Full Steam Ahead With The First Sea Lord

>> Michael Auslin: Welcome back to the Pacific Century, a Hoover Institution podcast on China, America and the fate of the Indo Pacific in the 21st century. I am Michael Ausiln, your host. It's been a while. We've been on a bit of a hiatus, though. There's been a lot going on and we've been keeping our eyes on it.

But we're happy to welcome you to a special mid summer edition of the Pacific Century. And we are particularly pleased to have as our guest Admiral Sir Ben Key, the first sea lord of the Royal Navy. Now, longtime listeners may remember that we had Admiral Key's predecessor, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the first sea lord, a few years ago.

And Admiral Radakin has now become chief of the defense staff, senior uniformed officer in the British armed forces, and Admiral Sir Ben Key has replaced him. So we are thrilled to be able to have an update on things that have happened since we last talked to the Royal Navy and about the Royal Navy broadly, but also in the Indo Pacific.

For those of you who are not familiar with the first Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Ben Key, he joined the Royal Navy in 1984. He studied physics at Royal Hollow, which is part of the University of London. He has commanded various ships in the Royal Navy, but perhaps most significantly, he was commander of one of Britain's aircraft carriers, HMS Illustrious, and then has worked at key staff positions and has also been involved in Britain's military activities in Afghanistan and of course, has experience around the world, including in the Indo Pacific.

He became first Sea Lord in November of 2021. So it's about a year and a half, and we are thrilled to have him join us. And welcome to the Pacific Century first Sea Lord.

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: Thank you very much. Great to have the opportunity to join you.

>> Michael Auslin: Well, sir, thanks so much for taking time.

And you are, I should say, the second 1st Sea Lord, not the second Sea Lord, which there is one, but the second 1st Sea Lord to join us on the Pacific century. Admiral Radakin, your predecessor, who now heads up the defense staff, the top uniform position in the UK, joined us a few years ago, and we had a great conversation, but there's a lot that's actually changed since then, and I'd like to get to that.

I think you've inherited a lot of pieces that were beginning to move when he joined us. But before we get into any of the specifics, we always like to let the audience get to know you a little bit and ask how did you get to become the first sea lord?

How did you get into the navy? Are you from a naval family. Was this a dream to span the oceans, or was it all serendipity?

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: I think the 18 year old Ben Key would be rather surprised if he knew that a decision to join the navy for a few years whilst I worked out what I was going to do with my life actually turned into the only career I have had for now in my 39th year.

And my maternal grandfather served in the Navy for many years. He effectively went to the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, when it was a school. So he went to the age of 13. He was mobilized from there at the age of 16 when the first World War began.

>> Michael Auslin: Wow.

 

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: Fought at the Battle of Jutland as a 17 and a half year old in HMS Collingwood.

>> Michael Auslin: That's some history. That's amazing.

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: Well, he served in the ship with then his Royal Highness the Duke of York, who went on to become King George VI during the second world War.

So there's kind of a connection there that endured for the rest of their lives. I think if you fought alongside someone as a young person, you kind of stay in touch. Not necessarily closely, but they stayed in touch until the king died. And so I was always had this influence of my grandfather, who was an engineer captain.

But I didn't grow up anywhere near the sea. I didn't grow up learning how to sail dinghies or anything like this. And it was just that when I was 18, my parents were living in Australia, and we might touch on my kind of Pacific connections.

>> Michael Auslin: Absolutely.

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: And I needed someone to help fund my way through university.

A challenge that we well known to many of your listeners. And at the time, the Royal Navy were, and the Army and the Air Force were offering kinda scholarships in support cadetships. And I opted for the naval one, I think, on the basis that that was the service I knew the least most about, or the most least about.

I'd been an army cadet at school, but. Yeah, so I knew I enjoyed military life and I thought, well, I'll do that for five or six years, having got my degree, and by then I'll have given myself some shape as to what I really want to do. And the answer actually became providentially, I landed in the career that was to shape and it never occurred to me to leave.

I just forgot to have that conversation with myself.

>> Michael Auslin: Well, I guess there's still time eventually.

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: So, no, I was very, very fortunate. I'm not the only person who joins the navy out of sort of slightly idle curiosity and then finds it's a great place. The value sets, the sense of community.

I really enjoy life on board a ship at sea that was, you know, really important, but I wouldn't say it was because I really, really have to be at sea. I don't own a yacht. I can't think of anything worse than getting back from a six month deployment and going sailing again.

You've just been looking at the stuff. I mean, I have learned now how to sail because I don't go to sea very often. But in my earlier life, I couldn't understand my colleagues who got back from a long deployment and were just talking about pushing their yacht down the slipway and going back out there.

I'd rather run up a mountain. So but then the career has just provided a whole range of professional challenges, personal experiences, opportunities that I've relished. And I suppose in enjoying them, you sort of tend to be okay at doing them and that just keeps you moving up the system.

