Our baseline measure of innovation, I_{ijt} , which is the count of products in early-stage development, does not discriminate between pharmaceutical products that are novel and those that come much later in the history of a therapeutic area. This reflects, in part, the difficulty of drawing a clear or meaningful line between "truly innovative" drugs and "me-too" drugs. The history of the industry provides several examples in which the first products in a class had significant shortcomings or side effects - and the real breakthroughs in terms of therapeutic efficacy came several product introductions later.³¹ Even when new products are merely recombinations or reformulations of existing active ingredients, the new products can often provide significant therapeutic benefits to certain categories of patients.

Despite these realities, critics of the pharmaceutical industry have accused branded firms of responding to generic entry or the threat of generic entry by coming up with branded "innovations" that are not true innovations, but merely minor modifications of earlier branded products. If the negative impact of rising generic entry on early-stage innovation, identified in our regressions, were limited to

³⁰ See Cohen (2010) for an extensive discussion of the literature analyzing the relationship between firm size and innovation.

³¹ See Arcidiacono *et al.* (2013).

incremental innovations with little or no therapeutic value, then that would have different policy implications from an effect that extended to the most novel compounds and drugs.

The Pharmaprojects database includes a variable that grades each product under development in terms of its novelty - the most novel compounds are ones that are first in their class. We do not accept the proposition that all compounds without this “novel” designation have limited therapeutic value. For the reasons discussed above, we believe the Pharmaprojects designation excludes a large number of socially useful new product introductions. Nevertheless, the designation allows us to introduce a useful robustness check that may address the concerns of those who are convinced that only pharmaceutical product introductions that satisfy a strict definition of novelty are socially useful. In Model 1, Table 4, we present the results of a regression in which we replace our comprehensive count of drugs in early-stage development with a count of only novel drugs in early-stage development, as defined by Pharmaprojects. In a fixed effects negative binomial regression, the coefficient on our measure of generic penetration is negative and statistically significant, indicating that rising generic penetration is associated with a statistically significant decline in the rate of introduction of novel products. The elasticity from Model 1 implies that a 10% increase in generic penetration in a particular market will *lower* early-stage *novel* innovations, in that same market, by 5.96%. Put another way, our results are not driven by a crowding out of purely incremental inventions or reformulations.

Next, we test the robustness of our results and the correctness of our interpretation by applying what amounts to a placebo test. In our previous regressions, we carefully defined innovation as early-stage product development. As compounds move through the costly, expensive, and risky clinical trials process, they require ever-higher levels of investment by the firm. A drug that has survived Phase 2 and Phase 3 clinical trials is likely to be introduced, even if generic penetration is rising sharply in a way that might lead to a throttling back of early-stage research in that therapeutic area. Drugs at these later stages of the development process should be significantly less responsive to our measures of generic penetration than our measures of earlier stage innovations.³²

Following this logic, in Model 2, Table 4, we define a new dependent variable, *Late Stage I_{ijt}*, as a count of firm *i*'s products in Phase 2 or Phase 3 trials in market *j* at time *t*. In this specification, we find that our measure of generic penetration, *G_{ijt-1}* is *not* significantly correlated with late-stage product

³² We thank Jeff Macher of Georgetown University for suggesting this robustness check.

innovation.³³ This is in line with our expectations, and strengthens our interpretation of the results using measures of early-stage product development.

Our next regression is a different sort of placebo test. Most prescription health plans in the U.S. allow for the use of branded products until generics become available. In most cases patients will be given the generic by retail pharmacies unless the prescription is written “Dispense as Written” or if the patient explicitly asks for a branded drug (in which case there is usually a much higher co-payment). More recently, however, insurance firms have begun to actively engage in “cross-molecular” substitution. For example, let’s assume there exist three branded products in a particular market, *Drug A*, *Drug B* and *Drug C*, sold by three different pharmaceutical firms. Each branded product has a different chemical composition (*i.e.*, a different molecule), and uses a different biochemical pathway to address the underlying illness. Then, a generic for *Drug B* enters the market. To save money, insurance companies can encourage patients taking *Drug A* or *Drug C* to switch to *Generic B*. While insurance firms cannot force patients to move they can entice them with lower (or no) copayments for *Generic B*.

Since physicians, not patients or insurance companies, write prescriptions, these financial incentives will only shift drug consumption to the generic products if physicians also consent to the change. However, in many therapeutic markets, practicing physicians have long regarded different drugs, based on different molecules and utilizing different biochemical pathways to attack the disease, as equally effective therapies for the underlying illness. In such cases, physicians will often consent to the insurance companies preferred change, especially if it saves their patients money. We refer to this possibility of substitution across drugs and molecules within a therapeutic category in response to emerging price differentials as that category's degree of *cross-molecular substitution* (Branstetter *et al.*, 2016). Where cross-molecular substitution is high, the implications for branded products can be quite profound. In such markets, the emergence of a generic equivalent to *any* branded product can affect the revenue streams of *all* branded products, leading to wide-ranging declines in revenues and profits.

