Nataliya Bugayova Explains How Ukraine Can Still Win

>> Andrew Roberts: Nataliya Bugayova is a fellow at the Washington-based Institute for war and an expert on Ukraine. Nataliya, you've just got back from a trip with General David Petraeus to Kyiv. What's the mood there?

>> Nataliya Bugayova: Thank you, Andrew. And it's great to be here. I'll highlight two things.

First, I think there is a sense of strategic clarity on the ground, that it is a persistent fight. It's a lone fight, despite the abs and flows on a battlefield. And frankly, Russia helps maintain that strategic clarity with its daily attacks on Ukrainian cities, including when we were in Kyiv.

On Ukrainian forces, on critical infrastructure, with continuous reports of atrocities on the occupied territories, and so on. So, there is no confusion that Russia's intent, even two and a half years into the war, remains the same, to fully subjugate Ukraine. I would say that second, as a result of this, you see a massive growth of domestic defense technology capability.

And back in 2022, we've seen a lot of innovation on the ground and MacGyvering to adapt existing capabilities and technologies and use them in creative ways. But what's emerging now in Ukraine is massive and impressive defense industrial capability, including an impressive engineering cadre that is also directly tied to battlefield needs and has a rapid innovation and iteration cycle.

And that really stood out to me during this trip is the emergence of this asset, if you will, agile Ukrainian defense industrial base. That I think also has a lot of implications and lessons learned for the West.

>> Andrew Roberts: And we're two and a half years into the war now.

Where are we strategically and in every other way?

>> Nataliya Bugayova: Yeah, I think while it may feel like a new normal or the war hostile to some in the West, when you're in Kiev, you realize that that is an illusion. The fundamentals of this war remain the same. As we discussed, Russia still seeks full subjugation of Ukraine.

There's still no indication in my assessment that the Kremlin seeks any off ramps or resolution of the conflict on terms that do not result in eradication of Ukraine's sovereignty. There's thousands of artillery shells fired on the front line a day. Both sides are racing to develop these new technological capabilities.

And the speed of an innovation cycle is much faster than, I believe, anywhere in the Western world. Russia's objectives regarding NATO, US, UK haven't changed either. Russia remains a self-identified adversary, and the war is also reinforcing the worldview that believes in the expansion by force. So, I would sum up at the strategic level that there is no going back to the status quo, no matter how much some of the Western leaders would prefer that.

And the real choice that we're really facing is either to invest in countering the Russian challenge in Ukraine and against the west in a way that results in a durable peace. Or settle for temporary respite that will have us facing the same problem with much higher escalation risk and costs down the road.

At the operational level, it's early to assess, but I think Ukraine has a chance to hold Pokrovsk if we look at the Pokrovsk axis. And even if Russia is able to take the city, which the Russian forces are pursuing at enormous costs, it would likely result in Russian culmination and potentially provide opportunities for Ukraine to attack.

I think the winter is going to be hard. Everyone recognizes it because of Russian missile campaign that will be aimed at devastating Ukraine's energy grid. But Ukraine is taking steps to prepare for that. But I think that's an area where additional western support, specifically the air defense capabilities, is vital at this point.

>> Andrew Roberts: Zelensky is taking what he calls a victory plan to the United Nations, to Biden in particular. Can Ukraine win? What's Ukraine's advantage at the moment?

>> Nataliya Bugayova: I would frame it in two ways. I think first, part of Ukraine's advantage is actually in Russia's weaknesses that we often overlook and in part in the west help offset with some of our incrementalist policies.

So, first of all, Russia is not invulnerable. And while it certainly has several key advantages that are well discussed, it has several vulnerabilities as well. First and foremost, it's inability to rapidly pivot, even though with time it always is able to adjust. Russia is also accumulating, and Putin himself is accumulating a number of risk a number of fronts, including domestic stability and the economy and the fundamentals of Russian defense industrial base.

But Russia also depends on a number of hard to replace capabilities that Ukraine is currently targeting. And if pressure on Russia persists, now, that does require persistent support from the west. But if that persists, Russia will be facing a lot of accumulating challenges in, let's say, next year because it's not able to replace some of these assets as fast as it's burning them, including, and it's very costly, offensive and coarse.

