

The Great Depression May Have Started Sooner Than We Thought!

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Great Depression Remains Mysterious

- (i) Unprecedented policies in late 1929 – Hoover's White House conferences with mfg. CEOs following stock market decline.
- CEOs agreed to keep nominal wages fixed & share work across employees in event of a downturn.
- Ohanian (2009) assessed effect of those policies
- ***Why were these policies adopted?***

Great Depression Remains Mysterious

- (ii) Immediately severe, long before widely-cited factors in literature: deflation, banking distress, money supply declines
- In 1930, -13% Real GDP, -33% Business Investment
- Why did economy fall so far, so fast?

Great Depression Remains Mysterious

- (iii) **80% drop in investment at trough**
- *By comparison, WWII investment fell 60%*
 - *WWII had rationing*
 - *Wartime conversion of factories for military use*
 - *Government spending = 50% of output*
- *Why did investment fall so much?*

Great Depression Remains Mysterious

- (A) Why were labor/industrial policies implemented?
- (B) Why was Depression so immediately severe, before commonly-cited shocks occurred?
- (C) Why did investment fall so much in 1930s?
- **These issues trouble me about the Great Depression**
- **Specifically, that we are missing something important**

“What We Missed” Might be Found in 1920s Economy

- **This paper shows 1920s economy - in some ways - as much of a “one off” event as 1930s**

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- Large 1920s deviations in quantities, prices, & income distribution (capital/labor) from standard model

“What We Missed” Might be Found in 1920s Economy

- This paper shows 1920s economy - in some ways - as much of a “one off” event as 1930s
- Large deviations in quantities, prices, & income distribution in 1920s relative to standard model
 - (1) 1920s labor, investment, output far below predicted values from standard growth theory
 - (2) Large gap between Y/H & real wages emerges in 1920s – wage growth far below Y/H
 - (3) Record capital share of income (40%)

What Happened during 1920s?

Big Technical & Management Innovations

- Literature focuses on two different innovations:
 - (1) Era of the creation of the *modern firm*: changes in management, organization, & efficiency of businesses
 - Focus of much research by business historians
 - (2) Continuation of *electrification process* in factories
 - Focus of much research by economic historians
- Modify neoclassical model based on nature of large technological change occurring around that time

A Possible Resolution for Understanding 1920s


- **Model of *modern firm* brings data & model predictions closer – suggestive, work in progress**
- **Findings may shed light on why Great Depression was so immediately severe, and why investment fell so much**

How Did We Miss 1920s?

“Seduced by the Balanced Growth Path”

- Cole and Ohanian (1999, 2000, 2002), Ohanian (2009) assume 1929 was on BGP
- Same (implicit) BGP assumption about 1920s in other studies:
- **Friedman-Schwartz (1963), Lucas and Rapping (1969), Lucas (1977), Bernanke (1983)**
- Implications of 1920s BGP perspective
 - 1920s largely irrelevant for what happened in 1930s
 - Without late 1929/1930s shocks, 1930s economy would have remained on balanced growth path

Chart 2-7. Real Per Capita GDP 1890-2010



Sources: Angus Maddison, *The World Economy, Historical Statistics 1890-1929* and
Bureau of Economic Analysis, *National Income and Product Accounts, 1929-2010*.

How Did We Miss 1920s?

“Seduced by the Balanced Growth Path”

- **Output is on trend, but...**
- **Hours worked/working age population fell 5 percent**
- **Capital stock/working age population rose just 7 percent**
- **Record TFP growth exactly offsets factor inputs to keep output on BGP**


A Three-Sector Economy for the U.S. : 1889-1929

- **Study U.S. economy, beginning in 1889 using John Kendrick's (1961) U.S. national accounts data**
- **Includes BEA-definition constructions of real output and its components, hours worked, capital stock, various measures of productivity, sectoral detail**
- **Widely considered best pre-BEA U.S. data**
- **Supplement with data from *The Conference Board*, Census, Ag dept, *Historical Statistics of US***


