Joseph Fewsmith

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The 19th Party Congress: Ringing in Xi Jinping’s New Age

The 19th Party Congress and the First Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee that immediately followed the congress endorsed sweeping changes in China’s leadership, including the makeup of the Politburo and its standing committee.

January 23, 2018 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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China’s Political Ecology and the Fight against Corruption

Since the 18th Party Congress convened in November 2012, China has undertaken a wide-ranging campaign against corruption.

March 19, 2015 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Mao’s Shadow

Nearly four decades after his death, Mao Zedong remains a controversial figure in Chinese Communist Party history, raising as he does questions of legitimacy. Over the past year the issue of how the Mao years should be evaluated in comparison to the reform years has been raised and discussed by Xi Jinping and others. This discussion apparently responds to divergent opinions in the party and seems to reflect Xi Jinping’s determination to define China’s ideology and its limits.

March 14, 2014 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Debating Constitutional Government

Rather than pull public opinion together, Xi Jinping’s call for realizing the “China Dream” seems to have revealed the depth of cleavage among China’s intellectuals. The newspaper Southern Weekend set off a drama when it responded by writing a New Year’s editorial calling the China Dream the dream of constitutional government, only to have provincial propaganda authorities rewrite it beyond recognition before publication. Subsequently, Xi Jinping authorized a sharp attack on “Western values,” including constitutionalism. This internal talk, written into the now infamous “Document No. 9,” prompted several publications to run articles against constitutionalism, provoking liberal intellectuals to defend the idea. This deep divide suggests there is increasingly little middle ground left among China’s intellectuals, while the backing of different views by different officials reflects a politicization of seemingly intellectual debates. These debates are ultimately about the legitimacy of the government and thus reflect fragility in the political system.

October 7, 2013 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Xi Jinping’s Fast Start

To paraphrase Hobbes’ characterization of life, one may say that the politics preceding the 18th Party Congress were long, nasty and brutish. The irony of this process is that in the end the political calculus worked out well for new party leader and president, Xi Jinping. As far as one can tell from the outside, he neither presides over a deeply divided Standing Committee nor faces an incumbent head of the Central Military Commission (CMC), as Hu Jintao was forced to do a decade ago. Moreover, as a princeling whose revolutionary heritage is unquestioned, Xi has approached his job with a confidence unseen in his two predecessors, especially early in their terms.

June 6, 2013 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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The 18th Party Congress: Testing the Limits of Institutionalization

The recent 18th Party Congress, convened only after a year of extremely contentious politics, surprised by generating a leadership group that appeared lopsided in favor of supporters of former general secretary Jiang Zemin (江泽民), thereby raising questions about “politics by elders” (老人政治) and the limits of acceptable intervention. Ironically the apparent bias in favor of Jiang’s network may give new general secretary Xi Jinping (习近平) a relatively free hand in the next few years. Nevertheless, by generating the oldest Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) in years, the congress set up a situation in which five of the seven members of the PBSC will have to retire in only five years and many contentious issues will have to be readdressed relatively soon. Sorting out succession politics issues appears to be getting more difficult over time, but such a judgment will have to wait at least another five years.

January 14, 2013 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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De Tocqueville in Beijing

Even as public attention has been focused on the ouster of Chongqing party chief Bo Xilai and the trial of his wife, Gu Kailai, as well as the upcoming 18th Party Congress, there has been a quiet but interesting discussion going on in Beijing about Alexis de Tocqueville’s classic work, Ancien Regime and the French Revolution, first published in 1856. Although seemingly far from the concerns of the day, the interest in the work in fact captures widespread concern in intellectual circles about the Chinese polity and where it might go from here.

October 1, 2012 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Bo Xilai and Reform: What Will Be the Impact of His Removal?

