Biden Meets Xi

>> Michael Auslin: Welcome back to the Pacific, a Hoover Institution podcast on China, America and the fate of the 21st century. I'm your host, Michael Auslin, and I am thrilled today to be joined by Lingling Wei from the Wall Street Journal. Those of you who read the journal, and I know most of you do, absolutely know Lingling's work.

She is the chief China correspondent for the journal. She is also the co author of the excellent book Superpower Showdown, which I highly encourage all of you to get. And she is the chief writer of the new WSJ China newsletter, which you can subscribe to by going to wsj.com.

So, Lingling, welcome to the show.

>> Lingling Wei: Thank you so much for having me, Michael.

>> Michael Auslin: Well, I've been hoping for an opportunity to have you on and meet with you, talk with you personally cuz I'm such a huge fan of the work you've done. And it seemed that APEC, which is happening right now here in San Francisco, and the meeting between President Biden and President Xi is just a perfect opportunity to get your insights, which have been some of the most clear and important on everything that's going on.

So why don't we just jump right into it? Let me ask you, even as this is all happening around us right now, your overall assessment of how the summit between the two went. And then we can get into more specifics about what each side wanted, what you think they're getting, and what this means going forward.

 

>> Lingling Wei: Sure, first of all, thank you so much for the very kind, generous introduction. This summit between President Biden and China's leader Xi Jinping this week was quite an event. The very fact that the two met was such an accomplishment, they started talking again after many months. That just shows how bad the relationship had become over the course of the past year.

So they met, they talked for quite a few hours, four hours also, and they had lunch together. They took a walk in the woods, so the optics all looked fine. And in terms of substance, it's very important both of them met. I do believe that the meeting helped stabilize the relationship a little bit, because really, the window of plenty was quickly narrowing.

Given the upcoming presidential election in the United States next year, China undoubtedly would again become very hot button issue. So from the readouts from both sides, they did reach a number of agreements. You may call it low hanging fruit, but it's still important. First of all, both sides agreed to restart contacts between their militaries, which is so important in terms of preventing conflicts, right?

And also, it's a big issue for the United States is China's agreement to crack down on fentanyl. So that was a big deal because, the drug has been killing millions of Americans, especially young people, every year. So it's very important for the Biden administration to get that. For the Chinese side, they really have been pushing for some kind of dialogue on artificial intelligence as a way to talk to the American about issue and potentially prevent further restrictions on AI transfer to China.

So both sides have agreed to start some sort of dialogue on AI, so that's important. But we don't know exactly how this mechanism works, right? Not very many details have been disclosed, I was told there could be some kind of track 1.5 dialogue on AI. That means not exactly official dialogue, but semi official, with both sides putting forward experts in that area.

Again, for the Chinese, nothing matters more than Taiwan going into the meeting. For the Chinese side going into the meeting, they had wanted the US side, President Biden to be more firmly oppose Taiwan independence in the agreement that was published after the meeting. But the US side rejected the request.

So instead, President Biden basically stuck to the usual talking point. The traditional position, which is the US adheres to this One China policy. So but even the Chinese readout, you can tell the issue about Taiwan remains the most sensitive issue for Beijing. The Xinhua readout of the meeting talked about how Xi Jinping really elaborated China's position on Taiwan and urged the US side not to support Taiwan's independence, not to arm Taiwan and would support eventual reunification of Taiwan.

So that's a really very important for the Chinese.

>> Michael Auslin: So that's a great lay down of what happened, in your assessment, since you've been looking at this so carefully and you start off by saying optics versus substance. Was it more about the optics, do you think? I mean, I was also told by people in the State Department and everyone messages the way that they want, but that it was really the Chinese who had pushed really hard for this meeting.

Obviously, as you've reported and your colleagues, the Chinese economy compared to even just a year ago, but certainly two years ago, is in much worse shape. There's been a lot more pressure, obviously, Xi had the political successes of the party congress, but he's facing a whole host of headwinds.

And so they really wanted the meeting to show that sort of things haven't changed, right? Everything is it still really about the US and China? So in your view, what was more significant, was it the optics of this or was it the substance? And then maybe we can delve down a little bit more into some of the substance that you talked about.

 

>> Lingling Wei: Sure, that's a great question, both sides really wanted this meeting. The Biden administration also had a huge incentive to have a successful summit with Xi so that US can show to allies in Europe and Asia, we're managing this relationship responsibly. For the Chinese side, you're absolutely right, Michael, even authoritarian leaders have domestic politics to worry about.