A Three-Sector Economy for the U.S. : 1889-1929

- **Three-sector model - Ag, Manufacturing, Services**
- **Why three-sector?**
 - U.S. was still transitioning out of Ag during period
 - 1920s “One-off” features easier to see at sectoral level
 - Preferences will depart a bit from balanced growth
 - Technologies (for now) will be standard (balanced growth)

TFP: 1889-1929



Aggregate and Sectoral TFP: 1889-1929



A Three-Sector Economy for the U.S. : 1889-1929

- **Household Preferences**
- $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \{ (\rho \ln(A_t - \bar{A})) + \gamma \ln(M_t) + \theta \ln(S_t + \bar{S}) + \psi \ln(1 - h_t) \}$
- **Income elasticity of demand for agriculture (A) <1**
 - $\bar{A}$ is Stone-Geary subsistence term (necessity good)
- **Income elasticity of demand for services (S) >1**
 - $\bar{S}$ is subsidy term (luxury good, Kongsamut et. al. 2001)
- **M is consumption of manufactured goods**
- **Asymptotic expenditure shares given by ρ, γ, θ**

A Three-Sector Economy for the U.S. : 1889-1929

- Technologies are standard
- $Y_{A_t} = B_{A_t} X_t K_{A_t}^\alpha H_{A_t}^{1-\alpha} = A_t$
- $Y_{M_t} = B_{M_t} X_t K_{M_t}^\alpha H_{M_t}^{1-\alpha} = M_t + I_t$
- $Y_{S_t} = B_{S_t} X_t K_{S_t}^\alpha H_{S_t}^{1-\alpha} = S_t$
- X_t is common technology component
- B_{i_t} is sector-specific technology component


A Three-Sector Economy for the U.S. : 1889-1929

- Capital perfectly mobile across sectors
- $K_t = K_{A_t} + K_{M_t} + K_{S_t}$
- 4 uses of time, labor perfectly mobile across sectors
- $H_t = H_{A_t} + H_{M_t} + H_{S_t}$
- Standard capital accumulation:
- $K_{t+1} = I_t + (1 - \delta)K_t$
- Focus of model on decade of 1920s, not so much on year-to-year changes


Parameter Values and Solution

- Expenditure shares similar to Kongsamut et. al. (2000)
- Discounting, depreciation, leisure parameters use common values
- Subsistence & subsidy preferences terms chosen so initial labor allocations across sectors similar to data
- Productivities are from Kendrick (1961)
- Perfect foresight solution (terminal condition of BGP)


Real output: Model vs data




Labor: Model vs data




Investment: Model vs data



Consumption: Model vs data



Labor allocation across: Model vs data



Large Deviations from Standard Model Predictions

- (i) Quantities: Weak economic activity
 - Investment 60% below predicted level
 - Labor 20% below predicted level
- (iia) Prices: Real mfg wage rose 15% in 1920s, compared to 72% increase in mfg output per hour
- (iib) In contrast, real mfg wage rose 25% between 1900-1919, in 1920s, compared to 27% increase in mfg output per hour
- (iii) Income distribution: Large drop in labor share

Why Were Factor Inputs Depressed During Fastest Decade of US Productivity Growth?

- **Unlikely increase in market power or tax policies**
- *“If monopolies were permitted, opportunity would be gone. The only remedy would be a revolution. We must have vigorous competition” - Coolidge*
- *“Too much competition is destructive, it wastes resources. A certain amount of industrial cooperation is in the nation’s best interest.” - Hoover*
- Hoover created industry associations that IO economists judged to have facilitate industry cartels
- 1920s tax rates declined
 - Top rate fell from 73% to 25%
 - Average marginal rate dropped by about half
 - Corporate rate little changed, around 13%

Labor-Saving Technological Change

- **Economic historians stress importance of electrification in manufacturing:**
- **Devine (1983), Jerome (1934), Lorient (1964), and Oshima (1984)**
- **(1) Continuous production methods, mass production techniques**
- **(2) New industry-specific capital equipment**