The unexpected flight of Chongqing’s Public Security head to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu in February started an unexpected sequence of events that led to the removal of Bo Xilai, the princeling head of the Chongqing party committee, and the subsequent decision to investigate him. Depending on the outcome of that party investigation, Bo could then be subject to civil proceedings (as is almost always the case). These events have disrupted what appeared to be the smooth transition planned for the 18th Party Congress later this fall. There has been much commentary on these events, and different observers look at the significance and impact of the Bo Xilai case on Chinese politics. Looking at Bo’s unique place in the Chinese political system and at the actions taken and commentary issued by the government in Beijing, this article concludes that Beijing is taking steps to narrow the case against Bo as much as possible, presenting it as a case of violating party discipline and the law. Although this makes sense in the short run, there may be ramifications of the case that will reverberate for a long time.

August 6, 2012 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Guangdong Leads Calls to Break up “Vested Interests” and Revive Reform

In September a protest in a Guangdong village threatened to embarrass the province and its party secretary, Wang Yang, who is a candidate for membership on the powerful Politburo Standing Committee when the 18th Party Congress meets later this year. Not only did Wang Yang intervene decisively to defuse tensions, but he also used a plenary session of the provincial party committee to launch an attack on “vested interests” and to call for reviving reform. Guangdong’s outspokenness was quickly echoed in the pages of People’s Daily, scholarly reports, and liberal opinion. The long-term implications are not yet clear, but the revival of reform rhetoric suggests a contentious year of politics as the country heads into the 18th Party Congress.

April 30, 2012 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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“Social Management” as a Way of Coping With Heightened Social Tensions

Over the last year there has been an increasing emphasis on “social management” as a way of managing increasing social tensions in Chinese society. Indeed, the effort the CCP is putting into publicizing this concept underscores high-level concerns. Although these concerns cannot be attributed to the Arab spring or other global events, such social movements certainly make the CCP leadership more wary about the ways in which external political changes might stimulate domestic incidents, especially given the growing role of social media. Although this emphasis on social management should not be seen as the government giving up on the modest efforts at political reform it has been undertaking in recent years, it does suggest that the government sees other measures as more important in the short run.

January 6, 2012 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Debating “the China Model”

In recent years, especially since 2008, there has been a broad-ranging discussion about whether a “China model” exists, and, if so, whether it is good or bad, and whether it is restricted to China or can be spread to other countries. While this discussion has involved both Chinese and foreign scholars around the world, it is largely a discussion about Chinese identity and whether and how China should adopt “Western” concepts and practices or resist such trends. Although some of the discussions are serious explorations of development trends, most are highly politicized and emotional. Participants in the discussion tend to fall along the lines of past debates, with those identified with the “new left” advocating the existence and virtues of the China model, and those identified as liberal rejecting the claims of the former. In addition, there are some who seek to avoid politicization by taking an agnostic attitude toward the existence of a China model. In many ways, the discussion of the China model is a recurrence of earlier debates over “socialism” and “capitalism,” “the Beijing consensus,” and even earlier debates in Chinese history about the uniqueness of Chinese civilization.

September 21, 2011 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Political Reform Was Never on the Agenda

In August 2010 Premier Wen Jiabao went to the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, which was approaching the celebration of its 30th anniversary, and gave a speech that, among other things, called for political reform. What exactly Wen meant by his remarks, and whether he differed significantly from General Secretary Hu Jintao, who gave an official and less enthusiastic address in Shenzhen two weeks later, have become topics of intense media speculation. Whatever distance may or may not lie between the general secretary and his premier, it is safe to assume that Wen was not crossing swords with Hu and that significant political reform—meaning reform that would challenge the Chinese Communist Party’s monopoly on power—was never on the agenda. There is, on the contrary, good evidence that the CCP is continuing on a trajectory of limited, inner-party “democracy” that it set on some time ago.