The extent of these impacts will vary across therapeutic categories, depending on the degree of cross-molecular substitution within that category. For example, based on conversations with practicing physicians, we would expect higher substitution in therapeutic areas such as anti-infectives, hypertension and allergies and lower substitution in markets such as depression and epilepsy. In general, the complexity and sensitivity of the human brain and the complicated nature of neurological disorders work to strictly limit the degree of cross-molecular substitution in drugs that treat neurological and psychiatric

³³ In these regressions, our dependent variable is identical to P_{ijt-1} , so we omit this variable from our set of control variables.

disorders. They even limit the degree to which practitioners are willing to use allegedly “bioequivalent” generic versions of the branded drug. When practitioners find a good match between a drug treatment and a patient in these domains, they are often reluctant to switch to a cheaper generic.

Economic intuition suggests that if a class of branded drugs was less susceptible to cross-molecular substitution and generic competition, then we might expect to see a muted innovation response to rising generic competition in that particular market. Focusing on the markets that include anti-epileptics, anti-depressants, and anti-psychotics, we indeed see this in our results in Model 3, Table 4. Increases in generic penetration do not appear to have any statistically significant effect on early-stage innovation in these therapeutic areas.³⁴ This suggests that there are markets for which direct substitution to a generic may be problematic, cross-molecular substitution is low, and as a result the effect on early-stage innovation is less of a concern.³⁵

Our final robustness check seeks to incorporate ATC 2-digit therapeutic market fixed effects and the interaction between ATC 2-digit therapeutic market and year fixed effects into the specification. This is not feasible in our main fixed effects negative binomial models (Table 2); attempts to estimate these nonlinear specifications with so many fixed effects fail to reach convergence. However it is possible to incorporate firm, year, ATC 2-digit therapeutic market fixed effects along with the interaction between ATC 2-digit therapeutic market and year fixed effects (ATC 2-digit market*Year) into the linear specification of Equation (1). The results for this full specification are shown in Model 4, Table 4. We view this an especially strong test of the hypothesis that an increase in generic penetration is associated with a decline in innovative activity, because all of the factors associated with an ATC 2-digit therapeutic market that vary over time in a common way across firms are swept out with the interaction terms.

Despite this, and despite the imperfect fit between the count data in our dependent variable and the statistical assumptions undergirding our linear specification, we still find that generic penetration is negatively associated with early-stage drug development, and this effect is statistically significant at conventional levels. The elasticity from Model 4 implies that a 10% increase in generic penetration in a particular market will *lower* early-stage innovations, in that same market, by about 4.1%. Recall that our unit of observation is at the firm-market-year level, where market j is defined at the ATC 2-digit

³⁴ Given the limited number of markets we are able to get convergence with a model that includes firm, year, ATC 2-digit therapeutic market and an interaction between ATC 2-digit and year fixed effects (ATC 2-digit market*Year). In that specification, G_{ijt-1} remains statistically insignificant.

³⁵ As a further robustness check, through consultations with practicing physicians we identified markets that they deemed ‘high CMS’ (high degrees of cross-molecular substitution), namely the anti-infective markets J01-J04. When we replicate the findings in Table 4 for these high CMS markets the coefficients on G_{ijt-1} are negative and significant at the 1% level. This is consistent with our intuition about high CMS markets.

therapeutic level. When we include ATC 2-digit therapeutic market fixed effects and the (ATC 2-digit market*Year) interacted fixed effects, O_{jt-1} is no longer informative. So, we omit it from the list of coefficients in Model 4, and we do so in every specification that follows where we include ATC 2-digit fixed effects and the interactions of these fixed effects with year dummies.

5.4 *An instrumental variables approach*

In this section, we take yet another approach to testing the robustness of our results: the use of instrumental variables.³⁶ Here, we exploit the fact that our firm-market-year specific measure of generic penetration moves over time as a consequence of patent expirations and successful Paragraph-IV challenges to existing drugs. For each firm i , we construct a count of the flow and stock of patent expirations that occur in market j at time t . Likewise, we construct a count of the total number of Paragraph-IV challenges that occur in market j at time t , and a count of the total number of patent challenges to firm i 's products in market j at time t . We instrument for G_{ijt-1} using these four instruments, and present results of three separate linear specifications using these instruments in Table 5.

With patent expirations in market j at time t , generic products will enter market j and generic penetration will grow at a certain rate. Penetration rates *across* markets will vary due to many factors, including the degree of cross-molecular substitution in that market. These factors induce a degree of exogeneity into the evolution of generic penetration in that market that is plausibly exogenous to firm i 's actions. Paragraph-IV challenges are also plausibly exogenous to the actions of the challenged firm. When the patents protecting a significant product expire or are successfully challenged, this can lead to large changes in G_{ijt-1} that are plausibly uncorrelated with contemporaneous movements in firm i 's underlying research productivity or other factors directly influencing I_{ijt} . Our instruments pass the usual overidentification test for instrumental validity, and the first-stage regression results indicate a high degree of correlation between our instrument and our potentially endogenous measure of generic penetration.³⁷

Model 1, Table 5 presents results of a two-stage least squares regression with firm, year, ATC 1-digit therapeutic market fixed effects along with an interaction between ATC 1-digit therapeutic market

³⁶ While we explore the potential endogeneity of G_{ijt-1} we have reason to believe it remains exogenous. Stata's estat endogenous command reports Wooldridge's robust score test and a robust-regression based test. If the test statistic is significant the variable being tested, in this case G_{ijt-1} , must be treated as endogenous. In our main model we fail to reject the null that G_{ijt-1} is exogenous ($p = 0.18$).

