Finland: A Perspective From NATO's Unquiet Frontier

>> H.R. McMaster: America and other free and open societies face crucial challenges and opportunities abroad that affect security and prosperity at home. This is a series of conversations with guests who bring deep understanding of today's battlegrounds and creative ideas about how to compete, overcome challenges, capitalize on opportunities, and secure a a better future.

I am HR McMaster, this is Battlegrounds.

>> Jenn Henry: On today's episode of Battlegrounds, our focus is on the country of Finland, a longtime US ally and strategic partner. Our guest is Kai Sauer, under Secretary of State for Foreign and Security policies since 2019. Sauer joined the Finnish foreign ministry in 1995 and has served in Croatia, Kosovo, and Austria.

Sauer was appointed ambassador to Indonesia, Timor Leste and ASEAN in 2010. And in 2014 he became permanent representative of Finland to the United Nations. He has been appointed as Finland's next ambassador to Germany, taking up his post in Berlin later this year. For centuries, Finland has sat between competing empires.

Modern day Finland remained under Swedish control until Russia's victory in the 1808, 1809, Russian Swedish War, after which Russia designated the Grand Duchy of Finland as autonomous within the Russian Empire. Finland retained its Lutheran religion and official language and acquired its own central government and bank. Finland declared independence in December 1917 amid the Russian revolution, but almost immediately found itself enmeshed in a violent civil war.

Almost 36,000 people died. The republic persisted, and Finland maintained its democracy. The Soviet Union invaded Finland on November 30th, 1939. Despite fierce Finnish resistance, the soviet army won the so called Winter War, the first of three wars that Finland endured during World War II. In the second, or continuation war, Finland fought to protect itself from soviet annexation and aligned with the Axis powers from 1941 until 1944.

That year marked the Lapland War in Finland's northernmost Lapland region between Finland and Nazi Germany following Finland's armistice with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. The Paris peace treaties established Finland's new borders. Finland maintained its independence and democracy throughout the post World War II period despite soviet pressure.

Finland gradually joined the international organizations created in the wake of the war to preserve international security and prosperity, including the United Nations, the Nordic Council, and the International Monetary Fund. Finland played an instrumental role in the creation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Following the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Finland completed its political and economic integration with the West, joining the European Union in 1995.

Finland and the United States grew into strong political, economic and defense partners. In 1994, Finland joined the NATO partnership for peace program. And in 2014, Finland became a NATO enhanced opportunities partner, the alliance's most meaningful tier of partnership. In 2016 and 2018, Finland and the US signed statements of intent to bolster defense readiness, exchange information, coordinate strategy and strengthen military capabilities.

In 2021, Finland decided to acquire F35 to replace its F18 fleet, deepening the defense cooperation between the two countries that began in 1992. After Russia's 2022 reinvasion of Ukraine, Finland requested to join NATO, and NATO members granted membership in April 2023. Finland will provide important capabilities and geostrategic advantages vital to countering Russian aggression and restoring and preserving peace in Europe.

Finland's relatively small population of 5.5 million and its 1,340 kilometer border with Russia have impelled the country to develop a robust defense capability, including large, well-trained reserve forces and the ability to mobilize the country quickly in time of crisis. We welcome Secretary Sauer today to discuss the war in Ukraine, Finland's priorities in the areas of defense and the economy, digital and energy security, and the future of Europe and the transatlantic relationship.

 

>> H.R. McMaster: Kai Sauer, welcome to Battlegrounds. It is great to see you again and great to have you on this program at a critical time. And so, hey, hey. Good to see you.

>> Kai Sauer: Thanks, HR, good to be at Stanford.

>> H.R. McMaster: Great, well, we have so much to talk about, but of course, a lot's happened across the last year when I saw you last.

We have, obviously, Finland as a member of NATO, bringing a tremendous amount of capabilities. But just recently we heard that the main roadblock to Sweden's secession to NATO has been removed. We have the Ukraine war going on. I want to talk about that and energy security and food security.

But first, I'd just like to ask you, what is your perspective on European security from Finland's perspective? What do you think our viewers need to know at the very top of this discussion?

>> Kai Sauer: Well, thanks, HR, I think I would still start with something which is connecting Finland to President Hoover since we had the Hoover Institution here.

I think it was in 1931 when President Hoover, he gave a debt relief after the Great Depression. And it was supposed to be a temporary debt relief, but most of the countries who were benefiting from it, they took it's a permanent one, with the exception of Finland, which continued servicing its debt until it was all paid.