February 22, 2011 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Institutional Reforms in Xian’an

Like many agricultural areas of the interior, Xian’an district in Hubei Province faced enormous problems from growing numbers of bureaucratic offices, increasing numbers of cadres, escalating debt, and financial malfeasance. Beginning in 2000, a new Party secretary, Song Yaping, began drastic measures to reduce the size of the cadre force and restructure local government. With strong political backing and a forceful personality, Song appears to have been largely successful, though his reforms remain controversial. The bigger question is whether the model adopted in Xian’an can be spread to other areas, and the answer to that appears to be negative.

June 28, 2010 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Bo Xilai Takes On Organized Crime

Although the 18th Party Congress remains two years away, competition among officials for seats on the all-important Politburo Standing Committee appears to be heating up. Over the past nine months, Bo Xilai, Party secretary of Chongqing, has been carrying out a high-profile campaign against organized crime that has catapulted him into the limelight. Because his predecessor in that position was Wang Yang, currently Party secretary of Guangdong Province and seemingly a valued protégé of General Secretary Hu Jintao, there has been much speculation over the possible rivalry between these two contenders for power. This speculation has been fueled in part because Bo Xilai, son of senior political leader Bo Yibo, is a “princeling” while Wang Yang, with no special family background but with a long history in the Communist Youth League, appears to be favored by Hu Jintao. Although one must be cautious about drawing conclusions, it is a situation that bears watching as preparations for the congress continue.

May 11, 2010 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Inner-Party Democracy: Development and Limitations

The Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee, which met in September, passed a decision on promoting “inner-party democracy,” a political direction with which CCP general secretary Hu Jintao is closely identified. Although there can be beneficial aspects of inner-party democracy, including expanding the pool from which cadres are drawn and increasing the number of people participating in the political process, the development of inner-party democracy over the past decade suggests that movement will be slow and that renewed emphasis on electoral practices within the Party is unlikely to stem corruption or reduce social conflict.

February 15, 2010 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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What Zhao Ziyang Tells Us about Elite Politics in the 1980s

On the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen crackdown, the posthumous account of politics in the 1980s by former premier and general secretary Zhao Ziyang was published in both Chinese and English. The publication of this memoir follows the publication of several interviews with the former Party leader and marks a continuing effort to speak to history. Publication was apparently intended to remind the world of the tragedy of Tiananmen, but there is little sign in China that it is having much of an impact. Although Zhao's various accounts do not contain startling revelations, they do add much detail and nuance to our understanding of politics in this period. Indeed, the role and rivalries of personalities come through very clearly, allowing one to better understand the political meltdown that befell China in 1989.

November 19, 2009 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Participatory Budgeting: Development and Limitations

Over the past five years, Wenling City— particularly Xinhe Township—in southeastern Zhejiang Province has pioneered openness and public participation in local budgeting. Although there are flaws in the reform, it is nevertheless highly significant in underscoring a clear problem in local governance, breathing life into the normally inert local people's congresses, and introducing a degree of democratic supervision. Local leaders can justly take pride in these reforms. Although there have been efforts in other parts of China to introduce legislative supervision of local budgets, there are significant obstacles to popularizing this innovation, including recent efforts to centralize control over budgets.

August 11, 2009 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Social Order in the Wake of Economic Crisis

With the onset of the world economic crisis, China’s export industries have been hard hit, with the result that millions of “peasant workers” have returned to their inland homes. Although these returnees present a potential social order problem, especially if the economy does not rebound in the latter half of 2009, most of the social order problems witnessed in recent months appear to be a continuation of the deterioration in local governance in various parts of the country in recent years. Thus, the return of migrant workers to the countryside is not so much a problem in and of itself as it is an additional burden on an already fragile political economy.

May 8, 2009 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Tackling the Land Issue—Carefully

Thirty years after undergoing a major revolution that de-collectivized agriculture, China is facing another major change in rural life as commercial agriculture spreads and as peasants migrate to the cities. This revolution in rural affairs, however, has been much more difficult. Cadres and peasants contend over land rights, growing income gaps between urban and rural areas fuel social discontent, and cities resist extending urban services to rural migrants. As the recent decision of the Third Plenum shows, China’s leaders are confronting the difficult issues involved, but are doing so cautiously. The Plenum decision also suggests that socially contentious issues that have boiled over in many places will continue for years to come.

