The Iranian Mindset

Andrew Roberts: Shay Khatiri grew up in Iran. Formerly of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He's now Vice President and Senior Fellow at the Yorktown Institute. He writes on Iran for the Wall Street Journal and National Review and is a contributor to the Middle East Forum.

Shay let's start with the 7th of October, if we may. You wrote a piece for the Wall Street Journal saying why it's obvious Iran approved Hamas' attack, which was subtitled, if you understand how the Islamic Republic's power centers work, it becomes clear what happened. Tell us more.

Shay Khatiri: The argument against that Iran had given the green light was that the intelligence, no intelligence, neither Israeli nor American had picked up any such thing. It is important to consider that, one, they also, both intelligence communities, missed the attack itself. Second, and more importantly, we tend to mirror image ourselves into our adversaries too often.

That was, in fact, Roberto Wolstador's argument about, one of the arguments, about the Pearl Harbor attack. And we continue to do it too often. Iran has a very, very informal culture. It's an informal society like most of the Middle East, and they do not have formal decision-making paper trails.

And due to this, it is very common for us, unless we can eavesdrop into their meetings, to miss their decision-making.

Andrew Roberts: Let's go back further. That makes perfect sense, by the way. Of course, in fact, there are loads of things that don't have written. They haven't yet found any written orders by Hamas leaders to rape women in Southern Israel on the 7th of October either.

But that doesn't mean that they didn't get these kind of orders. Let's go back even further to 1988, when Raisi, who's president and recently died, of course, was tasked with heading a panel that executed about 10,000 political prisoners in two months. This had personal implications for you, didn't it?

Do tell us.

Shay Khatiri: It almost did. My father was in prison for five years, and he went into prison in 1983, and his sentence was for seven years. He would have been there until 1990, but for a pardon, he received from Ayatollah Montazeri, who at the time was the deputy to Khomeini, to Ayatollah Khomeini, and was the heir apparent to become the next supreme leader.

Montazeri had become disillusioned by the regime and became an internal dissident. By 1988, he realized that his days were numbered as an official in the regime, and he was to be ousted as the heir apparent and the deputy. So he began issuing pardons to political prisoners. My father received a pardon.

He was in prison from 82, I should correct myself, until 87. He receives a pardon months after Mr. Montazeri is ousted, as the deputy goes into house arrest, and becomes an internal dissident until he dies in 2009. And in the summer of 1988, Mr. Raisi has a panel, a death panel, to determine the fate of political prisoners.

Up to 10,000 of them receive death sentences. Many of the prisoners were asked simple questions. Are you Muslim? No, okay, was your father Muslim? Many would respond, yes, my father is Muslim. Did your father pray? Yes, my father prayed, to save themselves. However, the argument was that if your father was Muslim, therefore you were Muslim, and you became someone who left the religion.

So they would be sent to the execution chamber as opposed to someone who said, no, my father never prayed. So, okay, you didn't grow up Muslim. It was a very draconian process. But up to 10,000 Marxists and Islamists, Marxists, and the Mujahideen, were executed. My father escaped death by a few months.

Andrew Roberts: Wow, let's talk about what happens when the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, dies. Because you have written in the Wall Street Journal, you think the instability is likely and that the US should prepare to take advantage of that. How should the US prepare to take advantage? What should the US do when that day comes?

Shay Khatiri: When that day comes, the first thing to keep in mind is that Mr. Khomeini himself was a compromise candidate for supreme leadership among different factions of the Islamic Republic. And he was perceived as somewhat of a buffoon. He was president at the time when Iran also had a prime minister, and the president had the same political powers as the president of Germany, let's say.

He was a buffoon, and he was chosen for supreme leadership because the men, including Mr. Rafsanjani and Khomeini's son, who chose him as Khomeini's successor, believed they could control him. Over the years, he either had the natural instinct of a politician or learned to eliminate all of his rivals, and several of them through assassination, and create a charismatic cult of personality for himself within the regime.

This time, different factions, rival factions. And I'm not necessarily talking about just ideological differences, I'm also talking about different interests. The clergy, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who have different interests, as well as the moderates and the reformists, as well as some people, the Iranian people, will understand that they cannot make any compromises on a new candidate.