And this is actually something which really shaped the American perception of Finland in the US at that time. So just as a bit of a background, but coming to your question, February 24th, 2022, was for us probably something similar. The 9/11 was to the United States.

>> H.R. McMaster: And of course, for viewers, this is the reinvasion of Ukraine.

 

>> Kai Sauer: Exactly.

>> H.R. McMaster: By Russia, the massive reinvasion.

>> Kai Sauer: Yes, when Russia unlawfully attacked Ukraine. So it made us to reevaluate our security environment. This was a case where a permanent member of the UN Security Council had attacked a neighbor, a sovereign country, Ukraine. And by this violated the rules-based international order, which has basically been the protection of small countries like ours.

So against this background, we had to consider what to do. And our decision also supported by a strong popular opinion, was to seek NATO membership. And, well, this was done very much in conjunction with Sweden, our good neighbor.

>> H.R. McMaster: And it happened quite rapidly, it was a big change.

I mean, I remember the term Finlandization, right, which was a synonym for neutrality. And it was a massive change, and it was decisive, wasn't it? Could you maybe explain a little bit about the political process, what happened inside of Finland that brought about this significant change in Finland policy?

 

>> Kai Sauer: Yeah, I think first I digress a little bit, but since you mentioned Finlandization, I think that's a term which is actually describing how a small country next to a bigger country with totalitarian or expansive ambitions. How to survive next to such an entity. And there are also other examples in Europe, like Denmark and Germany during the second World War, before the second World War.

But the process indeed was quite rapid, I think in the history of NATO's enlargements, ours was the fastest one. It took lessen than a year, although it could have been faster, but our Turkish and Hungarian partners, they needed some more time. And it was also, I mean, the decision itself was very much supported by a strong popular support and increased support to NATO membership, which manifested itself also in a convincing parliamentary majority.

The Finnish parliament has 200 MPs, 188 of them were in favor of NATO membership.

>> H.R. McMaster: So it's a huge statistic, and I think it's important for everyone to know that it wasn't close at all, it was quite decisive. I'm very enthusiastic about Finland as a new member of NATO, because of the tremendous capabilities Finland brings to the alliance.

The alliance, in my view, is much, much stronger with Finland than without Finland. Could you maybe talk to our viewers what you see as the major strengths that Finland brings to the alliance?

>> Kai Sauer: Yes, I'll do that briefly, and I divide it in maybe four or five categories.

So I would start with their military capabilities and human capabilities. Military capabilities, just as an example, a year and a half ago, Finland made the political decision about its largest ever military procurement, which was F-35 decision. And we are flying the F-18s now, it's time for an upgrade, so we organized a tender and decided that F-35s would be the next generation for us.

And we have a very strong artillery, I think the war in Ukraine has shown how important the artillery is, unfortunately. So, this combined with also Navy reform program, I think we have a pretty strong hardware set or toolbox at our disposal. Besides that, there's a human factor, we are one of the few countries left in Europe, maybe even worldwide, with the conscription service, which means that we can mobilize a significant reserve.

In the first instance, 280,000, and then the second instance, about 900,000, which would probably mean that I had to, be activated as well. And the additional factor is that we have also the very strong defense mindset. According to the surveys, about 80% of the Finns would be ready to take up arms in defense of the country, which is also very rare quality in Europe these days.

So this is the humanware factor. And then, other qualities, geography, Finland is a country stretching, well, if you look at the map of Finland, it's the shape of a woman, actually. So the top, the head of the lady, stretches up into the Arctic, and the toes, they're in the Baltic Sea.

So we are a bridge between the Arctic and the Baltic. And I think with the importance of the Arctic growing, strategic importance, addition of Finland and Sweden to NATO is also a balancing factor for the alliance. Then we have technology, Finland and Sweden, both high tech countries. And actually, with the enlargement to Finland and Sweden, two out of three global, 5 and 6G providers will move in the remit of NATO.

 

>> H.R. McMaster: And just for our viewers, it's the 5 and 6G communications hardware and equipment that's necessary to bring automation, really, to bring high speed Internet internationally. And of course, the big competitors from the Chinese Communist Party, Huawei, which is a large security concern. So this is a huge dimension of it that I hadn't put together.

Obviously, Ericsson and Nokia are from Sweden and Finland.