Out for Xi Jinping, despite the fact that his position is very secure, there's no challenge to his hold on power. But he still needs to tackle the economic pressure, which is building up significantly within China you talk to entrepreneurs, you talk to investors, they all hope for a better relationship with the United States.

That means the us market is still open for them, they can keep selling stuff to Americans. They can get American capital to flow into China, which is really important for the economy at a time it is burdened by a property crisis and too much debt. So foreign money, foreign capital, foreign know how is in demand more than ever.

That's really an issue here for Xi Jinping, he needs also to show to the Chinese public that he's got this relationship under control, at least for now. The meeting, the biggest accomplishment from this meeting is there's a truce of sort, right? We probably can expect some stability in the relationship in the coming weeks and months, but it's a very fragile one, right?

The boat could be rocked yet again by anything, so we'll see.

>> Michael Auslin: So actually, it's a great question, then you mentioned there'll be likely some short-term stability. Before we get into specifics, then, I would just wanna ask you, in your assessment, did anything fundamental change in the relationship?

 

>> Lingling Wei: Yes, so to your question. Right, they had this meeting, but that not to be confused with any fundamental change in the underlying relationship, it remains a very competitive relationship. One interesting point about the summit is the fact that, Xi Jinping seemed to really disagree with the Americans description about the nature of the relationship, right?

The US side, very clear about the competition is a competitive relationship, the question is how to manage our competition, right? But you see, from Xi Jinping's remarks, especially to the business community the other day, it really struck me. He's basically saying, okay, then how to define our relationship is very important, are we friends or are we enemies, right?

The underlying message is that if we're friends, then everything can be resolved. We can just talk through our issues, your problems, how we can help you, but if we're enemies, what's the point? So it's a very clear message to the business community. Okay for now, I know you have complaints about doing business in China, I know you have all those issues, but let's see what you can do for us first.

If you can play a constructive role in helping ease tensions between the two governments. Then if you can help do that, we can move to the next step, which is talk about your issues and make it easier for you to invest in the Chinese market. So I think the fact that Xi Jinping to this day still rejects the idea, the definition of a competitive relationship between these two countries, very interesting.

 

>> Michael Auslin: Well, I wanted to get to the specifics, which I still want to, but you raised this dinner with the CEO's and you just gave an incredibly, insightful analysis of a very sophisticated approach. But one that I think critics might say it's old wine and new bottles, meaning this is really the playbook that the Chinese always use.

Which is to say you can't be very careful of upsetting the broad, big, top scale meta relationship between the US and China, ie, as you phrased it friend or foe. And then once we've stabilized that, then later on, at some indeterminate point, in some indeterminate way, well get to your actual complaints, right?

Which was, as you reported so well just yesterday, that there was very little for the business community that came out of that dinner, there were no promises for greater access or protection of IP or the like. So its actually an incredibly sophisticated, yet some would say, well-tried approach, which is to say just keep things going and then eventually we'll get to the actual problems.

But the question is, do you ever get to the problems? So with that, let me just ask you then about some of the specifics. Let's talk about the fentanyl first, because, of course, the Trump administration had an agreement to try to crack down on different elements of the fentanyl trade, that was back in 2019, and that really went nowhere.

Is there any reason to expect that things will be different this time? Well, as President Biden put it, trust but verify, right? Going back, working back to President Reagan, of course.

>> Lingling Wei: Exactly, so, the years China has agreed to quite a variety of things stray but the track record may tell a different story.

But we do see some very muted action following the agreement that came out of the summit. China's security apparatus just recently released some rules about choking off this fentanyl chemical, the flow of that into the United States. So that's a positive sign, but obviously, we need to see more follow through, better enforcement of the rules and all that.

 

>> Michael Auslin: Can I actually ask you about the rule and what they agreed, if I'm correct, and correct me if I'm wrong, is that they're gonna try to crack down on ingredients that go into fentanyl. We're not talking about Chinese coast guard and maritime ships or the aerial post office intercepting shipments which go to Mexico and sometimes actually are shipped directly here in small packages.

Or go to Canada, so they're doing a different approach, one that its less visible, would that be a fair assessment?

>> Lingling Wei: Yes, I agree.

>> Michael Auslin: Okay, so wed have to see about that. Let me ask you then about the mil-mil, the military to military relations. So what in your sense, is the likelihood that restarting them will actually lead to any better understanding of each other's security sides?