This is likely to prolong the succession. That gives us a golden opportunity to further prolong the process until the regime turns against itself and begins to crack internally. It is important to keep in mind, that Iran's constitution doesn't necessitate a supreme leader. It also allows for a council of supreme leaders, or a council of supreme leaders, which could be three men, five men, seven men, or as many.

My prediction is that the likeliest outcome is three men. They will say that Khomeini and Khameini were people of otherworldly virtues, and to succeed them, we need a combination of men. So, combined together they could reach their level. That way, they could split their differences by having different people.

Several people, one from each family Faction in that council. That would be a good outcome, because it will prevent recreating a cult of personality, of a leader that is necessary to keep the regime in power. And we could see a scenario that which these men and their supporters would turn against each other over their differences.

Ideally, this process itself could lead to this crack even before a council is announced. Nonetheless, the worst outcome for us could be that they again come up with one person who could recreate this cult for himself. Our job, our intelligence agencies, our public, the diplomacy, and our diplomatic apparatus, all should try to prevent a singular leadership succession.

Andrew Roberts: Do you see any signs of this? You talk about cracking internally. What are the signs that the Iranian regime, seems to have gotten over the uprisings that took place recently over the wearing of the hijab and so on with a horrific, vicious crackdown? What are the signs that they might be cracking internally?

Shay Khatiri: A few signs. One, before the Biden administration began the de facto lifting of sanctions they're just not enforced, Iran's treasury was empty. And there is a leaked document from the Supreme Leader's office with several commanders of the IRGC who are saying, our soldiers, our troops are becoming disillusioned for many reasons, ideologically as well, but also because we cannot pay them.

Some of them are turning to second jobs. And keep in mind that IRGC is the best-funded organization in Iran. So that is within the rank and file and a bit above the rank and file. Because even some of these commanders are complaining that the suppression is going too far.

Some of them. Second, after Raisi became president, he immediately became a candidate to succeed Khamenei. There's a rival candidate, which is Mostafa Khamenei, the supreme leader's son. Raisi had close ties with the IRGC and he was their preferred candidate. Immediately after the powerful Qom seminary, which Khamenei came out of, appoints Mostafa Khamenei as a senior lecturer, despite his lack of Islamic credentials.

As islamic jurisprudence credentials, it was a sign that they still wanted to push their own guy to become the supreme leader. Now IRGC is going to find a new person as a candidate. They don't trust Mr. Khamenei's son. But these are just a few anecdotes of cracks that exist.

And third, the reform movement, which is mostly dead, has still purchase within the regime. Because the failures of the islamic republic over the past many years. Many reformists do not attribute it to the theocratic or tyrannical nature character of the islamic republic. Rather, they attribute it to diverging from Khomeini's ideals.

The reformist faction in the parliament has always been named the Followers of the Imam's Line. Imam refers to Khomeini, not Khamenei. They believe that to return to the glorious days of the revolution, they need to return to Khomeinism. It's not a good ideological line to take for liberals like us, but it is a sign of ideological difference, as opposed to younger people who are more in line with Harmony's ideology.

Andrew Roberts: Let's talk about the bomb. They have what it takes to build a nuclear bomb, but they haven't yet. And you think that's because of their lack of confidence in their delivery capabilities, don't you?

Shay Khatiri: The United States since 2019 intelligence estimate had said that Iran is currently not pursuing a nuclear weapon.

That continued into the 2020 nuclear posture review that the Biden administration published. So both the Trump and the Biden administrations agree. Last month, a few weeks ago, the new intelligence estimate changed. Now it says that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons as of last month. There are reports that Iran has begun looking into how to create a delivery system, and has started a preliminary computer modeling for nuclear missiles.

They're still, as far as we understand, and I trust our intelligence, not close to it, but they seem more confident that they're getting there. And I want to add one more point. Iran's delay in pursuing these capabilities was more caused by political decisions than scientific decisions. Actually, it was the IRGC and the policymakers who did not want to go too fast.

These scientists, such as Mr. Fakhrizadeh, whom Israel assassinated a few years ago, wanted to move ahead with weaponization. Something has changed over the past few months that we still cannot fully understand. But either they have more scientific confidence or they are making different predictions politically about the regional order, that they are now beginning to move ahead with weaponization.