So, I think that's number one. And the second I would highlight is that-

>> Andrew Roberts: But they're losing 1200 men a day, killed and wounded, and they're not replacing them that quickly. Is that what you're saying is one of the great, the Russians I'm talking about, that's Ukraine's big advantage?

>> Nataliya Bugayova: I would say it more relates to Russia's material, not just manpower, because Russia's defense industrial base and its weapons system is the rate determined in step for Russia in this war. Not necessarily the manpower, even though the manpower, of course, is a key factor as well. And the Kremlin is eroding a lot of Russia's future capabilities.

And Russia's defense industrial base ability to consistently support the current tempo or to fully resource Russia's reserve power is far from given. The current Russian policies are eroding the foundations of defense production, including macroeconomic stability in Russia and the workforce. And I think I will end to say that while Russia has deployed a lot of its capability, and yes, it's surging and it's succeeded in part to produce or maintain more, the West hasn't really surged a lot of its latent capability to support Ukraine.

So, we still have that option. And Ukraine's defense industrial base of course is increasing its capacity as well.

>> Andrew Roberts: How important is it that storm shadow missiles and other missiles from the west can be used in Russia? It's a huge debate, obviously, between London and Washington and Berlin at the moment.

>> Nataliya Bugayova: Look, I think Russia has to be denied its safe space to launch attacks on ukrainian critical infrastructure and military assets without Ukraine having any ability to strike back, it is fairly straightforward. I think the delays and incrementalism in expanding some of these authorities are eroding Ukraine's and western advantage because it provides Russia time to adapt and move some of the assets beyond the range of some of this long range weapon systems.

That said, there are plenty of valuable targets within the range that is being currently discussed. So I would say it's incredibly important for Ukraine to be able to use some of these long range weapon systems, including storm shadow on russian territory. I think secondly, the risk of escalation is exaggerated, especially when compared to the cost of letting Ukraine fail.

We've consistently seen Putin, first of all, the West has crossed numerous Russian red lines. We've also seen that Putin actually remains a pretty risk averse actor. If you look back in 2022, he invaded Ukraine at the moment when he expected minimal resistance. And when his original plan to conquer Ukraine in three days failed, he actually took many months before he tried to patch the capability gap through mobilization.

He's been quite cautious in how he's pursuing response in Kursk, to Ukraine's offensive in Kursk. And it took Russia a few days to even acknowledge that properly and start a counterterrorism operation in that territory. So I would just highlight that we observe Putin remaining at quite a risk averse actor, despite a lot of rhetoric.

And then finally I think the risk, of course, the nuclear escalation is there and it's inherent, frankly, in any attempt to resist aggression of any nuclear armed state. And it will be present if and when Putin invades Ukraine again, if Russia is allowed to freeze the lines. So unless we decide that we subordinate our foreign policy to any other nuclear power, then the best course of action remains to help Ukraine continue liberating its territories.

And its people as the only path to an actual durable peace, rather than a temporary respite. I will add one more point on the storm shadow. I think there is a huge focus on specific systems, and the West has been really impaling itself on specific weapons system as game changers in the war.

I think UK has set a really important precedent as a first mover and provision of some of these key systems, that rallied other Western support, and that has been critical. But no single system is gonna be the game changer in the war, it's the combination of different systems, that support different effects that will matter.

So I think priority right now is actually investing in helping Ukraine's defense industrial base to surge, as well as revamping Western defense industrial base to increase the overall stocks and availability of some of these capabilities.

>> Andrew Roberts: That would be helped enormously if the west were to unfreeze the $300 billion of frozen Russian assets held in Euroclear in Brussels and elsewhere, especially if that could be done before President Trump.

They're a chance of President Trump becoming president again. Where are we on all of that?

>> Nataliya Bugayova: I believe that some of the interest from Russian frozen assets is being currently used to support Ukraine. However, I agree that it would be helpful if the broader Russian policy, counter-Russian policy, or policy to support Ukraine would be coherent in the sense of incorporating both military and economic levers of power more effectively.