>> Kai Sauer: I mean, they are not joining physically, NATO,

>> H.R. McMaster: But that security.

>> Kai Sauer: The tech ecosystem will join with the country. And then my last observation would be also a certain responsibility and predictability. I mean, as a NATO member, we will continue trying to be a predictable and stable actor in our region.

So we are not out to provoke, we are there to stabilize.

>> H.R. McMaster: Finland participated for the first time in NATO's annual war games and simulations, any other thoughts on, strategically, what Finland is most concerned about? You mentioned the Arctic already and the competition with Russia, who's trying to lay claim, and now China, really, who has no claim from a geographic perspective, is also quite active in the Arctic.

But what are Finland's main concerns? We're all concerned, obviously, we'll talk more about the war against Ukraine, but what other security concerns does Finland have besides, as you look to the East?

>> Kai Sauer: Yeah, I think the east is our primary concern, Russian aggression on Ukraine through the existing European security architecture, out of balance.

And so that is the most important concern. And I think if you look at the global scale, there are many kind of immaterial or thematic concerns, like climate change, food security, diseases, pandemics, etc., which would deserve more attention and resources. But now our focus is so much on Russia and Ukraine that we've been distracted.

Our resources are distracted, our political attention is distracted from these much more important conflicts or potential strategic challenges. And I think this is something very important to understand that it is not because of us who are defending Ukraine and criticizing Russia for their unlawful aggression, but the blame has to be laid at the Russian doorstep.

Because of them, we cannot provide the necessary attention to the big thematic problems.

>> H.R. McMaster: Well, Kai, your government has struggled for a long time with political subversion, various forms of aggression that Russia uses, really, to try to accomplish objectives below the threshold of a military operation or what might elicit a military response.

And you have a center in Finland for excellence on hybrid warfare. What has Finland learned about defending, having a whole of society defensive approach against Russia's disinformation, cyber enabled information warfare, and other forms of political subversion?

>> Kai Sauer: Yeah, I think that's a very important point. And to counter hybrid and cyber threats, you need to be technically equipped.

You have to have the protection, technical protection or technological protection, but you have to have also intellectual protection. And this is something we have understood. And we have a very strong education system in Finland. It has been ranked very high in the PISA studies. So what we have done is we have used the education system already at the primary school to teach kids media literacy, so to distinguish between right and false information.

So I think this is part of our resistance also, and resilience in encountering hybrid threats. I just finished my thought here. I think it's easier for us to do that because we have a small country, a homogeneous country, and one thing is probably that language protects us as well.

Finnish is impossible for anybody else to speak.

>> H.R. McMaster: You make a really important point on education, because what Russia, I think, tries to do is polarize our society, pit us against each other, and diminish our confidence in who we are. Our common identity as Americans or as Finns, or maybe our faith, even in alliances, sciences, and the transatlantic relationship.

And education, I think, is the most important defense against that. We both have elections coming up next year, Finland and the United States. And, of course, Russia will be quite active, right? In terms of sowing conspiracy theories, the vast majority of Russian activity in the US, from a cyber enabled information warfare perspective, is on issues of race, to polarize on race or border control and immigration.

Or on gun control issues that already tend to divide Americans somewhat, and they try to use them to divide us even further. Have you seen that in Finland as well? You mentioned some of the strengths in Finland, right? A relatively small scale problem in terms of population, but also the homogeneity of the population and language.

But what do you think were some of the best practices that might be able to be scaled up here in the United States?

>> Kai Sauer: Yeah, I think it's simply awareness. Awareness and readiness and resilience. But I think in the US it might be more difficult because this is, and I hope you don't mind me saying this, it's a more or less equal society.

The social cohesion is perhaps not as strong as in small and homogeneous Finland, where everybody pays a lot of taxes. There are certain short-

>> H.R. McMaster: We're in California, I mean, we pay a lot of taxes.

>> Kai Sauer: You do? Okay.

>> H.R. McMaster: We just don't get as much foreign taxes as you get in Finland.

So I think one of the great strengths of America, obviously, is we've always come from. You can't really point out many Americans who originated here besides our Native American population. It has been our strength, but it's something, obviously to be cognizant of. And I think every time we talk about things that divide us, we should maybe spend a little bit of time talking about what we can agree on and what's important about our common identity.

