In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, US foreign policy understandably shifted focus toward counter-terrorism and a range of associated questions around Islamism. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq ensued, a period soon to be marked as well by the tragedies of the Arab Spring, especially the on-going human rights catastrophe that the Assad regime inflicts on Syria. Throughout this era, the touchstones of policy were terrorism, counter-terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism.
Yet when the 2017 National Security Strategy was issued, the primacy of terrorism ceded ground to the challenges of great power competition. The prospects for different kinds of war developed in the face of a different kind of enemy. Instead of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Russia and China emerged as the new adversaries, particularly in light of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea. Recognizing China as the key adversary made it appear prudent to draw down forces in the Middle East while pivoting out of the region and turning instead to the presumed site of future confrontations: the western Pacific. That conclusion, however, has proven to be deeply flawed in the spectrum of evolving problems throughout the MENA area.
This history of a paradigm shift–from counter-terrorism to great power competition–is too simplistic. The former never fully disappeared. It continues to exist side by side with the great power model, because the threat of Islamist terrorism has not vanished. Meanwhile it is foolish to imagine that the rising challenge of China means that the US should reposition its forces by abandoning old theaters in order to regroup into the Pacific. While the most salient competitions with today’s adversaries involve Ukraine and Taiwan, it makes little sense to give up historical advantages in the Middle East in the name of facing threats elsewhere.
This overlay of discrete frameworks–counter-terrorism and great power competition at the same time–applies especially in the Sahel. This is a region of poor, underdeveloped countries, often subject to problematic governance that exacerbates a sense of grievance in the population. An increasingly harsh climate undermines the local economy and contributes to emigration flows. The US has valid reasons to be concerned about the scope of human misery in the Sahel, including violations of human rights.
Meanwhile, weak economies in the region point to another policy challenge for the US and the West. Because economic emigration amplifies the movement of refugees into Europe, where an anti-immigrant backlash has upset the political landscapes, the Sahel contributes to the domestic political crises in many European countries. Witness the rise of the National Rally in France (formerly known as the National Front) where opposition to immigration goes hand in hand with anti-Americanism. In addition, the fragility of Sahel’s societies contributes to a deep disaffection that is a breeding ground for terrorism. Local jihadist groups, whether on their own or connected to larger networks of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, continue to pose a threat to western interests and may gain the capacity to initiate attacks in Europe or the US. Counter-terrorism policies therefore remain relevant.
Nonetheless, counter-terrorism alone is an insufficient paradigm to grasp the significance of Islamism in the Sahel, which is caught in a matrix of complicated international relations in the age of great power competition. Europe, Russia and China are all involved, posing a complex challenge to US foreign policy. European countries want to stabilize the region in order to minimize refugee emigration to Europe. Russia is trying to expand its strategic footprint across the African continent. China, too, is expanding its economic influence in Africa, with an interest in natural resources, especially energy and minerals. What is at stake in the Sahel is confrontations fed by indigenous problems but with ramifications far beyond the local context.
Recent French military intervention in the region began in 2013 in response to a request from the government of Mali and a UN resolution, with the goal of defending the country against Islamist militants. The campaign was initially successful, expanded its regional scope and came to involve other European countries, as well as significant US support. Yet popular hostility to France, the former colonial power, grew, and the 2021 coup d’état in Bamako undermined relations with France. Violence in the region has grown: there were 4,839 casualties in 2022, a 70% increase from 2021. France withdrew its troops in the course of 2022 and in November, French President Macron declared the end of the operation. Despite this defeat in Mali, France and Europe more broadly continue to have an important interest in trying to achieve stability in the region, due to their economic interests and in order to forestall greater migration. About 3,000 French troops are still stationed within the Sahel region, in countries including Niger and Chad to further its anti-jihadist mission.
While France has depended on US support in the Sahel, it is noteworthy that in April 2023, Macron profiled himself with comments arguing against Europe’s serving as a “vassal” to the US with regard to the defense of Taiwan, thereby distancing himself from supporting the US in the competition with China. While the remarks were no doubt an effort by Macron to distract from his own domestic political problems, they also indicate the recurring French vision of an autonomy from the US in international affairs. A reasonable US response should entail linking US assistance to European efforts in the Sahel to European cooperation with the US in other regions. Europe’s security interests in the Sahel are significantly greater than those of the US. The price of US support for France and Europe in the Sahel should include European commitment to supporting the US toward China.
American security concerns in the Sahel do not involve immigration, as much as is the case with France. From a US vantage point, the key issues are the incubation of terrorism but, even more so, great power competition, especially with Russia. Thanks to the intervention of the mercenary Wagner group, Russia has in effect displaced France as the key outside player in Mali, while simultaneously wielding considerable influence in both Sudan and Libya. This Russian renaissance in Africa, reminiscent of the Soviet era, echoes the reentry of Russia into the Middle East, a transformation that occurred under the Obama administration, when it accommodated the Russian role in Syria. It remains one of the worst legacies of his presidency.
Framing the politics of the Sahel in terms of the rivalry between the US and Russia introduces a geopolitical perspective and raises the stakes considerably. Jihadism in the region is a source of local instability, giving expression to local grievances, but it also opens the door to Russian intrusion, a new front in a grand global competition. A successful US foreign policy should mobilize European engagement in the region, while providing appropriate support, in order to push back both against jihadism and against Russia.
