China, the US and the Future of Democracy with Christopher Walker

>> Elizabeth Economy: Welcome to China Considered, a podcast that brings fresh insights and informed discussion to one of the most consequential issues of our time, how China is changing and changing the world. I'm Liz Economy, Hargrove, senior fellow and co-director of the US, China and the World Program at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

Today I'm delighted to welcome Chris Walker. He's the Vice President for Studies and Analysis at the National Endowment for Democracy. He's also well known for having coined the term China sharp power. He's written extensively on authoritarianism and democracy, and his most recent book is Defending Democracy in an Age of Sharp Power, which he co edited with Will Dobson and Tarek Massoud.

Welcome, Chris.

>> Christopher Walker: Thanks so much, Liz. It's great to be with you.

>> Elizabeth Economy: So let me start off with, I think, just the foundational question, which is why do we care whether another state is authoritarian or democratic? How does it actually affect US Economic interests or national security?

>> Christopher Walker: So thanks very much for that fundamental question. There are three things I would cite. The first is that democracies tend to be more secure. As a practical matter, the evidence tells us they don't fight wars with each other. They also have the mechanisms internally to channel discontent through institutions in ways that temper wild swings that you might find in non democratic settings.

Democracies also tend to be safer. We can think of Amarche Sen's observation that there aren't famines in democracies. And then critically, democracies tend to be more prosperous and free and open societies with rule of law, the evidence tells us, deliver more prosperity. And I think it's fair to say just on the other side of the ledger, repressive regimes tend to perform more poorly on human development indicators.

And all of these things were down to the benefit of, of democracies in the United States in terms of who their partners are and how we can advance our own prosperity.

>> Elizabeth Economy: So you're sort of arguing that US Business benefits from this, our security benefits from this. But what about China?

I mean, it's a, it's a country that you've written a lot about. And one could argue that China has been, you know, stable for the past, you know, several decades, that it certainly has had an incredible economic rise and, you know, at least 600 million people might be considered prosperous out of 1.2 billion people.

Does China defy your, your case, your argument?

>> Christopher Walker: Well, China, of course, is in a way a sui generis case. There are very few examples of societies that have operated without political rights, that have generated economic growth. Of course, some Observers have asked how much more prosperous China might have been had the system been open with the rule of law rather than the path it took.

It's a counterfactual. We won't know. I think it's also fair to say that the price of that economic growth has also been enormous in terms of the brutality leveled against minorities in the country, not least the Uyghur community, the sacrificing of rights that so many have had to make a part of the bargain.

And I think we're also seeing now some real question marks about whether this bargain of sacrificing or ceding political rights and freedom of expression and the like for economic growth is starting to hit some real bumps. The levers at the disposal of the leadership to pivot are pretty limited, and we're seeing, among other things, deep problems in the financial sector, the real estate sector, extraordinarily high levels of youth unemployment, by some measures upwards of 30%.

And I think all of this speaks to what are, in a way, the limitations of systems that don't permit meaningful competition and freedom of expression and other basic values that you would find in democracies.

>> Elizabeth Economy: Yeah, I mean that's a fair point. I suppose a lot of people make the case that, you know, China's fastest, you know, period of fastest economic growth certainly happened when it was more open, you know, during the period of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin up through Hu Jintao.

And, you know, we've seen a partly natural slowdown of growth, but also, I think, to your point, probably much of many of the repressive measures that Xi Jinping has taken have, in fact, constrained some important sectors of the Chinese economy. And so that's, I think, a reasonable argument to make.

But I guess time will only tell whether. Whether the Chinese leadership is able to pivot and, you know, revitalize the Chinese economy for yet another round of impressive economic growth. Go ahead. Sorry.

>> Christopher Walker: I was going to say, in a sense, one of the things to keep an eye on, not only in China, but other systems where the leadership has offered this bargain, such as it is, is to the extent the economy slows and performance legitimacy is challenged, you invariably see more repression.

And this is happening across a host of authoritarian regimes. And then related to this, and coming back to your original question about the advantages of democracies, I think you can also see people voting with their feet. And in so many of these cases, if we step back away from China for a moment and look at settings like Venezuela or Russia, people are not beating a path to these countries?

On the contrary. And the numbers suggest in China's case as well, that the outflow of people looking for opportunity in other parts of the world, often in democracies, is outstripping anyone, the numbers of people looking to find their way to the prc.

>> Elizabeth Economy: Yeah, I think that is a good point.

