The Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, aimed to undermine Israel stability. A strategic goal was to move beyond the settlements close to Gaza and connect with an uprising in the Judean hills in order to bisect Israel. The plan failed. Despite the violence of the assault on the kibuttzim, Israel has emerged militarily strengthened. Its military dominance in the region is clearer than ever before.

In Gaza, the scope of the devastation and displacement is enormous. The death toll is also very high, although there is dispute over the precise figures.  We should not forget that Hamas leadership calls these deaths “necessary sacrifices.” Nor is Hamas  alone  in valorizing death.  In the words of former Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli strike:  نحن عندما ننتصر ننتصر وعندما نستشهد ننتصر or “When we are victorious we are victorious, and when we are martyred we are victorious.” In other words, death is the glorious goal. No wonder the casualty count is high.

The conflict quickly extended far beyond Gaza.   On October 8, Hezbollah began to attack northern Israel from Lebanon, forcing the mass displacement of some 60,000 residents. They have not yet been able to return to their homes. Israel responded in kind. As a result, there have been similar displacements of Lebanese villagers from the south to the north. There are reports of buildings being taken over in Beirut to house the refugees. 

Israel controls the skies of Lebanon and is striking in the south, in Dahiyeh–the southern suburb of Beirut, the headquarters of Hezbollah–and in the north, the Bekaa valley, another Hezbollah stronghold.  It has also struck targets in Damascus. As widely reported, there have even been direct exchanges of missiles between Israel and Iran–a first in the region and therefore a dangerous escalation. In Yemen, the Houthis, which the Biden administration irresponsibly took off the terrorist watchlist, are disrupting international shipping, while also attempting to hit Israel, as do the Shia militia in Iraq.  Meanwhile, Iran is moving inexorably closer to nuclear weapons.

It would be foolish to overlook the possibility of further escalation. Yet, it is important to note factors that point toward possible resolutions and a new regional arrangement.  First and foremost, the Israeli Defense Force has been able to degrade its adversaries. It has killed or wounded significant numbers of Hamas fighters, and much of the Hamas infrastructure has been destroyed. IDF control of the Philadelphi Corridor, on the border between Egypt and Gaza, has choked off the smuggling, since this was formerly the conduit for supplies of new weapons. The death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar has significantly weakened the organization. To be sure Gaza is far from stabilized. The challenges of providing humanitarian relief and, beyond that, setting up a governance structure remain. Nonetheless, the future of Gaza will be without Hamas leadership. That is a good outcome.

Looking to the north, one finds that there has also been considerable IDF progress in Lebanon, although not as much as in Gaza. The two situations are not symmetrical. Hamas ruled Gaza with an iron first, and there are reports that the Gazan population is now turning against it. In contrast, Hezbollah has been extensively integrated into the social, cultural and religious life of the Lebanese Shia. Dislodging it completely will be difficult or even impossible. However, Israel has made strides in reducing Hezbollah as a military threat. Of particular importance is the elimination of the top tiers of leadership and the diminishment of its arsenal. Eventually Hezbollah might follow the path of the Irish Republican Army: from a paramilitary force to a demilitarized but effective political actor.

There is an ironic parallel between the developments in Gaza and in Lebanon. With the October 7 attack, Hamas robbed Israel of its sense of invincibility, no matter how much the IDF has subsequently achieved. Meanwhile, the war in Lebanon has robbed Iran of its different sense of invincibility: it used to think that the threat of Hezbollah’s missiles could hold Israel off from an attack on the Iranian homeland. That bluff has been called. Israel has reduced Hezbollah’s offensive capacity, while it has also demonstrated unchallenged air superiority over Iran itself. As a result it could even take out a major undeclared nuclear facility, Taleghan 2, 19 miles south of Tehran.

The fighting continues in Gaza and Lebanon, insurgents can still lob missiles into Israel, and Israeli leadership in Jerusalem might still succumb to overconfidence, but the momentum in the war is very much on Israel’s side.

Against that backdrop, it is worth recalling what has not happened. The Palestinians in the West Bank–Judea and Samaria–did not erupt in revolt. To be sure, Israel was keeping a watchful eye and has used force to suppress protests, but whatever insurgent spirit might have been present could not overwhelm security forces. Cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority has continued, which has also contributed to the restrained response. Jordan and Egypt, the two countries with formal peace treaties with Israel, took no steps to break them, nor did the Abraham Accord countries revoke the rapprochement that had been nurtured by the first Trump administration. There has, of course, been verbal criticism from some Arab leaders, but no concrete steps against Israel. On the contrary, some countries, like Jordan, cooperated in the Israeli air defense against Iranian missile attacks.