So I've been very lucky.

>> Michael Auslin: Well, I'm glad you cleared up one question I had, which is reading the Patrick O'Brien novels, I couldn't understand why Jack Aubrey wanted a home in the country. I would have assumed he wanted to be on the sea, but no, he has a country estate.

And I thought, well, does that ring true? And I think you've just put another data point to the fact that the Patrick O'Brien novels are brilliant and as close to life as possible. Let me ask, though, I just wanted to check. So when you joined, you were commissioned, you weren't enlisted?

You didn't have the enlisted experience in the Navy?

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: No, I joined as an 18 year old midshipman, did my initial training at the Naval College Dartmouth, which, unlike Annapolis, does not offer a multi-year degree program. It's a number of months contained within 12, left from there, joined the fleet as a midshipman ensign for a few months and then from there went to university.

So I sort of did it the other way around to how a lot do it today. And then during my three years at university, which was just, it was one of the colleges in London University. In my summers, I was then required to go back to sea to sort of maintain my currency.

And then once I'd graduated, I then picked up, finished my training, and resumed. And the idea of that program, and we're going back to the 1980s now, was to bring more graduates into the non-technical branches of the Navy. So I'm a warfare officer by background. And so it was just to create these opportunities to try and pull more people in.

And the way to do it was to sponsor them so that you had a bit more money than your average student, basically, because you were still being paid, albeit as a reduced salary. And, no, it worked very well. And my tuition fees were met, and that was a key element.

 

>> Michael Auslin: Absolutely.

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: Of the endeavor.

>> Michael Auslin: No question. So before we get to the serious stuff, let me ask you, just cuz I don't wanna forget it at the end, what's your most memorable Royal Navy experience? Was it almost getting washed off-board? Was it a sunset in Bali?

What's the most memorable that when you look back and those are the ones you want to keep with you, what is it?

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: Yeah, so, I mean, some of them are memorable, but not necessarily. So I've been very lucky to survive a helicopter ditching.

>> Michael Auslin: Wow.

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: That's memorable, but perhaps not for the right reasons.

 

>> Michael Auslin: Right.

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: But that means that I'm a member of the Goldfish Club, for which one of the former presidents of the United States is also eligible for membership.

>> Michael Auslin: President Bush, I assume you're talking about.

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: Yeah.

>> Michael Auslin: Yes.

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: And he was awarded honorary membership of the Goldfish Club.

It's a club that you never set out to join, but you become eligible for membership. And actually, what you find is that some of the people who, they tend to be military, but not all military aviators, cuz anyone who ditches in the water is eligible to join. But some of the stories of the aviation during the Second World War, in the early years after that, when they were really quiet, should we say that aviation safety wasn't as profound as it is today?

A lot of it was really innovative engineering, the rate of change and development of aircraft from aircraft carriers in particular, and then the arrival of those early helicopters, all of that. You found that the men and women who were involved in that sort of aviation had phenomenal stories to tell, or you would find out about those who had ditched and spent two or three days in a life raft in really cold conditions.

Not quite sure whether they were gonna be picked up by their own side or the other side and things like that. So it was always humbling to go to those reunions, whereas we ditched in a part of the world where the water was warm and the ship wasn't that far away.

But anyway, so that would be it. Now, I mean, command is always one of the great privileges and obligations. And I think the bits that I've felt have been the greatest memories for me is when you're part of an organization or team that has done something, and you realize that kind of, as the commander, you've set a direction of travel.

And then this amazing group of men and women have kind of turn that into something and made something of an opportunity or an obligation, often under considerable pressure or requiring real innovation. And when you're part of that, then that really feels quite special. And it's those things, I think, that I'll take the most satisfaction from.

And that's not because it was my wisdom in command. It was the delight at seeing the things that I kind of thought might be a good idea turned into something, really, because of the people that did it, and being part of those sorts of teams, yeah.

>> Michael Auslin: That's great.

 

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: And I've been couple of those, anyway.

>> Michael Auslin: Well, I appreciate that. And I think it would be helpful, before we get again to the Asia part, maybe if you could do a really sort of brief 101 on the Royal Navy for our listeners, some of whom may have heard when Admiral Radakin came on.

And I think I asked him the same question. But especially those of us in Washington, it's a sort of skewed dataset of thinking about the US Navy and thinking about its size and its role. Even if there's a robust argument on whether its size is enough, it certainly dwarfs most of the other navies.

And that's something that Americans have been so used to for so long that they don't really think about a lot of the tradeoffs, the questions, the difficulties in many ways of operating globally as you do, but with a smaller force. And so maybe, if you wouldn't mind just sort of walking us through as if we were parliamentarians, asking, why do you need this?

What does the Royal Navy look like today? The number of your capital ships, the number of those both in uniform as well as on shore, the bases you have around the world? Just give us a one-on-one, if you could. And then we'll move over to the Pacific.