January 9, 2009 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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An “Anger-Venting” Mass Incident Catches the Attention of China’s Leadership

On 28 June, at least 10,000 people, and perhaps as many as 30,000 protested the death of a schoolgirl in Weng’an County in southwestern Guizhou, the poorest province in China, overturning police cars and setting fire to the local security bureau. Video and still photographs of the event quickly circulated on the Internet. Shortly after the Weng’an incident, another mass riot broke out in Menglian, in neighboring Yunnan Province, showing that the emotions that fueled the Weng’an riot are not isolated. Whether because of an inability to cover up an incident of this size, the approach of the Beijing Olympics, or for other reasons, Chinese media quickly switched to trying to explain the causes of the incident and to calling for reforms to prevent similar confrontations in the future. Although the Weng’an disturbance was particularly large in scale, similar incidents have erupted in China over at least the last four years. Unlike protestors demonstrating against exorbitant taxation or land requisition, those participating in the Weng’an riot were not involved in the incident that set it off (the death of a girl), suggesting longstanding anger among the populace. Preventing similar incidents in the future marks a serious challenge for the Chinese government.

September 2, 2008 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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What Happened in Maliu Township?

Often the pressures that generate political reforms—and the limits to those reforms—are best viewed at the local level, which is why this column has explored so many instances of local reform. In this issue, we look at Maliu Township, a poor township in Chongqing Municipality that rose to at least local fame by adopting the so-called “Eight-Step Work Method,” which introduced popular participation in decision making and oversight. But as the local political economy changed—specifically as the impact of the abolition of the agricultural taxes has been felt—it has been difficult to sustain this innovation.

June 17, 2008 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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A New Upsurge in Political Reform?—Maybe

The 17th Party Congress called for continuing political reform, particularly at the grass roots. This appeal has been quickly followed by an important new book by the Central Party School that lays out a cautious but important blueprint for political changes over the next 15 years. This article focuses in particular on an important reform in one county in Sichuan Province, both because it may well have informed the thinking that went into the Party School report and because it raises important questions that remain unanswered both in the report and in the materials available on this county’s reforms.

March 12, 2008 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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The 17th Party Congress: Informal Politics and Formal Institutions

The 17th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was a significant milestone because the post-revolutionary generation had for the first time to sort out issues of succession and power distribution without the looming shadows of luminaries of the past. In general, they did fairly well. There appear to have evolved certain agreed-upon rules—including retirement and the distribution of posts in the Central Committee—that have, so far, confined conflict within certain institutional boundaries. Within these limits, however, there is evidence of a great deal of serious politics taking place. At least two important questions emerge from this. First, how will informal politics mesh with institutional rules? Second, if compromise and the distribution of benefits to different Party interests are the answer (as seems to have been the case at the 17th Party Congress), then will this system be able to respond quickly and effectively to crises?

January 23, 2008 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Democracy Is a Good Thing

Over the past several months there has been a vigorous discussion about democracy in China. Some of this discussion has been undertaken by well-connected, policy-oriented intellectuals, while other parts of the discussion have been conducted by liberal intellectuals who appear to have little policy impact. The Chinese Communist Party leadership, including Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, has, in general terms, endorsed continuing to implement various forms of “inner-party democracy.” Although such calls should be welcomed, they come at an odd time—just as the change of leading cadres at the local levels has come to a conclusion. The discussion on democracy may promote more experimentation at the local level, but the Party center has been firm on the importance of “democratic centralism” and “scientific socialism”—not democratic socialism.