I guess the question is implicit on, what did the mil-mil talks do beforehand? Because obviously we've had, as you put it, sought of a relentlessly negative trend in relations, including on security issues. Whether it's South China Sea, it's Taiwan, it's Hong Kong, it's Xinjiang, it's the question of weaponization of AI and the like.

What did the mil-mil relations achieve beforehand? Meaning the communications, what should we expect from this new one, especially with Xi Jinping, who has purged some of the military leaders just in the past months to get, whether it's greater control or just those he trusts more into position.

>> Lingling Wei: Right, it's so important these days to have this mil mill conversation because we have seen increasingly aggressive behavior by the Chinese military.

The intercepts and those are extremely dangerous, right? Could really lead to losses of lives and bigger conflicts and also the use of increasingly sophisticated technology for military purposes like AI. That's also something that needs to be talked about, what kind of standards each side is adhering to. So all those issues are super important in terms of past dialogue military.

I wish I knew more about what they talked about and what possibly those discussions have led to, but the details are very little. I don't really know too much about the past dialogue, but just for the moment, restarting this military dialogue, it's just so crucial. But again, as we have seen many times, mil to mil dialogue also traditionally has been the first one to be suspended, right?

If China felt unhappy about things the US has done, as we witnessed last year their anger over the US support for Taiwan that really led to the suspension of the military talks. So, we'll see how effective the talks are gonna be. And we're also going to see if, again, this is something that could be suspended at the first sign of the Chinese happiness with the Americans.

 

>> Michael Auslin: And they did agree, or I guess they agreed earlier, but they reiterated to set up a hotline between Biden and Xi. And that, of course, has traditionally been one of the great examples of how this competition or adversarial relationship between China and the US is different from the one in the Cold War between the US and the Soviets.

Where there were multiple channels of communication as well as multiple agreements on what the White House likes to call rules of the road, right? Standards of behavior, whether it was incidents at sea between US and Soviet ships or of course, the celebrated hotline that was set up in the sixties after the Cuban missile crisis.

Have you heard anything about how effective people feel, especially on our side, how effective the hotline will be? Have they tried it yet? What is the assurance, right? The way it's phrased is when I pick up the phone, he'll pick up the phone. What is the assurance that you're hearing that our side really has confidence that that is gonna happen?

I think it's also in China's interest to pick up the phone should something really urgent happen. One would hope, one would hope.

>> Lingling Wei: One would hope, one would hope, right? Exactly, as we discussed earlier, they're facing so many challenges, economic problems in particular. And also China's military is not ready, they haven't fought a war for so many years.

They not ready for any kind of combat conflict, right? So it's still despite the fact that Xi Jinping might have seemed to be more of a risk taker than his predecessors, he still have an interest in maintaining stability here. He doesn't want war at the moment, at least.

He still wants to focus on buying time to build up, continue building up the resilience of the Chinese system. So it's really in their interest to pick up the call.

>> Michael Auslin: That's a great point about the military, which is something that people have not focused on as much because they look at the surface of a very impressive military and don't talk about the point you raised, which is, it's a very untested and untried military.

So that is something I think important to keep in mind. Let me ask one or two more specific questions and get back to the sort of bigger atmospherics very quickly. I didn't see in the readout, I may have missed it. There has been talk lately that there will be some type of arms, not arms control talks, but talks over nuclear weapons.

Given revelations about the growth of the Chinese nuclear development plan and, and the like, did any of that come up from your understanding?

>> Lingling Wei: That is not a major area where there has been tremendous progress. The Chinese has been reluctant to talk about nuclear arsenal for obvious reasons, so we don't have too much visibility into that issue.

Just on the topic about Chinese military's readiness. Obviously, even Xi Jinping doesn't believe that they're ready, right? The most recent crackdown on high level military officials should show he's kind of pissed off, right, by continued corruption within the ranks. And they spend so much money every year buying equipment R and D, equipping the whole military and where did the money go?

So that's the crackdown. It really is the reflection of his very strong desire to ensure that the military is capable of fighting and capable of winning the fight and they're not there yet. But I think the morale within the military officers these days is also kind of low because so many of their colleagues, their former bosses have been rounded up.

So it's gonna be a long way to go, but they're definitely trying to get ready.

>> Michael Auslin: I think that's a great point. I think it's an important perspective to keep in mind in our debates, of course, over possible timelines regarding Taiwan vis-a-vis Taiwan, what China might do. I would extend that to the South China Sea.