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: Yeah, of course, so, I mean, I would say this anyway, but I think the Royal Navy tries to be profound value for money for the British taxpayer.

And as one of the leading navies in the world, and I say that not based upon our size, I'm curious that you say the US Navy now has this factor of size. I come from a navy where, 150 years ago, the basic policy of the Royal Navy was to be the size of the next two biggest navies combined.

That was the benchmark by which we were. And not surprisingly, therefore, we were disproportionately large and the nation couldn't afford that going through. But what I take enormous pride of is that we're one of the very few navies in the world that covers the range of major maritime capabilities we do.

And we offer both conventional and nuclear strategic deterrence capabilities. So at the heart of the fleet, clearly, are the four strategic missile-carrying submarines which carry the Trident missile system. And they then take with them another seven SSNs. So we're a nuclear operating navy that operates an independent nuclear deterrent, very closely shared with the US through extraordinary treaties set in the 1950s and the 1960s around the mutual defense agreement and then the Polaris sales agreement.

And we might come back to that in the context of what's happened in the Pacific now. We're the only navy in the world that operates two aircraft carriers specifically designed to support the F-35, a fifth generation aircraft. And I say that with all due respect to the USS Gerald R Ford, which is at sea today.

But that's an evolution of a design that's been going on for many years, whereas we were essentially given a blank piece of paper to start again. So that's HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales. And then supporting that, we have a range of destroyers and frigates providing the kind of standard escort force, but also able to operate on their own across NATO or other individual partnerships.

And then a series of smaller offshore patrol vessels which actually are globally deployed, including two that we keep permanently operating across Across the Indo-Pacific region, which we'll come back to. Not big, only 90 meters long, but they're on five year deployments into the region. And so that allows us to achieve a considerable number of linkages and for us to regrow some of our kind of operating partnerships and a part of the world we used to know very well.

But have tended over the last few decades to not be involved with quite so much. And then we clearly operate our own organic aviation. But the other thing I'm tremendously proud of is that within the navy sit the Royal Marines. So they're not a separate service, they're definitely not part of the army, they're part of the Royal Navy and they bring with them all of that considerable history and partnership and really give us our literal strike capability.

So we offer these three main pillars around the continuous sea deterrent, which is the nuclear aspect, and then carrier strike and literal strike with the supporting enablement. We operate out of three naval bases in a dockyard around the UK, plus air stations and commando bases. We don't have any navy, only bases that we own around the world, though clearly we have permanent presence in the Falklands, in Bahrain and one or two other places such as that.

But actually the great thing that we've done in the last few years, particularly reflecting the government's Indo-Pacific tilt as it gets called. Is that in the last 18 months we've operated with confidence across every line of longitude and in both polar oceans. So we've definitely gone back to not just the navy that can operate globally, but one that is operating globally.

The carrier strike group deployment in 2021 into the Indo-Pacific region, of which the US Marine Corps put a squadron of F35 and also the US Navy, one of their destroyers, the Sullivans. That was that first major reach back into the region and has recently been announced we'll be doing another major deployment into the region in 2025, plus raising our levels of presence.

So the joy for me is that I see a navy that is going back to operating globally. Clearly the Euro Atlantic is our principal area of activity and NATO remains at the bedrock of everything we do, but we're not constrained to that. We recognize we have a number of global partnerships in a world that is globally connected and we'll probably explore some of that as we move on.

And sorry, in the final bit. So we're about 36,000 in total. That's about 30,000 sailors and marines, 3000 reserves, and then about 3000 brilliant civil servants who are part of the navy. And then clearly there's the broader industrial partnerships without which we would not be able to do our business?

 

>> Michael Auslin: Well, you mentioned the, and rightfully starting off with the illustrious history of the Royal Navy and its size and outsized influence on the world, and as you point out, coming back to that, operating around the world. But you have this, such an interesting mix, right, in terms of the nuclear capability, aircraft capability, and then the sort of more standard capabilities that many navies have.

Who, if anyone, do you see as sort of the closest peer naval force that you say that looks a little bit like us, they operate a little bit like us. Is there anyone? Or do you occupy just a really unique niche that, of course, allows you in many ways to be the single most important naval partner of the United States and certainly of great value to other partners.

 

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: So the navy closest to us in that kind of peer style is also geographically our closest as well, which is the French Navy. But to say that we've always been the closest of allies would be a slight misreading of history.

>> Michael Auslin: Right.

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: And I think it's fair to say that on a number of occasions in the last few hundred years, we've resolved our differences at sea by the use of cannons.

Admiral Pierre Vandier of the French Navy today, wrote to me when I was appointed the most delightful letter in which he reflected a thousand years of shared history. The majority of which has been more peaceful than less. And they are very definitely across Europe. We are the closest in capabilities because we're the only two navies that operate nuclear submarines, both of which obviously, both of us obviously operate also from that, nuclear weapons or carry nuclear weapons on behalf of the nation.