October 5, 2007 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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The Political Implications of China’s Growing Middle Class

China’s middle class has developed rapidly over the past three decades. If one assumes that there was no one, or at least very few people, who could be considered middle class in 1978, there are now probably around 50 million people who can be considered middle class. Although the emergence of such a group in three decades is impressive, given the size of China’s population, it will be many years until we can speak of China as a middle-class society. In the meantime, despite indications that the middle class is more participatory than their economically less well off neighbors, there is no indication that the middle class—much less the wealthy—desires to challenge the political status quo. The fact that many more people identify themselves as middle class than can be reasonably classified as such by sociological criteria indicates that large swaths of Chinese society identify with middle-class aspirations. Alongside many fissiparous tendencies in China, this is one trend that suggests social cohesion.

July 16, 2007 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Assessing Social Stability on the Eve of the 17th Party Congress

Recent data on overall public opinion in China make one fairly optimistic about the state of Chinese society. Incomes are up, trust in the central government is high, and many aspects of government are seen as fair. But when one looks more closely at the issues closest to people—health care, social security, and local government—then the potential for social unrest looks significantly greater. This is particularly true when one looks at the effect income has on opinion.

February 28, 2007 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Exercising the Power of the Purse?

Over the past 10 years, the city of Wenling, in the eastern coastal province of Zhejiang, has been developing a system of “consultative democracy” that has allowed citizens to ask about and express their opinions on subjects related to their interests, particularly capital construction, road building, and education. Over the past year, this experiment has been extended to include public discussion of the budget process—or at least part of it. In one township, this process merged the practice of consultative democratic meetings with the local people’s congress. These reforms, widely reported on in the Chinese press endorsed at high levels, are still quite limited, but they suggest an effort to make the budgetary process both more transparent and subject to legislative review by expanding the role of local legislative bodies.

October 24, 2006 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Institutional Innovation at the Grassroots: Two Case Studies

The emergence of new institutions is critical if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is to transform itself from a traditional Leninist party, exercising highly concentrated authority and mobilizing populations, to a more modern, administrative party that follows procedures and adheres to rules. Whether such a transformation is successful in the long run, efforts in this direction are slowly reshaping power at the local level in China. To the extent such efforts are successful, they have the potential to reduce social conflict and make local governance more effective. Success is far from guaranteed. Nevertheless, in the interest of better understanding the transformation of local governance, this article looks at two instances of institutional innovation: the “one mechanism, three transformations” adopted in Handan, Hebei Province, and the “permanent representative system” as adopted in Ya’an, Sichuan Province.

July 7, 2006 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Promotion of Qiu He Raises Questions about Direction of Reform

For the last two years, the Chinese media have widely discussed the "Qiu He phenomenon," attempting to understand the significance of a local county party secretary's using autocratic methods to jump-start the economy of Jiangsu's poorest county. The party secretary, Qiu He, has been both praised and criticized. But now he has also been promoted to vice governor of the wealthy province of Jiangsu, and at 50 years of age he could rise farther in China's political system. Promotions to vice governor rarely raise eyebrows, but the significance of Qiu's promotion has been widely discussed. Known as an "official with personality," Qiu stands out among the ranks of China's generally staid bureaucracy, and his rise prompts speculation about what types of officials might be promoted under Hu Jintao and what this means for the building of institutions in China.

January 1, 2006 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Chambers of Commerce in Wenzhou and the Potential Limits of "Civil Society" in China

Wenzhou is famous for its thriving private economy. Less well known is the growth of chambers of commerce and other trade associations there. These organizations are changing the structures by which China is governed and policy is made. Chambers of commerce have done much to promote quality standards within industry and maintain Wenzhou's competitiveness. Though these groups have brought about new forms of state-society accommodation, they have not challenged party rule. On the contrary, they are another manifestation of the emergence of a new political-economic elite which broadly agrees on many issues.