 

>> Kai Sauer: That's true, may I just add one thought to your question? Because I think maintaining economic stability means also social stability. So economic prosperity results into social stability. And I think here we are on kind of unsure ground or insecure ground with the ongoing crisis because we have suffered from inflation, there has been unemployment, and all this comes after pandemic, of course.

So it's kind of a very fragile economic environment, and people sense that, and they tend to then make political choices which are more maybe extreme, either left or right. And I think this is something which can also be exploited from the outside. If you're talking about hybrid influence.

 

>> H.R. McMaster: And you already alluded to this already, I think what Russia has done is Russia has completely caused this crisis, caused the horrors and the suffering of the Ukrainian people, but also global suffering. And we've seen the failure to renew the grain deal recently and then continued threats to energy security that have helped drive inflation internationally.

But Russia likes to try to blame everyone else for these problems, as if it was NATO who caused the war or who caused the energy crisis or who caused the food shortage. And I think it's important for us to trace these terrible conditions back to the Russians who actually caused them.

In the area of energy security, what did Finland do? Because Finland was an example, right? Germany I think, will now admit, obviously, that Germany made a big mistake in giving Russia coercive power over its economy because of over reliance on natural gas, cheap natural gas, Russia. What did Finland do differently, and what's the lesson that could be applied to energy security going forward?

What should be our priorities in this arena?

>> Kai Sauer: I think in Finland, we are either a bit slow or very strategic, because after the Cold War, Fukuyama, Californian.

>> H.R. McMaster: Right here, it's my colleague here at Stanford, right?

>> Kai Sauer: Right, so we're-

>> H.R. McMaster: What you're alluding to is this thesis of the end of history, right?

 

>> Kai Sauer: End of history, yes.

>> H.R. McMaster: That democracy was gonna be the final form of governance. Now, he qualified that to Frank's defense.

>> Kai Sauer: Yes.

>> H.R. McMaster: But the interpretation of it was an overly optimistic view of the future of governance, and democratic governance in particular.

>> Kai Sauer: Exactly, so what we did, we missed the train of optimism we maintained.

 

>> H.R. McMaster: I think when it's cold and dark, maybe it's an important corrective to that optimism.

>> Kai Sauer: And it resulted in us maintaining our military capabilities and actually we even reinforced them after the Cold War, when Germany also dismantled a lot of its artillery and especially the eastern German one,.

We went shopping, so we got a lot of artillery and then leopards we scaled up and the same idea basically also applies to our energy policy. So what we are doing, we are not putting all our eggs in one basket, we imported some energy, oil and gas from Russia, but not all of it.

We have nuclear energy, we have hydro energy, wind energy, and we have a very good Nordic Grid. So in case we have shortages, Norway or Sweden, they can compensate for that. So our energy portfolio is rather diverse. This is not the case with all Europeans, we have countries like Hungary, which is very dependent, and others as well.

And it depends a little bit not only on the political choices, but also on geography, how connected you are on the pipelines.

>> H.R. McMaster: That's right, the old infrastructure.

>> Kai Sauer: Exactly, infrastructure, whether you are landlocked or not. I mean, Germany is building the LNG terminals now at the coast.

 

>> H.R. McMaster: The regasification terminals-

>> Kai Sauer: And also offshore wind energy, which all countries cannot do.

>> H.R. McMaster: And it was a big mistake, I think, also to cancel nuclear. I mean, I think Finland has sidestepped that as well, but it's difficult to cancel nuclear jump to renewables.

>> Kai Sauer: Yeah.

>> H.R. McMaster: Without continued investment in some more traditional or hydrocarbon infrastructure.

I think maybe that's one of the biggest lessons, but can I ask you, what you think about Russia's next steps in the aggression against Ukraine. And the aggression really against the west broadly in terms of using energy for coercive purposes, now using food for coercive purposes. There was the explosion of the Nord stream, two pipeline, which happened.

It was not a coincidence, think that was the same day that the Norway, Finland, Poland pipeline opened. I mean, what's next? What do you think we ought to be concerned about in terms of the trajectory of Russian aggression?

>> Kai Sauer: Yeah, I'm not following the military events on the daily basis, it's a very kind of fluctuating and dynamic situation.

We are in the phase where Ukraine is launching the counteroffensive, they are very conscious that they have to save human lives, their own ones.

>> H.R. McMaster: They're probing, they're trying to find, I think, an area of weakness now.

>> Kai Sauer: Yeah.

>> H.R. McMaster: To get through these layered defenses behind them.