³⁷ The first stage F-statistic is 1,793.83. The p-value for the overidentification test is 0.5125, implying that the null hypothesis of instrument validity is not rejected.

and year fixed effects (ATC 1-digit market*Year). The effect of rising generic penetration is negative and statistically significant at conventional levels. The estimated coefficient implies that a 10% increase in generic penetration leads to a 4.7% decline in early-stage innovation. Model 2 incorporates the more disaggregate ATC 2-digit therapeutic market fixed effects and the interaction between ATC 2-digit therapeutic market and year (ATC 2-digit market*Year) fixed effects; the measured impact of rising generic penetration remains negative and statistically significant, implying that a 10% increase in generic penetration leads to a 8.4% decline in early-stage innovative activity. Model 3 uses a full-blown Arellano and Bond System GMM specification, in which we instrument for generic penetration, incorporate a lagged dependent variable, and allow for serial correlation in the error terms. Yet again, the estimated impact of generic penetration is negative and statistically (and economically) significant. In a final attempt to capture any potential effect of ω_{ijt} , we run a linear model with G_{ijt-1} along with firm, year, ATC 2-digit therapeutic market fixed effects along with an interactions between ATC 2-digit therapeutic market and year (ATC 2-digit market*Year) fixed effects and firm and year (Firm*Year) fixed effects. The coefficient on G_{ijt-1} is -0.7751 and significant at the 1% level, similar to reported results in Model 4, Table 4.³⁸ Regardless of how we approach this relationship, all of the arrows continue to point in the same direction – the existence of a negative relationship between generic penetration and early-stage innovation.

5.5 *Are generics driving a switch to biologics-based drug development?*

Other researchers have conjectured that declining revenues associated with small-molecule (chemical-based) products are increasingly motivating firms to switch to large-molecule (biologic-based) products (Wong, 2009; Golec *et al*, 2010). As we have noted above, such a shift could have mixed consequences for future drug development. Biologics are more expensive than chemical-based products, on average (Aitken *et al.*, 2009; Trusheim *et al.*, 2010), and biologics are likely to experience far less generic competition than chemical-based drugs for the foreseeable future. If consumer uptake across the two types of products over their entire product lifecycle remains similar, then a shift from chemical-based to biologic-based drugs could imply that, all else equal, the percent of overall health care expenditures spent on pharmaceuticals will increase.³⁹

³⁸ This regression is unreported but available upon request.

³⁹ As long as the data exclusivity period remains at 12 years there will still be a significant difference between the regulatory incentives for biologic-based drugs and chemical-based drugs. As of this writing, data exclusivity for chemical-based drugs is 5 years (with additional extensions available for pediatric use, orphan designation and reformulations.)

In order to consider whether a shift to biologic-based products may be occurring as a consequence of rising generic penetration, we estimate the specification described in Equation (5). The dependent variable in this specification is the difference between early-stage chemical-based innovations and early-stage biologic-based innovations. As constructed, this variable can now take on negative values, which prevents us from using count data models. Instead, we create a variable, $cat(CI_{ijt}-BI_{ijt})$, that equals 1, 2 and 3 if the difference $(CI_{ijt} - BI_{ijt})$ is negative, zero, or positive, respectively, and we estimate Equation (5) using an OLS specification (Models 1 and 2, Table 6) and for comparative purposes an ordered logit model (Models 3 and 4, Table 6).⁴⁰ Model 1 and Model 3, Table 6 report our complete baseline specification with all ATC 1-digit therapeutic market fixed effects, including the (ATC 1-digit market*Year) interaction. Model 2 includes the full set of ATC 2-digit therapeutic market and (ATC 2-digit market*Year) fixed effects. Across all specifications our measure of generic penetration is negatively and significantly related to the difference in types of early-stage innovations. This suggests that as generic penetration increases, our dependent variable, $cat(CI_{ijt}-BI_{ijt})$, declines which, in turn, implies that the difference, $(CI_{ijt} - BI_{ijt})$ is decreasing. In other words as generic penetration increases, the flow of biologic-based innovations is greater than the flow of chemical-based innovations for firm i , in market j , at time t . Controlling for other factors, it appears that pharmaceutical firms are responding to generic competition by shifting to biologics, where they do not face similar competition.

Table 7 provides results from an alternative approach - one in which two separate linear models predicting chemical-based product innovations and biologic-based production innovations, respectively, are run as a system, using the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) approach. In all specifications, we can see that generic competition is negatively associated with chemical-based innovation, but positively associated with biologic-based innovation, and both relationships are significant at the conventional threshold levels. We noted earlier in the paper that our sample is limited to firms with at least one approved product and at least one candidate drug in early-stage development. This sampling restriction excludes some small, research-intensive firms. However, these smaller entities are overwhelmingly focused on biologic drug development. We strongly believe their inclusion in our empirical analysis would, if anything, significantly strengthen the general tenor of our findings, especially those concerning the shift out of chemical-based drugs and into biologic-based drugs.