There are other navies in the Italians are building their F35 capable carrier force as well. But actually, if you did the kind of the Venn diagram, who are we closest to? It's undoubtedly the French, but I think it's also fair to say that sometimes and usefully. We see the world through different perspectives and in a constructive and collaborative sense, that then becomes very productive because it prevents groupthink.

And Pierre Vandier and I'm sure the same will be with his successor, who takes over at the end of this month, Nicolas Vojoure. We want to see that as a strength, that we can have really creative conversations about how we do things together well and better. But recognizing that our constructs are, for very understandable reasons, slightly different.

But we need to turn that into a partnership rather than some of the challenges we've done in the past, I see that's really important to us. And actually, when you then look further afield, there are a number of other navies where we've got very similar kind of scales or approach.

So we're doing increasingly more with the Japanese navy, who are getting used to their order of battle is extremely modern. It's well invested in that kind of technical understanding is really profound. There's a lot of opportunity and in many ways, over the last few hundred years, we've had a really quite close relationship.

By dint of history, they're beginning to find their kind of more regional and global capabilities and operational. So there's a lot that we can learn and share with them. And then clearly there's kind of the Australia, Canada, New Zealand through the Five Eyes partnerships, which also is the straight historic linkages.

But I think it would be a mistake to presume that just because all four of those, Australia, New Zealand, ourselves, all share the same monarch and very considerable history, that our navies are in the same place. That's not the sense, because each occupies a different geographical position, each responds to different geopolitical pressures.

The trick for us all is to double down and invest and magnify in the strengths that partnership and collaboration bring. And look for those areas where by doing things together, we can do them better. But that would be it. I admire the way the Indian navy is growing at the moment.

I admire hugely what the Brazilians are doing. The head of the Colombian Navy has got great ambition to grow. We've got long partnerships with the Chileans. So I can't help but recognize that through our history, a number of our admirals, sometimes the ones that have been kicked out of UK have then gone on to have very successful careers in other navies around the world.

That has given us kind of a historically-bounded network that we don't take for granted. But the shared narrative can be quite profound.

>> Michael Auslin: Well, it's actually a perfect segue into the Pacific. And let me actually start not with a gotcha question, but just for the sake of role playing, as if this were a parliamentary hearing from someone who represents a constituency that's inland, that doesn't think about the world much necessarily, and asks you rather bluntly.

We understand you don't make policy, but you represent the navy, obviously. What interests does the Royal Navy, or for that matter, Britain more broadly, have in Asia? Why, as you mentioned, your core area is the Euro-Atlantic. You're a European nation or an Atlantic nation. We have a special relationship between the US and Britain.

All that makes sense. Why should you ever be so far afield as in the Pacific? And what do you get out of it? And maybe that's a way to get into what you do do and where you might be going. And then we'll get more specific.

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: So the Indo-Asia Pacific region is the fastest growing economic region of the world.

40% of our economic interests are already bound up with the region. So the idea that in some sense we would have an economic partnership relationship with that part of the world, and then not tie that in with the other arms of national influence and power would seem to me to be an incomplete solution.

And if you then look at those, what are those aspects of a kind of national framework that then brings in the diplomatic, the economic trade, but also the security aspect? And we're very much part of that security piece. And when you consider just how much of the trade that flows in the Indo-Asia Pacific region goes by sea or by undersea cable, when one looks at data movements.

Then for us to not want to play a part in ensuring some of that freedom of movement, security for all that should pass upon the high seas, to quote a long-established piece, would seem to me to be both slightly bizarre. In terms of why wouldn't we want to use that to reflect some of the kind of alliances and partnerships and relationships, but also actually as part of an obligation?

We shouldn't assume that only the Indo-Asia Pacific regions will look after our trade. We've got to play that part as well. Now, the preponderance of our effort will always keep us in the Euro-Atlantic, because that's the kinda geophysical nature. But the globally collected characteristics of what are going on in the world now mean that in that sense, you can't keep it all at range.

And I think there are many examples through the history of the last 150 years or so where nations have tried to keep stuff at range, and that has proved to be an impossible long-term policy position. And I don't say that as a reflection upon arguments going on in the US in the last ten years.

It is true of the world today, I think. That it is very difficult to be isolated from the rest of the world, regardless of whether or not you happen to be sharing your most connected things to, say, northern European countries like Norway, Sweden, and Finland, who we see much more of than we might necessarily Malaysia or Indonesia.

But you can't be exclusive about that.

>> Michael Auslin: So then working from that, and the really interesting way that you laid out, this is an element of all national power and national interests, and you're tying it to trade. What specifically then, from the Royal Navy's perspective, in terms of the Indo-Pacific, or as you termed it, the Indo-Asia Pacific.

