All wars must end, and the Russo-Ukrainian war is not an exception to the rule. In fact, there is growing interest, most visibly in the United States, to see an end to this conflict, which started in 2014 with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and parts of Eastern Ukraine, and then escalated further in 2022 with a Russian attempt to conquer Kyiv and end Ukraine’s independence. Given that neither Russia nor Ukraine can break the other’s lines, the conflict has turned into a war of attrition that is not in the long-term interest of Ukraine and is not sustainable, at least politically, in the U.S. and Europe. We can surmise that Russia, or at least Putin, is more capable of withstanding the attrition of Russian manpower and resources, but even Moscow has limits and may be interested in a ceasefire to regroup and refit.
The American and European goal cannot be to sustain Ukraine “as long as it takes”—a phrase used by President Biden as well as by many European leaders. This is a murky definition of victory that has no metrics according to which one can measure success or failure. Moreover, time is not on Ukraine’s side. Wars of attrition are wars of destruction and civilian devastation. A long war of attrition will only destroy Ukraine’s already fragile economy and bleed it of men in a demographic situation that has been well below replacement for decades (add to this also the high number of Ukrainians who emigrated since the 2022 Russian attack). Ukraine’s loss of land is also damaging as the amount of harvested land decreased by about a third for some crops. Its energy grid is unstable and under frequent Russian attacks. And the rebuilding of Ukraine’s housing, infrastructure, and industry will probably cost more than half a trillion dollars. A continued war of attrition will not improve this situation and is simply not sustainable for Kyiv.
Ukraine’s Western friends also do not have time on their side. The United States is clearly not interested in a forever war on Europe’s eastern frontline. Weapons are being consumed at a rapid pace that will require months, if not years, to replace, and this creates worries in Washington as China insists on a more expansive role in the Pacific. And Europeans, despite their claim that the war in Ukraine is existential to the continent (and it may be), have not ramped up their defense spending nor increased their warfighting capabilities. The rhetoric in most European capitals is bellicose and increases as the Trump administration appears to be less interested in an open-ended support of Ukraine. But the rhetoric remains unmatched by actions because few European nations are willing to incur the large costs needed to rearm in a serious way and to supply Ukraine with continued and abundant weapons and ammunition. The longer this war lasts, the smaller the Western support will be.
The question is how the war can end—both in the sense of what the outcome may be and how to achieve it.
Let’s look first at the possible outcomes. Historically, it is exceedingly difficult to have a neutral state in this region. Europe’s borderlands are uncomfortably located between centers of power—Russia, Turkey, and Europe’s core—that have engaged in a continued struggle for mastery. Hence, for Ukraine there is no neutral, non-aligned option. This does not mean necessarily that a formal alliance is necessary. That is, Ukraine can be Western without NATO membership, or it can fall within Moscow’s influence without turning into a Russian republic. But it cannot be just a neutral Ukraine, peacefully living in the borderlands between Russia, Turkey, and Europe.
Ukraine, thus, has three geopolitical choices: Moscow, Istanbul, or Warsaw.
Let’s eliminate the Muscovite and Turkish options. The latter is not feasible simply because Turkey is not yet a great power capable of projecting its influence on the northern shores of the Black Sea, effectively inserting itself between Eurasia’s West and East. It has certainly played a role in the war, supplying Ukraine with drones and some diplomatic mediation, but Istanbul is not ready for a prime geopolitical role. The former—Muscovite—option is possible and even likely but not desirable. A Ukraine under Russian domination inserts Moscow into the heart of Europe, turning Russia from a peripheral Asiatic state into a crucial determinant of the continent’s balance of power. Such a geopolitical map is not beneficial for Ukraine, for Europe and, as the ultimate guarantor of European security, for the United States.
The best outcome is an independent, sovereign, militarily strong and economically growing Ukraine. This would allow Ukraine to remain geopolitically separate from Russia, preserving its democratic aspirations and preventing a westward expansion of Russian power. But Ukraine can’t achieve this outcome without being tied to the West. This is the third historical geopolitical choice of Ukraine: Warsaw or, more broadly and more reflective of current politics, the West.
To be anchored in the West, Ukraine does not need to be a member of NATO. In any case, neither Washington nor many other European allies support Ukraine’s membership in NATO, despite the persistent requests by Kyiv. Few Western states are willing to accept the security commitment to Ukraine that would come with NATO membership. If Germany, for instance, is reluctant to arm Ukraine now, it will certainly not be eager to defend it in the future as a formal ally.