Capital-Biased Technological Change

- Conceptually similar to *Capital-Skill Complementarity*:
Rapid growth in capital-biased technological change and high substitution elasticity between capital and unskilled labor reduced demand for the unskilled labor
- Depressed labor & compensation in 1920s – real output per hour in mfg rose 70%, but real compensation rose 15%
- “Technological Unemployment” term coined in 1920s
- “*Electricity-Capital Complementarity*”

Electricity-Capital Complementarity

- Idea: Electricity is complementary with capital, and is a substitute for labor
- $y_t = \{\alpha(A_t k_t)^\sigma + (1 - \alpha)(B_t h_t)^\sigma\}^{1/\sigma}$
- A_t, B_t are capital-biased, labor-biased technologies, respectively
- A_t includes the impact of electrification
- Assess how factor demand conditions with reasonable parameter values match data

Electricity-Capital Complementarity

- **Marginal products:**
- $F_h = \left(\frac{y}{h}\right)^{1-\sigma} (1 - \alpha)(Bh)^\sigma$
- $F_k = \left(\frac{y}{k}\right)^{1-\sigma} \alpha(Ak)^\sigma$
- **Manufacturing wages from detailed surveys by Conference Board (Beney (1936))**
- **Average mfg wage rose 15% 1929 vs. 1919**
- **Output per hour rose 72%**

Electricity-Capital Complementarity

- $\% \Delta F_h = (1 - \sigma) \% \Delta \left(\frac{y}{h} \right) + \sigma (\% \Delta B + \% \Delta h)$
- Plugging in 1929/1919 percent changes in Y/H, real manufacturing wages, hours worked:
- $15\% = (1 - \sigma) 72\% + \sigma (\% \Delta B - 5\%)$
- Assuming B did not decline, this implies:
- $\sigma = \frac{5}{6}$, $\rightarrow$ k/h substitution elasticity = 6
- Much higher than estimates in literature (0.6-2)

Electricity-Capital Complementarity

- Another challenge for electrification hypothesis: electrification was spreading throughout economy for decades
- 1899-1919, electrification rose from 4% of plant power generation to 59%
- But, real mfg compensation and output per hour grew by same amount between 1899-1919

Changes in Firm Management & Organization

- Creation of the *modern firm*: major changes in how firms were managed & organized in 1920s
- Created large efficiency gains, with firms economizing on capital and labor inputs
- Alfred Chandler: *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business*
 - *Decentralization of decision making to managers released time of executives*

“Person of Interest Number 2: Modern Firm” Changes in Firm Management & Organization

- ***Frederick Taylor, Scientific Principles of Management***
- **Taylor, was U.S.’s original “McKinsey & Company”**

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- **“The country is suffering great losses in efficiency”**
- **“The remedy is *systematic management*, not searching for an extraordinary manager”**

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- **“The remedy is *systematic management*, not searching for an extraordinary manager”**
- **“Improving efficiency will reduce resources needed to produce output”**

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- **“The country is suffering great losses in efficiency”**
- **“The remedy is *systematic management*, not searching for an extraordinary manager”**
- **“We must apply science & mathematics to replace the ‘rules-of-thumb’ that waste resources”**
- **Peter Drucker: “Taylor provided most powerful & lasting American contribution to Western thought since Federalist Papers”**

Neoclassical Production Assessment of 1920s

- *Technological advances that:*
- (1) Depress demand for labor and its compensation
- (2) Depress demand for capital
- (3) In a nutshell, businesses didn't want more factor inputs, despite enormous growth in $\frac{Y}{H}$ and $\frac{Y}{K}$

Neoclassical Production Assessment of 1920s

- *Modified technology:*
- Add third input to production function that is a substitute for capital and labor
- Third input has limited scalability (I assume it is fixed for simplicity, and that it is intangible)
- Increase its specific efficiency to match change in manufacturing sectoral productivity during 1920s

Modeling 'The Modern Firm'

- Include a third (intangible) input in manufacturing
- Similar to *Organizational Capital* literature:
- Prescott & Visscher (1980, JPE), Hall (2001, AER), Atkeson & Kehoe (2005, JPE), McGrattan & Prescott (2005, ReStud)
- Key point of literature – most corporate value is not its physical capital, it is value of *intangible capital*

