The Middle East faces another watershed moment. Iran’s strategy of so-called resistance—arming, directing, and supporting proxy militias—has faltered, leaving the regime vulnerable. Israel has effectively neutralized Iran’s non-state actors, exposing Tehran to direct attack. Hezbollah’s leadership has been decimated, forcing the group into a humiliating ceasefire under UN Security Council Resolution 1701. If fully implemented, this resolution would require Hezbollah’s disarmament. Similarly, Hamas has suffered devastating losses, making its recovery as an organized militia capable of governance unlikely, though its Islamist ideology and calls for Israel’s destruction will endure.
Iran’s remaining proxies, including the Houthis in Yemen and Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq, have also been degraded. However, they lack the geographical proximity to replace Hezbollah as Iran’s first line of offence along Israel’s border. Tehran’s vulnerability became further evident in its direct attacks on Israel on April 13 and October 1, 2024—actions that diverged from its traditional reliance on proxies as both a sword and a shield. These assaults, which caused minimal damage due to US military support and advanced Israeli missile defense systems, underscored the inferiority of Iran’s arsenal. Israel’s retaliatory strikes destroyed significant portions of Iran’s air defenses and ballistic missile production facilities, re-establishing the military dominance it had lost after Hamas’s attacks on October 7, 2023. And its astoundingly successful assassination campaign against leaders of Hezbollah, Hamas and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Lebanon, Syria and Iran has restored the formidable reputation of its intelligence services.
Iran’s coordinated seven-front “ring of fire” strategy—aimed at overwhelming Israel—has reshaped Jerusalem’s national security doctrine. For the first time, regime change in Iran has emerged as a central goal of Israeli state policy.
A Parallel to Historical Failures
Iran’s current situation recalls the grandiose rhetoric of Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1960s and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in the 1990s, both of whom vowed to eliminate Israel but ultimately failed. Across the Middle East, Iran and its proxies are increasingly perceived as “paper tigers.” Online, memes mock Hezbollah’s former leader Hassan Nasrallah’s exaggerated claims about the group’s missile capabilities and the ferocity of his fighters. The defeat of Hezbollah has also discredited its ideological model, which promised “political and economic liberation” through the cultivation of a blend of Frantz Fanonian and an Islamist “culture of resistance.” This meant militarily fighting Israel and the US until the former is destroyed and the latter expelled from the Middle East. Neither of these outcomes is likely to materialize--both Iran and Hezbollah are on the defensive.
Arab commentators, particularly in Lebanon, have begun openly accusing Iran of exploiting the Palestinian cause and Lebanon’s population to advance its Persian-Shiite hegemony. Such criticism, once unimaginable due to fears of Hezbollah’s violent retaliation, signals a shift in the region’s perception of Iran and its proxies. Although few will openly praise Israel’s role in dismantling these militias, there is tacit relief among many Arabs at Hezbollah’s and Hamas’s weakening.
Rebuilding Deterrence: Iran’s Strategic Dilemma
The critical question now is how Iran will attempt to re-establish deterrence. Will it rebuild its weakened militias, or will it pursue nuclear weapons development, knowing this could provoke devastating strikes from the U.S. and Israel? Both options are fraught with risks.
For over four decades, Iran has invested heavily in proxy militias, beginning with Hezbollah in the early 1980s and expanding to include groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. These militias were instrumental in projecting Iranian influence across the region and deterring attacks on the regime. Hezbollah, as the crown jewel, served not only to threaten Israel but also to extend Iran’s reach into other countries in the region. In Syria, for example, its fighters helped sustain Bashar al-Assad’s regime during the civil war. The Houthis in Yemen, trained by Hezbollah, attacked Gulf states and disrupted maritime trade, further enhancing Iran’s regional leverage.
At its height, Iran’s proxy network posed threats to both Israel and Saudi Arabia while retaining the capacity to disrupt global trade routes. It not only ringed Israel with fearsome militias but also Saudi Arabia, the control of which remains the ultimate prize for the Islamic revolution. Iran could also disrupt sea transport in an arc running from the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea, on to the Red Sea and up through the Eastern Mediterranean, guaranteeing an ability to harm the global economy should the regime’s survival be imperiled. Despite recent setbacks, Iran retains some ability to destabilize the region, particularly in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Still, the loss of Hezbollah’s dominance significantly weakens Tehran’s deterrence capabilities.