 

>> Kai Sauer: Exactly, yeah.

>> H.R. McMaster: Multiple minefields and entrenchments and deliberately prepared defensive positions, by the way.

>> Kai Sauer: Yes, yes, I read some reports about the mines, and it's simply terrible. Yeah, so we are in this phase, and I think how this phase will end or progress will very much also determine what Russia's next move will be.

We shouldn't be perhaps distracted by smaller events here and there, but try to look at the bigger picture. It is interesting what happened a few weeks ago with Prigogine and Wagner.

>> H.R. McMaster: Yes, yes.

>> Kai Sauer: But it still is a bit foggy, maybe too early to make any final conclusions about it.

But I think what it shows that the control and command is maybe not as robust or solid. And what it clearly showed to me, at least, is that there's no social contract in Russia as we know it. So no accountability between the government and the citizens. If you observed how Wagner was received down in Rostow, I mean, it was welcomed by the people.

They were cheering, nobody cared, it's a mercenary group challenging the government.

>> H.R. McMaster: Right, it's an ex hot dog salesman and convict who took over the equivalent of United States Central Command, right? The Southern Command was running the war effort, it was extraordinary and so it is very difficult to understand internally what's happening in Russia, right?

You see polls of Russians, but what are they gonna say, right? So because they're constantly under duress, they're more political prisoners in Russia than there were during the height of the Cold War. There are more people in the internal security apparatus for Putin than there are in his armed forces.

But from your vantage point, and I know a long student of Russia, what can you tell our viewers about what you see happening inside of Russia in recent years? Especially the reinvasion of Ukraine in February of 22?

>> Kai Sauer: Yeah, I'm nothing an expert on Russia, but, of course, we have a long history with them, and we have observed how the Russian society has evolved.

And my short conclusion is that Russia is a country of a reversed accountability, which is like a little bit of Orwellian, George Orwell, 1984, and animals farm. That the people are accountable to the parliament and the parliament is accountable to the president, not the other way around.

>> H.R. McMaster: That's a great way to put it.

 

>> Kai Sauer: So you don't have a civil society or free media, critical media, which is driving the political processes. You don't have a rule of law which you can turn to if you have been mistreated. It's basically power which decides.

>> H.R. McMaster: Right, and how do you see the power dynamic shifting after the Petrosian revolt, right?

It did seem to me to at least remove the air of invincibility around Vladimir Putin. But as you know, my old interlocutor there was Patrushev. He and others of this hyper nationalist, revanchist class really have a worldview that seems to me to be quite similar to Putin in terms of his obsession with restoring the Russian empire, restoring Russian national greatness.

I know there are some really courageous opposition leaders in prison, many others in exile. I know it's very hard, it's impossible to say. But, of course, what many people are discussing these days is, how does Russia evolve? Does it become a country that would see that its future lies in a peaceful relationship with Europe?

And the integration with Europe, that's always been the hope for. So Finland has been sitting next to Russia for 600 years. So what is your 600 year perspective on that question?

>> Kai Sauer: Yeah, I mean, I'm a bit hesitant to make any predictions, but maybe history can show us something.

And our national history is very much tied into the Russian history. So what we have observed in 1917, was the Russian revolution which created the Soviet Union, it wasn't a democracy. The Soviet Union and the Soviet Union in 1991 collapsed and resulted into something else, the current Russia, which really never evolved into a western style democratic society.

So, I mean, you can maybe draw some conclusions from that. And by the way, all these two or three years, which I mentioned, 1917, 1991, and now 2022, for us, they have meant a change as well. Because the chaos in Russia has opened a window or created circumstances where we have had the need to Act.

So first was independence, second was EU integration, and third was NATO. I don't know what comes next.

>> H.R. McMaster: Where can we join after EU and NATO? So, you're a long serving European diplomat. Your next posting is gonna be in Berlin. So maybe let's talk about NATO and Europe and what do you think the priorities ought to be for the EU and NATO for the future.

And of course, Putin got the opposite of what he wanted, right, with the reinvasion of Ukraine. He thought NATO was gonna splinter. He thought that Europe would be weakened. Quite opposite has happened. So we should be happy about that. But, of course, there's a lot more work to be done.

And so what do you think the priorities ought to be for those organizations?

