

Liquidity Dependence

Why Shrinking Central Bank Balance Sheets is an Uphill Task

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Conundrum: Where did all the liquidity go?

- Unprecedented expansion of central bank balance sheets since the GFC
- Surprisingly fragile liquidity conditions in money markets
 - Repo rate spike in September 2019
 - Dash for cash in March 2020
 - Recent turmoil in UK gilts, Sep-Oct 2022
- Are central bank balance sheet expansion and liquidity stress related?
 - Focus on banking sector liability-side (see Acharya-Rajan 2021)
 - In contrast to the more common asset-side and asset-pricing approach to QE

QE : (i) Purchase from banks

Initial Balance Sheet Conditions

| FEDERAL RESERVE | |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| Assets | Liabilities |
| Treasury securities | Reserves held by banks |
| | Cash |

| BANKING SECTOR | |
|---------------------|-------------|
| Assets | Liabilities |
| Treasury securities | Deposits |
| Reserves at the Fed | Capital |

The Fed Purchases Assets from Banks
Balance Sheet Effects

| FEDERAL RESERVE | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Assets | Liabilities |
| Treasury securities +\$1 | Reserves held by banks +\$1 |
| | Cash |

| BANKING SECTOR | |
|-----------------------------|-------------|
| Assets | Liabilities |
| Treasury securities -\$1 | Deposits |
| Reserves at the Fed +\$1 | Capital |

Asset
swap
with
banks

Source: "How the Fed Changes the Size of its Balance Sheet" (Leonard, Martin and Potter, *Liberty Street Economics*, 2017)


QE: (ii) Purchase from public/non-banks

Initial Balance Sheet Conditions

| FEDERAL RESERVE | |
|---------------------|---------------------------|
| Assets | Liabilities |
| Treasury securities | Reserves held by banks |
| | Cash held by the Treasury |

The Fed Purchases Assets from the Public
Balance Sheet Effects

| FEDERAL RESERVE | |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Assets | Liabilities |
| Treasury securities +\$1 | Reserves held by banks +\$1 |
| | Cash held by the Treasury |



Bank balance sheets expand, financed with deposits

| BANKING SECTOR | |
|---------------------|-------------|
| Assets | Liabilities |
| Treasury securities | Deposits |
| Reserves at the Fed | Capital |

| PUBLIC | |
|---------------------|-------------|
| Assets | Liabilities |
| Deposits | Net worth |
| Treasury securities | |

| BANKING SECTOR | |
|--------------------------|---------------|
| Assets | Liabilities |
| Treasury securities | Deposits +\$1 |
| Reserves at the Fed +\$1 | Capital |

| PUBLIC | |
|--------------------------|-------------|
| Assets | Liabilities |
| Deposits +\$1 | Net worth |
| Treasury securities -\$1 | |

Source: "How the Fed Changes the Size of its Balance Sheet" (Leonard, Martin and Potter, *Liberty Street Economics*, 2017)

Given different ways of Fed b/s expansion...


We seek to answer the following important questions:

- How does Fed balance-sheet (QE) expansion affect the size, deposits, and “demandability” of deposits of the banking sector?
- Do other demandable liabilities issued by banks such as credit lines to corporations also grow with reserves?
- Do these claims shrink when the Fed shrinks its balance-sheet (QT)?

QT is not simply a reversal of QE!

- QE => growth of on- and off-balance-sheet demandable bank liabilities
 - Demand deposits expand (akin to QE purchases from non-banks)
 - Plus shrinkage of deposit maturity; additional writing of credit lines
 - Why “portfolio balance” view of QE transmission may not work.
- QT => No shrinkage of these liquidity claims
 - they continue to grow post-QE and remain stable during QT
- “Liquidity dependence” in the banking system
 - Ratcheting up of central bank b/s size as it injects more reserves with each stress
- QT can be an uphill task


Traditional view: Exogenous demand for liquidity



Price of Liquidity =


- As demand is exogenous, increasing supply of reserves is stabilizing

Dependence view: Liquidity demand affected by reserves




- Supply of reserves creates its own additional demand, new claims written by banks.
- Liquidity conditions and the effect of quantitative tightening depend on how these claims evolve.


Reserves and Claims (% of GDP)




Reserves and Claims (% of GDP)




Reserves and Claims (% of GDP)




Claims on Liquidity (multiple of reserves)




Demandable and Time Deposits (% of GDP)




Demandable and Time Deposits (% of GDP)



Demandable and Time Deposits (% of GDP)



Uninsured/Insured Demandable/Time Deposits (% of GDP)



Empirical Tests

- Aggregate, time-series evidence
 - Reserves -> Quantities of demandable claims
 - Reserves -> Price of demandable claims
- Panel tests across banks
 - Reserves -> Quantities
 - Instrument for bank-level reserves
 - Reserves -> Price of liquidity -- Term Spread in deposit rates
 - Instrument for bank-level reserves and deposits
 - Reserves -> Price of liquidity -- Credit line fees
 - Instrument for bank-level reserves and credit line originations

Data Sources

We examine over the time period 2001Q1 – 2021Q4

- Aggregate Reserves, Deposits, Credit Lines Outstanding, GDP data – FRED and Flow of Funds (Financial Accounts of the United States) Data
- Bank Balance Sheet Data – FDIC's Call Reports Data
- Bank-County Level Deposit Data – Branch Office Deposits in FDIC Summary of Deposits
- Bank-Drop instrument-Level Interest Rate Data – S&P Global's *RateWatch* database
- Credit Lines Originations and Pricing data – Dealscan *Refinitiv LoanConnector*

Time-series analysis: Reserves -> Claims

$$\Delta Y_t = \alpha \Delta X_t + \beta X_{t-12} + \varepsilon_t$$

$\Delta Y_t = Y_t - Y_{t-12}$ is either the $\Delta \ln(\text{Deposits})$ or $\ln(\text{Credit Lines})$ or the Δ of Deposits or Credit Lines

$\Delta X_t = X_t - X_{t-12}$ is respectively either the $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ or the Δ Reserves.