But still they are, as far as we can tell, they are not one week away from a nuclear weapon that could be delivered.

Andrew Roberts: The West has used economic incentives to curb or try to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions. But you've argued that Iran doesn't respond to economic incentives in the way that we think it does.

Could you elaborate on that?

Shay Khatiri: Yes, indeed. We are a commercial republic in the United States, and most of liberal democracies are responsive to their peoples. And people usually want two things. One, economic prosperity, and two, security guarantee and freedom in equilibrium with each other. We believe that this is how most governments operate, which is to some extent true.

But non liberal regimes have other and sometimes even more important incentives for the islamic republic. Ideology matters much more, and one element of that ideology. Is being a revisionist power to change the order of the Middle east. And if you want to go too idealistic, the entire world.

Now I mentioned the ideological element of it, which is important. There's a second importance to Iran's incentives, which is the supreme incentive, staying in power. One might think that economic prosperity would help Iran Islamic Republic to stay in power longer if it has domestic credibility. The problem is that that is something in the eyes of the regime leaders that comes and goes.

What is permanent is a security guarantee against foreign intervention to help overthrow the Islamic Republic. And the only security guarantee they can think of is nuclear weapon.

Andrew Roberts: What happens, do you think, apart from securing themselves domestically, what else happens strategically around the Middle East when Iran gets the bomb?

Shay Khatiri: I do not think that they will use the nuclear bomb. They will have. I do believe that they are intelligent enough to look at the history of the Cold War and even more so the current history of Russia Ukraine war to understand that they can get away with a lot if they have the threat of nuclear blackmail.

What we are seeing in the region right now will change, not in its character, but in its magnitude. Iran will continue to do what it's doing but with much more impunity. And more importantly, I do think that if Iran has nuclear deterrence, it will begin to use its conventional forces much more often.

One reason Iran has not been using those forces is that they understand that their military will be obliterated by the us military and they do not want to start that confrontation. Now if Iran has nuclear weapons, they will still be obliterated by the US military if engagement happens, I just-

Andrew Roberts: You can see the US taking on a nuclearized Iran, can you?

Shay Khatiri: But that is the exact point that if they have nuclear weapons, they can avoid that confrontation. They do not have to worry that their forces will be attacked and retaliated against by the us military.

Andrew Roberts: And also tell us about, I mean, it's taken its place very much in the new, for want of a better phrase, axis of evil with China and Russia, North Korea, Belarus, and much more junior figures like Venezuela. What are the fault lines between these? And is this axis likely to get closer, or are there fault lines that can be exploited by the West?

Shay Khatiri: This coalition is growing. My friend Eren Friedberg has a very good point that there used to be the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War, and they were divided by a common ideology. Now, he says, they are united by anti-ideology, by anti-liberalism, anti-Americanism. All these forces, despite their many differences, understand again, learning the lessons of the cold war that they cannot afford to be divided.

The cooperations that are happening are stealth but important. Iran has signed a 25 year security agreement with China. It has not been published. We do not know what's in it. One rumor inside Iran is that the Chinese have been given permission to build a naval port in the Persian Gulf, which would be a catastrophe with Russia.

They are also seeking a formal security agreement. Meanwhile, they are providing weapons, such as missiles, drones, to Russia. In fact, they are building a drone factory in Russia, why? One, Russia needs those drones, and Iran needs the money. Second, Iran needs deterrence. It understands that its drone facilities inside Iran are vulnerable to Israeli and American strikes.

Not in Russia. Other nation states that are cooperating with Iran include, as you mentioned, Belarus, Venezuela, Cuba, sometimes Turkey. And the extent of these cooperations are entirely transactional. But that makes it even more difficult to separate them because there's no trust for us to demystify, like between China and the Soviet Union.

There is no ideological rivalry. They understand the cynical character of their relationships.

Andrew Roberts: Let's talk about some of the franchises. We'll kick off with the Houthis. You've argued that the West's attack on the Houthis haven't kept up with the pace of Tehran's resupply efforts. Give us a few insights and perhaps some facts about that.