Modeling 'The Modern Firm'

- **Modify production technology in Manufacturing**
- $y_t = \left\{ \mu E_t^\sigma + (1 - \mu) (A_t K_t^\alpha H_t^{1-\alpha})^\sigma \right\}^{1/\sigma}$
- **Third input, it is fixed, & is intangible**
- **It has specific efficiency E_t**
- **It has a KORV feel to it**
- **Treat payments accruing as capital income**

Modeling 'The Modern Firm'

- **Modify production technology in Manufacturing**
- $$Y_{M_t} = \left\{ \mu E_t^\sigma + (1 - \mu) (A_t K_{M_t}^\alpha H_{M_t}^{1-\alpha})^\sigma \right\}^{1/\sigma}$$
- **Exogenous efficiency, E_t , grows over time, similar to Atkeson-Kehoe (2005)**
- **Similar to McGrattan-Prescott but they restrict to Cobb-Douglas & unlimited accumulation of 3rd input**

‘The Modern Firm’ Experiments

- $Y_{M_t} = \left\{ \mu E_t^\sigma + (1 - \mu) (A_t K_{M_t}^\alpha H_{M_t}^{1-\alpha})^\sigma \right\}^{1/\sigma}$
- **We want a labor and capital saving technology, so specify substitution elasticity $\left(\frac{1}{1-\sigma}\right)$ bigger than 1**

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- **1889-1919: “Old School Firm”**
 - Parameter μ small, & growth rate of E_t same as long-run growth of X_t


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- **1889-1919: “Old School Firm”**
 - Parameter μ small, & growth rate of E_t same as long-run growth of X_t
- **1920-1929: “Modern Firm”**
 - Parameter μ & growth rate of E_t rise in 1920-1929


‘The Modern Firm’ Experiments

- $Y_{M_t} = \left\{ \mu E_t^\sigma + (1 - \mu) (A_t K_{M_t}^\alpha H_{M_t}^{1-\alpha})^\sigma \right\}^{1/\sigma}$
- Experiment with 2 different substitution elasticities, 2 and 5
- Experiment with two different pairs of μ
- $\mu = .05$, then rises to .15 in 1919
- $\mu = .02$, then rises to .20 in 1919
- For both elasticities, and for both values of μ experiments, model predictions are closer to data


Labor: Model vs data




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
Investment: Model vs data




Investment: Model vs data




Real output: Model vs data




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
Consumption: Model vs data




Consumption: Model vs data




Manufacturing: Output per manhour



Manufacturing: Output per manhour



Labor share of income




Wage




Manhours in manufacturing



Labor share of income



Wage



Manhours in manufacturing



Measuring the Impact of the Modern Firm

- $Y_{M_t} = \left\{ \mu E_t^\sigma + (1 - \mu) (A_t K_{M_t}^\alpha H_{M_t}^{1-\alpha})^\sigma \right\}^{1/\sigma}$
- Hall (2001) and McGrattan-Prescott (2005) use stock market valuation to infer the importance of μE_t
- Rising stock values indicate greater importance of intangibles
- Stock values increased 500% in 1920s (22% per year)

What This Could Mean for Great Depression

- **This change in technology depresses demand for factor inputs**
- **Implies that the impact of Hoover's nominal wage fixing program will have larger effects than in a standard technology**
- **How much larger? About three times larger.**

Conclusions

- 1920s are a “one off”, similar in some ways to 1930s
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- 1920s Low wage growth and drop in labor’s share provide explanation for why Hoover implemented policies raising wages and work-sharing
- Reconciling 1920s anomalies requires reducing mfg demand for both capital & labor
- Simple model of intangible input whose importance grows at time of “modern firm” is promising direction
- **To do list:**
 - **Analyze how Hoover program - above-market wages and work sharing – impact economy with the 3-input technology**
 - **Use stock values to quantify importance of intangibles in 1920s**