Now, of course, comparatively, the Chinese, no matter how untested or how little morale there is, or how unready they are, far outstrip and dwarf almost all of the other militaries that they would encounter except perhaps Japanese. But they are not certainly feel ready for the big contest, the showdown with the US, but with smaller militaries.

That's a very different calculation. But I think your point is an important one as we try to come up with an overall picture. Let me just shift for the last specific question and then go back, as I mentioned, to the atmospherics AI dialogue. What does that really mean?

We throw it around AI, no one, I think, really understands. There's generative AI, there's large language models, there's machine, there's all these different types of things that none of us are specialists in, right, as policy people. So, what are they actually talking about? Why is it a good thing?

And what might be the dangers of engaging in discussions about AI with the Chinese?

>> Lingling Wei: Right, such good questions. I'm certainly not counting myself as an AI specialist, so it's very unclear what kind of specific issues both sides will talk about. If this dialogue does happen, I would expect some kind of standards.

How do you govern the use of AI in different areas, the implication of using AI for military purposes. So those are very important, because again, it relates to security. You really do not want accident to happen because misuse of such sophisticated technology. I guess, that's my very lacking, limited understanding of this issue.

But the risk is especially, based on my conversations with a lot of people on the US side, the risks from their views that, okay, talk is good. But some of them do not want this to become another kind of dialogue that could just tie the US side up, because for years, China and the US have had so many dialogue, right?

And sometimes for many people it's kind of frustrating, because never lead to meaningful outcomes. So the risk here is from some of the people I've talked to on us side, they don't want this to become a way for China to keep using this kind of dialogue as a way to prevent the US further tighten restrictions on technology sales to China for national security purposes.

Because China does have an interest in slowing down the pace of sanctions against Chinese companies.

>> Michael Auslin: So I wanted to follow up with that on asking about some of these potential semiconductor export controls. What we've seen with, for example, Nvidia, which was barred from sending off, exporting the high end chips.

But then created developed chips that were just underneath the bar and then those have come under scrutiny. So not from the technical side, of course, but from the political side. Did you get any sense, was there any discussion about either maintaining or tightening those restrictions or potentially even loosening them?

 

>> Lingling Wei: Right, that kind of discussion, debate has been ongoing for a long time. Most recently before the summit between Biden and Xi Jinping. The administration did issue some new rules, right, that further tightened the sale of high end chips to China. So I do not think the trend will be reversed anytime soon.

I think more measures are being discussed, being debated because there is a balance that the administration has to strike between protecting national security. And still allowing us businesses to do business and to make money, right, including with China, so it's still a huge debate ongoing. And also, as you know Michael, both sides, the Chinese government and the US government, has agreed to set up those working groups, right, to talk about economic, commercial, financial issues.

And the export controls definitely will come up as a key point of concern, especially for the Chinese side. They will do their best to try to reverse a trend or at least slow down the pace of sanctions. But again, the question for the US side is, okay, what can you do to get some of the measures rolled back or prevent us from doing more that kind of dialogue?

We'll see if it's just a talk shop or something that could lead to meaningful outcomes.

>> Michael Auslin: So there's other probably specifics we could get into but I'd like to switch back to the sort of bigger question of the atmospherics. One of them, which straddles both, was of course, that Xi Jinping went to a dinner of American CEO's in San Francisco.

He didn't have dinner with President Biden, he went to a CEO dinner which had. And again, as you all reported, fewer tech CEOs but many financial and I guess we call manufacturing CEOs. And he received what one might describe as a lavish, warm welcome. You reported a standing ovation as he walked in the room.

And yet you referred to this a little bit earlier, there weren't a lot of specifics that he offered, just what's your take on that? It's been somewhat criticized in certain quarters, of course, that the US CEOs were giving a standing ovation to Xi Jinping. It's also been criticized that they did so without getting anything in return, again, something you very insightfully mentioned.

But can you just talk a little bit more about that dinner and what it might have meant. And whether what we see is further evidence of a split, let's say, between the security community, which is worried about all the things you've been talking about. And the private economic community, which is really pushing for deep reengagement, is that fair?

So maybe talk a little bit about the dinner, if you could.

>> Lingling Wei: Sure, the dinner was really quite an event. I was fortunate to be one of the reporters allowed to cover the event, very tight security, obviously. And we were, or asked to be in the back of the room, not allowed to actually mingle with the guests very much.