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|
| | $\Delta \ln(\text{Deposits})$ | $\Delta \ln(\text{Demand Deposits})$ | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | $\Delta \ln(\text{Credit Lines})$ | $\Delta \text{Deposits}$ | $\Delta \text{Demand Deposits}$ | $\Delta \text{Time Deposits}$ | $\Delta \text{Credit Lines}$ |
| $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | 0.137*** (0.0368) | 0.180*** (0.0541) | -0.242** (0.114) | 0.0802*** (0.0282) | | | | |
| $\ln(\text{Reserves})_{t-12}$ | 0.0503*** (0.0140) | 0.0136 (0.0227) | -0.0251 (0.0702) | 0.0882*** (0.0323) | | | | |
| $\Delta \text{Reserves}$ | | | | | 0.999*** (0.242) | 1.358*** (0.314) | -0.224** (0.0932) | 0.147*** (0.0392) |
| Reserves_{t-12} | | | | | 0.329*** (0.0691) | 0.343*** (0.0838) | 0.0726 (0.0684) | 0.146*** (0.0399) |
| Constant | -0.327*** (0.106) | -0.0265 (0.172) | 0.163 (0.533) | -0.616** (0.249) | -88.97 (169.3) | -15.98 (164.0) | -220.0 (150.2) | -162.4* (91.28) |
| Obs | 147 | 147 | 147 | 147 | 147 | 147 | 147 | 147 |
| R-sq | 0.592 | 0.589 | 0.296 | 0.232 | 0.663 | 0.673 | 0.334 | 0.416 |
| Reg-Type | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS |
| S.E.(# Lags) | Newey-West (12) | Newey-West (12) | Newey-West (12) | Newey-West (12) | Newey-West (12) | Newey-West (12) | Newey-West (12) | Newey-West 20 (12) |

Reserves →
Demandable
deposits and CLs

Time-series analysis: Reserves -> Price of liquidity

LS-VJ (2022):

$$\begin{aligned} &EFFR - IOR_t \\ &= \alpha \ln(Reserves)_t + \beta \ln(Deposits)_t + \gamma \ln(Credit\ Line)_t + \varepsilon_t \end{aligned}$$

OR (to address issues of non-stationarity and co-linearity)

$$\begin{aligned} &\Delta(EFFR - IOR)_t \\ &= \alpha \Delta \ln(Reserves)_t + \beta \Delta \ln(Deposits)_t + \gamma \Delta \ln(Credit\ Line)_t + \varepsilon_t \end{aligned}$$



$\Delta X_t = X_t - X_{t-4}$ for regressions with quarterly variables and

$\Delta X_t = X_t - X_{t-12}$ for regressions with monthly variables

| | (1) EFFR-IOR | (2) EFFR-IOR | (3) EFFR-IOR | (4) EFFR-IOR | (5) EFFR-IOR | (6) EFFR-IOR |
|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Ln(Reserves) | -0.0122 (0.0266) | -0.188*** (0.0125) | -0.188*** (0.0148) | -0.150*** (0.0107) | -0.145*** (0.0103) | -0.191*** (0.0158) |
| Ln(Deposits) | | 0.365*** (0.0159) | | | | |
| Ln(Demand Deposits) | | | 0.315*** (0.0147) | | | 0.251*** (0.0433) |
| Ln(Time Deposits) | | | 0.105*** (0.0350) | | | 0.0701 (0.0445) |
| Ln(Credit Lines) | | | | 0.333*** (0.0215) | 0.294*** (0.0199) | 0.0893* (0.0481) |
| Ln(Usage) | | | | | 0.0200** (0.00781) | -0.00754 (0.00628) |
| Constant | 0.00446 (0.198) | -2.048*** (0.113) | -2.355*** (0.408) | -1.570*** (0.164) | -1.709*** (0.180) | -2.028*** (0.478) |
| Obs | 155 | 155 | 155 | 155 | 155 | 155 |
| R-sq | 0.00702 | 0.894 | 0.895 | 0.843 | 0.851 | 0.902 |
| Reg-Type | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS |
| S.E.(# Lags) | Newey-West (12) | Newey-West (12) | Newey-West (12) | Newey-West (12) | Newey-West (12) | Newey-West (12) |



Reserves, Claims, and the Price of Liquidity



Note: inspired by Lopez-Salido and Vissing-Jorgensen (2022)

| | (1) ΔEFFR-IOR | (2) ΔEFFR-IOR | (3) ΔEFFR-IOR | (4) ΔEFFR-IOR | (5) ΔEFFR-IOR | (6) ΔEFFR-IOR |
|----------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| ΔLn(Reserves) | -0.155*** (0.0319) | -0.188*** (0.0368) | -0.186*** (0.0308) | -0.161*** (0.0290) | -0.173*** (0.0313) | -0.220*** (0.0213) |
| ΔLn(Total Deposits) | | 0.474** (0.211) | | | | |
| ΔLn(Demand Deposits) | | | 0.344*** (0.125) | | | 0.376*** (0.0961) |
| ΔLn(Time Deposits) | | | -0.00215 (0.0612) | | | 0.0460 (0.0610) |
| ΔLn(Credit Lines) | | | | 0.140** (0.0523) | 0.183*** (0.0496) | 0.170*** (0.0482) |
| ΔLn(Usage) | | | | | -0.0157*** (0.00518) | -0.0123* (0.00660) |
| Constant | 0.00173** (0.000751) | -0.000692 (0.00120) | -0.000857 (0.00130) | 0.00325 (0.00196) | 0.00318 (0.00200) | -0.00385* (0.00210) |
| Obs | 154 | 154 | 154 | 51 | 51 | 51 |
| R-sq | 0.277 | 0.305 | 0.314 | 0.521 | 0.561 | 0.607 |
| Reg-Type | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS |
| Standard-Error | Newey-West | Newey-West | Newey-West | Newey-West | Newey-West | Newey-West |
| #Lags | 12 | 12 | 12 | 4 | 4 | 4 |

From time-series to panel tests

- Time-series evidence suggests
 - Reserves affect claims on liquidity held by the banking system
 - Demandable deposits and credit lines rise
 - Time deposits shrink
 - Claims on liquidity have to be accounted for to price liquidity
- Time-series tests lack power to analyze individual QE/QT periods
 - Can't rule out confounding effects due to interest rates, economic activity
- Hence, panel tests...