>> Kai Sauer: Well, I think you pointed to a very important observation, which is the strategic mistake Russia has committed by launching this aggression on Ukraine. I try to paraphrase President Biden, who at the previous NATO summit in Madrid said that with the aggression on Ukraine, Russia tried to finlandize Europe, but instead it natoized Finland and Sweden.

So instead of getting rid of NATO from his borders, he got more NATO at his borders. And I'm talking about Putin now. But there are other strategic mistakes as well. I think one of Putin's goals has been to influence Ukraine in such a way, first politically and now with the military aggression, that it would not fall into the western hemisphere or political hemisphere, into the NATO and EU.

Because it would mean, or as a result, would be that Russia would also, or the Russian people would ask, well, if they do it, why don't we do it? And it would create a political pressure against the existing russian political elite. So that is another point. And Ukraine has been united.

Ukraine used to be a divided country between Russian speakers, Ukrainian speakers. Now it's one country fighting off the aggressor.

>> H.R. McMaster: And of course, what's needed for Ukraine in the long-term is to be a secure and viable state economically. The offensive will have a lot to do with that.

The counteroffensive by the Ukrainians, will they be able to regain the territory to ensure that viability? I think, in my opinion, that includes the Crimean Peninsula, because the Crimean Peninsula, as we have seen, is a launching point and a logistics point for continuing the attacks on Ukraine. And I think Putin will never be satisfied, right?

He's not going to take any off ramp he's offered. He's gonna look for another on ramp. And I think we see, with the latest, even missile and drone attacks on port facilities, the shutting down of the grain deal, it seems as if he's determined to continue to choke Ukraine out.

Is there more that the European Union can do, the United States can do to help Ukraine get on that path to security? I mean, like Finland, right? Or the other examples that have been used for South Korea or Israel? Countries that have hostile, difficult neighbors, live in generally insecure environments, less secure than many other countries, but have been quite successful.

 

>> Kai Sauer: Yeah, I think the Russian aggression has also created a strong unity between the United States and the European Union and other partners. I'm talking about the Asia Pacific for Korea, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. And we have been helping Ukraine a lot, US, financially, militarily, same with the European Union.

Finland has allocated 1.1 billion euros to Ukraine, mostly in military aid, 16 packages altogether. The European peace facility has been used for this purpose. So there are many instruments we can use to supply military and financial aid. But then I think you rightly pointed to the question of the political support.

And there we need to discuss Ukraine's future in NATO and the European Union. Ukraine was given the candidate status to the European Union. And at the NATO summit in Vilnius, 11th, 12th of this month, July, I think NATO also drew Ukraine much closer.

>> H.R. McMaster: As close as maybe is feasible under the current conditions, right?

And I know that President Zelenskyy was disappointed. Of course, he's under severe duress, and there's people under severe duress, and it's understandable. But I think it was a generally good outcome. And I think the secretary general has done a phenomenal job. I mean, staying on even longer is tremendous.

So what I'd like to ask you then is to maybe speak to Americans here, because we have an international audience. But many Americans are skeptical about sustained commitments abroad. And you see even debates here in the United States about sustaining the commitment to Ukraine, although I believe that there's a very strong consensus, and an enduring consensus behind that.

But I think that many Americans have been subjected to, you mentioned this earlier, we've been through a lot of traumas. We had the financial crisis, we can go back that far to 2008, 2009. We had huge transitions in the global economy that left a lot of Americans behind, especially those in manufacturing jobs, that had a lot to do with the transfer of manufacturing to China in particular.

You then had a number of other crises, I think maybe in some ways precipitated by social media, the advent of social media. And how those algorithms tend to drive people apart. We had an opioid epidemic, we had COVID. I mean, so we've been through a heck of a lot.

And a lot of Americans, I think, are saying, okay, why are we even concerned about what's going on overseas, let's get our own act together here. But what would you say to those who are skeptical about sustained commitments abroad?

>> Kai Sauer: Yeah, good question, first, I would encourage everybody to look at the history again.

We have the experience of the First World War, where the United States joined the war in 1917, after three years of the war, saved Europe. Then you have the Second World War, again, US joining late, but again saving Europe. So I think this should be one guideline to study, and the second is perhaps to the defense of our common values.

I mean, after the Second World War, after so much sacrifice, we agreed on an international order which should be respected, and not be superseded by totalitarianism and anarchy. And I think this is very much the situation that should we give in now, should we settle for certain concessions which would violate Ukraine's territorial integrity or sovereignty, we would compromise on our own values very severely.