As a final robustness check we consider markets where there is robust biologic-based early-stage innovation. It should be the case that once we restrict the sample, using the same methodology as Table 7,

⁴⁰ As with the negative binomial fixed effects regression, ordered logit regressions do not converge when we employ the full set of (ATC 2-digit market*Year) fixed effects.

our results should strengthen. That is, we should see a greater negative effect on CI_{ijt} and a greater positive effect on BI_{ijt} in markets where biologic-based innovation is especially well developed, frequent, and, perhaps, easier for firms with the requisite knowledge capital.⁴¹ In Table 8 we therefore restricted the sample to the top three ATC markets (F, J and T) with the largest number of early-stage biologic-based innovations. Again using a SUR approach we find that across both specifications we obtain the predicted effects – a greater negative effect on CI_{ijt} and a greater positive effect on BI_{ijt} .

6 Conclusion

For many years, researchers and industry observers have conjectured that rising generic penetration might have an impact on the rate and direction of pharmaceutical innovation. Using a new combination of data sets, we are able to estimate the effects of rising generic penetration on early-stage pharmaceutical innovation. While the overall level of early-stage drug development has continued to increase, generics have had a statistically and economically significant impact on *where* that development activity is concentrated and *how* it is done. In the full sample, we find that, as our baseline measure of generic penetration increases by 10% within a therapeutic market, we observe a decrease of 7.96% in early-stage innovation in that market. This implies that drug development activity is moving out of markets where generic competition is increasing and into domains where it is relatively less intense.

Our preferred interpretation of this relationship, namely that a rise in generic penetration leads to a decline in drug development in that market, is strengthened by the finding that this relationship varies across therapeutic areas in ways that conform to our prior expectations. In earlier work (Branstetter *et al.*, 2016), we pointed out that the degree of substitution between generics and branded products can vary substantially across therapeutic areas. In markets where the substitution possibilities between generics and branded drugs are more limited, changes in generic penetration could be expected to have a weaker impact on innovation. This is indeed what we observe when we focus on three markets containing drugs that treat neurological and psychiatric disorders, where clinicians are sometimes reluctant to move away from a good "match" between a patient and a drug, even when a cheaper generic alternative becomes available. In these markets, we find no statistically significant effect of generics on early-stage innovations. However, in markets with high levels of cross-molecular substitution we see the opposite.

In a similar manner, we would expect the measured negative correlation between rising generic penetration and new drug development to be strong and significant for early-stage drug development, where it is still feasible to redirect research efforts, but much weaker in late-stage drug development,

⁴¹ We thank Ariel Stern for making this suggestion.

where candidate drugs have already proved their safety and efficacy in a series of increasingly expensive and stringent clinical trials and are generally introduced even if the market is known to be limited by increasing generic competition. We find exactly this pattern in the data, providing further support for our preferred interpretation of the statistical relationship. The robustness of our results is also confirmed when we limit our sample to drugs candidates designated as novel by Pharmaprojects. This shows that our results are not driven by generic competition simply pushing out "me-to" drugs or reformulation/recombinations of existing therapies. For better or worse, the rise in generic penetration is associated with a decline in novel drug development. The elasticity from our results implies that a 10% increase in generic penetration in a particular market will lower early-stage novel drug development, in that same market, by 5.96%.

We also note that, in a linear specification, the negative relationship between drug development and rising generic penetration is robust to the inclusion of a full set of ATC 2-digit therapeutic market fixed effects and the interaction between ATC 2-digit therapeutic market and year fixed effects (ATC 2-digit market*Year). In this specification, where all the unobserved factors impacting an ATC 2-digit therapeutic market over time in a common way across firms are effectively removed, the key empirical relationship remains negative, strong, and statistically robust. The elasticity from our results implies that a 10% increase in generic penetration in a particular market will lower early-stage innovation, in that same market, by 4.7%. An instrumental variables approach confirms the robustness of the negative estimated relationship between generic competition and early stage innovation.

Finally, we also consider the economic incentives created by regulation to shift, within therapeutic markets, from chemical-based to biologic-based products. Currently, data exclusivity is much longer for biologic-based products, and the regulatory pathway to market for biosimilars is likely to be far more challenging than the pathway for small molecule generic drugs. We conjecture that as chemical-based products are pressured by generics, pharmaceutical firms will change the nature of their innovation by shifting to biologics. This is indeed what we observe. Increases in generic penetration in market j appear to lead to an increase in the relative amount of biologic-based drug development. As generic penetration in market j rises, firms do not appear to be abandoning market j completely, but rather changing the *nature* of the innovation they pursue.

Are our results simply an artifact of technological exhaustion in various therapeutic markets? We do not believe so. First, to the extent that there is variance in technological exhaustion across markets and through time then our interaction between ATC 1-digit (and 2-digit) therapeutic market and year fixed effects ($\alpha_j * \alpha_t$) should control for these trends. Second, we control directly for late-stage innovation (P_{ijt-1})

and recent drug introductions (D_{ijt-1}); we argue that declines in these variables should further capture any exhaustion phenomenon. Third, we find no evidence of a negative relationship between generic penetration and innovation in markets with limited substitution possibilities between generic and branded drugs (Model 3, Table 4). If technological exhaustion were driving our results, why do we not see its effect in these markets? Fourth, if our results could be explained by technological exhaustion, how do we explain the different results between early-stage (Model 4, Table 3) and late-stage (Model 2, Table 4) innovation? Finally, if technological exhaustion was the only factor driving our results, then why is innovation in biologic-based drugs (BI_{ijt}) increasing at the same time that innovation in chemical-based drugs (CI_{ijt}) is decreasing in the same therapeutic markets where generic competition is rising (Table 8)? In the end, we simply do not believe that technological exhaustion plausibly explains away the full range of our results.