This going back to the question of Russian vulnerabilities and Western policy of incrementalism, that is providing Russia with these pockets and time and space to adapt, because we're rolling out, be it military support or economic measures or countermeasures, in this incremental fashion. So we're helping Russia essentially absorb more shock, and absorb more cost, with accumulating less risk than they would have otherwise.

>> Andrew Roberts: You're an expert criminologist, what's Putin's strategy?

>> Nataliya Bugayova: I think the core Russia's strategy right now, and the main effort after Putin failed in his three day invasion plan in 2022, is to direct all the energy in shaping Western decision making. And that process includes both information operations, but also physical activities that support informational effects.

All right, and I think that there are a number of lines of effort there, including helping convince not just the US, but West broadly, that supporting Ukraine is too costly, it's too risky, it's not in our interest. That support doesn't really make a difference, that to try to prevent us from developing a coherent, long term strategy, because actually western persistence can be lethal to Russia's objectives in Ukraine.

Simply because Putin realizes that as long as Ukraine's will to fight persists, combined with Western support, Russia is not able to accomplish its objectives militarily in Ukraine. So, Putin's strategy is to redirect a lot of his energy and the Kremlin's energy in trying to shape our perceptions. I think we can also discuss some of the Russian tactics that are focused on simply confusing the debate and forcing us to argue about irrelevancies in this war instead of actually focusing on solution.

>> Andrew Roberts: Such as what examples would you give for irrelevancies?

>> Nataliya Bugayova: Yeah, I think a great example of that, and I would name two, the first one is discussing the resolution in Ukraine in the context of giving certain territories to Russia that have Russian-speaking Ukrainians on those territories which actually a myth created by Kremlin as we've seen, that Russia actually targeted a lot of Russian speaking Ukrainians. It invaded territories in Ukraine that were populated by Russian speaking Ukraine, destroyed a lot of economic wealth and well being of those Russia speaking Ukraine. So that is to say, the Russian objectives in Ukraine have never been protecting Russian speaking Ukraines and yet the debate still often brings that fact up in the context of discussion of how the war would end.

I think another example is Putin kind of forcing us to discuss whether Ukraine as a country has a right to exist, and his detours into historical discussions of history, of Kyiv and Rus, which is irrelevant to the current point, because the world avoids a Hobbesian war of all against all by rejecting the validity of such arguments.

And yet Kremlin is really focused on driving them as it tries to divert our discussions about what to do now into this historical irrelevancies, if you will.

>> Andrew Roberts: You've seen that people around Trump, especially the isolationists around Trump, are trying to present this as another forever war, and they're asking, why should we really care about the war?

What's at stake for the US and to a lesser extent, the UK? What do we say to counter that?

>> Nataliya Bugayova: I think a couple of points. First of all, there's a category error in the discussion of this being a long war. It cannot be a long war for the United States or the UK, because US or UK or other countries not fighting that war, they're helping Ukraine fight that war.

But I think it's really important to call out this category error in the discussion. In terms of the stakes, I think US and the United Kingdom and European countries have a lot more at stake than they realize in this war. Because the cost of failure, meaning letting Russia prevail in Ukraine or freeze the gain, is much higher than the cost of continuing to support Ukraine again, as long as Ukraine's will to fight persist.

Because in the scenario where Russia wins or managed to freeze the gains, it will take time to reconstitute, to rebuild its large scale warfighting capability, to focus on eroding the center of gravity on this war, Ukraine's will to fight in western support. And when Russia is ready, because of its unchanged intent, it will launch new attacks on Ukraine and we will be faced with the same problem, with the same or worse escalation risks, but under conditions that favor Russia.

I think the second thing I will mention is that it's not only about Russian capability that disproportionately depends on the outcome of this war, it is also about Russia's intent. And not only intent regarding Ukraine, it is also about Russia's intent regarding the United States, UK, NATO. Because Russia keeping these gains will literally reinforce the problem that got us here in the first place, and that being the Kremlin's worldview, that believes in the expansion by force and that taken an increasingly anti-US, anti UK stance.

And Russia's victory in Ukraine essentially would present the west with it, not just reconstituted, but embolden Russia that is more determined to undermine the United States. As you've seen this wars transform in Russia within, fundamentally, there is an emergence and expansion of ultra nationalist ideology that is inherently anti western.