So let's focus on China a little bit more because it's the country that certainly the first Trump administration and the Biden administration both identified as posing sort of the greatest long term strategic threat to the United States. Do you agree with that? What do you see as sorta the elements of China's policy that are most challenging for the United States?

What do you see as China's objectives really with regard to the US Policy?

>> Christopher Walker: So I think the objective at a basic level is China seeking to displace the US as the world's most influential country. And part of this, as China has methodically asserted itself globally, is to pull countries into its orbit and through that process gain privileged access to markets, ports, natural resources and the like from governments that then are technologically and economically dependent on Beijing.

We've done a good deal of work on the technological aspirations of the Chinese leadership and how this plays out across the globe. And of course, to the extent that ambition is successful. This will play to the disadvantage of the US And I think at least over the last decade or so, the United States has taken a more clear eyed look at the China challenge.

But the scope and comprehensiveness, the domains in which China is operating, I think calls for even greater attention the US and its partners, to make sure that we don't slip behind.

>> Elizabeth Economy: When you talk about the technological aspect, you're talking about the digital Silk Road, China's efforts to sort of deploy everything from subsea cables all the way to satellite systems throughout emerging and middle income economies,

>> Christopher Walker: for sure. I think part of what we've seen, just to allude to a couple of things we've done in the recent past, is a very coherent playbook for spreading technology of Chinese origin around the world. And that includes providing incentives, having know how accompany the hardware that China makes available, particularly so in the developing world in Africa, and a lot of state subsidies that undergird that to provide an advantage.

Now, what also accompanies this technology, and this is something for the US and other free societies to keep in mind, is capabilities and affordances for censorship and surveillance that's typically baked into these systems. And on that count, there often is an inadequate understanding of exactly what's coming along with these tech packages in the settings they're arriving.

And this cries out for greater information and discussion of both the way in which deals around tech are consummated, but at the same time understanding the tech itself. Just last week we sounded the alarm with a report titled Data Centric Authoritarianism that focused on the next generation of technologies that China's prioritizing that could really give the PRC a leg up in areas including, but not limited to AI surveillance tech, different sorts of applications, neuro and immersive technologies, quantum tech and digital currencies.

And Valentin Weber, who authored this report for us, really stressed the need for the free world to pay more attention to China's ambitions in this regard.

>> Elizabeth Economy: Okay, I want to come back to, you know, what you think the U.S. and its, you know, partners and its allies should be doing.

But I do want to ask then, you know, the Trump administration started with, you know, the first Trump administration, you know, had its clean network effort. The Biden administration, I think was called Trusted Network. So there has been some effort on the U.S. side to compete, I think with Huawei, with ZTE, with other Chinese providers of digital infrastructure.

Have you seen any that the US has made any headway in this competition?

>> Christopher Walker: So I think both the US and Europe alike have made efforts in this sphere. There's Still a lot more to do, I think, both in terms of the scope of the challenge, the efforts to have clean networks essentially to afford opportunities for use of technology that doesn't have the affordances.

And in a sense, the baggage that comes along with technology of Chinese origin is going to shape the future of freedom and democratic governance around the world. So I think, if anything, we need to step up those efforts in ways that are commensurate with the challenge.

>> Elizabeth Economy: Okay, and I wanna come and have you talk a little bit about what the National Endowment for Democracy is doing in this space and in others.

But first, let me just pop in a question about sharp power, because I think you were the first to use this. It's become part of every China Watcher, China App analyst, government official, of the lexicon that we use when we talk about sort of the, the range of Chinese power from soft to sharp to hard.

What is actually sharp power and how does China exercise it and what should the US Be doing to counter it?

>> Christopher Walker: So fundamentally, the effects of sharp power limit free expression, curb pluralism, and distort the political environment. And just to talk about how we got to that point and made the case for something different than either soft or hard power, this really came about from things we were seeing out in the field.

Many of the groups we work with and support were referencing engagement first and foremost from China, but it's also true with Russia, which has pretty sweeping investments in non kinetic forms of influence around the world. But China certainly was at the top of the pyramid in terms when coming to the scope and depth of engagement around the world.

And contrary to this idea that engagement in media or education or culture was simply resulting in greater mutual understanding or helping to persuade or attract, we often found that the features of this engagement had significant elements of political censorship, of monopolizing. The partner organizations that were engaging with PRC actors were their surrogates.

And it, it simply wasn't fitting cleanly or coherently in any sort of rubric that was out there. And it was slowly being brought to scale. And so the more we thought about it and the more we looked at what we were coming across, we were finding far too many instances of where there were efforts to sideline discussion, intimidate partners, coerce partners.