Challenges in panel tests

- Reserves are exogenous for the banking system as a whole
- Reserves are however endogenous for each individual bank
- Reserves may correlate with higher time-deposits and lower demand deposits / credit-lines due to risk-aversion / regulations (LCR)
 - => Relation to overall deposits dampened or ambiguous
 - => Correlation of reserves positive with time-deposits
- Hence, we instrument bank-level reserves with
 - Exogenous variation in reserves (aggregate change in reserves)
 - Non-transient bank-level variation (bank's share over the past year)

Instrument for Reserves

$$z_{it}^R = \ln\left(\frac{\text{Aggregate Reserves}_t}{\text{Aggregate Reserves}_{t-1}}\right) \times \frac{1}{4} \sum_{k=1}^4 \text{Bank } i\text{'s share of aggregate reserves}_{t-k}$$

Bank i's share of aggregate reserves in quarter t is calculated by dividing the bank-level reserves by aggregate central bank reserves.

Rationale:

- Average of lagged share reflects “location” of the bank with regard to picking up exogenous reserves
 - being a money-center bank,
 - having relationships with non-banks tendering assets to the Fed
- Assumption: Endogenous responses caused by shocks uncorrelated to “location”

Summary of Panel Test Results

- Mirror time-series quantity results with instrumented reserves
 - Reserves → Demandable Deposits ↑ in QE, but no reversal of claims in post-QE / QT

Deposit Quantity (bank-level)

IV 1st Stage:

$$\Delta \ln(Reserves)_{it} = \gamma_1 Reserves\ Instrument_{it} + \gamma_2 \ln(Reserves_{it-5}) + \delta_t + \mu_{it}$$

where $\Delta(Y)_{it} = Y_{it} - Y_{it-4}$, and δ_t represents (quarter) time-fixed effects

IV 2nd Stage:

$$\Delta \ln(Deposits)_{it} = \beta_1 Instr \Delta \ln(Reserves)_{it} + \beta_2 \ln(Reserves)_{it-5} + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where $\Delta(Y)_{it} = Y_{it} - Y_{it-4}$, and τ_t represents (quarter) time-fixed effects

Total Deposits – IV 2nd Stage

Relative to OLS,
QE effect
amplified; QT
effect reversed

| Panel A.2 | (1) $\Delta \ln(\text{Total Deposits})$ | (2) $\Delta \ln(\text{Total Deposits})$ | (3) $\Delta \ln(\text{Total Deposits})$ | (4) $\Delta \ln(\text{Total Deposits})$ |
|-------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | 0.0252** (0.0112) | 0.0248** (0.0101) | 0.0248** (0.0100) | -0.130** (0.0617) |
| $\ln(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | 0.00264** (0.00121) | 0.00215 (0.00139) | 0.00227 (0.00141) | -0.00771* (0.00401) |
| Obs | 115680 | 50982 | 43177 | 30789 |
| Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Clustered SE | | | | |
| Reg Type | IV | IV | IV | IV |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Demand & Savings Deposits – IV 2nd Stage

Amplified

| Panel B.2.1 | (1) $\Delta \ln(\text{Demand} + \text{Savings Deposits})$ | (2) $\Delta \ln(\text{Demand} + \text{Savings Deposits})$ | (3) $\Delta \ln(\text{Demand} + \text{Savings Deposits})$ | (4) $\Delta \ln(\text{Demand} + \text{Savings Deposits})$ |
|-------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | 0.128*** (0.0168) | 0.121*** (0.0172) | 0.124*** (0.0147) | -0.134** (0.0677) |
| $\ln(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | 0.0136*** (0.00185) | 0.0152*** (0.00246) | 0.0156*** (0.00228) | -0.00929** (0.00436) |
| Obs | 115533 | 50921 | 43130 | 30770 |
| Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time | Y | Y | Y | Bank only |
| Clustered Ses | | | | |
| Reg Type | IV | IV | IV | IV |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Time Deposits – IV 2nd Stage

Sign flip from OLS:
Reserves cause time
deposits to fall

| Panel B.2.2 | (1) $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | (2) $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | (3) $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | (4) $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ |
|-------------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | -0.102*** (0.0323) | -0.0831** (0.0309) | -0.0789*** (0.0233) | 0.125 (0.175) |
| $\ln(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | -0.0138*** (0.00388) | -0.0198*** (0.00486) | -0.0175*** (0.00325) | 0.0116* (0.0116) |
| Obs | 114689 | 50555 | 42853 | 30551 |
| Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Clustered SEs | | | | |
| Reg Type | IV | IV | IV | IV |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Summary of Panel Test Results

- Mirror time-series quantity results with instrumented reserves
 - Reserves → Demandable Deposits ↑ in QE, but no reversal of claims in post-QE / QT
 - Reserves → Credit lines to IG + non-rated firms ↑ in QE, but no reversal in post-QE / QT

Credit Lines – IV 2nd Stage

Reserves cause credit lines to rise in QE.
No reversal in QT

| | (1) $\Delta \ln(\text{Credit Lines})$ | (2) $\Delta \ln(\text{Credit Lines})$ | (3) $\Delta \ln(\text{Credit Lines})$ | (4) $\Delta \ln(\text{Credit Lines})$ |
|--------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | 0.0584** (0.0248) | 0.0678** (0.0268) | 0.0614** (0.0231) | 0.440 (3.847) |
| $\ln(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | -0.00684 (0.00870) | -0.00207 (0.0126) | -0.00255 (0.0121) | 0.00755 (0.174) |
| Obs | 2263 | 910 | 679 | 575 |
| Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank and Time Clustered Ses | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Reg Type | IV | IV | IV | IV |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