Shay Khatiri: I use the parallel of the Afghanistan war. The problem with that war that cost us success in Afghanistan was that we couldn't degrade Taliban capabilities as quickly as Pakistan was providing them. We have the same problem with Houthis. We cannot degrade their capabilities as quickly as Iran is providing them.

We have two advantages with Iran that we did not have with the Taliban or with Pakistan, I should say. One is that we do not have to worry about losing our relationship with Iran. It's already in existence, and we do not have to worry about their nuclear weapons.

It still does not exist. Second, Pakistan's shared mountainous border with Afghanistan, making smuggling of weapons much easier. Iran does not have land access to the Houthis. Everything to arrive in Yemen has to leave the sea. Sometimes it goes through Oman. They just cross the Persian Gulf or the sea of Oman, arrive in Oman, use their relationships with local tribes to smuggle those weapons and funds to Yemen and to the Houthis.

Sometimes they exit the Sea of Oman into the Arabian Sea and supply the Houthis with that route. Nonetheless, it's a naval problem. The best way to stop this supply is by sinking Iran's cargo ships to prevent them, but to dismantle their capability of delivery.

Andrew Roberts: So that's a declaration of war, isn't it? To sink the ships of another state?

Shay Khatiri: Not necessarily. In 1988, Ronald Reagan sank 6 of Iran's 12 ships without the declaration of war. And that was justified because it was an act of self-defense. Reflagged oil tankers were being attacked by Iran, and in response, to retaliation, Reagan sank six of their ships.

You saw that there was a strike that killed Qassem Soleimani, the IRGC general in Iraq, in an act of self-defense. We have been attacked and harassed by Iran's forces enough to legally be allowed under Presidential Powers Act, War Powers Act, excuse me. In an act of self-defense retaliate against Iran, one.

Two, if you understand the Houthis as an extension of Iran's military, which we should, we are being attacked by the Houthis right now, currently. And again, that would be an act of self-defense.

Andrew Roberts: Moving on to Hezbollah, you don't think it a complete foregone conclusion that Hezbollah is an arm of the Islamic Republic, do you? Or at least you're not so sure about this. Tell us more about how the relationship changed in your view.

Shay Khatiri: It used to be undeniably an extension of Iran's military power, and as some would describe it, an arm of the US, excuse me, an arm of the Islamic Republic State.

Since 2010s, during the civil war in Syria, Hezbollah was involved, and let me restart. Hezbollah became involved in the Syrian civil war into the 2010s. And during that period, became much wealthier, much better funded, and much more weaponized. You see that the threat that is posed to Israel suddenly grows, by Hezbollah, suddenly grows in that time.

But also, Hezbollah's control, and influence over Lebanese politics grew, going from a small entity in southern Lebanon to essentially controlling the entire state at some point. This wealth and power have made it more autonomous and independent from Iran. Because it has to rely less on supplies of arms and money, its decision-making could go either way now.

That I'm not incapable enough to adjudicate whether this means that they will be now more hawkish on Israel to attack Israel or less. Though there is evidence that Mr. Nasrallah in interviews and in his conduct has said several times he regrets the 2006 war and he does not wish to go to war again with Israel.

I am not certain that Iran will be able to convince Hezbollah to retaliate against Israel if it needs Hezbollah to do so. It might be, I'm just not convinced that it will be able to do that. It's rather a question mark for me than a foregone conclusion.

Andrew Roberts: How worried should Israel be that one day Iran will get a nuclear bomb and the capacity to deliver it?

It's a small country, Israel. It only needs one and it will be wiped out. Surely Israel has every right to be extremely concerned and worried to the point that it has the right to retaliate before this happens, to have been of the idea that Israel made the wrong decision after October 7.

Shay Khatiri: If you think in clausewitzian terms, you start the war with the big enemy, not the small one. And out of the three, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, Hamas is the smallest one. In fact, Prime Minister of Defense Collins was of the view that they should go after Hezbollah.

I understand why that decision was made. However, one, you need to get your hostages back, and two, you have to rely on your support. And President Biden was adamant that Hezbollah should not be attacked.

Andrew Roberts: Let alone Iran.

Shay Khatiri: Absolutely, absolutely. If you set aside those considerations, which are very important.