And allowing Russia to prevail would mean that that ideology will be solidified and will shape Russia's foreign policy for decades to come. I think the final point I'll mention about the stakes, it is also fundamentally about the effectiveness and credibility and the cost of US and NATO deterrence.

Our alliances and partnerships are fundamental to US deterrence and UK deterrence, in no small part because we rely on access and placement that they provide. And our security also depends on our adversaries' latent and existing intent to not make a repeated decision not to attack us or hurt our interests.

And if Russia is able to prevail in Ukraine, especially because of reduction in western support, that perception of credibility and deterrence will diminish, and the cost of that will grow. So I think that's another very important element of what's actually at stake here.

>> Andrew Roberts: Is a negotiated settlement even possible?

>> Nataliya Bugayova: I would answer briefly that, first of all, that presumes that Russia actually has an intent or an objective to settle. So far, we're seeing no indication of that whatsoever. I think, secondly, the purpose of any negotiated settlement is to ensure that the conflict is settled. Right now, there are very little objective reality that would support, if the lines are frozen today, this becoming a durable peace rather than a temporary respite.

In part because Ukraine still needs to liberate some of the critical terrain that's vital, not just from military standpoint, but also from economic standpoint, including in the south. And similarly, right now, Putin believes, in my assessment, that he can outlast the west, in part because of our policy of incrementalism.

So there's little indication that he would use any settlement for anything other than preparation for the resumption of offensive operations in Ukraine. But also for reconstitution of Russian capability to be used in other areas to complete some of Russia's long standing objectives. For example, in Belarus, Moldova, that Russia has been pursuing for a while and still intends to achieve.

>> Andrew Roberts: How's the war transforming Russia? What does it mean for Russia's relationships in the world?

>> Nataliya Bugayova: I think as we briefly discussed, the war has really empowered an ultra-nationalist ideology inside of Russia that Putin relies on to both sustain his regime and sustain this war. There is a lot of discussion of who's after Putin.

I would say that if Russia is defeated in Ukraine, the next after Putin may or may not be like Putin. But if Russia prevails in Ukraine, this ultranationalist ideology will be solidified. And the next after Putin will almost certainly be like Putin, or worse, because of political imperatives that this empowered ultranationalist community will generate.

And that will have absolutely implication for Russia's relationships with the West long term, because that's the cadre that will be shaping Russia's foreign policy for many years to come.

>> Andrew Roberts: Is there a risk of Russia collapsing?

>> Nataliya Bugayova: I would answer it with two thoughts. First of all, Russia has been an unstable matter for a long time, but it can exist in this condition for a long time as well.

Now, Putin has been accumulating a lot of risk internally. There are rising ethnic tensions, in part driven by the war and again by empowered ultr nationalist class inside of Russia. There are tensions within civilians and returning military in Russia. There are also economic clashes that are being exacerbated by the war.

So there are numerous fragilities and conflicting structures that Putin regime has been accumulating, exacerbating. Now, what I would say, though, and that has to do a lot with the Western discussion about fear of Russian collapse. Russia may or may not collapse, but if it does, it will not be because of something that west has done, rather of 30 years of policy that we just discussed that have eroded every capability and foundation of Russia's economy, society, population, and so on and so forth.

And I think there's a little bit both of arrogance and naivete in Western discourse, thinking that there would be something that we can do or will do that will trigger that, and not again the three decades of destructionist policies that Russian leadership pursued internally. Including launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine that resulted in over half a million casualties inside of Russia and every imaginable negative consequences for the Russian economy.

>> Andrew Roberts: How worried are you? And actually, more importantly, how worried are Ukrainians, the sort of people you met in Kyiv, that a future President Trump is gonna just switch off the spigots and no longer give any military support to Ukraine?

>> Nataliya Bugayova: Look, US support has been game-changing, and it is a center of gravity in this war.

And I think there is a realization of that in Ukraine and as well as in Russia, of course. And that's why Putin is spending so much time trying to erode that. That said, there's an increasing focus on self-reliance in Ukraine. And that's why I started with the reflection about the defense industrial base capability and expansion of Ukraine's ability to be self-reliant in the long term.