And it led us to, I feel pretty strongly that it would be useful to have a different way of thinking about this, at a minimum to stimulate more concerted discussion on these issues. And I have to say the Australians were really at the front of the line on this.

And we had some terrific contributors to our work, including the scholar John Fitzgerald, who contributed to our Defending Democracy in an Age of Sharp Power. I might just mention one of the things he cites in the chapter. Chapter in the book is going back now, two decades ago when he was testifying before the Australian Senate and he alluded to the case of Chen Yong Lin in 2005.

And this was a junior PRC diplomat who had sought asylum in the PRCs in Sydney at the time, and through those conversations had outlined the extensive network of CCD. The efforts and agents in Australia that were monitoring Chinese Australian activists and religious believers through the PRC's Sydney consulate.

And it was among the first instances where there was a public airing of the sort of manipulative and coercive efforts that fall under the sharp power rubric. I would argue. And Fitzgerald made the case ultimately that through the really good work of investigative journalists and academics in Australia, they in essence unearthed what was a, what he called an integrative network of control that was being operated by China within Australia, a democracy.

>> Elizabeth Economy: But so just to put maybe get a little bit more granular. So China uses basically the strength of its market, of its economy to do what it buys meat into media, into local media. And shapes the narrative. What kind of pressure would it bring on, you know, Chinese citizens that it's spying on?

So it's more than just the spying on them. Right. It's trying to shape their behavior in some way.

>> Christopher Walker: So that's true, I think, maybe just sticking with the political censorship angle and the free expression angle. Another incredible case in the Australian context, which squares with other things we've seen subsequently.

It was about a decade ago that the Australian Broadcasting Company engaged in what seemed to be pretty straightforward partnership with Chinese state media, essentially to share content in both directions. But one of the secret components of the deal they agreed to at the time was to suppress the Mandarin service of the abc.

And that only came out after the fact. It was a scandal. It was unearthed by journalists in Australia. And I think the notion that decision makers at an independent media institution operating within a democracy would concede that sort of thing was also an indication a, of the ambition of the Chinese side essentially to limit speech or the capability of covering issues that the Chinese authorities feel should be off limits and to seek to induce partners in open societies to take that kind of action.

So that's one part of it, of course. Similarly pernicious. Even more pernicious are the examples in any number of settings. We've seen this in Canada, Australia, the US of intimidation of people within free societies. What is effectively transnational repression to either do the bidding of the Chinese party state or.

Or to hold their tongues on certain issues. And I think this has similarly been a part of the star power pattern. Absolutely. Does not fall in a soft power context. And this is, I think, part of what we're grappling with.

>> Elizabeth Economy: Yeah, and I think it's important to recognize the US has not been immune.

Has faced its own challenges with this in a number of industries. I think in particular, maybe, you know, Hollywood. The film industry has often come under pressure from Chinese partners to shape the narrative, to make sure that China's not painted as the enemy or to ensure that a map reflects Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea or over Taiwan, or else, you're not gonna get market access for your failure.

>> Christopher Walker: Exactly. And we have a terrific chapter in the book by Aynne Kokas of the University of Virginia who looks at the challenge in Hollywood. And I think one of the things we have to reckon with at this point is to the extent key institutions or figures within them internalize the wishes of the party state, that is to say, in the entertainment industry.

And I think this transcends Hollywood. I think it's true in other parts of the world that something that is perceived to be undesirable or wouldn't be welcomed by Beijing would never even be thought about, say, by a screenwriter or scriptwriter in the first instance. And so then you've achieved what's in essence, the anaconda and the chandelier at scale by having the internalization of the wishes of authoritarian powers.

And I think this is something we see even in the very difficult decisions that authors make when their books are published and then translated to reach markets within the prc. I think more often than not these days, for certain issues, they will accede to the preferences of the editors in Beijing.

And there, too, just as a theoretical exercise, over time, if we keep widening the circle of topics or issues that are understood to the off limits from the perspective of the leadership in China, where will that lead us? 15 years ago, it might have simply been Taiwan, Tibet, and Tiananmen Square.

Today, it surely includes, in many instances, issues relating to the corruption of the party leadership in China. In instances in other parts of the world where China's engagement may be running afoul of local norms, those things might not be covered by local news outlets who perceive it to be out of bounds.