I'm just not an Israeli diplomat to figure out these complexities, or Prime Minister Netanyahu. If you can figure out those complexities, Hezbollah needs to be pushed back behind the Latani River, as everybody talks about, to be neutralized as an aggressor against Israel. But before doing so, it is wise to consider neutralizing their air capabilities, forget about their ground capabilities.

Just neutralizing their artillery by attacking their launchers preemptively and then attacking Iran. Because there's still a chance that if you attack Iran first, Hezbollah will retaliate, it's still possible. So to buy yourself time, neutralize their launchers, and then go and attack Iran's nuclear facilities.

Andrew Roberts: And you think that Israel's got the wherewithal to be able to carry out a successful attack on these well-defended, deep concrete bunker facilities?

Shay Khatiri: There are two sides of that, one is just traveling the distance. We saw in May after Israel responded to Iran's aggression, that they have some secret capabilities that nobody's aware of, and that's how they hit Iran's radar system. As for the distance, also, we should also consider that we have been working with Israelis on air refueling capabilities with KC-class military aircraft.

As for attacking Iran's deeply dug nuclear facilities, Israel has some bunker busters. There are people who say that these bunker busters would not be sufficient to dismantle Iran's facilities. I should add that these people have also been very adamant that we should under no circumstances attack Iran. So there might be an analysis to prove a foregone conclusion for them.

Because they're on the left and they have always been for reaching a diplomatic agreement with Iran. However, even if they are correct, tunnels have mouths. You do not need to necessarily destroy the entire facility. You can just destroy their ability to access them and buy yourself time. Of course they're going to rebuild those mounts to the tunnels, and you will have to attack them again.

If it is truly unachievable to attack those and destroy those underground facilities. But the access points are still above the ground. You can just keep destroying them.

Andrew Roberts: Let me go back 70 years plus you've got a revisionist line on the, what's known as the Mossadegh coup. One of the reasons that the British and Americans are so unpopular in Iran, at least with the regime, I don't think we necessarily are with the people, is that there's a very widespread belief that the CIA and MI6, back in 1953, during Winston Churchill's premiership, actually effectively overthrew the democratically elected, progressive, exciting regime.

Sorry, the government of Mossadegh, the Iranian prime minister, talk us through it and why you think that narrative is incorrect.

Shay Khatiri: Andrew, I'm so happy that you asked this question, it's one of my favorite topics to talk about. And in fact, you were right to call it overthrowing Mossadegh's regime, not the government.

My argument has been that first Mr. Mossadegh came to power via election fraud. Actually, before the election fraud, the incumbent prime minister resigned and Mossadegh succeeded him, which is fine, it was within the constitutional order. He called new elections before the votes were being counted fully, they started in cities, in Arabic areas which were more liberal and favorable to Mossadegh.

He was ahead, and while those counts were nearly finished and they were still processing at a much lower space in rural areas, he stopped the count and declared himself as the winner of the election. And that's how he quote and quote wins the premiership.

Andrew Roberts: A bit like what's happened with Maduro in Venezuela the other day.

Shay Khatiri: Yes, very much so, and into his term, he abolished first the Senate and then the House, the Lord's chamber. He was told that constitutionally absent from the legislature, the king had the power to dismiss him. He acknowledged this but said he didn't have the guts to do it, referring to the king.

This is where the coup happens I say, when the first regime change happens, the coup happens that the monarchy is overthrown and the constitutional order is disrupted because the Shah had dismissed him, I forgot to add this part, I apologize. The Shah had dismissed him and he refused the royal order despite the constitutionality of it, and forced the Shah to flee.

Then there is some MI6, but even more so, CIA attempt to restore the Shah, it's not going anywhere, and it's mostly given up on. People came to the streets demanding the shah's return, which happened organically. The CIA, Kermit Roosevelt, who was CIA, the grandson of Theodore Roosevelt, who was the CIA station chief in Iran at the time, used that as an opportunity to direct the protests to restore the shah.

What Roosevelt had as a winning card, as a trump card, was a letter from the shah that he had dismissed Mossadegh and appointed Mister Zahedi as his prime minister. That was within his constitutional prerogative, so he Mr. Zahedi was in hiding, Roosevelt found him, took him to the radio station, he wrote the royal letter publicly.