And this would set a precedent maybe for others who have ideas about territorial adjustments. And I think that is a very dangerous path. So basically, this is already a cliche to say, but I think it's important to repeat that Ukraine actually is fighting for us, they are fighting for our values.

 

>> H.R. McMaster: Right, I do think the analogy can be overused, but Poland in 1939 does come to mind for me. And I think the argument also is that, of course, this is quite different from Finland's close proximity to your security challenges on your border. But for Americans, I think we've learned that problems and challenges to our security that develop abroad can only be dealt with at an exorbitant cost once they reach our shores.

And I think in particular about the importance of deterring conflict or now restoring peace in Europe. One of the concerns has been escalation, I'd like to ask you about your concerns about escalation vertically and horizontally. But, of course, we wouldn't be talking about escalation if the war didn't start to begin with, right?

If there had been, I think, the strength there in Ukraine and in Europe, broadly, and with the United States, a perception of strength that had led maybe Putin to conclude he could not accomplish his objectives in Ukraine at an acceptable cost. But could I ask you about these other concerns, arguments about the sustained commitment have to do with fears of escalation.

And how do you think about that, and of course, how about horizontal escalation? We have a Bulgarian election coming up in 2024. We've seen what Russia's done in Georgia already, the problems that they created in Transdniestria. You have long service in Southeastern Europe, and you've seen how Russia's been stoking Serbian nationalism there.

So what are we not talking about maybe in these areas that we ought to maybe consider and try to prevent?

>> Kai Sauer: Yeah, I think the points you made there are very much related to the question of Ukraine's future as a member of NATO. And I mean, this is not an official position of my government.

But I'm just maybe referring to some ideas and thoughts which have been raised. And one idea goes back to Germany after the Second World War, when Germany was divided. But Western Germany still joined NATO, and the question of Eastern Germany was put aside. And indeed, after 40 years, the problem solved itself, pretty much.

I'm not saying that this would work one to one, but I think we need to be creative in our thinking. And we shouldn't allow an outsider, in this case, Russia, to determine or limit our actions.

>> H.R. McMaster: That's right, absolutely, and how about your concerns geographically, in terms of geopolitical threats that Russia can still pose elsewhere in Europe?

 

>> Kai Sauer: Of course, I mean, they are now very much occupied in Ukraine. But it will take them maybe four or five years to recover, and then we will need to deal with that situation. But at the moment, I don't think, if you're referring to our part of the world, the northeastern corner of NATO, we are not feeling a physical threat now, which is, of course, very good.

 

>> H.R. McMaster: Right, and so I'd like to ask you just a final question about what you'd like to say to Americans about Finland, about maybe any Americans-

>> H.R. McMaster: Who might wanna visit Finland, which as I'm going to soon? And what they should know about your culture, Nordic culture, and how that can maybe help us enrich our own lives here in the United States?

 

>> Kai Sauer: Well, thank you for giving me this commercial slot, but I'm not going to abuse it. There are certain stereotypes, maybe, in the US about Finland, and they are good stereotypes.

>> H.R. McMaster: Everybody's always in the sauna, apparently.

>> Kai Sauer: Yeah, exactly.

>> Kai Sauer: Sauna, Santa Claus, we paid our debt, we fought the Winter War.

But this is part of our history, which we are very proud of, but there's also a new Finland, which is technology. It's a very safe country, it's a rule of law country, there's no corruption, and it's the happiest country of the world.

>> H.R. McMaster: It is, right.

>> Kai Sauer: And I'm not making this up, it's a Columbia University survey, for the fifth consecutive year, we are the happiest country of the world.

If you ask the average Joe in the street, he probably denies it, but there's a science. So come and invest into Finland, come and live, come and visit, yeah.

>> Kai Sauer: It's an interesting place, yeah.

>> H.R. McMaster: Well, Kai Sauer, I can't thank you enough for being with us on Battlegrounds.

And I couldn't have been a more timely discussion with Finland and maybe soon Sweden entering NATO. And congratulations on your posting to Berlin. And it was just a true pleasure to have you here at Hoover and Stanford University, thank you so much.

>> Kai Sauer: Thank you HR, thank you, it was an honor and a pleasure, thank you.

 

>> Jenn Henry: Battlegrounds is a production of the Hoover Institution, where we generate and promote ideas advancing freedom. For more information about our work, to hear more of our podcasts or view our video content, please visit hoover.org.