NOTE: Credit lines analysis is at bank-holding-company-level


Summary of Panel Test Results

- Mirror time-series quantity results with instrumented reserves
 - Reserves → Demandable Deposits \uparrow in QE, but no reversal of claims in post-QE / QT
 - Reserves → Credit lines to IG + non-rated firms \uparrow in QE, but no reversal in post-QE / QT
- Mirror time-series results on the price of liquidity (also instrument deposits)
 - Reserves → Term spread of deposits \downarrow [3m/18m/24m CD rate - Savings rate]
 - Again, effects during QE, but no reversal in post-QE / QT

(Panel) Reserves -> Lower deposit term spreads

| Panel B: IV | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | 3 month CD Rate - Savings Rate | 12 month CD Rate - Savings Rate | 18 month CD Rate - Savings Rate | 24 month CD Rate - Savings Rate |
| Ln(Total Deposits) | 0.179 (0.178) | 0.330* (0.177) | 0.496* (0.253) | 0.400** (0.169) |
| Ln(Reserves) | -0.109*** (0.0304) | -0.0502 (0.0528) | -0.220*** (0.0558) | -0.111*** (0.0282) |
| Obs | 85319 | 91212 | 76421 | 89830 |
| Bank & Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank and Time | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Clustered SEs | | | | |
| Reg Type | IV | IV | IV | IV |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 |

Bank preference to shorten the maturity of deposits in QE ; No reversal of this preference post-QE / QT



NOTE: Results robust to whether we include and instrument Total Deposits for exogenous variation

Summary of Panel Test Results

- Mirror time-series quantity results with instrumented reserves
 - Reserves → Demandable Deposits ↑ in QE, but no reversal of claims in post-QE / QT
 - Reserves → Credit lines to IG + non-rated firms ↑ in QE, but no reversal in post-QE / QT
- Mirror time-series results on the price of liquidity (instrument deposits/CLs)
 - Reserves → Term spread of deposits ↓ [3m/18m/24m CD rate - Savings rate]
 - Reserves → All-in-spread drawn/ spread undrawn of LCs to IG + non-rated firms ↓
 - Again, effects during QE, but no reversal in post-QE / QT

(Panel) Reserves -> AISD/AISU Ratio

| Panel C: IV | (1) AISD/AISU | (2) AISD/AISU | (3) AISD/AISU | (4) AISD/AISU |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------|---|---------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Ln(Reserves) | -0.840*** (0.301) | -1.545*** (0.360) | -1.581*** (0.379) | -3.380 (4.279) |
| Ln(Credit Lines) | -0.335 (0.572) | -2.208* (1.141) | -2.460 (1.483) | -5.722 (6.405) |
| Obs | 2202 | 768 | 715 | 586 |
| R-sq | -0.160 | -1.355 | -1.539 | -0.696 |
| Bank & Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank and Time Clustered SEs | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Reg Type | IV | IV | IV | IV |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |


Bank preference to make it cheaper to draw down credit lines in QE.
No reversal of this preference post-QE / QT

NOTE: Results robust to whether we include and instrument Credit Lines to separate supply from demand

Why do banks not shrink liquidity claims when reserves fall?


- Perhaps they substitute reserves with “eligible” assets?
 - Can be “repoed” for reserves with other banks
 - And with the Fed through the discount window and now the SRF

$(\text{Credit Lines} + \text{Demandable Deposits}) / (\text{Reserves} + \text{Eligible Assets})$




Dispersion across time

Distribution of $(\text{Credit Lines} + \text{Demandable Deposits}) / (\text{Reserves} + \text{Eligible Assets})$
by




Each line represents within-bucket medians across time

Histogram of the Distribution



Dispersion across time, by Bank Size Buckets

Distribution of $(\text{Credit Lines} + \text{Demandable Deposits}) / (\text{Reserves} + \text{Eligible Assets})$
by Assets Buckets



Each line represents within-bucket medians across time

Why do banks not shrink liquidity claims when reserves fall?

- Organizational constraints
 - How do you withdraw a line of credit from a relationship client?
 - Wholesale deposit desk may be hard to close.
- Moral hazard
 - Fed will come in in times of need since stress will show up in Treasury repos.

Is there a cost to repeated Fed liquidity provision?



- Market underprices liquidity, enhancing need to intervene.
 - Easy for Fed to get in, hard to get out
 - Distortion in financial activity.
 - Distortion in real activity?
- Accidents/places Fed cannot reach
- Interferes with monetary function
- Permanent fiscal financing

Policy Implications

- Demandable bank claims do not reverse in QT →
 - Financial stability objectives vs monetary policy objectives
- Monitor, understand, and manage bank-issued liquidity claims in QE/QT
 - Make reserves mobile by requiring LCR, Resolution Planning be met fortnightly?
 - > Supervisory stigma with intra-day overdrafts (Nelson, 2019)
 - Countercyclical capital requirements (SLR policy of April 2020, 2021, e.g.)
- Access for non-banks?
 - Standing repo facility, subject to prudential requirements on “shadow banks”
- Engage in QT while “feeling the stones” for financial fragility
 - Revisit desirable scale, scope, duration of QE, when “pushing on a string”?