We have shown that the rise of generic competition is reshaping the locus of drug development activity. Is this a good thing? In this paper, we have refrained from taking a strong stand on the welfare impact of this shift. The data we would need to determine this are not yet available, and, at this point, we can only speculate on the sign of the ultimate welfare impact. On the positive side, one can argue that social welfare is enhanced when pharmaceutical firms are induced to shift development efforts away from markets where a broad range of effective and cheap generic therapies already exist to ones with far fewer treatment options. This can be true even if the probabilities of research success are lower in the domains into which research effort is being pushed, because the social returns to expanding the range of treatment options is relatively high. Even an increasing shift to more expensive biologic-based drugs may be beneficial in the long run if further innovation in small-molecule drugs brings little social value.

However, it is equally easy - and for us, equally plausible - to imagine a less positive outcome. Rising generic competition could be eliminating the development of new small molecule drugs that have all the benefits of existing therapies without the side effects. Such new drugs would have social value, even in markets with an extensive range of existing therapies. The less explored domains into which the pharmaceutical industry's small-molecule developments are being pushed may yield little or no success. Such pessimism would be consistent with much of the discussion of the pharmaceutical industry's longstanding productivity crisis. Finally, by tilting the regulatory playing field so heavily against small-molecule drug development and in favor of biologics, we may be inducing the global industry to give up on the former domain that has done so much to advance global health through the provision of cheap,

relatively simple, effective drugs long before the potential benefits of further research have been exhausted.⁴²

The first step toward a more definitive conclusion about the welfare impact of the shift in drug development would be the creation of a map that locates the various therapeutic categories in terms of their proximity in technology space. It is reasonable that firms pressed by rising generic competition would seek to redeploy their R&D resources in domains that are not wholly dissimilar from the ones in which they have been working. Despite decades of high-quality empirical research on the pharmaceutical industry, no researchers have yet created such a mapping. With such data at hand, we could begin to explore not just the declines in drug development that have been induced by generic competition, but the increases in development in technologically proximate markets. These data would also facilitate the comparison of research success probabilities in the domains where drug development effort is declining and ones in which it is increasing.

Even with such data at hand, assessment of the full welfare impact of the recent shift will require strong assumptions that allow researchers to sketch out the counterfactual distribution of research effort that would have existed in the absence of the recent rise in generic competition. Despite this, we believe the effort is not just worthwhile, but necessary. Whether the effect was intended or not, the rise of generics in the U.S. market is significantly reshaping the pattern of global drug development efforts. We need to know if this is pushing that pattern closer to or further away from the social optimum. As is usually the case in research, much remains to be done.

⁴² In fact, many industry insiders believe that there are hundreds of small molecule compounds with as yet undiscovered therapeutic benefits. Because the patents on these compounds expired long ago, there is no mechanism by which a branded pharmaceutical company could appropriate the returns from R&D into these new therapeutic benefits. This line of thinking raises the possibility that there is a gold mine of potentially high-return research projects that are currently inaccessible to the global pharmaceutical industry. Meanwhile, the existing regulatory regime induces them to spend billions on extremely complex, large-molecule therapies whose full interaction with the human body is imperfectly understood, and where the rate of failure in clinical trials is correspondingly high. See Higgins *et al.* (2014) and Roin (2014) for an explication of this idea and potential policy solutions.

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Figure 1. Early-stage innovations, 1998-2010. This figure tracks the aggregate flow of early-stage pharmaceutical innovations, defined as the annual count of compounds at the preclinical stage or in Phase 1 clinical trials. We provide annual aggregate counts for our sample firms (solid line) and for the entire population (dotted line) of compounds contained in the Pharmaprojects database. Over our time period, 1998-2010, the number of early-stage innovations, including both small- and large-molecules, has increased. Our sample closely tracks the population, with differences being explained by our sample restrictions. Recall, firms must have at least one approved product and one early-stage innovation in order to be incorporated into our sample.




Figure 2. Relative contribution to total innovations across therapeutic categories. This figure plots the relative contribution of each therapeutic class at the ATC1-level based on Pharmaprojects data. Data includes all products for which Pharmaprojects identifies a therapeutic category. For a color version of this table we direct the readers to an earlier version of this paper, Branstetter *et al.*, (2014).




Table 1. Variable definition and descriptive statistics. This table provides definitions, data sources along with descriptive statistics for our variables of interest. Our main dependent variable of interest will be early-stage innovations, I_{ijt} , while our main independent variable is generic penetration, G_{ijt-1} experienced by firm i , within market j , at time $t-1$.