October 30, 2005 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Taizhou Area Explores Ways to Improve Local Governance

Standing apart from the many recent reports of rural instability is an account of a different nature: It singles out a township in a region of Zhejiang Province known nationally for its flourishing market-based prosperity, where innovative reforms have been implemented to enhance popular participation in political decisions. Although these reforms are intended to strengthen the rule of the Chinese Communist Party in local affairs and not as a step toward democratic transition, they do suggest that the growth of "social capital" at the local level is bringing about greater public roles in policymaking, improving local governance, and perhaps even changing, albeit to a limited degree, the way the party operates at the local level.

July 30, 2005 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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China under Hu Jintao

Contrary to hopes expressed by both Chinese intellectuals and foreign observers that the new Hu Jintao administration would be more open to political change and to freer expression of ideas, Hu's government has backed away from some of the tolerance that existed (though insufficiently) under Jiang Zemin. While Jiang Zemin did not shy away from criticizing presumed Western efforts to "divide" and "Westernize" China, the Hu administration has actively backed a campaign to criticize "neoliberalism" and has cracked down on the expression of liberal opinion. For the moment at least, Hu seems determined to address the problems facing China by strengthening the Chinese Communist Party rather than adjusting the relationship between the party and society through greater openness.

April 30, 2005 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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CCP Launches Campaign to Maintain the Advanced Nature of Party Members

The Chinese Communist Party has launched a campaign to "maintain the advanced nature of Chinese Communist Party members." Although it may seem anachronistic to carry out an old-style rectification campaign in the early 21st century, the campaign is just one part of a much broader effort to strengthen the "governing capacity" of the party—the primary theme of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee in September 2004. Party members are cynical about campaigns such as the one just begun, but campaigns nevertheless can give the party center new information about lower-level party cadres and provide a basis for reshuffling careers.

January 30, 2005 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Pressures for Expanding Local-Level Democracy

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has faced numerous pressures in recent years to reform its governing practices, particularly at the local level where these practices directly affect the lives of citizens. Despite years of campaigning against it, corruption continues to get worse at local levels, where abuse of power by officials has inflamed relations with the citizenry, and where there seems to be a palpable need to enhance the legitimacy of local officials. Village-level elections were introduced in China in the late 1980s to respond to these needs, but they also created new problems. Local party secretaries clashed regularly with village heads, and township cadres resented newly assertive village leaders. Moreover, the electoral process stalled as efforts to promote it at the township level met resistance. In recent months, however, there have been new and expanded experiments with local democracy that enhance the importance of local people's congresses, open up the electoral process, and use elections for the selection of local cadres. Importantly, these experiments are not limited to the village level, but are taking place at the township and sometimes county levels. These innovations may not augur looming democratization, but they do reflect a response to increased pressures to cope with the problems of local governance.

October 30, 2004 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Promoting the Scientific Development Concept

For the past nine months, party General Secretary Hu Jintao and other leaders have been promoting a new economic approach that they call the "scientific development concept." This approach aims to correct what they describe as an overemphasis in recent years on increasing gross domestic product (GDP), which encourages the generation of false figures and dubious construction projects while neglecting the social welfare of those left behind in the hinterland. Advertised as a "people-centered" approach to development, the scientific development concept has been extended to leadership practices in general, including the recruitment of talent and the administration of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Leaders associated with former party General Secretary Jiang Zemin, such as Secretariat head Zeng Qinghong, have endorsed the scientific development concept, but Zeng in particular has appeared to demur at some of its central notions. At a minimum, this divergence underscores the difficulty of defining "social development" as opposed to "mere" economic development; at a maximum, it suggests continuing tensions within the leadership.

July 30, 2004 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Continuing Pressures on Social Order

The recently published edition of the Blue Book of Chinese Society, an annual survey of social problems and attitudes published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), gives ample evidence that social problems continue to worsen even as the new government focuses more attention on the plight of those left behind in China's struggle for economic growth and modernization. There are positive signs as well. Overall, incomes are up (according to official statistics); the middle class, depending on how one defines it, is growing; and most people continue to expect incomes to grow. Moreover, the government is increasing the resources it expends on social welfare. Nevertheless, a host of problems challenges China's new leadership, including income inequality, labor disturbances, rural disorder, and corruption. But the most difficult issue remains jobs. China's booming economy just does not create enough jobs relative to overall growth or the needs of the society. Thus, social order appears to be a long-term political problem for China.