Appendix


Uninsured Demandable Deposits (multiples) by size




— Above 90th percentile assets

— Below 90th percentile assets


Total Deposits/(Reserves and Eligible Assets): Aggregate



Distribution of Deposit Types



Deposits (multiple of reserves and of HQLA) by size



First Stage - Deposit Quantities

| | (1) $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | (2) $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | (3) $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | (4) $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ |
|---|--------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| z_{it}^R (= $\ln(\text{Reserves}_t/\text{Reserves}_{t-1}) \times$ Lagged Share in Agg. Reserves over 4Q) | 17.55*** (1.493) | 18.46*** (3.599) | 18.25*** (1.795) | -63.22* (34.41) |
| $\ln(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | -0.101*** (0.00597) | -0.124*** (0.00609) | -0.127*** (0.00967) | -0.0674*** (0.00576) |
| Constant | 1.098*** (0.0518) | 1.611*** (0.0584) | 1.559*** (0.0858) | 0.734*** (0.0564) |
| N | 115839 | 51062 | 43236 | 30830 |
| R-sq | 0.111 | 0.137 | 0.139 | 0.0192 |
| F-stat | 152.6 | 211.5 | 96.05 | 68.40 |
| Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time Clustered FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Total Deposits – OLS

| Panel A.1 | (1) $\Delta \ln(\text{Total Deposits})$ | (2) $\Delta \ln(\text{Total Deposits})$ | (3) $\Delta \ln(\text{Total Deposits})$ | (4) $\Delta \ln(\text{Total Deposits})$ |
|-------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | 0.0157*** (0.000951) | 0.0157*** (0.00145) | 0.0146*** (0.00150) | 0.0188*** (0.00109) |
| Newey-West s.e. | (0.000748) | (0.00110) | (0.00117) | (0.000916) |
| $\ln(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | 0.00171*** (0.000506) | 0.00103 (0.000704) | 0.000996 (0.000726) | 0.00228** (0.000898) |
| Newey-West s.e. | (0.000417) | (0.000547) | (0.000599) | (0.000612) |
| Constant | 0.0520*** (0.00434) | 0.0470*** (0.00642) | 0.0326*** (0.00641) | 0.0463*** (0.00809) |
| Obs | 117225 | 51009 | 43196 | 32279 |
| Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Clustered SE | | | | |
| Reg Type | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Demand & Savings Deposits– OLS

| Panel B.1.1 | (1) $\Delta \ln(\text{Demand} + \text{Savings Deposits})$ | (2) $\Delta \ln(\text{Demand} + \text{Savings Deposits})$ | (3) $\Delta \ln(\text{Demand} + \text{Savings Deposits})$ | (4) $\Delta \ln(\text{Demand} + \text{Savings Deposits})$ |
|-------------------------------|--|---|--|--|
| $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | 0.0128*** (0.00186) | 0.0151*** (0.00292) | 0.0152*** (0.00323) | 0.0171*** (0.00125) |
| Newey-West s.e. | (0.00142) | (0.00233) | (0.00256) | (0.00105) |
| $\ln(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | 0.00204*** (0.000693) | 0.00223** (0.000953) | 0.00197* (0.00104) | 0.000952 (0.00125) |
| Newey-West s.e. | (0.000556) | (0.000715) | (0.000791) | (0.00105) |
| Constant | 0.0804*** (0.00607) | 0.0885*** (0.00844) | 0.0767*** (0.00890) | 0.0783*** (0.0114) |
| N | 117076 | 50948 | 43149 | 32258 |
| Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Clustered SE | | | | |
| Reg Type | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Time Deposits– OLS

| Panel B.1.2 | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ |
| $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | 0.0134*** (0.00129) | 0.0133*** (0.00184) | 0.0139*** (0.00198) | 0.0185*** (0.00138) |
| Newey-West s.e. | (0.00104) | (0.00163) | (0.00176) | (0.00134) |
| $\ln(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | -0.00219** (0.00109) | -0.00781*** (0.00147) | -0.00566*** (0.00103) | 0.00436** (0.00187) |
| Newey-West s.e. | (0.000743) | (0.00102) | (0.000973) | (0.00145) |
| Constant | 0.0275*** (0.00944) | 0.0205 (0.0132) | 0.00879 (0.00879) | -0.0162 (0.0173) |
| N | 116227 | 50579 | 42872 | 32037 |
| Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Clustered SE | | | | |
| Reg Type | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Total Deposits – Split by p90 assets - OLS

| Above 90 th Percentile Assets | (1) ΔLn(Deposits) | (2) ΔLn(Deposits) | (3) ΔLn(Deposits) | (4) ΔLn(Deposits) |
|--|---------------------------|---|---------------------------|---------------------------------|
| ΔLn(Reserves) | 0.0178*** (0.00162) | 0.0193*** (0.00284) | 0.0178*** (0.00299) | 0.0208*** (0.00201) |
| Ln(Reserves) _{t-5} | -0.00230*** (0.000794) | -0.00258* (0.00132) | -0.00248* (0.00138) | -0.00372** (0.00135) |
| Constant | 0.119*** (0.00785) | 0.112*** (0.0141) | 0.0941*** (0.0143) | 0.140*** (0.0153) |
| N | 49119 | 19173 | 15237 | 11408 |
| R-sq | 0.0378 | 0.0700 | 0.0375 | 0.0369 |
| Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time Clustered | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| SE | | | | |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Total Deposits – Split by p90 assets - OLS

| | (1) Δ Ln(De posits) | (2) Δ Ln(De posits) | (3) Δ Ln(De posits) | (4) Δ Ln(De posits) |
|--|---------------------------|---|---------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Below 90 th Percentile Assets | | | | |
| Δ Ln(Reserves) | 0.0118*** (0.000905) | 0.0110*** (0.00105) | 0.0103*** (0.00108) | 0.0160*** (0.00108) |
| Ln(Reserves) _{t-5} | -0.00240*** (0.000698) | -0.00280*** (0.000849) | -0.00303*** (0.000915) | -0.00105 (0.00153) |
| Constant | 0.0652*** (0.00541) | 0.0627*** (0.00684) | 0.0515*** (0.00728) | 0.0616*** (0.0125) |
| N | 68106 | 31836 | 27959 | 20871 |
| R-sq | 0.0475 | 0.0890 | 0.0318 | 0.0199 |
| Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time Clustered | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| SE | | | | |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Total Deposits – Split by p90 assets - IV