Why has there been so little response across the Middle East? There are several distinct components to the answer. There is a growing weariness with the Palestinian cause in much of the Arab world; the Palestinians had several opportunities to reach compromise resolutions but their leaders chose not to endorse them.  Meanwhile, the scope of Palestinian fatalities pales in comparison to what has been transpiring in Syria and Sudan.  In addition, Arab capitals still see revolutionary Iran, not Israel, as the real threat, while Hamas is viewed correctly as a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate and therefore a further source of potential destabilization. Saudi Arabia in particular has shown itself distinctly apathetic toward the Gaza cause because October 7 was largely directed against the imminent Saudi-Israeli connection. The only “Arab street” that has made much of a show about Gaza  has been in some Western European cities and on elite American campuses.  Neither China nor Russia has raised a finger.

In the wake of October 7, the Biden administration made efforts to manage the conflict but faced challenges. It supported Israel in important ways, but it was hampered as a result of election year politics. Its capacity for success was also tarnished by the legacy of the Afghanistan withdrawal, and it had damaged its own ability to act in the region by an unnecessary alienation of the Saudi Crown Prince.

However, it is more important to point out how the incoming Trump administration has the possibility of reaching a stable arrangement in a new Middle East. Peace in the Middle East has been the diplomatic prize that many presidents have pursued.  Candidate Trump has presented himself as the peace-maker, proud of  how no new wars started on his presidential watch. The Middle East is now his opportunity to build a legacy. How?

The nomination of Marco Rubio as next Secretary of State and Mike Huckabee as Ambassador (both pending confirmation by the Senate) point to a policy of strong support for Israel, consistent with the first Trump administration. This should not surprise anyone. There may yet be dramatic military developments before inauguration, but it is likely that Washington’s support for Israel’s campaign against Iranian proxies will amplify once President Trump returns to office. There is even the potential for this war to extend into Iran directly. The future stability in the region will be a function of U.S.-supported Israeli primacy and not–as was the Obama administration’s vision–a “balance” between U.S. allies and the Iranian “axis of resistance.”

In light of this prospect, U.S. planning in the next Trump administration should work toward formalizing a security network in the region, analogous to the “Quad” in the Indo-Pacific which links the U.S., Australia, Japan and India. A similar security dialogue could stretch from India, through the Gulf states, to Egypt, Jordan and Israel. Its goals would include maintaining regional stability, thwarting Iranian aggression, counter-terrorism, and protecting international trade.

Parallel to the security integration, a program for economic development could expand on Saudi’s “Vision 2030” by bringing Saudi financial resources and Israeli technology together. Rebuilding Gaza with Saudi investments could in fact be the lynchpin, given the proximity to Saudi’s envisioned  futurist city of Neom, as well as the strategic regional location of the Red Sea, the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. As with security, so too with economics: strong cooperation between Washington and Riyadh will be of paramount importance.

The Palestinian question remains a critical aspect of regional diplomacy, although no one still views its resolution as the panacea for all the region’s ills. The current war is not about Palestinian national liberation; it is about Iran’s failing pursuit of regional hegemony, its uncompromising hostility to Israel and its aspiration to degrade the U.S. presence. Iran has merely been instrumentalizing the Palestinian question. For that reason, among others, it remains a question that must be answered. However, decades of failure by the Palestinian leadership cannot be undone, the clock cannot run backwards, and the likely outcome will be far short of the Palestinian state that was available in 1948, or the 1967 armistice borders or Camp David or the other offers that have been rejected.

Nonetheless, the Palestinians will remain a constant presence in the region and deserve a form of genuine self-governance. Whether this self-governance amounts to a full-fledged state is unlikely for the foreseeable future. Neither the U.S. nor Israel will accept a Palestinian state that would be free to enter a military alliance with Iran. Israel will want to retain air dominance and security in the Jordan Valley. Palestinian self-rule may therefore develop at first only in the “Area A” regions of the Oslo Accords, i.e. in the form of a federation of the Palestinian cities, in which, after all, most of the population resides.

What remains then is the question of Iran. The revolutionary regime that came to power in 1979 still terrorizes its own people. It has lost domestic legitimacy, as the waves of protests demonstrate repeatedly. It is up to the leadership in Tehran to decide whether it intends to continue its policy of regional destabilization. If it does, it is sure to face consequences from the Trump administration. There would however be a different and better route for Iran, which must be apparent to at least some policy-makers in Tehran:  break with the Chinese and Russian patrons, come to terms with the new Middle East that is emerging, and make peace with the U.S.  This message should be promoted through back channels to achieve de-escalation and, potentially, realignment.

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