There are other ways of anchoring Ukraine in the West. A Western commitment to arm Ukraine in the future, even after a ceasefire with Russia is established, is indispensable. This can mean not just a continued supply of Western arms, but various business arrangements to allow Ukraine to produce some weapons, expanded training of Ukrainians in the West (for instance, a program to rebuild Ukraine’s air force on Western platforms and with Western standards; and a plan to conscript and train Ukrainian men who emigrated to Europe), and arrangements to surge weapons and ammunition into Ukraine in case of another Russian attack (e.g., by stockpiling ready to access ammunition in Poland or Romania, out of reach from a preventive Russian attack but close to Ukraine’s border for quick delivery).
Furthermore, Ukraine will have to be linked economically with the West. The so called “minerals deal” proposed by the Trump administration is valuable exactly because it develops American business interests in Ukrainian lands, giving the United States a stake in Ukraine’s natural resources—access to which would be threatened by Russian control. It is not a security guarantee akin to a military alliance, but it is an economic commitment that creates interests that did not exist before. Such an agreement can also serve as a model for other arrangements with European countries, developing economic and business links that would tilt Ukraine’s geopolitical outlook toward the West.
Finally, it is not necessary to draw new, final territorial contours of Ukraine at this stage. It is evident that Ukraine cannot militarily reconquer Crimea, which it lost to Russia in 2014, even though it can hold it at risk by demonstrating the capacity to sever the land connection between this peninsula and Russian mainland (especially through the bridge on the Kerch strait). Similarly, Ukraine has not been able to regain lands lost in 2014 and since 2022 in the Donbas, and the loss of manpower that would be incurred in a push in that direction may not be worth the benefit of those territories. But the inability or difficulty of restoring Ukraine’s original territorial integrity does not mean that Kyiv must recognize Russian control over these conquered territories. A final territorial settlement can be postponed.
The key for Ukraine is to maintain unimpeded access to the sea through Odessa, its only port left, as well as to limit Russian naval capabilities in the Black Sea. The maritime situation should allow the unopposed navigation of commercial vessels carrying agricultural products from Ukraine to the global markets. It would be, of course, very beneficial for Ukraine to regain its littoral over the Sea of Azov (e.g., in Mariupol) and this should be part of the negotiations with Moscow. But, short of the exercise of some serious leverage (e.g., the United States’ threats of more sanctions on Russia, or American promises to arm Ukraine with medium range missiles with no strings attached), it is unlikely that the ceasefire line of demarcation will move the existing frontline in any meaningful way.
Let’s now return to the question of how—that is, in what way—the war may end.
In brief, the likely scenario is that war will simply be interrupted, rather than reach a long-term settlement removing the initial causes of the conflict. No matter what the official term of the outcome will be—a de facto ceasefire, a formal armistice, a peace treaty, or a more generic plan of action—the reality is that the interests of the two sides are fundamentally opposed and non-negotiable: Ukraine wants to be independent, Russia wants her empire in Europe. Whether under Putin or his successor, Russia will not abandon her imperial aspirations to become a key European power through a full control of Kyiv. And the stronger China becomes on Eurasia’s eastern side, the greater Moscow’s need will be to maintain great power status by reentering Europe through Ukraine. This basic geostrategic interest will not change with a cessation of fighting in Ukraine.
The best-case scenario is that active fighting ends along the current line of contact, without a grand political settlement. There will be a recognition of de facto realities on the ground without the need to establish new––and for both Ukraine and Russia difficult to accep––de iure maps. After years of fighting and a large loss of blood, Kyiv cannot accept having lost forever large swaths of sovereign territories. And Russia cannot accept limiting her grand imperial scheme to slivers of new lands instead of a grand historic reentry into Kyiv. For Kyiv this would be too much; for Moscow this would be too little.
Both sides must recognize that at this moment their ultimate objectives—for Kyiv, the restoration of territorial integrity, and for Moscow, the conquest and annexation of Ukraine—cannot be achieved militarily. Ukraine must be convinced by its supporters that their help is not eternal and infinite. Moscow must be convinced by the West that Russian military might has limits and will be contained. This requires a delicate game of diplomacy and military support on the part of the United States and the Western supporters of Ukraine.
In the end, whatever agreement is reached in the near future, the conflict on Europe’s eastern frontier will not be resolved. The pause will be welcomed by both belligerents, but mostly because it will be considered an opportunity to regain strength, refit their military forces, and prepare for another round of war. The West should therefore use this moment to rebuild its defense capabilities, restart its weapons production, and shore up Ukraine as an Eastern rampart. If it does not, the next decade will be a dark one for Europe.