| | (1) $\Delta \text{Ln}(\text{Deposits})$ | (2) $\Delta \text{Ln}(\text{Deposits})$ | (3) $\Delta \text{Ln}(\text{Deposits})$ | (4) $\Delta \text{Ln}(\text{Deposits})$ |
|--|--|---|--|--|
| Above 90 th Percentile Assets | | | | |
| $\Delta \text{Ln}(\text{Reserves})$ | 0.0277** (0.0121) | 0.0267** (0.0107) | 0.0258** (0.0107) | -0.0825* (0.0451) |
| $\text{Ln}(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | -0.00125 (0.00147) | -0.00156 (0.00191) | -0.00136 (0.00200) | -0.0114*** (0.00314) |
| N | 49119 | 19173 | 15237 | 11408 |
| R-sq | 0.0133 | 0.0247 | 0.0225 | -0.642 |
| F-stat | 16.09 | 9.235 | 7.799 | 11.06 |
| Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time Clustered | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| SE | | | | |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Total Deposits – Split by p90 assets - IV

| | (1) $\Delta \ln(\text{Deposits})$ | (2) $\Delta \ln(\text{Deposits})$ | (3) $\Delta \ln(\text{Deposits})$ | (4) $\Delta \ln(\text{Deposits})$ |
|---|--------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Below 90 th Percentile Assets | | | | |
| $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | 0.137 (0.107) | 0.110* (0.0646) | 0.127** (0.0600) | 0.0608 (0.295) |
| $\ln(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | 0.0149 (0.0149) | 0.0134 (0.0109) | 0.0157 (0.00994) | 0.00306 (0.0285) |
| N | 66561 | 31809 | 27940 | 19381 |
| R-sq | -1.210 | -1.009 | -1.403 | -0.106 |
| F-stat | 6.544 | 6.886 | 6.422 | 1.681 |
| Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time Clustered | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| SE | | | | |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Demand + Savings Deposits – Split by p90 assets - OLS

| | (1) $\Delta \text{Ln}(\text{Demand} + \text{Savings Deposits})$ | (2) $\Delta \text{Ln}(\text{Demand} + \text{Savings Deposits})$ | (3) $\Delta \text{Ln}(\text{Demand} + \text{Savings Deposits})$ | (4) $\Delta \text{Ln}(\text{Demand} + \text{Savings Deposits})$ |
|--|--|--|--|--|
| Above 90 th Percentile Assets | | | | |
| $\Delta \text{Ln}(\text{Reserves})$ | 0.0173*** (0.00345) | 0.0215*** (0.00622) | 0.0217*** (0.00690) | 0.0189*** (0.00278) |
| $\text{Ln}(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | -0.00180 (0.00126) | 0.0000709 (0.00184) | -0.000231 (0.00207) | -0.00634*** (0.00216) |
| Constant | 0.139*** (0.0124) | 0.134*** (0.0185) | 0.121*** (0.0201) | 0.178*** (0.0231) |
| N | 49037 | 19144 | 15210 | 11395 |
| R-sq | 0.0355 | 0.0443 | 0.0268 | 0.0265 |
| Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time Clustered | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| SE | | | | |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Demand + Savings Deposits – Split by p90 assets - OLS

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--|---|---|---|---|
| Below 90 th Percentile Assets | $\Delta \text{Ln}(\text{Demand} + \text{Savings Deposits})$ |
| $\Delta \text{Ln}(\text{Reserves})$ | 0.00765*** (0.00132) | 0.00873*** (0.00131) | 0.00873*** (0.00144) | 0.0149*** (0.00108) |
| $\text{Ln}(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | -0.000830 (0.000837) | -0.00212* (0.00110) | -0.00281** (0.00116) | -0.0000153 (0.00153) |
| Constant | 0.0882*** (0.00668) | 0.111*** (0.00903) | 0.104*** (0.00931) | 0.0768*** (0.0127) |
| N | 68039 | 31804 | 27939 | 20863 |
| R-sq | 0.0335 | 0.0547 | 0.0141 | 0.0137 |
| Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time Clustered | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| SE | | | | |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Demand + Savings Deposits – Split by p90 assets - IV

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--|---|---|---|---|
| Above 90 th Percentile Assets | $\Delta \text{Ln}(\text{Demand} + \text{Savings Deposits})$ |
| $\Delta \text{Ln}(\text{Reserves})$ | 0.148*** (0.0163) | 0.136*** (0.0176) | 0.138*** (0.0156) | -0.0279 (0.0616) |
| $\text{Ln}(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | 0.0122*** (0.00223) | 0.0157*** (0.00334) | 0.0160*** (0.00332) | -0.00981*** (0.00302) |
| N | 49037 | 19144 | 15210 | 11395 |
| R-sq | -0.477 | -0.421 | -0.465 | -0.0394 |
| Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time Clustered | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| SE | | | | |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Demand + Savings Deposits – Split by p90 assets - IV

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--|---|---|---|---|
| Below 90 th Percentile Assets | $\Delta \text{Ln}(\text{Demand} + \text{Savings Deposits})$ |
| $\Delta \text{Ln}(\text{Reserves})$ | 0.213* | 0.172** | 0.176** | 0.0997 |
| | (0.125) | (0.0718) | (0.0787) | (0.317) |
| $\text{Ln}(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | 0.0275 | 0.0246* | 0.0240* | 0.00781 |
| | (0.0174) | (0.0122) | (0.0131) | (0.0305) |
| N | 66496 | 31777 | 27920 | 19375 |
| R-sq | -1.831 | -1.574 | -1.642 | -0.291 |
| Bank & Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time Clustered | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| FE | | | | |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Time Deposits – Split by p90 assets - OLS

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--|------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Above 90 th Percentile Assets | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ |
| $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | 0.0177*** (0.00267) | 0.0210*** (0.00407) | 0.0218*** (0.00445) | 0.0214*** (0.00284) |
| $\ln(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | -0.00485*** (0.00171) | -0.0131*** (0.00240) | -0.0109*** (0.00196) | 0.00452 (0.00362) |
| Constant | 0.0794*** (0.0164) | 0.0816*** (0.0244) | 0.0786*** (0.0194) | 0.0244 (0.0381) |
| N | 48552 | 18923 | 15076 | 11220 |
| R-sq | 0.0867 | 0.0907 | 0.0716 | 0.0358 |
| Bank & Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time Clustered | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| FE | | | | |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Time Deposits – Split by p90 assets - OLS