And I think from a freedom of expression and censorship point of view, there's a lot of space from the perspective of free societies to really think about where to draw their own bottom line and to refresh. Defense of freedom of expression.

>> Elizabeth Economy: Yep. So, that, I think, raises an important point about.

I think in a bigger picture, we are in the midst of a big debate in the US over to what extent we should support people globally who are fighting for their own freedom and democratic institutions. How do you think about this issue? I mean, what do you think is at stake?

And I think you talked a bit about this right up front in our discussion about the value for the United States of having a majority of the world's countries be democracies. But. But what do you think fundamentally is at risk here?

>> Christopher Walker: Well, I think there is what one could consider the noble side of the work, which is to support people who themselves are struggling for their own freedom.

And this is very much in the American tradition, people who are looking to enjoy the rights that we're all blessed with, living in open and free societies. Why shouldn't. They be able to enjoy themselves. And if they're willing to fight for it, there's a very strong argument to support them in that noble endeavor.

At the same time, there's a very practical argument for this, which is to say we're in a tough period right now where certainly the leadership in capitals like Beijing and Moscow. And Tehran, they're feeling their oats, they feel like the wind in some respects is at their back.

And supporting people who believe in freedom helps to shine a light on the activities and the ambitions of the leadership in those countries as they do this. And so if we want to have a world where there's more transparency, where there's more freedom, there's more opportunity for innovation.

We need more countries that are more free and enjoying liberty and are more prosperous, and we need to support natural allies who themselves are working towards that end. And I think the work that my colleagues and I have done at the National Endowment for Democracy at a top order level.

Helps to counter threats from regimes like those in Iran and Russia, North Korea, Cuba and China. This is something we've done for years and years. And just talking about the challenge posed by China, as we discussed earlier. I would contend that the leadership in China has made pretty considerable headway in spreading their vision of freedom of expression and censorship globally.

They have a very clear vision domestically. That's reflected in the way they brutalize independent media, don't permit meaningful alternative voices, really put the screws to any sort of independent civil society. In a sense, it's a regime of censorship. And because China now has interests around the world, they have clearly taken, to the extent they're able.

And to the extent local circumstances in other countries permit that vision for censorship to other parts of the world. And so Ned has really been squarely focused on fighting the CCP's censorship and documenting the party states. For example, egregious persecution against religious minorities and Chinese dissidents abroad in the context of transnational repression.

And this is as important today, I would contend, as it's been since the end of the Cold War.

>> Elizabeth Economy: So let me just take you a half a step back because you raised Russia, Iran, Cuba, obviously there's North Korea and Venezuela. To what extent do you see, and I know you testified last month actually on what's become considered an axis of Russia, Iran, North Korea and China.

So I testified before the US economic and Security Review Commission. What do you see as the relationship among them? Are they independent actors who share a vision and pursue parallel opportunities and policies or are they in some way working together or are they learning from each other? How do you think about the relationship among these sort of leading authoritarian powers?

>> Christopher Walker: Thanks for the question. I testified before the commission, they were grappling with this question of whether there's an axis or not. In a sense, I think the question, it may not be essential to answer that question definitively because I think what we're seeing is. And this is a trajectory over quite a few years, is unquestionably more cooperation.

And I think part of what has emerged over time is that China's leadership over the last period, as we've discussed, has been committed to projecting more power internationally in its own right. But less obvious has been the extent to which China has used, we could call it a web of relationships with other autocracies to enhance leverage and where possible, to achieve multiplier effects.

And then I would argue more generally to guide the world in a direction that's more friendly to the CCP's interests and preferences. And as Beijing over this period, say over the last 5 to 10 years, has deepened its strategic coordination with countries that include Russia, Iran, North Korea.

China's also played a pretty key role in helping make the whole of these groupings of countries stronger than any single part. One example of this, which is it's such a ghastly case, but it's Russia's unprovoked attack on Ukraine where I think if you and I had had this chat several years ago and I had said.

I can imagine a time where Russia was waging full scale war on Ukraine, Belarus was offering itself as the leadership in that country, as a staging area for Russia. Iran would be producing thousands and thousands of kamikaze drones. That North Korea would have thousands of soldiers on European soil fighting on Russia's behalf against Ukraine, and that China would, would be providing a range of support.

Diplomatic material as we understand it, and very importantly in the information and media domain. Where today China's global propaganda apparatus systematically helps Russian arguments reverberate about the nature of the war, who started the war, who's responsible for it. And that's no small thing given the billions of dollars that the PRC invests annually in their outward facing communication.