The Case Against Nuclear Development
While rebuilding its militias remains a likely priority, Iran faces pressure to pursue a nuclear weapons program as an alternative means for regime survival. However, this strategy carries immense risks:
1. Military Retaliation: Developing nuclear weapons would almost certainly trigger a massive military response from the U.S. and Israel, threatening the regime’s existence.
2. Internal Power Dynamics: A nuclear weapons program could shift power within Iran’s leadership, empowering the IRGC at the expense of the clerical establishment. Historically, Iran’s leaders have been wary of granting the military excessive power, fearing a potential coup.
3. Regional Isolation: A nuclear-armed Iran would deepen its isolation, alienating even its remaining allies and potentially unifying adversaries in the region.
Given these challenges, Iran is more likely to prioritize rebuilding its proxy network to maintain regional influence, with a particular focus on strengthening Hezbollah and Hamas. Championing the Palestinian cause continues to be central to Iran’s strategy for acceptance within the Sunni-majority Arab world, despite its Shiite and Persian identity. Ayatollah Khomeini underscored the importance of Palestine in his revolutionary ideology, a focus that persists to this day. For Israel, responding to Saudi Arabia’s call for the establishment of a viable Palestinian state will weaken Iran’s leverage. Such a step would undercut the ability of spoilers like Iran to exploit the issue of Palestinian rights to radicalize the region and incite violence. It will also lead to normalization with the Kingdom, which will result in many additional dividends.
Khamenei’s Ideological Rigidity
Iran’s strategic decisions are deeply influenced by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, its 85-year-old supreme leader. Khamenei remains committed to the revolutionary ideology of Khomeinism, which frames the regime’s legitimacy around its opposition to Israel and the U.S. Karim Sadjadpour, a leading scholar on Iran, notes that Khamenei’s speeches frequently blame Israel for global, regional and even national problems, reflecting an obsessive focus on the Jewish state.
Khamenei’s ideological rigidity leaves little room for self-correction. The regime’s revolutionary ethos—centered on resistance against “oppression” and the defeat of “arrogance”—serves as the glue holding its leadership together. It is what constitutes the regime’s framework of solidarity or asabiyya—a concept developed by the 14th-century Arab scholar Ibn Khaldun. Abandoning this ideology would risk unraveling the regime itself. With no apparent Gorbachev-like figure in Tehran to lead a reformist shift, the likelihood of significant change under Khamenei is minimal.
A more plausible scenario involves a military takeover led by the IRGC following Khamenei’s eventual death. However, even this outcome is unlikely to produce a significant departure from the regime’s current policies.
A Nation or a Cause?
This brings us to the fundamental question posed by the late Henry Kissinger: Is Iran a nation or a cause? Under its current leadership, Iran remains firmly a cause, driven by an ideology of resentment, grievance, and militancy. According to this narrative, the troubles faced by Iranians and other peoples in the region are attributed to alleged American and Jewish schemes of domination, with the claim that only resistance, led by a divinely guided cleric, can achieve liberation. Thus, the regime prioritizes its revolutionary mission over the well-being of its people, even as domestic unrest intensifies, and the falsehood of its claims becomes increasingly evident.
Iran’s alliances with Russia and China offer limited support but cannot shield the regime from its vulnerabilities. Neither Moscow nor Beijing is willing or able to defend Iran against direct military attacks, as recent Israeli strikes have demonstrated, nor a domestic uprising.
As Iran continues to pursue its revolutionary agenda, it faces mounting internal and external pressures. The regime’s strategy of supporting militias has faltered, its economy is under severe strain, and its people increasingly demand change. Yet, Tehran remains committed to its eliminationist policies toward Israel and its implacable hostility toward the U.S., effectively signing its own death warrant.
The question now is not whether the regime, in its weakened state, will collapse but rather how much harm it will inflict—on its own citizens and the region—before its eventual downfall or complete transformation into what Kissinger called a nation. The priority for the incoming Trump administration should be to focus on accelerating this process while minimizing the suffering it causes to the Iranian people and others in the region.
Bernard Haykel is Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University and is completing a book titled “The Realm: MBS and the Transformation of Saudi Arabia.”