 

>> Michael Auslin: Did you get to eat?

>> Lingling Wei: Well, I had no time to eat.

>> Michael Auslin: Okay.

>> Lingling Wei: I was, yeah, very focused on really reporting out the whole event. So bear in mind, this dinner, the guests to this dinner, yes, they're primarily from the business community but they do not represent the entire US private sector.

So they were invited because a lot of them were considered by the Chinese side as friends, right, as friendly to China.

>> Michael Auslin: Great point.

>> Lingling Wei: Right, so the standing ovation probably was a reflection of that, they're friends anyway, they wanted to show respect to this leader from the world's second largest economy.

So, there were about 350 guests in the entire room. And there is a head table up in the front, the head table, it's a very big table. 44 guests sat with Xi Jinping, and a lot of them were CEOs from the Wall Street firms like Blackrock, Blackstone, Bridgewater Associates.

And they're big technology firms as well Apple was there, Qualcomm was there. But to me, if you do a compare and contrast, the last time Xi Jinping had a similar reception, similar dinner was back in 2015 when he went to Seattle and toured Microsoft headquarters, right? Back then, the reception actually was much warmer than this time around.

 

>> Michael Auslin: Interesting.

>> Lingling Wei: All those big American CEOs, especially from technology companies, really flocked to pay homage to him. You have Facebook as well, back then. And on the Chinese delegation, there were quite a few tech entrepreneurs from China. Jack Ma Alibaba, right, but this time around, there are very few Chinese entrepreneurs that were part of the official Chinese delegation, I actually didn't see any.

So that just shows how things have changed in China, the government crackdown on the private sector. Really, if you want more evidence about that, this is like one small piece of supporting evidence. Okay, so those who were the guests, right? And obviously, they're not just business types. They're also the Xi Jinping's old friends from Iowa, the first state he visited when he was still very low level official back in the 80s.

And also the Flying Tiger veterans were also invited to this event. Those are all part of the whole plan to show that we still care about the relationship with the United States. Look, our history, he really started his speech by giving us a walk down memory lane. Really started all the way back to the World War II, talk about how us and China worked together to fight against the Japanese.

His first trip to the United States, how warmly he was received by his American hosts, and the start of the ping pong diplomacy that led to the establishment of the former ties of both nations. So he did try to give the speech a human touch, right? Let's remember those good times, right?

We have come a long way, however, based on my conversations with many people in the audience after the dinner. They were disappointed that there was no mention, no talk about trade and investment for a room full of CEOs, right? They wanted to hear from the very top leader, okay, what's your assessment of the China's economy?

What policies are you adopting to continue to make foreign business felt comfortable about investing in your country? Especially given the fact that this year has been a year where a lot of American businesses felt increased pressure from the Chinese government. We have seen race detention investigations involving US companies, so that's what they're going into the meeting.

That's where a lot of industry representatives were hoping that they could get some kind of inkling from the very top. They were saying, he probably would make repeat the longstanding position on China will continue to reform and open the economy, the society, but he didn't even mention reform and opening.

It's pretty interesting, he mentioned high quality development. That's just code for okay, slower growth but our focus will be more on high end manufacturing technology in those sectors. So for some of the executives in the audience, they felt like that was a disappointment and a lost opportunity for Beijing actually to offer some kind of assurance for the business community.

 

>> Michael Auslin: And just from your observation of him, was this a confident leader? Was this a leader who seemed, I don't wanna say under pressure. But did he seem dismissive that he didn't really care? What did you take away from him? Since this is one of the few chances that non-government interactors were able to be in a room with him, hear him speak, observe his body language.

What was he like?

>> Lingling Wei: He came across as being very confident. And he didn't sound any apologetic at all, especially when he talked about China's Belt and Road program. You know how much that had been criticized, right? By both private sector investors and other governments, especially in the West, for how that program really settled a lot of developing countries with too much debt.

But he actually made a mention of Belt and Road as a way to tell the audience those are all opportunities. You guys can work with us, in terms of promoting our own initiative. He didn't sound apologetic at all, and that's really interesting to me. And also the fact that he talked about the nature of the relationship.

He told the business community, it is very important for us to first define our relationship. Are we friends or are we foes? And what can you do to make sure that the US China relationship remains stable, and then we can talk about other issues. So the whole speech really, I felt was a lot of platitudes about friendship between the US and China.