If you could come up with a hierarchy of interests, meaning these are the most critical things that we have to do, and then we flow downwards, and ultimately that may then be just upholding general norms of freedom of the seas, what would that hierarchy of specific Royal Navy interests look like from your desk?

 

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: I think the most important thing we can do is demonstrate to the nations across the region that they matter to us. And we're doing that as part of a national endeavor. We're not doing that alone. But if I look at the two offshore patrol vests, the two sort of 90-meters Corvettes that we've got in the region, HMS Bay and HMS Tamar.

The fact that they are deployed to the region over five years, that they can go and visit a number of nations where we've not been for many years ourselves and then revisit and start to say, okay, where can we help? Where can we contribute? Not with the arrogance of turning up saying, this is what you need to do, but turning up and saying, are there things that we can do to help?

Have we got some skill sets or some insights from our own experiences? Some good, some not so good. Are there areas where as a navy, we can help invest in those partnerships and alliances? That's really important. And also, because we can kind of showcase a British commitment into the region, whether that's in support of the regional ambassador or trade, and then in rebuilding that network and saying, look, we matter, because the region is so vastly covered in ocean.

It then allows us to start to play a part, a small part, alongside the other navies in the world. And some of the really big challenges, transnational crime, illegal fishing, seabed security, we're not gonna solve it on our own, but showing the willingness. We are showing a willingness to be part of the solution space.

And that actually, the international system, the rule set that apply there, and that we kind of extol very clearly as the United Kingdom and are committed to, that we're prepared to put in some effort around the world to engage on that. And that seems to me to be the most important thing.

And then second after that is, because you can't predict how the future will go, also is to demonstrate that we can also deploy hard power into the region. That is not to preempt or to predict or to sort of say that we know that something is gonna happen.

But to indicate that we have an ability, should the government of the day, should the events of the day and all the rest of it require that the United Kingdom will commit into maintaining peace and security, that we're prepared to do that. And we have a tradition in the United Kingdom of being willing to commit alongside our friends.

Well, if you're gonna have that narrative, then you've got to rehearse and practice it. And I think those elements and showing that we have a competent capability that is genuinely, globally capable is the second part of the narrative.

>> Michael Auslin: Can I ask actually one thing that Americans, and we've talked about it on this podcast, but Americans don't Often remember or maybe don't even know is, of course, you do have territory in the region and you have the commonwealth.

And how important are those? And as you're talking about them, could you also talk a little bit about what may happen with Diego Garcia? Because that's a critical node for us and for you. But maybe you could start just by you do have territory. It's not that you don't have passport holders and citizens out there in the British overseas, well, Indian Ocean territory, Bayat, which is Diego Garcia, but also the Commonwealth.

How does that figure into or factor into your hierarchy of interests?

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: We clearly have some overseas territories and dependencies across the region and we need to ensure that we're playing our part as one part of the British linkage. And the offshore patrol vessels have been very useful actually recently in visiting some of the more isolated ones in the Pacific and delivering stores and capabilities.

And in one case we actually took a dentist to one of the isolated islands so they could do some sort of basic post-COVID healthcare. So those sorts of things are part of being kind of part of being part of that sort of broader government effort. The Commonwealth is a phenomenal organization, and if you think about it, because its roots were in the British Empire, the British Empire was founded on a trading basis.

But clearly empire is a very difficult concept in many ways. Some of the history associated with empire is far from great. And yet in the way that the British Empire came to an end, out of it was born this Commonwealth, this sort of organization of partnership of nations.

And whilst one could argue about just how effective it is or not, what it does do is it creates partnerships and alliances where it gives us opportunity. And providing we, and I'm really clear to all of my teams, we've got to be humble in how we approach these relationships.

We're not masters of anything out in the Indo-Pacific. In many ways we're the guest, but we do have history in the region. We do have long-term relationships often founded or sort of built through quite unusual lenses. So part of the relationship with Fiji is through rugby. This sort of, it's through sport.

And actually if you want to create a relationship with a Fijian, talking rugby for the first 20 minutes is a really good way of getting a dialogue going alongside kind of understanding.

>> Michael Auslin: We finally have rugby in DC now, we've got a rugby league. So hopefully you'll be able to take in a game when you come and visit.

 

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: It's a fantastic game. So you get those kind of things which build on the Commonwealth network. But as we've seen, the Commonwealth is a kind of a voluntary organization. Countries are not obligated to stay. In many ways, there are many people who say that the Commonwealth, its great strength was her late Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.

But I think what we've seen since her death last year is actually it has continued and it will remain a strength, I think, going into the future. In terms of some of the independent. I mean, clearly there are challenges in a lot of areas around some of these territories.

And I know it's not in the Indo-Pacific, but the Argentinians continue to lay significant claim to the Falkland Islands. And there is clearly ongoing dialogue around the British Indian overseas territories, otherwise known as the Diego Garcia, and the Chagos Islanders, and in that particular position, and I wouldn't want to preempt where that will end up.