That's when people are convinced that what Mossadegh had done was absolutely unconstitutional and gives legitimacy to Zahedi's government. After that, the Shah returns, many mistakes were made after that, I am critical of us policy after the restoration of the shah, but what I say is that that was a counter coup.

That was the restoration of Iran's constitutional government that we engaged in. We can't talk about the mistakes after, but up to this point, we are restoring a legal government against an illegal government of Messer Mossadegh.

Andrew Roberts: Interesting, yes, so the sort of analysis and the assumptions that have been made ever since about it being an example of western imperialism and interference in internal Iranian politics is misplaced.

Shay Khatiri: Yes, and there's somewhat an easy explanation to this misunderstanding in history, which is that we're Americans. We see a quote and quote elected government, overthrowing monarchy and establishing a republic. We're gonna like that.

Andrew Roberts: Yeah, well, I'm not an Englishman.

Shay Khatiri: Well

Andrew Roberts: Anyway,

Shay Khatiri: I'm with you on that.

Andrew Roberts: Moving on, moving on, what's your favorite, what if?

Shay Khatiri: I thought about this and I might be cheating a little bit because it doesn't involve a decision that was made. Rather, I always think, what if Frederick William the First was not such an austere man, rather, he was extravagant?

His son, Frederick the Great, inherited a joint treasury because of the austerity of his father. Using that treasury, he goes to annex Silesia, starts the seven-year war, what if he didn't have that money? What if he either easily loses the seven-year short war in Silesia or doesn't even start it?

Stamp Act didn't happen You could see that Prussia might not become the center of Germany, Hanover or some other principality might become, or maybe Austria remains. Maybe the holy Roman Empire didn't even collapse when it did, to be so hollowed out.

Andrew Roberts: That's a good one, I like that, the extravagant Frederick William I Russia. Yes, we certainly haven't said anything like that recently. Tell me, what's the history book or biography that you're reading at the moment?

Shay Khatiri: I am reading two books, one is a political biography of Paul Nietzsche called America's Cold Warrior by the historian of the State Department, it's a very interesting book.

It's a very good book, but I wish that he had discussed Nietzsche's unique hostility to Jews, which doesn't come up in the book, including his doesn't, it's not mentioned at all. He mentions his weird fascination by Speer, but another friend of mine who wanted to write. A biography of Nietzsche, he talks about his very, very hostile words for Jews in his private correspondences. That doesn't come up.

Andrew Roberts: And your second book?

Shay Khatiri: The second book is called The Venture of Islam by Marshall Hutchson. He was a Quaker historian, I don't know if you're familiar with him.

Andrew Roberts: No, I'm not.

Shay Khatiri: He was a Quaker historian with short life, died young.

He wrote this trilogy of history of Islam from classical age of Islam, which is what I'm reading, going forward. He also was the chairman of the Committee on Social Thought in the University of Chicago. In fact, reading this book, I sometimes wonder if it was ghostwritten by Leo Strauss. It's a very similar-

Shay Khatiri: Style of writing. It's a fascinating book. I'm reading it because I'm trying to figure out if the classical age in the Middle East ended perhaps later, the ancient era, it ended later than in Europe. The fall of Rome is when we end antiquity.

But Persian Empire, which was the equivalent in the Middle East, the hegemon of the Middle East, as you may, falls hundreds of years later. And I'm wondering if we're still in the medieval era in the Middle East. That our hopes for liberalism and enlightenment are not being realized because they haven't even started reconsidering religious dogma that is associated with Middle Ages in Europe, and now in the Middle East. So, that is why I'm reading this book.

Andrew Roberts: Shay Khatiri, thank you very much indeed for coming on Secrets of Statecraft.

Shay Khatiri: Thank you, Andrew.

Andrew Roberts: On the next Secrets of Statecraft, Matt Ridley is a British scientist, cultural pundit, scientific historian, and peer of the realm. He might be best known for his 2010 book The Rational Optimist, How Prosperity Evolves.

Presenter: This podcast is a production of the Hoover Institution, where we advance ideas that define a free society and improve the human condition. For more information about our work, or to listen to more of our podcasts or watch our videos, please visit hoover.org.