So that's just one example, but I think it's fair to say by just about any measure today. There's more of a stitching together of these authoritarian powers in ways that gives them more lift together rather than in any individual case.

>> Elizabeth Economy: What do you think it would take at this point for the United States and together, really, with its allies and partners.

To be able to compete effectively with, I think, what you've quite accurately demonstrated to be an extremely significant challenge, even threat to democracy and freedom on the global stage.

>> Christopher Walker: And I really appreciate the question, Liz. I think the competition we're in, going back, say, a generation ago, has been grossly underestimated.

And now we find ourselves in what is an intense competition with formidable rivals. And as we've discussed during the course of our conversation, the Chinese party state is investing across a wide range of domains. Of course, they're investing in the military sphere, and the trajectory of that investment is rising.

And I think the US and other democracies properly need to think about the sort of investments in that sphere that are. Suitable for the environment we find ourselves in. That's beyond my ken. What we focused on is the non military sphere. And there too, I think we really underestimated the level of commitment and purpose that China.

And other authoritarian states had in this sphere in the information technology, media, cultural education and other such domains where they've invested very heavily. It is by many measures in the many, many billions of dollars that China alone is investing in the outward facing information and communications sphere, just to give that example.

And I think we have to recognize that if we're going to be successful, the United States and other free societies in this competition. We also have to have a level of preparation and investment that's commensurate to the task so that we can compete at a higher level in the battle of ideas.

The Chinese leadership is making an argument, they're essentially making an argument that it isn't necessary to have liberty and freedom as an ingredient that's essential to prosperity. I think their own experience now is starting to offer some free, pretty rough internal contradictions about that. But I don't think we should underestimate the sort of traction that those arguments are getting in different parts of the world.

And if we're not in the fight competing, it's going to be very hard for other countries to do so themselves. And so we have a huge opportunity both to help share information and educate the world about the ambitions of the Chinese party state, to assert its own vision and its forms of control.

And on the one hand, and at the same time to offer an affirmative alternative that privileges freedom and prosperity. And I think that's where the real opportunities are going to come in the coming period.

>> Elizabeth Economy: So let me just ask one last thing. And I think, have painted a picture that suggests that we've been a little bit slow off the mark, that we haven't really appreciated I think the enormity of the challenge that is before us.

Is there anything else that you think an issue or a topic with regard to China in particular, tIhat where you think we're missing the reality of the story somehow. Some issue about China that we don't really know enough about, we need to learn more.

>> Christopher Walker: I think the issue of how China seeks to shape the information and ideas realm is crucial because in a sense what we've seen, it's often done subtly, but it's become a feature of the external engagement.

All authoritarian regimes, China in this case in particular, is trying to delegitimize the ideas and even the political systems of the US and its allies. And by doing that, seeking to corrode international confidence in free systems. And I think unless we have the sorts of arguments that can respond to what is now a systemic strategy that Beijing has around the world.

It's going to be very hard for all of us to have a clear eyed view of what we're up against. And so among the wide range of issues that we're facing, I think the challenge in the idea sphere that's on offer. And being put out by the leadership in Beijing really deserves more granular and focused and systemic attention from all of us.

>> Elizabeth Economy: Well, Chris, I want to thank you really on several fronts. First, just for reminding us why democracy and freedom matter so much and matter not only just for us here in the United States. But it matters to us that other countries are able to share the opportunities and benefits that derive from free and open societies.

And thank you too for your sobering analysis of the challenge that we face in protecting those values and rights that we have had for so long, and for your call to arms. And for your articulation of what we need to do now to push back against authoritarian countries that seek to undermine freedom and democracy.

And replicate their own societies and their own values and interests globally. So thanks for coming on the podcast and for delivering such a powerful message.

>> Christopher Walker: Thank you so much for this opportunity. I'm sorry if it was maybe too sobering, but in a sense, if we're not able to frame and see a challenge clearly, it's really hard to devise a response that can meet that challenge.

So I really appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today. Liz,

>> Elizabeth Economy: thanks again. If you enjoyed this podcast and want to hear more reason, discourse and debate on China. I encourage you to subscribe to China Considered via The Hoover Institution YouTube channel or podcast platform of your choice.

In our next episode, I'll be speaking with Matt Turpin, visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution and former Senior National Security Official in the first Trump Admin.

>> Presenter: This podcast is a production of the Hoover Institution, where we generate and promote ideas advancing freedom. For more information about our work, to hear more of our podcasts or view our video content, please visit hoover.org.