April 30, 2004 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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The Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee

The recent Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee suggests that despite obvious signs of tension within the leadership over the past year, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Hu Jintao has begun to put his distinct stamp on policy. A long "Decision" on the goals of further economic reform—the only document emerging the plenum to be made public—indicates a greater concern with balanced growth and the social dimensions of economic development than did the political report adopted at the 16th Party Congress in fall 2002. Although the plenum did not take up the issue of political reform explicitly, it adopted a new party procedure that called for the Politburo to report on its work to the whole Central Committee, a step advertised as a step toward "inner-party democracy." Recent articles in party journals indicate that discussions continue on political reform, albeit of a limited sort, and that there are likely to be significant developments in this area in the future.

January 30, 2004 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Studying the Three Represents

Starting in June, Chinese media have been promoting a new campaign to study the "three represents," Jiang Zemin's ideological formulation that was enshrined in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constitution at the 16th Party Congress in fall 2002. Following Hu Jintao's efforts to emphasize a more populist approach to governance, including his "people's war" against severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in April and May, the new campaign has raised new questions about the relationship between Hu and Jiang. Review of the evidence reveals that this campaign has long been in the works and thus should not—in and of itself—be taken as evidence of a reassertion of Jiang's political clout, but there are nevertheless significant differences between the two leaders and their approaches to governance and ideology. Although the evidence suggests that Hu Jintao has been trying to inject new themes and approaches to governance, he remains willing to acknowledge the role of Jiang as elder statesman and refrains from challenging him directly. Thus, political differences are more likely to be played out in personnel decisions and policy priorities over the coming months than in the sort of political competition that is likely to lead to instability.

October 30, 2003 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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China's Response to SARS

A month after severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) moved from a medical crisis—albeit one unacknowledged as such by the Chinese authorities—to a political crisis, it has become apparent that the disease will have a significant impact on China's political system, though one that is likely to be long-term rather than immediate. Although some have argued that SARS will be "China's Chernobyl," leading to far-reaching political change and perhaps democratization, others have maintained that the political system will simply absorb the impact and not change. Both judgments appear wide of the mark. Much more likely is that SARS will set off a variety of forces which the government will try to control, but which are going to be increasingly difficult to contain. It is still too early to draw strong conclusions about the impact of the SARS crisis, but some tentative conjectures about both elite politics and the longer-range implications can be hazarded.

July 30, 2003 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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China's Domestic Agenda: Social Pressures and Public Opinion

In the months since he has taken over as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Hu Jintao has focused on domestic issues. Indeed, recent interviews in China suggest that some foreign policy specialists are concerned that Hu's domestic interests will distract him from important foreign policy issues. In any event, a recently published survey of social trends in China outlines the depth of the problems facing the Chinese government. These are not short-term or easily handled problems; they are rooted in the demography of China and in the long-term separation between urban and rural areas. Public opinion surveys suggest that China's most vulnerable do indeed feel worried about the future. Nevertheless, the same surveys show that a sizable majority of Chinese is cautiously optimistic about the future. Such assessments of the future appear to give the government a window of opportunity for addressing the social pressures it faces.