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--|------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Below 90 th Percentile Assets | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ |
| $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | 0.00820*** (0.000909) | 0.00684*** (0.000994) | 0.00655*** (0.00107) | 0.0149*** (0.00143) |
| $\ln(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | -0.00566*** (0.000849) | -0.00588*** (0.00119) | -0.00620*** (0.00130) | -0.00541*** (0.00117) |
| Constant | 0.0371*** (0.00666) | 0.0000679 (0.00978) | 0.00352 (0.0105) | 0.0486*** (0.00979) |
| N | 67675 | 31656 | 27796 | 20817 |
| R-sq | 0.0994 | 0.0705 | 0.0680 | 0.0522 |
| Bank & Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time Clustered | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| FE | | | | |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Time Deposits – Split by p90 assets - IV

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--|------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Above 90 th Percentile Assets | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ |
| $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | -0.121*** (0.0341) | -0.0947*** (0.0325) | -0.0930*** (0.0254) | -0.0267 (0.188) |
| $\ln(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | -0.0199*** (0.00489) | -0.0293*** (0.00658) | -0.0271*** (0.00448) | 0.000930 (0.0127) |
| N | 48552 | 18923 | 15076 | 11220 |
| R-sq | -0.339 | -0.271 | -0.326 | -0.0216 |
| Bank & Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time Clustered | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| FE | | | | |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Time Deposits – Split by p90 assets - IV

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--|------------------------------------|---|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Below 90 th Percentile Assets | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ | $\Delta \ln(\text{Time Deposits})$ |
| $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | -0.400* | -0.257*** | -0.250*** | -0.273 |
| | (0.233) | (0.0827) | (0.0821) | (0.180) |
| $\ln(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | -0.0624* | -0.0494*** | -0.0475*** | -0.0320* |
| | (0.0320) | (0.0127) | (0.0124) | (0.0154) |
| N | 66137 | 31632 | 27777 | 19331 |
| R-sq | -7.917 | -3.811 | -3.749 | -3.672 |
| Bank & Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time Clustered | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| FE | | | | |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Credit Lines Origination (bank-holding-co-level)

IV 1st Stage:

$$\Delta \ln(Reserves)_{it} = \gamma_1 Reserves\ Instrument_{it} + \gamma_2 \ln(Reserves_{it-5}) + \delta_t + \mu_{it}$$

where $\Delta(Y)_{it} = Y_{it} - Y_{it-4}$, and δ_t represents (quarter) time-fixed effects

IV 2nd Stage:

$$\Delta \ln(Credit\ Lines)_{it} = \beta_1 Instr \Delta \ln(Reserves)_{it} + \beta_2 \ln(Reserves)_{it-5} + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where $\Delta(Y)_{it} = Y_{it} - Y_{it-4}$, and τ_t represents (quarter) time-fixed effects


First Stage – Credit Lines Quantities

| | (1) $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | (2) $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | (3) $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | (4) $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| z_{it}^R | 7.270*** (0.928) | 7.431*** (1.167) | 5.246*** (0.752) | 6.460 (19.79) |
| $\ln(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | -0.0853*** (0.0203) | -0.104*** (0.0333) | -0.447*** (0.0545) | -0.0392* (0.0212) |
| Constant | 1.374*** (0.265) | 2.076*** (0.463) | 6.766*** (0.758) | 0.556* (0.315) |
| Obs | 2268 | 911 | 678 | 578 |
| R-sq | 0.235 | 0.298 | 0.415 | 0.0808 |
| Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank and Time Clustered SEs | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| F | 35.09 | 20.16 | 400.9 | 4.758 |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Credit Lines - OLS

| | (1) $\Delta \ln(\text{Credit Lines})$ | (2) $\Delta \ln(\text{Credit Lines})$ | (3) $\Delta \ln(\text{Credit Lines})$ | (4) $\Delta \ln(\text{Credit Lines})$ |
|-------------------------------|--|---|--|--|
| $\Delta \ln(\text{Reserves})$ | -0.0503*** (0.0149) | -0.0216 (0.0175) | -0.0318* (0.0184) | -0.122 (0.0798) |
| Newey-West s.e. | (0.0153) | (0.0224) | (0.0227) | (0.0567) |
| $\ln(\text{Reserves})_{t-5}$ | -0.0157 (0.00954) | -0.0105 (0.0146) | -0.0116 (0.0145) | -0.0158 (0.0196) |
| Newey-West s.e. | (0.00850) | (0.0124) | (0.0138) | (0.0114) |
| Constant | 0.299** (0.129) | 0.273 (0.208) | 0.279 (0.202) | 0.295 (0.291) |
| Obs | 2263 | 910 | 679 | 575 |
| R-sq | 0.187 | 0.270 | 0.210 | 0.117 |
| Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Time Clustered SEs | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Reg Type | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Average Term Deposit Rate Spreads



Deposit Interest Rate Spread (bank-level)

IV 1st Stage:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(\text{Deposits})_{it} &= \gamma_{11} \text{Deposit Instrument}_{it} + \gamma_{12} \text{Reserves Instrument}_{it} + \rho_i + \delta_t + \mu_{it} \\ \ln(\text{Reserves})_{it} &= \gamma_{21} \text{Deposit Instrument}_{it} + \gamma_{22} \text{Reserves Instrument}_{it} + \rho_i + \delta_t + \mu_{it} \end{aligned}$$

where i represents bank, t represents quarterly data, ρ_i represents bank-fixed effects, and δ_t represents (quarter) time-fixed effects

IV 2nd Stage:

$$\text{Deposit Rate Spread}_{it} = \beta_1 \ln(\text{Deposits})_{it} + \beta_2 \ln(\text{Reserves})_{it} + \pi_i + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where i represents bank i , t represents the quarterly date, π_i represents bank-fixed effects and τ_t represents (quarter) time-fixed effects. *Deposit Rate Spread* is 3, 12, 18, 24 month Certificate of Deposit (CD) Rate – Savings Rate Spread

Instrument for Deposits (Bartik-style)

$$z_{it}^D = \ln \left(\sum_{c \in Ci,t} w_{ict} \frac{Dep_{c,t}}{Dep_{c,t-1}} \right) \text{ where } w_{ict} = \frac{Dep_{c,t-1}}{\sum_{c' \in Ci,t} Dep_{c',t-1}}$$


where w_{ict} is the bank-specific weight accorded to county c the bank operates in time t , and $\frac{Dep_{c,t}}{Dep_{c,t-1}}$ is the growth rate in aggregate deposits in that county over the past period.

