Israel cannot “win” the Gaza war, that is, eradicate Hamas and impose a stable and satisfactory political settlement on the territory, because its American alliance makes victory unattainable. The Biden Administration provided a $14 billion supplemental aid package for Israel, but it also withheld ammunition shipments and twisted Israel’s arm to accept ceasefires that effectively nullify its efforts to extirpate Hamas from Gaza. It has countenanced a vast increase in Iran’s oil exports, indirectly strengthening Hezbollah and other Iranian auxiliaries. Most of all, Washington promoted Qatar’s role as “mediator” while Qatar continues to host Hamas leaders, including individuals under U.S. indictment as terrorists.
The new Cold War with China and Russia constrains Israel’s leverage over Iran. As long as China continues to buy Iran’s oil and sell it industrial goods, there is little that the West can do to undermine it. Russia’s military cooperation with Iran, although constrained by the exigency of the Ukraine war, limits Western maneuvering room. Most of all, Israel faces the decline of American influence in the region and the growing influence of its competitors.
Israel faces internal as well as external obstacles to victory. The Israeli army neglected the training of Israel’s reservists; according to media reports, the average number of days served by Israeli reservists fell to only 2 million a year in 2022, down from an average of 10 million in the 1990s. Only 120,000 of the country’s 490,000 reserves spent more than 20 days a year on duty in 2022. Israel’s military leaders concentrated on high-tech weaponry and special forces rather than infantry, partly due to advice from their U.S. counterparts. In consequences, the Gaza campaign has been constrained by shortages of manpower and training issues.
The outcome will be a prolonged period of continuing political, economic, and psychological strain for Israel. Reducing Hamas has left Gaza to a great extent in ruins, and the territory will remain under Israeli military administration for the foreseeable future; no outside power has the will or means to rule Gaza, and the resettlement of large numbers of Gazans is unlikely. A high level of reserve deployment will continue to drain Israel’s economy and the patience of its population.
In the long term, Israel is on a trajectory to emerge as the most powerful country in the region. The working-age populations of Turkey and Iran will drop by half during the present century, according to UN projections, while Israel’s will double. But the next two years will challenge Israel’s reserves of economic and spiritual strength.
Israel’s widely discussed intelligence failure on October 7 defies simple explanation. Qatar’s deal with the Israeli government to provide $15 million a month or more to Hamas in cash-filled suitcases was a factor. Qatar became a “major non-NATO ally” of the United States in January 2022, with the same designation as Israel. Israel was led to believe that Qatar was buying quiescence from Hamas. Either Hamas deceived Qatar about its intentions, or Qatar itself was a party to the deception. Yet Hamas continues to operate out of Doha. If Qatar was deceived by its Hamas client, why did the emirate exact no penalty from its Hamas client for such deception?
This has not passed entirely without notice. Sen. Ted Budd (R-NC) on April 10 introduced Senate 4093 “to review and consider terminating the designation of the State of Qatar as a major non-NATO ally,” citing the official U.S. designation of Hamas as a terrorist organization and Qatar’s support for Hamas.
The indictment on terrorism charges of Hamas official Khaled Meshaal by the U.S. Justice Department should focus the problem: Despite its “major ally” status, Meshaal is based in Qatar, but Qatar has no extradition treaty with the United States.
Qatar hosts the largest American air base outside the United States and retains enormous influence in American policymaking. Qatar is not only the major funder of Hamas, Israel’s antagonist in Gaza, but also the long-time host to its leadership, and the funder of the propaganda apparatus (through the Al-Jazeera news network and other outlets) that defend Hamas and its peers before the world public. And thanks to the United States, it is the intermediary in negotiations for the return of hostages held by Hamas. Israel has had no choice but to play out a ghastly charade mediated by Qatar in which Hamas pretends to trade the lives of hostages for a cessation of Israeli military operations.
During the Arab Spring, Qatar aligned with the U.S. intelligence community in promoting Sunni jihadists opposed to the old Arab order. Unlike the other Gulf monarchies, Qatar embraced the radicals who overthrew Mubarak and tried to remove the Assad family in Syria. Ultimately this led to the 2018 quarantine of Qatar by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Iran helped rescue Qatar from the Saudi blockade, and the United States remained neutral.
Meanwhile, The Biden administration’s efforts to court the Iranian regime by easing sanctions on Iran’s oil exports have put tens of billions of additional dollars in the hands of a regime whose Lebanese and Syrian allies threaten to open a second and third front against Israel. Hezbollah’s low-intensity warfare against Israel has forced the evacuation of 60,000 Israelis from the country’s north. The Iranian-controlled militia has fired over 8,000 projectiles at Israel since October 7, 2023.
Although complete victory in Gaza is not within Israel’s grasp, it has drastically weakened Hamas and should be able to prevent any large-scale attacks. It cannot force Iran to stand down its proxies on Israel’s border, but it can deter Iran effectively. An added factor in Israel’s favor is that China, whose influence in the region is growing, is the largest importer of Persian Gulf oil and therefore does not want a wider war. Israel will have to endure a tense and uncomfortable period of prolonged uncertainty. Before October 7, Israel was close to establishing diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, the basis for a long-term peace in the region. Iran seems unwilling to engage Israel directly and has offered no response to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh on July 31. Despite its heated rhetoric against Israel, Turkey is unlikely to involve itself. Over time, Israel should be able to retrace its diplomatic steps.
A great deal depends on the outcome of the November U.S. elections. The deterioration of U.S. influence under the Biden administration and its ambivalent treatment of Israel may persuade Israel to act less like the outpost of the West in the Middle East and more like a Middle Eastern nation pursuing its own interests amid the tangle of regional politics.
David P. Goldman is Deputy Editor of Asia Times and a Washington Fellow of the Claremont Institute.
