Russia wants to contain China on her Asian border but not on the Pacific Ocean. In fact, it is in Russia’s interest to encourage a Chinese expansion in the Pacific as well as farther out, from Europe and the Middle East to Latin America. An ocean-going China with global ambitions, from the Mediterranean to the Pacific, is for Russia a safer China. A China with limited, regional aspirations would, on the other hand, focus mostly on its immediate neighborhood and its lengthy land frontier with Russia.
As a result, American and Russian interests are diametrically opposed: the U.S. wants a China that is preoccupied with its continental borders and does not devote resources and attention to the Pacific Ocean, while Russia seeks exactly the opposite. There is therefore no reason to expect common ground between the U.S. and Russia in containing Chinese expansion.
The difference between Russian and U.S. objectives toward China is rooted in large measure in geography. Russia shares a long land border with China and has no desire to create tensions with China on her eastern flank. Russian reluctance to engage in competition with China is strengthened by a realization that China is growing and the economic and military disparity between Beijing and Moscow is only getting larger. Why should Russia risk engaging in a rivalry in which she is at a clear disadvantage and with a power that is so close to her? Russia has no great aspirations on her eastern flank other than the preservation of the existing status quo: a relatively stable border with China, with Chinese economic penetration in Central Asia (and Siberia) but military overwatch by Russia.
Russia wants minimal tensions with China also because her great geopolitical goal lies in the West: Russia wants to be in Europe, albeit not of it. Moscow’s actions of the last few decades have been characterized by this remarkable simplicity of concept and continuity of action: westward expansion through a variety of means with the goal of imperial reconstruction and of being the decisive power in Europe’s balance of power.
There is a link then between Russia’s eastern and western frontiers: Russia needs to have stability on one (in Asia) in order to expand in the other (in Europe). Throughout her history, Russia’s ability to turn westward was derivative of her success in stabilizing the other frontiers (the southern and eastern ones). Putin has mostly succeeded in stabilizing the southern frontier in the Caucasus and has achieved a modus vivendi on the eastern one with China. And this is why for the past two decades he could, and continues to be able to, pursue a very aggressive westward strategy of expansion.
Russia’s interest in keeping a peaceful and stable relationship with China is therefore independent of the tenor of U.S.-Russian relations: good relations (the definition of which is, in any case, murky) will not turn Russia into an opponent of Chinese global ambitions, and bad relations with Washington will not make Moscow into a long-term partner of Beijing. Russia, that is, has interests of her own, and is not merely an empty vessel whose goals and motivations are only a reaction to what the West or the United States do.
In fact, the best way to prevent a Russian insouciance or even friendliness to China is to close for Moscow the possibility of a westward expansion. Russia will not stabilize her European frontier until she is met with a clear opposition and counterbalancing from European states (American presence on Europe’s eastern flank is vital but insufficient to stop Russian moves, which are across the spectrum of state tools). The goal of deterring Russia is not merely to prevent further destabilizing actions on the part of Moscow, but also to redirect Russian attention to its other borders. A strong and clear Western deterrent on Russia’s European flank will not make Russia into a Western friend, but it will also remove Moscow’s priority of being accommodating to China.
In brief, Russia has no interest in joining the United States in opposing China. And there are no incentives (e.g., “good relations,” accommodating Russian ambitions in Ukraine or in Central Europe, withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, or repositioning the few U.S. troops farther from Russia) that the U.S. can provide to make Russia more amenable to a counterbalancing posture against China.