April 30, 2003 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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The 16th Party Congress: Implications for Understanding Chinese Politics

Jiang Zemin emerged from the recent 16th Party Congress and First Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee with a sweeping victory. Not only were his "three represents" written into the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) charter, but his allies also emerged in critical positions on the Politburo and its Standing Committee. Jiang himself will continue to hold the chairmanship of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC). In terms of understanding Chinese politics, however, does this mean that personnel can be manipulated at will, without reference to institutions? Not entirely, for institutions are taking on greater force in Chinese politics, but Jiang has proven a master of working--and dominating--the institutions. Looking closely at the results of the recent CCP congress makes Jiang's victory at the 15th Party Congress in 1997 all the more important. Although it is too early to predict what will ultimately ensue at the highest reaches of Chinese politics, Jiang's domination of personnel decisions makes it very difficult for Hu Jintao, relying primarily on the institutional power of the office of general secretary, to consolidate power in his person.

January 30, 2003 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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Social Issues Move to Center Stage

For the past two decades, economic reform—or, more precisely, economic growth—has been at the center of China's thinking about politics. Party conservatives hoped to avoid social and political cleavages by constraining economic reform. Party reformers hoped to outrun and defuse social and economic challenges by developing the economy rapidly. Today, there is no escaping that reform has created winners and losers. That conclusion is forcing social issues to the center of political consciousness. Some believe that it is already too late to address these issues effectively, while others see them as forcing a process of political reform. For the moment, the political leadership is giving few indications of specific intentions regarding political reform. But it is nevertheless setting a tone and framework that provides space for such issues to be addressed. Although the Sixteenth Party Congress will be important for many reasons, it seems likely that whatever leadership arrangements are made, the pace of political reform will increase. Whether it will increase sufficiently is more difficult to assess.

October 30, 2002 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

commentary | Articles

The 16th Party Congress: A Preview

The 16th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will convene November 8, 2002. It and the First Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee that will immediately follow the congress will overhaul China's top leadership, including the Central Committee, the Politburo, the Politburo Standing Committee, the secretariat, and the CCP's Central Military Commission. The congress will also revise the CCP's party charter—to what extent and in what way will be watched closely—and issue a political report, which will review the party's achievements and amend its ideology. Although much anticipated, this party congress is unlikely to provide a sharp turning point in party policy. The influence of Jiang Zemin and/or his close supporters will persist. The political transition many are hoping for is likely to be drawn out, perhaps extending to the 17th Party Congress in 2007.

October 30, 2002 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

commentary | Articles

Rethinking the Role of the CCP: Explicating Jiang Zemin's Party Anniversary Speech

After Jiang Zemin delivered his groundbreaking speech on the communist party's anniversary last summer, there was much speculation about the strength of his political position and controversy over the meaning of the speech itself. Close examination of authoritative commentary, however, suggests that the speech has received strong support within the party and represents far more than the general secretary's personal views. Moreover, articles by party theoreticians based at the Central Party School indicate that Jiang's speech was intended to convey a program of wide-ranging political reform, albeit not one of democratization. This program of political reform is intended to meet the domestic and international challenges facing the party and to make the exercise of power in China better institutionalized and more stable.

April 30, 2002 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

commentary | Articles

Is Political Reform Ahead?—Beijing Confronts Problems Facing Society—and the CCP

On July 1, Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), called for admitting private entrepreneurs into the party. Although this decision in some ways brought party policy into line with reality, it was an important announcement not only because it reversed a formal party decision made in the wake of the Tiananmen crackdown but also because it opened the door to a wide range of possible political changes. Jiang's announcement may be only the tip of the iceberg. Recent publications have suggested that, in the run-up to the Sixteenth Party Congress (scheduled for fall 2002), party leaders are thinking systematically about the changes it needs to make to cope with the very rapid socioeconomic changes in Chinese society. Although the clear goal is to keep the CCP in power, it is evident that party leaders at the highest levels understand that they can only stay in power by changing. Political change is not without danger. "Leftists" in the party have excoriated Jiang's announcement, and there is widespread resentment over inequalities that have opened up in recent years in Chinese society. If the party is widely seen as speaking only for the well to do—a perception that is already widespread—popular discontent is likely to continue to spread.

January 30, 2002 by Joseph Fewsmith via China Leadership Monitor

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