I'm just pleased that there is ongoing dialogue because we recognize that actually these islands have significance, that we want to continue to invest in and sustain, and that's very much our government position. But we're not closed to the fact that there are others who feel that they should also have some sort of rights to the islands.

And that is a matter of significant political and diplomatic dialogue at the moment, which is not something I would want to preempt how that will land.

>> Michael Auslin: Well, I understand. Sometimes I just point out the third rails. We definitely don't anticipate that you're gonna grab them with both hands, so no pressure there.

But maybe we could talk about another intensive diplomatic and military initiative, which is AUKUS, which is a new and very innovative and approach to security, collaboration. And yet also one that has challenges associated with it, quite rightly, because of how ambitious it is. Can you talk a little bit about AUKUS and where you've sat now in the chair for a little while and so thinking about how we've gone through the first 18 months.

How we go forward on it, any worries you might have on it, or things you'd want an American audience to know that you're keeping an eye on, where does it stand, from your perspective?

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: So I think AUKUS is one of the most profound trilateral agreements that has been reached in a security sense and probably more broadly, but particularly, I think, for many decades at its heart, or its founding thing, was the transfer of nuclear propulsion technology from one nation to another.

And the last time the United States did that, of course, was with us as a result of the 1958 agreement. So these things do not come around very often. And one of the things that I am very, very aware of and has been for the last few years, and I'm not a submariner, my background, so it's really only when I've got in senior position.

Just how seriously the United States takes its obligations to the United Kingdom under the mutual defense Agreement and that stewardship of nuclear propulsion technology. And now the Australians are being brought into this to turn it into a three way partnership. No one underestimates just how challenging that is going to be, not just over the next few years, but over the next 20, 30, 40 years.

I mean, this is a multi-decade commitment. It's deeply profound for the Australians, who it's not that long ago that they wouldn't even allow nuclear powered warships from other nations into their waters. Very profound for Australia, I think very strategic. The whole process they went through in order to undertake the analysis that led to the conclusions that they needed to shift to nuclear powered submarines in order to consider their security.

And the whole nature of their strategic review that took place and provided that kind of conceptual framework I really admire, because it is a huge commitment. The challenge is that somehow you need to take two nations that have considerable nuclear capabilities, but which are also. Not full of spare capacity.

And the image I'd like to give to the listeners of the podcast is if you can imagine a very large bucket, which is called United States nuclear submarine capability. Into which you can put industry as well as the Navy, as well as nuclear reactors, and all of that.

And that's pulled to the brim with stuff and it's busy. And then you've got a smaller bucket, which is the UK's equivalent, and then you've got an Australian bucket, which is currently empty. And somehow we have to fill the Australian bucket without emptying the UK or the us ones, because the simplistic one, if you ever wanted to do that, was to take our two buckets and slop a bit into the Australian one and kind of even it all out.

But actually, that's not an option when there are the role of those. The reason why you have this nuclear submarine technology is for fundamental security issues for our two nations and for the United Kingdom, our deterrent is allocated to NATO. The nuclear submarines that we have have roles of their own, and in each country, we are going through major recapitalization programs as we build new submarines to replace the older classes as they come out.

So, as if that wasn't enough, we now need to help Australia develop its own capabilities. And as you'll be aware, that's a kind of, as the leaders announced earlier this year, when the three leaders met in San Diego. Which I was privileged enough to be there alongside Admiral Mike Gilday, the head of the US Navy, and Admiral Mark Hammond, the head of the Australian Navy.

There was this kind of phased approach where phase one is to see more US and UK nuclear submarines operating out of Australia. The second is for the Australians to operate Virginia class, American Virginia class, under their own flag. And then the third is the building, along with the United Kingdom, of what has become known as SSN-AUKUS.

And that is multi-decade commitment. To pretend that that's not gonna be a massive challenge is to miss the point. But the strategic opportunity is really, really great. And that is where I think AUKUS is the kind of visionary thing that has become in pillar one. Because it's committed three nations to something which the outcome of which is the ability to contribute to a globally operated nuclear submarine force with everything that that can offer into the security framework of the world.

As well as driving greater resilience and prosperity and economic benefit into the supply chains that support it. But AUKUS isn't just about, although the headline is around nuclear submarine propulsion technology. The pillar two work is also looking at a number of other areas where investment can be made.

Electronic warfare, hypersonics would be a couple of the areas that have been mentioned and a number of others. And of course that then leads us to a mindset about how we're going to operate together, mutually support each other, what are the things we want to do together? And I think it's very interesting to me to see how other nations in the Indo-Pacific region have responded to AUKUS.

Where clearly, they have had to respect their own national sensitivities and all the rest of it. But in the main, it has been broadly welcomed as a positive contribution, and I think that is a really important recognition of what this framework is going to offer us in the longer run.