VARIABLES	DEFINITION	SOURCE	OBS	MEAN	S. DEV.	MIN	MAX
I_{ijt}	<u>Early-stage innovations</u> : Count of early stage pipeline (pre-clinical + phase 1) at i, j, t level.	Pharmaprojects	29,514	0.78	1.81	0	36
G_{ijt-1}	<u>Generic penetration, baseline measure</u> : Ratio of generic sales to sum of focal firm and generic sales at $i, j, t-1$ level.	IMS MIDAS™	29,514	0.54	.46	0	1
O_{jt-1}	<u>Technological opportunity</u> : Logarithm of stock of citation-weighted articles in year $t-1$ for j^{th} therapeutic market. Discounted 15% per year.	IMS NDTT™ & MIDAS™, PubMed and SCOPUS Sciverse	29,514	8.04	7.30	0	14.4
Z_{ijt-1}	<u>Technological challenges</u> : Counts of suspended or discontinued pipeline projects and withdrawn approved products at $i, j, t-1$ level.	Pharmaprojects	29,514	0.05	0.26	0	6
D_{ijt-1}	<u>Firm innovative capability I</u> : Moving average of product introductions in $t-1, t-2, t-3$ at the $i, j, t-1$ level.	Pharmaprojects	29,514	0.24	1.01	0	25.67
P_{ijt-1}	<u>Firm innovative capability II</u> : Count of Phase II and Phase III products at the $i, j, t-1$ level.	Pharmaprojects	29,514	0.09	0.35	0	6
SA_{ijt}	<u>Downstream co-specialized assets</u> : Ratio of promotions at the i, j, t level and total pharmaceutical sales at the i, j, t level.	IMS MIDAS™	29,514	0.48	20.12	0	2225
S_{it}	<u>Firm size</u> : Logarithm of total pharmaceutical sales at the i, t level.	IMS MIDAS™	29,514	12.71	4.44	0	17.23

Table 2. Flow of innovation (Poisson). This table presents results from Poisson models across four specifications over our full sample. Model 4 serves as our base specification as it contains our full array of fixed effects, including an interaction between market (ATC1) and time (Year). The dependent variable, I_{ijt} , is defined as early-stage innovation. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	I_{ijt}	I_{ijt}	I_{ijt}	I_{ijt}
G_{ijt-1}			-1.373*** (0.133)	-1.360*** (0.133)
O_{jt-1}		0.0118** (0.00479)	0.0347*** (0.00375)	0.0345*** (0.00368)
Z_{ijt-1}		0.398*** (0.0299)	0.367*** (0.0249)	0.369*** (0.0228)
D_{ijt-1}	0.106*** (0.00993)	0.114*** (0.0103)	0.101*** (0.00816)	0.104*** (0.00801)
P_{ijt-1}	0.246*** (0.0447)	0.138*** (0.0365)	0.132*** (0.0351)	0.141*** (0.0375)
SA_{ijt}	-0.00271 (0.00310)	-0.00266 (0.00304)	-0.000823 (0.00124)	-0.000766 (0.00122)
S_{it}	0.00965 (0.00649)	0.0116* (0.00612)	0.0195** (0.00831)	0.0198** (0.00846)
Constant	0.330 (0.246)	0.194 (0.245)	-0.438** (0.222)	0.0626 (0.349)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
ATC1 FE	Y	Y	N	Y
ATC1 x Year FE	N	N	N	Y
Observations	29,514	29,514	29,514	29,514
Pseudo log likelihood	-28846.07	-28108.87	-26524.64	-26348.69

Table 3. Flow of innovation (Negative Binomial). This table presents results from Negative Binomial models across four specifications over our full sample. Model 4 serves as our base specification as it contains our full array of fixed effects, including an interaction between market (ATC1) and time (Year). The dependent variable, I_{ijt} , is defined as early-stage innovation. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	I_{ijt}	I_{ijt}	I_{ijt}	I_{ijt}
G_{ijt-1}			-1.476*** (0.112)	-1.465*** (0.112)
O_{jt-1}		0.00778* (0.00429)	0.0356*** (0.00378)	0.0352*** (0.00376)
Z_{ijt-1}		0.653*** (0.0329)	0.573*** (0.0310)	0.570*** (0.0311)
D_{ijt-1}	0.227*** (0.0312)	0.208*** (0.0288)	0.173*** (0.0236)	0.173*** (0.0236)
P_{ijt-1}	0.202*** (0.0410)	0.127*** (0.0433)	0.104** (0.0406)	0.105** (0.0407)
SA_{ijt}	-0.00490 (0.00345)	-0.00468 (0.00351)	-0.00188 (0.00183)	-0.00180 (0.00180)
S_{it}	0.00102 (0.00729)	0.00485 (0.00715)	0.0143* (0.00838)	0.0143* (0.00842)
Constant	0.410* (0.241)	0.255 (0.233)	-0.409* (0.212)	0.0140 (0.345)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
ATC1 FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
ATC1 x Year FE	N	N	N	Y
Observations	29,514	29,514	29,514	29,514
Log likelihood	-26759.09	-26336.31	-24936.29	-25031.03

