Crony Capitalism in Modern China

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THE CHINESE ECONOMY IN THE LONG RUN, STANFORD

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OUTLINE

China is a bureaucratic-authoritarian one-party state, in principle highly centralized but in practice substantially decentralized.

Kroeber, 2016

- * REAL-WORLD CASES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
 - Dual roles: government officials serving as corporate executives
- **❖ CENTRAL-LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS (**央地关系)
 - Misalignment of incentives between central and local governments
- AN INTERESTING CASE OF AN ENTREPRENEUR MENTIONED IN THE PAPER
 - Special deals from multiple local governments



AN INTERESTING CASE



- ❖ ZHAN, XIALAI (詹夏来)
 - serving as Chairman of Chery Automobile
 - ❖Shanghai-GM's strategy of exploiting its monopoly power
 - GM used the political power of its partner SAIC to obtain exclusive rights to sell large sedans
 - How ZHAN countered and responded:
 - Secured a license for Chery (奇瑞) to manufacture car engines
 - Lobbied Beijing for a car manufacturing license, with restriction of only selling in Wuhu (芜湖)
 - Further lobbied Beijing to expand sales throughout China, though encountered significant resistance in Shanghai and other cities with established local automotive companies

1999年10月任芜湖市委书记、市长: 2000年11月任芜湖市委书记;

1999年1月任芜湖市委副书记、市长; Since January 2003, he served as the Secretary of the Wuhu Municipal Committee and Director of the Standing Committee of the Municipal People's Congress (1997/01-2004/02, he concurrently served as the Chairman of the Board of Chery Automobile Co., Ltd.).

2003年1月任芜湖市委书记、市人大常委会主任(1997年1月至2004年2月兼任奇瑞汽车有限公司董事长);

2005年5月任安徽省委常委, 芜湖市委书记、市人大常委会主任:

2008年1月任安徽省委常委, 芜湖市委书记:

2008年6月任安徽省委常委、省委秘书长:

2011年4月任安徽省委常委、省委秘书长,省政府副省长、党组副书记:

2011年10月任安徽省委常委、省政府副省长、党组副书记:

2013年8月任安徽省委常委、省政府副省长、党组副书记,省食安委主任。

Source: People's Daily Online (人民网)





MORE CASES, LGFV



SUN, ZHE (孙喆)

2004-2013: Mayor of Jiamusi City (佳木斯), concurrently serving as Chairman of the Jiamusi City Urban Infrastructure Investment and Financing Development Center (a Local Government Financing Vehicle, LGFV)




WANG, ZHAOCHUN (王赵春)

2010-2013: Party Secretary and Director of Anqing (安庆) City Finance Bureau, concurrently serving as Party Secretary and Chairman of the City Urban Investment Company (an LGFV)

Post 18th Party Congress (2013), government officials **no longer allowed** to hold concurrent positions in enterprises



CORRUPTION CASES



Data Source: Central Commission for Discipline Inspection




LGFV AND DEBT

STARTED FROM 2009 4-TRILLION STIMULUS PLAN

- Mostly implemented through local governments (Bai, Hsieh and Song, 2016, Brookings)
 - 1 trillion from Beijing; the rest via LGFV (地方政府融资平台)
 - LGFV: State-Owned Enterprises, "Corporations"
- Off-budget entities that enabled local governments to bypass borrowing restrictions while fueling explosive growth in local government debt

❖ 2017: "THE LIFETIME ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT"

- Curb local government (hidden) debt expansion by creating personal stakes for decision-makers
- Since 2022, the Ministry of Finance have publicly announced 32 accountability cases involving hidden local government debt



THE CENTRAL'S STANCE ON LOCAL PREFERENTIAL POLICIES

- IN RECENT YEARS BEIJING TRIED TO MOVE AWAY FROM A REGIME OF SPECIAL DEALS
 - In 2014, the State Council laid out specific policies to stop local leaders from providing special deals
 - In 2015, the State Council reversed its earlier decision on the use of preferential policies
 - ❖ In 2024, the State Council issued "the Fair Competition Review Regulation (公平竞争审查条例)", in order to establish a unified national market and create a level playing field for businesses
 - Prohibits local governments from creating market barriers or offering unauthorized preferential treatment



CHINESE METAL TYCOON



STORY IN THE PAPER AND ACEMOGLU AND ROBINSON (2012)

- ❖ In 2002, DAI Guofang (戴国芳) established Jiangsu Tieben (江苏铁本钢铁有限公司) in Jiangsu province (江苏省)
- ❖ With strong backing from local government officials in Changzhou (常州市), Tieben expanded aggressively
- However, DAI's ambitions collided with national industrial policy. DAI was arrested in 2004, in jail for 4 years

* EPILOGUE EXPLORED IN BAI, HSIEH AND SONG (2020)

- ❖ Following his release from prison, DAI established Jiangsu Delong Nickel Company (江苏德龙镍业有限公司) in 2008, with support from Xiangshui county (响水县) government in Yancheng city (盐城市) (another city in Jiangsu Province)
- ❖ Delong rapidly expanded across several regions in Jiangsu, including Xuzhou (徐州市) and Dainan (戴南镇), and even ventured into Indonesia



EPILOGUE TO THE EPILOGUE

SUCCESSFUL ENTERPRISES ARE ALL ALIKE; EVERY UNSUCCESSFUL ENTERPRISE IS UNSUCCESSFUL IN ITS OWN WAY

- ❖A sharp decline in ferro-nickel prices sent Delong into financial distress
- In August 2024, Delong declared bankruptcy and placed under courtsupervised restructuring
 - Well, basic market forces are at work
- It triggered a complex and contentious battle b/w various local governments that had supported the company's operations in their jurisdictions
 - These local authorities now found themselves fighting over the Delong's remaining assets, each attempting to minimize financial losses and protect local employment
- ❖ To be continued...



CONCLUDING REMARKS

- CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IS TAKING A BIGGER SHARE OF FISCAL BURDEN
 - Trade-in (like Cash for Clunkers) program
- ❖ ANECDOTALLY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE LYING FLAT (躺平) IN 2023-2024
- **♦ MARCH 4TH, 2025, OPENING SESSION OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS IN BEIJING**
 - Still set the goal of GDP growth to be 5%
 - Aggressive fiscal spending plan, from Beijing's pockets (special-purpose bonds) but implemented by local governments
 - Special deals have been gone (?), but no silver bullets from Beijing so far