 

>> Michael Auslin: So that's actually a great point, and I appreciate the detail in which you talked about AUKUS and why it makes sense, but your last comments are a great point to ask just a couple more questions before we wrap up about some of those other nations. And while there are many nations we could talk about, I'd like to single out two, Japan and China, and ask the Royal Navy's perspective about the partnership that's been developing with Japan.

And is it valuable, why? Do you want it to continue? Do you want it to continue? And if so, where could it go? And then you can't have a podcast on Asia without talking about China, so maybe you could talk about Japan first a little bit, and then we'll shift over to China and try to get, again the view from the bridge on, you know, what you face in terms of dealing with China, but Japan first.

Another one, by the way, with you, you've had some interesting history in the past, and it's actually, as a historian who started by working on Japan and Japan and the world, it is, how would I put this? It is wonderful, it's a blessing, it's a privilege to live in a time where we don't have to deal with so many of the problems that our two countries dealt with for generations.

We get to talk about it in a totally different manner. So maybe you could talk a little bit about Japan from that perspective.

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: So a few years ago, I met a previous head of the Japanese Navy at a fleet review in India. And this was just at the time, I think, under the late prime Minister Abe, where they were really beginning to open up again and think about kind of becoming more globally engaged in a military sense.

And he said to me, look, the royal Navy and the Japanese navy have a history stretching over several hundred years, and we have operated together. Much of the Japanese Navy's Construct was taken from the way that the Royal Navy's approach. He said, and then we had a difficult period, which has lasted for a few decades.

In the middle of the last century, he said, but I want to look. His point was, we've moved beyond that now. And what I want to do is to get back to how it used to be, because that actually is how we're going to define the future. And he didn't mean that in a kind of.

It's not as good as it used to be. Can we go back? What he said was, that's the level of partnership we should be aspiring for. And I thought that was a really interesting and positive comment, because how can you ignore, not ignore, when you've got a country of Japan's size, its economic heft, the way that the Japanese Navy has been developing.

They've got to be a key regional partner if we're going to engage in that part of the world. And so there is clearly so much that we can start to do together much more closely. And I'll be delighted that actually, this month, my Japanese opposite number is coming over to London and Portsmouth to spend some time talking about how we can invest in all of that.

So great, and Japan matters to the United Kingdom across a whole range, not just in an economic basis. But I look at the global combat aircraft program, which the UK and Japan have set up. I mean, that might not have quite the kind of the nuclear aspect associated with it, but it's still a multi-decade program investing in modern technologies that will develop the next generation of fighter aircraft, both crewed and uncrewed.

That is a really profound partnership as well. And so Japan, as I said, I think I used the phrase at the beginning, it would be bizarre for us not wanting to get as close a partnership as possible with Japan because of what it represents. It's a member of the Quad, and so it brings heft and perspective that seems to us to be really important.

So that's, I see them as a key partner just as, in the same way, and you didn't ask me about it, but the Republic of Korea Navy is also someone that we would wish to have as close a tie with as we can. They're at different stages of their development, but, you know, it's also an important regional security partner.

And then China. And I think we're really clear what we want is a productive relationship with China. But that doesn't come all on Chinese terms. And I think at its heart, this is what we would. I look at the way that China is developing its navy and is clearly developing some key capabilities.

And President Xi has made no secret of his ambition for what he expects to see out of the PLA Navy and elsewhere. We're not framing them in adversarial terms, but they need to recognize that there are a number of other people around the world. Nations who have got views and who have got setups and who have absolutely the fundamental right enshrined in the United Nations charter to go about their business with freedom and choice.

And providing that that's how China wishes to respond to and the way that the Chinese Navy wants to act at sea and all the rest of it, then I'm very happy to work alongside them. But they need to understand that this is a relationship that needs to be done on the basis of mutual respect and equality and not some of the kind of more bellicose language and threatening language that we've heard in the past.

 

>> Michael Auslin: Have you been able to work with them?

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: So I would refer back. I mean, I remember back in 2014, I think it was, we had a delegation of senior Chinese admirals who ran the Chinese Navy education process came over for two days to see how we did training and education in the Royal Navy.

And there were some very productive conversations. You know, you could actually talk about those areas where investing in human capital and making the most of the potential of the young men and women that join our respective services was a really interesting, really interesting dialogue. The first sea lord of the day, Admiral Zambellas, visited China and was able to have similar conversations with his opposite number.

So we've done this in the past. We know we can do it, and we want to do it again in the future, but it needs to be done, as I said, on the basis of mutual respect.

>> Michael Auslin: So, Admiral Key, before we let you go, I just thought of a wrap up question.

Now had a lot of Air force officers on the program at different times, or at least a couple or I've met a lot of air force officers, certainly working in DC, and I always ask them one question. I always ask them, if you could fly any fighter jet throughout history, what would you have chosen?

