On his first day as secretary of state, Marco Rubio told his new employees that President Trump’s foreign policy “is centered on one thing, and that is the advancement of our national interest, which they have clearly defined through his campaign as anything that makes us stronger or safer or more prosperous.” I’m sure many American diplomats in that room, if not most, did not vote for Trump. I am also sure that everyone in the room agreed with this mission statement.
Reaffirming the grand goal of US foreign policy—advancing the security and prosperity of the American people—is easy. With very rare exceptions, all presidents and their administrations have put America first. What’s much harder—and more divisive—is articulating and implementing a strategy that achieves that universally recognized goal.
Over the centuries, three big debates have shaped our foreign policy strategies: isolation versus internationalism, unilateralism versus multilateralism, and realism versus liberalism. Trump articulated and practiced in his first term a clear preference for isolationism, unilateralism, and realism. I think he is on the wrong side in all three debates—isolationism, unilateralism, and realism are not the best approaches for making Americans “stronger or safer or more prosperous.” This makes me worried about the effective pursuit of US national interests in the next four years.
Here is a quick and superficial review of the cleavages in these debates.
Ideas that divide
Isolationists believe that the best way to advance American interests is to not engage with world affairs. They seek to avoid building alliances that “entangle” the United States into conflicts, prefer tariffs to free trade to isolate and protect the American economy, and dislike foreign aid and international institutions because they constrain and dilute American power—so the argument goes. Isolationists also do not think that the world's problems are our problems. In the 1930s, isolationists argued that Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia was not our problem. Japan’s invasion of China? Not our problem. Hitler’s and Stalin’s invasion of Poland? Not our problem. Today, isolationists make the same argument about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Internationalists hold the opposite view. They believe alliances enhance American national security and share the burden of providing security; they believe in free trade and trade agreements as means for making the United States more prosperous. They think that international institutions and treaties advance American power, not constrain it. Internationalists also believe that we cannot ignore conflicts abroad—be it the invasion of Poland in 1939 or Ukraine in 2022 —because these “regional” conflicts can spill over and eventually threaten American national security directly.
There also are less acute divisions between advocates for entrenchment and proponents of expansionism. Entrenchment presidents like Barack Obama never argued for complete withdrawal from the world, just a less-expansive agenda. Such presidents usually come after expansionist presidents like George W. Bush, who, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, pivoted to a much more ambitious foreign policy agenda. (On these pendulum swings in American foreign policy, read Stephen Sestanovich’s excellent book, Maximalist.)
The debate between unilateralists and multilateralists is related but distinct. Unilateralists are not opposed to all American engagement with the world. But when they do engage, they want to be completely unconstrained by laws, norms, allies, or multilateral institutions. Because the world is anarchic, only the law of the jungle applies, so they argue. In the Hobbesian world, the United States will best pursue its interests by acting alone. On December 5, Elon Musk succinctly captured the spirit of this strategy when he declared, “We should not have any international treaties that restrict the freedom of Americans.”
Multilateralists hold the opposite view. They believe that American national interests are best advanced by participating in multilateral institutions and adhering to international treaties, rules, and norms. Multilateralists think that cooperation between states, for instance, through international agreements and organizations, can reduce anarchy in the world. This does not mean that multilateralists do not use force; they sometimes do, but only when authorized by the UN Security Council. For instance, Obama believed in multilateralism and therefore intervened in Libya in 2011 only after obtaining Security Council resolutions authorizing force. George W. Bush, on the other hand, was more of a unilateralist. After failing to obtain the Security Council’s authorization to bless his invasion of Iraq, he invaded anyway.
A third big debate about strategy for pursuing American interests is between realists and liberals. I hate these labels. I see many aspects of the realist tradition as very unrealistic! And the term “liberal” implies a perspective aligned with the Democratic Party, which is not true. That said, there are clear differences between these two traditions.
Like the unilateralist tradition, realists believe that anarchy exists in the world, and power and the balance of power between states are the central drivers of international politics. Regime type—that is, how the system of government is organized (e.g., democracy, dictatorship)—does not matter to them. From this analytic diagnosis of the nature of international relations comes the prescription: pursue maximalist power and do not devote any attention to worrying about trying to change the internal composition of states.
Liberals also recognize the centrality of power in shaping global affairs, but they believe that regime type matters, too. Autocracies and democracies clash and even, at times, go to war. Democracies rarely, if ever, fight each other. In American history, our greatest enemies in World War I, World War II, and the Cold War were all dictatorships. Today, our biggest adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—all are autocracies. The kind of economic system in a country also influences its international behavior. Countries with communist systems, state-dominated economies, or strong oligarchies act differently from those with free market economies. From this diagnosis of international relations comes a prescription: promote democracy, capitalism, and human rights.