Table 4. Robustness checks. This table presents three placebo tests based on a negative binomial specification (Models 1 – 3). Model 1 redefines the dependent variable as novel early-stage innovation, *Novel I_{ijt}* while Model 2 redefines the dependent variable as late-stage innovation, *Late Stage I_{ijt}*. The sample is restricted in Model 3 to markets where we anticipate low cross-molecular substitution. These include: anti-epileptics, anti-depressants, and anti-psychotics. The dependent variable is defined as early-stage innovation, *I_{ijt}*. Finally, in Model 4 we present a linear specification of our baseline model including our full array of fixed effects. However, Model 4 now includes fixed effects at a more disaggregate level of therapeutic markets, ATC2. Both the market fixed effect and the market-year interacted fixed effect are included in Model 4. Note, *Ojt-1* is excluded from Model 4 as it is measured at the ATC2-level. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	NegBin	NegBin	NegBin	OLS
VARIABLES	<i>Novel I_{ijt}</i>	<i>Late Stage I_{ijt}</i>	<i>Low CMS I_{ijt}</i>	<i>I_{ijt}</i>
<i>G_{ijt-1}</i>	-1.096*** (0.187)	-0.0686 (0.110)	-0.106 (0.268)	-0.583*** (0.0700)
<i>O_{jt-1}</i>	0.0258*** (0.00807)	0.0339*** (0.00756)	1.101 (1.426)	
<i>Z_{ijt-1}</i>	0.390*** (0.0574)	0.434*** (0.0337)	0.262*** (0.0729)	1.505*** (0.179)
<i>D_{ijt-1}</i>	0.0837*** (0.0188)	0.168*** (0.0230)	0.154*** (0.0409)	0.364*** (0.0424)
<i>P_{ijt-1}</i>	0.0597 (0.0740)		-0.00779 (0.110)	0.478*** (0.126)
<i>SA_{ijt}</i>	-0.000482 (0.00196)	-0.00844** (0.00358)	-0.0499 (0.529)	-0.000117 (0.000167)
<i>S_{it}</i>	0.00764 (0.00996)	-0.00817 (0.0115)	0.0184 (0.0265)	0.00928 (0.0109)
Constant	-23.28*** (1.100)	-21.02*** (1.074)	-15.29 (19.30)	1.008*** (0.140)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
ATC1 FE	Y	Y	Y	N
ATC1 x Year FE	Y	Y	N	N
ATC2 FE	N	N	N	Y
ATC2 x Year FE	N	N	N	Y
Observations	29,514	29,514	1,577	29,514
Log likelihood/R ²	-5603.75	-6616.19	-1189.71	0.404

Table 5. Flow of innovation (IV and System GMM Specifications). Models 1 and 2 present results from two-stage least square regressions where we instrument for G_{ijt-1} . Both models include our full array of fixed effects, including the interaction between market and time. The market level in Model 1 is ATC1 while Model 2 uses the more disaggregate ATC2-level. Model 3 implements an Arellano and Bond system GMM where we also instrument for G_{ijt-1} and incorporate a lagged dependent variable. Again, in Model 2, O_{jt-1} is omitted because it is constructed at the ATC2-level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
	IV	IV	SYSTEM GMM
	I_{ijt}	I_{ijt}	I_{ijt}
G_{ijt-1}	-0.668*** (0.191)	-1.204*** (0.582)	-0.444*** (0.160)
I_{ijt-1}			0.506*** (0.113)
O_{jt-1}	0.0135*** (0.00361)		0.00105 (0.00244)
Z_{ijt-1}	1.800*** (0.196)	1.542*** (0.108)	0.720 (0.501)
D_{ijt-1}	0.402*** (0.0419)	0.395*** (0.025)	0.445*** (0.152)
P_{ijt-1}	0.667*** (0.150)	0.495*** (0.088)	0.0654 (0.372)
SA_{ijt}	-4.81e-06 (0.000161)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.00164 (0.00399)
S_{it}	0.0280*** (0.00621)	0.038*** (0.003)	0.00678 (0.00862)
Constant	0.216 (0.140)	0.0609 (0.477)	0.414*** (0.144)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y
ATC1 FE	Y	N	N
ATC1 x Year FE	Y	N	N
ATC2 FE	N	Y	Y
ATC2 x Year	N	Y	N
Observation	29,514	29,514	21,088
R ² /Wald X ²	0.384	0.479	1763.13

Table 6. Change in innovation (OLS and Ordered Logit). Across all four specifications the dependent variable $cat(CI_{ijt}-BI_{ijt})$, equals 1, 2 and 3 if the difference $(CI_{ijt} - BI_{ijt})$ is negative, zero, or positive, respectively. Note, CI_{ijt} is defined as chemical-based early-stage innovation while BI_{ijt} is defined as biologic-based early-stage innovation. Models 1 and 2 present results from OLS with a full array of fixed effects. Model 1 includes market fixed effects at the ATC1-level while Model 2 includes market fixed effects at the more disaggregate ATC2-level. Models 3 and 4 present ordered logit models, with Model 4 including a full set of fixed effects, including the interaction between market and time, at the ATC1-level. In Model 2, O_{jt-1} is omitted because it is constructed at the ATC2-level. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	OLS	OLS	OLOGIT	OLOGIT
VARIABLES	$cat(CI_{ijt}-BI_{ijt})$	$cat(CI_{ijt}-BI_{ijt})$	$cat(CI_{ijt}-BI_{ijt})$	$cat(CI_{ijt}-BI_{ijt})$
G_{ijt-1}	-0.333*** (0.0212)	-0.382*** (0.0291)	-1.823*** (0.0480)	-1.830*** (0.0482)
O_{jt-1}	0.00430*** (0.000988)		0.0220*** (0.00263)	0.0222*** (0.00263)
$diff(Z_{ijt-1})$	0.174*** (0.0284)	0.136*** (0.0243)	2.428*** (0.203)	2.448*** (0.204)
$diff(D_{ijt-1})$	0.0628*** (0.00954)	0.0366*** (0.00784)	0.777*** (0.0558)	0.780*** (0.0564)
$diff(P_{ijt-1})$	0.210*** (0.0180)	0.153*** (0.0167)	1.874*** (0.0651)	1.880*** (0.0656)
$diff(SA_{ijt})$	-0.0073*** (0.0021)	-0.0003 (0.0003)	-0.000427*** (0.000152)	-0.000422*** (0.000156)
S_{it}	0.00214 (0.00204)	0.00323 (0.00199)	0.0194* (0.0111)	0.0224** (0.0112)
Constant	3.094*** (0.0750)	2.802*** (0.0763)	-20.81 (30.94)	-22.18 (218.7)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
ATC1 FE	Y	N	Y	Y
ATC1 x Year FE	Y	N	N	Y
ATC2 FE	N	Y	N	N
ATC2 x Year FE	N	Y	N	N
Observations	29,514	29,514	29,514	29,514
R ² /Pseudo R ²	0.466	0.569	0.402	0.405