And 99% of them all say the same jet, which is the P 51 Mustang. But we have the head of a navy here, one of the great navies of the world, one of the greatest in world history. So, first, sealord, let me ask you, if you could have sailed on or better commanded any warship in history, any time, any country, any place, which worship would it have been?

 

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: That is a really unfair question, because the reason why I'm gonna slightly dodge it, well, I think is cuz, of course, the thing about the airplane was that that was just the pilot and the airplane. Whereas a warship requires you to go to sea with several hundred other people.

It's a community sense, and so actually, some of that. But if you wanted a set of sense of excitement to be part of something that felt different, I suppose you would look for one of those moments which were generational, changing. So for me, it would be the sort of ships like HMS Dreadnought, the first of the new battleships.

That was kind of a paradigm change that came out in the early 20th century. I mean, I'm sure there were bits of technology about it that were frankly awful, but it represented a real conceptual shift. And the people that were on board serving in those ships at the time knew they were going through something very, very different.

Actually, the same could probably be said of the ships like the German pocket battlecruisers of the second World War, the Graf Spee, the Tirpitz, very fast, very agile, designed to operate on their own, some phenomenal technology in them. Yes, they were on the other side, and we were very glad when they had sank, but they represented something really quite profound in thinking generational ships.

And then, of course, the next generational ship for us was into the aircraft carrier, and I was lucky enough to command, albeit a smaller one than today's generation, one of those. So I think at those moments, you would go for those moments when you've got a kind of a technology ship.

And of course, the thing I'm saying, there'll be someone to go, well, he hasn't mentioned HMS Victory. I haven't mentioned HMS Victory. There's all the history in the world there, and that would just be presumptuous. If I was to talk about what she was, she was one of the finest battleships of her day and full of technology that was very applicable to them, except a lot of that technology was in the use of wood and sail.

Rather than in the use of metal, steam, and now gas turbine, nuclear propulsion technology. So, yeah, that's a bit of a hedgy question. Hedgy answer to, actually, a very good question.

>> Michael Auslin: Well, I've never asked it before, but actually, it's actually a fascinating answer that you gave. Not one I expected, but actually one that I think perfectly reflects the challenges that you and your peers face, because we are at a transitional period.

We're at a transitional period with autonomous technology. We're at a transitional period in terms of other nations now coming up to the level of capabilities that we've had for so long that we take them for granted. And I'm really, actually fascinated that you put it that way, and I'm glad you put it that way.

But I think the very fact that you put it that way reveals how important this moment is, because it will set the tenor for the next generation or two generations of fighting on the sea and patrolling on the sea as well as in the air and on the land.

 

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: You are reflecting something I say to my own team, that if you track through navies used to propel themselves by awe, that was the principal way. And then they recognized that was quite limiting. So the Peloponnesian wars were fought at sea by city states, but that was about paying people to row.

Then they moved and they found a way of, sailing ships were developed which became ever faster, greater acreage of sail, sleeker hulls. But you've also gotta balance the kind of firepower that goes into them and to show how wedded people were. The early ships all around the world that started to have engines, didn't get rid of their masts and sails.

And Jackie Fisher, my predecessor, who was caught up in the Dreadnought, actually, although he's most known for the Dreadnought, the thing that he really did was he said to the Navy, we're out of sail and we're out of coal. Oil is the way to go. And the other thing that he profoundly changed was the kind of a lot of the personnel structures within the Navy to move away from a very hierarchical, and I don't mean Austrian rating.

But you either, if you're an engineer, you wore colored stripes between your gold stripes to demonstrate you weren't quite a proper naval officer. You were an engineer, actually. He said, no, remove all of that color. My grandfather was one of those early ones, because that was a recognition.

We are a technical service that is moving to a different way of thinking, and we're going through another one of those now, which is around a digital. So we become a navy that has to be digital. So this isn't a change of shift around propulsion now. This is a change of shift around the way that we are gonna engage and fight and operate in an autonomous, semi autonomous, fully crewed.

Talk it how you will, but the foundation of what maritime power or naval power feels like now is going to be profoundly different over the next ten to 15 to 20 years than it was through the 20th century. So it does feel to me like one of those kind of Dreadnought moments that we're living in, and that is extraordinarily exciting.

And it's something that, frankly, we will only do if we do it with our partners allies around the world because of the nature of the connected planet in which we live.

>> Michael Auslin: Well, that is a wonderfully upbeat note on which to end. We don't always get that on this podcast.

Often it's a sort of semi somber or fully somber note, but it's nice to end on vision and a thought of what we can do together and where we're going. And so, Admiral Ben Key, first sea lord of the Royal Navy, thank you so much for joining us on the Pacific century.

 

>> Admiral Sir Ben Key: It's been an absolute pleasure. Thank you very much for giving me your time.

>> Michael Auslin: Well, for the Pacific Century podcast, I'm Michael Auslin. Thank you so much for joining us, and we will see you again soon. Bye bye.

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