Understandably perhaps American foreign policy analysts have developed a reflexive pessimism about the Middle East since 2001. From Washington’s perch things have gone from bad to worse in the region: the Oslo Peace Process failed, the Iraq war proved a costly blunder, the Arab Spring culminated in chaos and repression, the “Islamic State” and other terror groups ran amok, and Iran’s malignant proxy network grew. The American-designed security architecture generally failed, and disengagement and securitization have become the default regional policy.
Yet in 2025 we have a bit of good news - and cause for a changed approach to a pivotal country in the region: Syria. With the fall of the Assad regime at least six threats to U.S. interests have receded: Russian power projection on the Mediterranean, Iran’s militant proxy network, the likelihood of continued displacement of roughly 12 million Syrians, torture and repression on an industrial scale, a narco-trafficking based economy, and a vacuum of legitimacy that rendered any national reconciliation impossible. A transitional government has emerged that is proclaiming moderation and inclusion, signaling a foreign policy rooted in balance and commerce, and pursuing reform and reconstruction in ways unthinkable under Assad.
You might not know all that by reading statements coming out of Washington. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard has described the transitional government and its leader, Ahmet al-Sharaa (nom de guerre Jolani) as extremist and unacceptable. White House advisor Sebastian Gorka has equated the new Syrian authorities with the Islamic State, and assessed that they are not capable of moderation. Debate in Washington has focused less on how to influence and incentivize the new Syrian government, more on the degree of its Islamist leanings and how to weaken it.
Pathological Pessimism?
To be fair, the prevailing pessimism on Syria has not been total. Some observers, while still counseling against fulsome engagement, have made allowance for a transactional relationship “ruthlessly focused” on countering the vestiges of the Islamic State. Others have begrudgingly admitted that Assad’s fall is a net positive, but brings the U.S. closer to strategic disaster than opportunity. The generous end of the spectrum has argued for carefully parceling out packets of sanctions relief, engagement, and non-aggression in exchange for a carefully specified program of concessions and conditions from the nascent Syrian regime. Most Syrians see Sharaa and the transitional government as a major upgrade on the genocidal predecessor, but the U.S. government is not so sure.
Washington has tended to reward catastrophic thinking when it comes to the Mideast in general and Syria in particular - a binary division of regional problems into vulnerable saints and extremist sinners with the latter in the ascendance. Catastrophism is an understandable response to trauma, but it is also a sign of dysfunction that leads to bad decision-making and normally requires therapy. Catastrophic problem framing in foreign policy provides a “choice architecture” that tends towards minimal engagement and maximum securitization. A dose of such thinking might be useful in terminating a period of excessive exuberance or ambition in the region, but can also result in missed opportunities when seeking to restore a modicum of stability. It is a strategy rooted in fear, not vision.
Concerns over Israel’s security also inform Washington’s arms-length approach. Jerusalem reportedly favors a devolution of power from Damascus to ethnically divided cantons, centered on promoting the minority Kurds and Druze against the 70-percent Sunni majority. Some Israeli catastrophists cast post-Assad Syria as a seething pit of radicalism yoked to a neo-Ottoman caliphate – all this, one suspects, without actually talking to Turks or Syrians. A country devastated by fifteen years of war and sanctions shows no appetite for tensions with neighbors. Unfortunately, if the U.S. follows such thinking into a policy of negation, it may contribute to state failure, as it did in post-Qaddafi Libya. Europe seems to sense this now, and is actively engaging with Damascus to encourage moderation and inclusivity. If the U.S. is to secure its interests it should do the same, albeit conditionally and gradually.
The Transitional Man
Much of the hesitance in Washington stems from the biography and movement of al Sharaa. He committed himself to resisting the U.S. invasion of Iraq, prompting his affiliation with Al Qaeda. Yet he successively disavowed both the Islamic State and Al Qaeda a decade ago, rejecting international jihad and focusing on the effort to overthrow Assad. Sharaa was a driving force in the nationalization of the Islamist Syrian opposition, driving the evolution from Jabhat al-Nusra to Jabhat Fath al-Sham to Hayat Tahrir as-Sham (HTS) - each a step in the nationalization of a jihadist movement. The evolution is consequential in ideological and practical terms, and has culminated now in the dissolution of HTS and subordination of its elements (and all other factions) under the Syrian state.