Table 7. Change in innovation (SUR). This table presents results from three SUR specifications. CI_{ijt} is defined as chemical-based early-stage innovation while BI_{ijt} is defined as biologic-based early-stage innovation. The specifications differ in the mix of fixed effects included. Regardless of choice, our core results remain: generic penetration (G_{ijt-1}) is negatively associated with chemical-based innovation but positively associated with biologic-based innovation. Clustered standard errors at the firm level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	(1) SUR		(2) SUR		(3) SUR	
	CI_{ijt}	BI_{ijt}	CI_{ijt}	BI_{ijt}	CI_{ijt}	BI_{ijt}
G_{ijt-1}	-0.594*** (0.0207)	0.0375** (0.0170)	-0.592*** (0.0207)	0.0392** (0.0170)	-0.612*** (0.0242)	0.0437** (0.0204)
O_{jt-1}	0.0168*** (0.00122)	-0.00363*** (0.001000)	0.0167*** (0.00122)	-0.00368*** (0.000998)	-0.00543 (0.0621)	-0.0126 (0.0522)
Z_{ijt-1}	1.306*** (0.0281)	0.404*** (0.0231)	1.311*** (0.0282)	0.406*** (0.0231)	1.107*** (0.0256)	0.375*** (0.0215)
D_{ijt-1}	0.203*** (0.00745)	0.166*** (0.00611)	0.204*** (0.00744)	0.166*** (0.00611)	0.211*** (0.00710)	0.150*** (0.00597)
P_{ijt-1}	0.132*** (0.0219)	0.492*** (0.0179)	0.129*** (0.0219)	0.494*** (0.0179)	0.0658*** (0.0201)	0.400*** (0.0169)
SA_{ijt}	-0.000267 (0.000358)	0.000144 (0.000294)	-0.000493 (0.000362)	0.000153 (0.000294)	-0.000261 (0.000358)	0.000140 (0.000294)
S_{it}	0.00842** (0.00414)	0.000264 (0.00339)	0.00845** (0.00414)	0.000196 (0.00340)	0.0115*** (0.00374)	-0.00119 (0.00314)
Constant	0.843 (1.151)	0.00863 (0.944)	0.860 (1.162)	0.0362 (0.954)	0.844 (1.040)	0.0348 (0.875)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
ATC1 FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
ATC1 x Year FE	N	N	Y	Y	N	N
ATC2 FE	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	29,514	29,514	29,514	29,514	29,514	29,514
R ²	0.322	0.369	0.326	0.372	0.449	0.462

Table 8. Robustness: Change in innovation (SUR). In these two SUR specifications we limit the sample to those markets where biologic-based innovation is most active. Based on data from Pharamaprojects, these include ATC1 markets: F, J and T. The intuition behind this approach is simple, if a rotation is taking place from chemical-based to biologic-based innovation, the effects should be amplified in markets where the rotation is easier for firms to undertake. Results are consistent with this intuition. CI_{ijt} is defined as chemical-based early-stage innovation while BI_{ijt} is defined as biologic-based early-stage innovation. Clustered standard errors at the firm level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VARIABLES	(1) SUR		(2) SUR	
	CI_{ijt}	BI_{ijt}	CI_{ijt}	BI_{ijt}
G_{ijt-1}	-1.085*** (0.0732)	0.229* (0.139)	-1.054*** (0.0776)	0.334** (0.145)
O_{jt-1}	0.0922*** (0.00449)	-0.0467*** (0.00855)	0.256 (0.201)	-0.100 (0.378)
Z_{ijt-1}	0.558*** (0.0460)	1.192*** (0.0875)	0.522*** (0.0435)	1.049*** (0.0815)
D_{ijt-1}	0.0555*** (0.00939)	0.195*** (0.0179)	0.0788*** (0.00933)	0.175*** (0.0175)
P_{ijt-1}	-0.155*** (0.0291)	0.741*** (0.0554)	-0.124*** (0.0279)	0.599*** (0.0523)
SA_{ijt}	-0.000623 (0.00272)	0.00940* (0.00518)	-0.000128 (0.00256)	0.0117** (0.00480)
S_{it}	0.00536 (0.00850)	-0.00200 (0.0162)	0.00874 (0.00801)	-0.00715 (0.0150)
Constant	0.958*** (0.197)	0.417 (0.375)	0.785*** (0.191)	0.805** (0.357)
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
ATC1 FE	Y	Y	N	N
ATC1 x Year FE	Y	Y	N	N
ATC2 FE	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	4,958	4,958	4,958	4,958
R ²	0.284	0.429	0.365	0.509