So I think there is a realization that it is a long fight. There is realization of the need to persist. And while there is a natural worry, of course, about potential diminishing aid, there's also a realization that Ukraine will be investing in its own capabilities to persist in this fight.

>> Andrew Roberts: When you and I were in Kyiv last year, we met Oleksandr Kamyshin, the Minister for Strategic Industries. Very impressive figure, I think, we both felt. Tell us a bit about the internal ministerial setup in Zelensky's government.

>> Nataliya Bugayova: What I would say, without going into nuances of Ukrainian politics is that the Ukraine's defense industrial sector has many impressive figures, such as Oleksandr Kamyshin, but also a lot of emerging talent, both in the state-owned enterprises as well as private industry, that are focused on domestic production.

It is notable and noticeable how much that cadre has evolved and is growing. And I think it will be a key foundation for Ukraine's efforts to increase its self-sufficiency in terms of military capability for years to come.

>> Andrew Roberts: What are the key decision points and choices that need to be made in the next year regarding Ukraine?

Not just for Ukraine, but Russia, the UK, the West in general. What are the key moments that we should be looking out for over the next year?

>> Nataliya Bugayova: I will start with Russia. I think Putin will have a decision point regarding Kursk, because part of Russia and federation is occupied.

And no matter how much Kremlin is trying to downplay the significance of that, no matter how much Kremlin is trying to isolate Russians in the information space from the reality of Kursk, the reality remains the same. Part of Russian federation is occupied, and that's not a decision that Putin can ignore.

That's a decision point for him to make of how and what way to retake that territory. I think the second one is regarding the manpower and whether the current recruitment pace is sufficient to fulfill Russia's objective, which I think in an assessment of many, is not. And whether he will need to actually call mobilization.

Regardless of the decision that he will make, it will not be without cost, and it will open additional opportunities for Ukraine and the partners. I think the main decision for Ukraine partners, Western partners in particular, is to really, it's a strategic decision, right? It's a decision between.

>> Nataliya Bugayova: It's a decision between helping address the drivers for this war, and in doing so, potentially securing a generational win, or passing the national security risk forward.

That's the real choice I think we're facing. It's between a lasting investment and a lasting solution that may take longer, or trying to settle for some short-term solution that nevertheless will be guaranteed to be costly and potentially catastrophic for Ukraine and its partners in the future. So that's the real decision and choice that I think UK, United States, the West faces.

>> Andrew Roberts: Nataliya, thank you very much indeed. Tell me, what history book or biography are you reading at the moment?

>> Nataliya Bugayova: Great question I am actually reading a book by a Ukrainian journalist and now a member of Ukrainian armed forces. His name is Pavlo Kazarin, and the book is called The Wild West of Eastern Europe.

It's actually his chronology of history of modern Ukraine and was born out of the occupation of Crimea in 2014 and the war. And the author is from Crimea. And I think it's a really good account of what this war is really about, what is at stake in this war, what forces are actually fighting in this war.

One of his quotes, I think, from the book that says, we're trying to understand where they, meaning Russia, ends and where we, meaning Ukrainians, start, kind of captures the essence. I think it's also a great account of Russian efforts to create alternative reality in Russia, in Crimea, in Eastern Ukraine back in 2014, but also in the West.

So we highly recommend for anyone following this issue.

>> Andrew Roberts: Nataliya Bugayova, thank you very much indeed for appearing on Secrets of Statecraft.

>> Nataliya Bugayova: Thank you very much for having me, Andrew.

>> Andrew Roberts: Thank you, Nataliya. On the next Secrets of Statecraft, I'll be speaking to Sir Bill Browder, the author of Red Notice: A True Story of High Finance, Murder, and One Man's Fight for Justice, and Freezing Order: A True Story of Money Laundering, Murder, and Surviving Vladimir Putin's Wrath.

>> Presenter: This podcast is a production of the Hoover Institution, where we generate and promote ideas advancing freedom. For more information about our work, to hear more of our podcasts or view our video content, please visit hoover.org.