The bank-specific weight is determined as the level of aggregate deposits in that county at time $t-1$ divided by the sum of aggregate deposits over all the counties the bank has a presence in.

First Stage – Deposit Interest Spreads

| | (1) | (2) Ln(Total Deposits) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) Ln(Reserves) | (8) |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|---|---------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|---|---------------------------|---------------------------------|
| z_{it}^R | 1.038*** (0.352) | 0.329** (0.151) | 0.0204 (0.131) | 6.829 (5.595) | 11.96*** (1.467) | 9.537*** (0.843) | 8.583*** (0.707) | 38.13* (21.70) |
| z_{it}^D | 0.0449*** (0.00690) | 0.0291*** (0.0101) | 0.0439*** (0.00992) | 0.0320*** (0.00773) | 0.0296 (0.0241) | -0.00300 (0.0397) | 0.0298 (0.0345) | 0.0701** (0.0294) |
| Constant | 13.48*** (0.000607) | 13.47*** (0.000779) | 13.29*** (0.000678) | 13.66*** (0.000674) | 8.968*** (0.00208) | 9.643*** (0.00307) | 9.309*** (0.00209) | 9.802*** (0.00247) |
| N | 133964 | 57975 | 49607 | 34682 | 121851 | 53372 | 45439 | 31354 |
| R-sq | 0.939 | 0.960 | 0.967 | 0.988 | 0.726 | 0.763 | 0.755 | 0.843 |
| F-stat | 26.79 | 6.886 | 10.69 | 10.72 | 34.59 | 64.84 | 73.78 | 4.650 |
| Bank & Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank & Time Clustered FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |

Pricing of Credit Lines and EFFR-IOR



All Loans

Only investment-grade
rated and unrated loans

Investment-grade rated and
non-investment-grade loans

Credit Lines Pricing (bank-holding-co-level)

IV 1st Stage:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(\text{Credit Lines})_{it} &= \gamma_{11} \text{Credit Lines Instrument}_{it} + \gamma_{12} \text{Reserves Instrument}_{it} + \rho_i + \delta_t + \mu_{it} \\ \ln(\text{Reserves})_{it} &= \gamma_{21} \text{Credit Lines Instrument}_{it} + \gamma_{22} \text{Reserves Instrument}_{it} + \rho_i + \delta_t + \mu_{it} \end{aligned}$$

where i represents bank, t represents quarterly data, ρ_i represents bank-fixed effects, and δ_t represents (quarter) time-fixed effects

IV 2nd Stage:

$$AISD/AISU_{it} = \beta_1 \ln(\text{Credit Lines})_{it} + \beta_2 \ln(\text{Reserves})_{it} + \pi_i + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where $AISD/AISU_{it}$ is the ratio of the all-in-spread-drawn and all-in-spread-undrawn from LoanConnector, collapsed at the BHC (i) and quarter (t) level. All regressions include bank (π_i) and quarter-time (τ_t) fixed effects

Instrument for Credit Lines

$$z_{it}^{CL} = \ln(Credit\ Lines)_{it-1} \times Excess\ Loan\ Premium_{t-1}$$

we use the lagged credit line originations times the lagged aggregate *Excess Loan Premium (ELP)* from Saunders et al. (2022) to capture demand for credit lines


Rationale:

- A bank that is providing credit lines even in times of tight financial conditions (“excess loan premium”) has some inherent advantages in such provision
- Assumption: This variation is uncorrelated with the demand for credit lines, which would tend to raise credit line fees rather than lower them (supply effect)


First Stage – AISD/AISU Ratios

| | (1) Ln(Credit Lines) | (2) Ln(Credit Lines) | (3) Ln(Credit Lines) | (4) Ln(Credit Lines) | (5) Ln(Reserves) | (6) Ln(Reserves) | (7) Ln(Reserves) | (8) Ln(Reserves) |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------|---|----------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|---|---------------------------|---------------------------------|
| z_{it}^R | 0.401 (1.159) | 2.432*** (0.523) | 0.458*** (0.151) | -259.9** (99.35) | 11.37*** (1.504) | 12.66*** (2.251) | 3.846*** (0.422) | -536.7*** (147.7) |
| z_{it}^{CL} | 0.398*** (0.0473) | 0.318*** (0.0428) | 0.0407*** (0.0130) | 1.204*** (0.211) | 0.286*** (0.0571) | 0.251*** (0.0610) | -0.0542*** (0.0148) | 1.226*** (0.210) |
| Constant | 5.280*** (0.509) | 3.638*** (0.764) | 8.472*** (0.250) | 5.555*** (0.706) | 10.39*** (0.590) | 9.989*** (1.099) | 15.51*** (0.285) | 10.44*** (0.708) |
| Obs | 2325 | 807 | 744 | 646 | 2213 | 774 | 720 | 588 |
| R-sq | 0.465 | 0.606 | 0.920 | 0.458 | 0.494 | 0.301 | 0.838 | 0.399 |
| Bank & Time-FE | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Bank and Time Clustered SEs | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| F-stat | 38.95 | 109.8 | 9.037 | 43.25 | 172.1 | 54.48 | 50.32 | 45.66 |
| Period | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 | Overall: 2001Q1 - 2021Q4 | QE I-III + Pandemic QE: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | QE I-III: 2008Q4 - 2014Q3 | Post-QE III + QT2014Q4 - 2019Q3 |
| | & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | | | | & 2019Q4 - 2021Q4 | | | |


Reserves Levels



Eligible Assets Levels



Deposits Levels



Uninsured Demand + Savings Deposits Levels