And also he basically, the underlying message from that speech to the business community is very clear. Let's see what can you do to help us before we get to your concerns.

>> Michael Auslin: Right, and we should probably note that the seats at the main table, as you reported, went for $40,000 a seat, less, I guess, in the bleacher seats, as we in Chicago would call them.

So to sort of wrap up then, and there's been just a fantastic overview of what's happened and some of the different elements of it. What do we expect going forward? What should we be looking for going forward? Obviously, you will be reporting on it as it happens. So even in your own mind, what is it that you're gonna be focusing on going forward that policymakers, scholars, investors, strategist planners should be thinking about over it's the next six months, nine months, a year, or the like coming out of these meetings?

 

>> Lingling Wei: Well, we'll see whether or not those discussions, dialogue will actually happen, right? Mil to mil, economic, financial and other issues, right? So that's the first test and how substantive those discussions will be. And at this point, if the two sides keep talking, it's really a good thing and a win for all of us.

And then going forward, we'll see whether or not those discussions will lead to any meaningful outcomes. First of all, they have to start talking. I mean, they agreed to restart the talks, and then we'll see whether or not they actually walk the walk, right? Actually start the talks, so next year is going to be brutal, right?

For the relationship and very soon we will see the outcome from the Taiwan election.

>> Michael Auslin: January 24th, so that's coming up.

>> Lingling Wei: Exactly, exactly, right, and then the US presidential election, the campaign-.

>> Michael Auslin: All of 2024. All of 2024. You can't escape it, exactly.

>> Lingling Wei: Exactly, right, so what this week did was basically put a floor under the relationship.

But how sturdy that floor is will be tested very, very soon.

>> Michael Auslin: So your point on the talks, I guess it's the old question of quality versus quantity, that's one. First of all, they get quantity of talks. And perhaps more important or equally important, is what's the quality of those talks.

Clearly recognized and understood headwinds, the election in Taiwan, the election in the US. Anything big in China that might affect the relationship? I mean, the party congress is over, the minor meetings don't really seem to. Is there anything from the Chinese side potentially affect what happens over the next year that you're aware of?

 

>> Lingling Wei: Well, for China, I mean, the biggest issue these days really is the Chinese economy.

>> Michael Auslin: The economy.

>> Lingling Wei: Right, are they going to prevent a full-blown financial crisis from happening? Because right now, as we and others have reported, the whole economy really struggling. All those young people having trouble finding jobs, and the property crisis is really deepening.

Local governments are also running out money and struggling to repay debt. So they really have a full plate of issues to worry about. So how they manage the risks, how they manage the debt problems, how they manage the property crisis are all things we need to be on the lookout for.

Because how interconnected the global economy has become, right? Whatever China is experiencing definitely will have impact on the rest of the global markets and global growth. And another, near term for the near term. One thing that a lot of investors and policy thinkers and makers are on the lookout for is when China is going to hold the third plenum.

Traditionally, third plenums have been very econ-focused, right? So people are really hoping that China will still have this third plenum, we still do not know the date and the government hasn't announced the date. If history is any guide, the third plenum usually takes place in November but now we're November 17th, right?

So only a couple of weeks left, so we do not know whether or not the third plenum will really take place before the year-end or next year. But that's something people are looking forward to because Xi Jinping has talked about, we need to coordinate development with security, but that's such a contradictory policy, right?

Because he obviously has put security, the need to fend off any perceived foreign threats ahead of development. So that has caused many foreign investors, foreign business, uneasy about investing in China. So people are looking for some clarity from events like the third plenum to give them guidance about whether or not we should keep pulling money into China.

 

>> Michael Auslin: Yeah, that's fantastic, and other things that are ongoing, of course, the confrontation between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, or at least the standoff that's there. Unresolved issues, of course, related to India-China relations and the whole relationship with Japan, including the new US, Japan, Korea trilateral set of agreements.

So there is a lot that can affect, if not cloud, this relationship, so we could go on and on, but I think we've come to a good stopping point and really appreciate you taking time to explain all this to us. I hope you'll be able to come on again, we've been speaking with Lingling Wei, who is the chief China correspondent for the Wall Street Journal, the author of Superpower Showdown and the new WSJ China must read newsletter.

So, Lingling, thank you so much for joining the Pacific Century.

>> Lingling Wei: It was a pleasure, thank you.

>> Michael Auslin: So for the Pacific Century, I'm Michael Auslin, we appreciate you listening in, and we will see you next time.

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