

# Discussion of “The Economic Effects of the English Parliamentary Enclosures”

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Discussion focus on three aspects of the paper

- 1) Question: effect of enclosure or effect of privatization?
  - Data: amazing new data set
- 2) Design: questions about instrument and its logic
- 3) Results: why do we see increased performance of privately held property?

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
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  - Why are the compliers **to this instrument** the interesting subsample to estimate the effect?
  - (Personally) struggle with intuition about compliance with this instrument

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Theoretical question: what is the effect of privatization? (Marx's question, I think)


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
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


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- If enclosures  $\rightsquigarrow$  infrastructure from government  $\rightsquigarrow$  outcomes that is interesting, but unrelated to private vs collective debate

# Leave one out instrument and historical time frame

Figure 2: THE NUMBER OF PARISHES ENCLOSED THROUGH PARLIAMENT, BY YEAR



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- For each parish, calculate proportion of neighboring parishes that successfully petition government
- With turnover, very different members of parliament on committee
- What is the economic model that implies this is exogenous?

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Why do We See Increased Performance of Private Land? Or, annoying questions about mechanisms?

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- Is it private holding of land or more expertise about farming?
- Does the **time** at which the land was privatized matter?

# “Big Questions” and Historical Studies

Often asserted that “Big questions” necessarily can’t be answered precisely  
This study  $\rightsquigarrow$  engages in a 250 year old debate with careful data, analysis,  
and interpretation  
Precise answers + Big questions