The prospects for ending terror campaigns are much brighter when a counter-terror campaign contains ideological and political transformation rather than more elusive attempts at annihilation. Comparative studies of counterterrorism and anti-terrorism reveal an important difference between terrorism rooted in specific local or regional conflicts and globalized ideological “super-terrorism.” The former frequently respond to a political dimension or strategy for termination, whereas the latter may not respond to incentives that depend upon the compromises a negotiated resolution would imply.
Analysts acquainted with al Sharaa believe his desire to transform post-Assad Syria into a “normal” state is sincere. Longtime Syria analyst Noah Bonsey argues that
Over the last 12 years, al Sharaa has moved his group steadily and inexorably away from the organizations and ideology of transnational jihadism. With each key turning point - breaking from ISIS, then going to war against it; breaking from al-Qaeda, then later crushing its remnants in Idlib; cooperating with the deployment of a NATO member military (Turkey) to Idlib’s frontlines - hardliners who opposed al Sharaa’s pragmatic shift defected or were pushed out. As a result, these breaks fundamentally transformed the internal balance of power and identity of the organization. Today, if there is one point al Sharaa’s closest allies and staunchest critics agree on, it’s that he’s fundamentally pragmatic in his decision-making, not ideological. Syrians from across the political spectrum recognize this, which is why you see such a broad array of prominent Syrians now looking to build relationships with the new authorities. Key regional and international players recognize this, which is why you see states across regional fault lines - Paris to Moscow, Doha to Abu Dhabi - engaging with Damascus, and seeking to shape the incentives it perceives. Washington would be wise to do the same, rather than ceding the ground to its rivals.[1]
Dareen Khalifa of the International Crisis Group adds that characterizing al Sharaa through an ideological lens fixed in 2012 misses important evolutionary steps:
His actions over the past decade suggest that he is unlikely to jeopardize his own political and military gains for the sake of ideology. He has always wanted to govern, and his decision to prioritize governance over jihad was one of the key factors in his break with al Qaeda and other Salafi-jihadist groups. Ultimately, al Sharaa’s current stance reflects years of strategic and ideological drift from jihadist groups on core issues. He has inculcated these divergent views within HTS’ rank and file, cementing them in the group’s governance approach, from its treatment of women and minorities to its education policies and dealing with the international community.[2]
The Upside
For Washington, ideological evolution may be less important than present counter-terrorism cooperation, particularly with regard to remnants of the Islamic State. In early 2025, Damascus has acted on U.S. intelligence tip offs to conduct a series of arrests and pre-emptive raids, in great contrast to Assad’s tacit encouragement or “incubation” of the terror group.. Reticence in Washington notwithstanding, initial outreach from the U.S. has found a cooperative response from the transitional government on a number of topics.
There are significant potential benefits to early and active U.S. engagement with the new government in Damascus, rather than the proverbial stiff arm or cold shoulder. The first is developing influence through dialogue, phased sanctions relief and technical assistance. The second is greater visibility over multilateral counter-terrorism cooperation now being discussed by Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Turkey - which holds the key to eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops from northeast Syria. Third, the post-Assad reconstruction of Syria will present lucrative opportunities for U.S. firms, and a business-minded Trump Administration can help promote American commercial interests by facilitating early entry.
Syria has been a catastrophe due to decades of Assad family misrule, but needn’t be any longer. European, Turkish, and Arab leaders are acting on the opportunities (and imperatives) of this non-catastrophe by embracing Damascus anew. Similar steps by the U.S. are the best way to avoid Syria being dependent on any one foreign patron in the way Assad was on Iran. Engagement with conditionality can provide protections for ethnic and religious minorities, women, and democratic norms. It will also unlock prosperity and stability for average Syrians. As U.S. Congressman Joe Wilson has predicted, the fall of Assad can have a positive strategic ripple effect across the region - but that outcome is far more likely if the U.S. allows its diplomats and businessmen to actively work the case.
Dr. Rich Outzen is a retired US Army officer and geopolitical consultant serving private sector clients, as well as a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.
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[1] Author interview, February 15 2025.
[2] Author interview, February 15, 2025.