Moving to extremes
For many eras in American history, and especially during the Cold War and after, these three debates did not align neatly with our political parties but often were most salient within our political parties. Richard Nixon was a realist. Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush were liberals. In the 2008 presidential election, Democratic Party presidential candidates Barack Obama and Bill Clinton were deeply divided over the war in Iraq. In the 1992 presidential election, Republican presidential candidate Pat Buchanan was an ardent isolationist, and George H. W. Bush a strident internationalist. Every presidential administration also has had a mix of realists and liberals, unilateralists and multilateralists, and even isolationists sprinkled within internationalist administrations.
Within a single leader, one can detect the proclivities of these different strategies. I worked for Barack Obama for five years. He certainly had realist and liberal tendencies that rose and fell over time.
Compared to previous presidents over the past hundred years, Donald Trump has professed allegiance to the extreme end of all three of these debates.
First, he is the most isolationist president we have had in a century. During his first term, Trump pulled out of several treaties and multilateral organizations, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Paris Climate Accords, the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INT) with Russia, the World Health Organization (WHO), and UNESCO. His tariff regime targeted not only China but also our close European allies. He had minimal engagement with the United Nations and WTO, and, most shockingly, he even threatened to quit NATO.
Second, when Trump does engage in the world, his instincts are clearly unilateral, again more so than any president that I can think of in the past century. By comparison, even George W. Bush looks like a multilateralist.
Third, Trump is a hard-core realist. He has never shown any interest in advancing democracy, supporting small-d democrats, or fighting autocracies. In his first term, he actually admired and embraced dictators like Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un and disparaged many of our democratic allies. He often compared American bad actions to those of dictators. When questioned about his admiration for Putin and his violent ways, Trump shot back: “There are a lot of killers. You think our country’s so innocent?”
There is no clear evidence that Trump has changed his views on US foreign policy strategy over the past four years. After his first week in office, he had already withdrawn the United States again from the Paris Climate Accords and the WTO. He threatens to impose sweeping tariffs. Most strangely, he has proposed ideas tending toward imperialism, a foreign policy I thought we had retired a long time ago.
Trump might be more successful in implementing his radical foreign policy agenda than he was during his first term. First, he will not be surrounded by the “grownups” and the generals who previously constrained his most extreme impulses. Second, today he has a blueprint. He returned to the White House with a plan for foreign policy. Third, Trump and his team now have a much better understanding of how the US government works. In his first term, the budget for democracy assistance increased substantially even though the president himself was not a supporter of advancing democracy abroad. That probably happened because Trump and his team did not follow congressional appropriations very closely. That is likely to change. Finally, Trump believes he has a mandate from the American people for his foreign policy agenda. On his isolationist tendencies, polls show growing support.
What is holding Trump back?
At the same time, there will still be some constraints on Trump’s foreign policy strategy.
First, his new administration is already showing signs of ideological division. Rubio and Vice President J. D. Vance have very different views on Ukraine. Trump’s new national security adviser, Mike Waltz, also used to be a big supporter of Ukraine. A debate about H-1B work visas for immigrants also simmers.
Second, Trump is most focused on his domestic agenda. He may not have the bandwidth to pursue revolutionary foreign policy ideas.
Third, Trump and his team have promised to purge the “deep state” of “woke” generals and “leftist” diplomats, but the reality is that thousands in the professional state are still on the job. During my five years in government, I learned the value of these professionals, including those who served the previous administration. I hope the Trump 2.0 team will, too.
Fourth, we are not a monarchy. The Constitution gives the president enormous power over foreign policy, but other actors get a say too: Congress, the media, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, Stanford professors like me, and most important, the voters. Polls show clearly that Americans who voted for Trump cared much more about the price of eggs than about any foreign policy issues. They most certainly did not sign up for invading Canada or seizing Greenland.
Fifth, other countries—both allies and adversaries—can influence Trump’s actions. They have agency, too. Trump has declared that he aims to end the war in Ukraine as soon as possible. I wish him success. But Putin has a say in whether Trump succeeds, and Volodymyr Zelensky does, too.
Finally, without any inside knowledge or data, I wonder whether Trump is truly committed to pursuing a radical foreign policy. It will take tremendous time and energy. It will divert him from his other agenda items of massive deportations, tax cuts, deregulation, and retaliation at home. Is he really up for that? It’s too early to tell.
