Three wars that Turkey is currently involved in, namely in Syria, Libya, and the South Caucasus, suggest that Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s foreign policy has settled into a new phase. Erdoğan is building a “mini Empire” by—often—simultaneously fighting and power-brokering with his Russian homologue, and to this end the Eastern Mediterranean provides ample opportunities for him.
In Syria, Turkey supports rebels opposing the Assad regime, itself backed by Russia. In the South Caucasus, Turkey backs Azerbaijan, which is trying to recover its occupied territory from Armenia, a close Russian ally. And in Libya, Ankara backs the internationally-recognized Tripoli government against forces supported by the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Putin’s mercenaries, known as Wagner’s Army.
At the same time, rising tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean between Turkey and Greece have raised concerns regarding conflict between the two NATO allies. Turkey is also at loggerheads with Cyprus, an ally of Greece.
Franco-Turkish tensions too, are rising in the region. Recent press reports according to which Paris claimed the Turkish navy “illuminated” a French vessel off the coast of Libya in June 2020 point at growing tensions between Ankara and Paris—again around the Eastern Mediterranean basin. Turkey is nearly playing alone against France, Greece, Cyprus, Syria, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, and often also Russia around the eastern rim of the Mediterranean Sea—but can it win?
War in Libya
When Libya descended into civil war in 2014, Erdoğan threw his support behind the—at the time––mainly political Islamist factions in Libya’s western-based Dawn Coalition, which would later, and following addition of other factions to it, morph into the country’s internationally-recognized Tripoli government. The Dawn Coalition’s adversary has been the Dignity Coalition, mainly led by General Khalifa Haftar’s forces in the country’s east.1
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and his ally, the UAE, worried about the ascent of political Islam in Libya next door to Egypt (and eager to undermine Erdoğan), were quick to assist Haftar’s forces; they carried out air strikes aimed at the Tripoli factions.
In a counter move, Turkey signed two agreements with Tripoli in November 2019: a memorandum of understanding on providing the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli with arms, training, and military personnel; and a maritime agreement delineating Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the Mediterranean waters separating the two countries.2
In December 2019, Erdoğan announced that he was willing to deploy troops in Libya if the GNA requested it.3 He reiterated the offer during a December 15 meeting with GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj in Ankara4—a visit that arose after Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) renewed its push to take Tripoli by force.
In January 2020, Turkey’s parliament authorized the deployment of troops to support the GNA.5 Since January 2020, around 80 Turkish military personnel have been stationed in Tripoli as part of a train-and-equip program. One unit has been deployed to operate the radio jammer systems sent to the GNA by Turkey to jam Tripoli’s airspace.6
Libya has emerged as a focal point of Ankara’s foreign policy, which seemingly regards the country as an arena for Turkish proxy competition against Egypt and the UAE, and vice-versa. At the same time, Libya’s GNA has become increasingly dependent on Ankara for military reasons—namely, a lack of other allies willing to provide arms capable of countering the LNA’s Emirati-supplied drones, and the arrival of Russian mercenaries who added new technology and precision weapons to Haftar’s war against Tripoli.
Countering the “East Med Bloc”
Ankara’s Libya policy also stems from its isolation in the East Mediterranean, which has gradually worsened since the rupture of Turkish-Israeli ties in 2010 and Erdoğan’s regional policy miscalculations during the Arab Spring uprisings. On the latter front, his support for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood in 2011–2012 cost him dearly after that government was ousted by mass protests and replaced with a military-backed administration led by President Sisi, and supported by his allies in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh.
Soon after coming to power, Sisi opened talks with Greece to delineate their maritime economic areas. He then held a three-way summit in November 2014 to promote a deal for supplying natural gas to Egypt from undersea fields off the coast of Cyprus. Cairo also hosted the inaugural meeting of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum earlier this year, notably excluding Turkey. Egypt has also been conducting joint air exercises with Greece since 2015, with Cypriot forces participating in 2018. Separately, they carried out three rounds of joint exercises in Israel earlier this year.
These initiatives have pitted Ankara against an emerging coalition of old and new adversaries across the East Mediterranean, mainly Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, and Israel. Given its cool-to-hostile relations with these states, Ankara is alarmed by the rate at which they have come together in strategic cooperation.
Ankara’s new maritime agreement with Tripoli was forged in part to counter such cooperation. The November 28 accord established a virtual maritime axis between Dalaman on Turkey’s southwest coast and Darnah on Libya’s northeast coast (far from the GNA’s practical area of control). In Erdoğan’s view, drawing this line will allow him to cut into the emerging Cypriot-Egyptian-Greek-Israeli maritime bloc, while simultaneously pushing back against Egypt and the UAE’s pressure on the GNA.
Enter Russia
Although Erdoğan and Putin back opposing sides in the civil war, their operational track record in Syria speaks volumes about their potential for reaching an understanding in Libya.
Recently, Moscow has been playing both arsonist and firefighter in Libya: it gave critical advantage to Haftar by deploying mercenaries to boost his forces, and providing his troops with technology to shoot down drones, forcing Tripoli—and Ankara—to the bargaining table. Putin may force Haftar to agree to Russia’s position as Libya’s “peacemaker” by pulling some crucial support away from him.
What is more, Putin could use Libya to align Turkey with the Russian position in Syria and the South Caucasus. On January 13, 2020, during a Libya summit, Turkish and Syrian intelligence chiefs met in Moscow, underscoring Putin’s desire to get Ankara to shake Assad’s hand and wrap up the conflict in Syria on terms favorable to Russia and Damascus.7
And France…
In addition to strategic calculations, Ankara’s Libya policy has a key driver: Turkey wants to collect Gadhafi-era debt in Libya—totaling billions of dollars—and have access to new and lucrative construction contracts in that war-torn, but oil-rich country.
Enter France, which also wants to take a large slice of this cake. Accordingly, vying for money, contracts, and influence (Turkey is currently reportedly building a military base in Libya), Ankara and Paris have been supporting opposing sides in Libya.
What is more, Ankara’s success on the battlefield in Libya, pushing Haftar’s forces away from Tripoli by militarily supporting the GNA, has upset Paris. In return, France has decided to consolidate its partnership in Libya with Turkey’s regional opponents: Egypt and the UAE.
What is more, emerging differences between Ankara and Athens in the Eastern Mediterranean have provided France with another opportunity against Ankara. Recently, tensions have flared up between Ankara and Athens over Kastellorizo/Meis, a tiny Greek island that lies a stone’s throw away from the Turkish coast. If Kastellorizo/Meis were to have the continental shelf fully claimed for it by Greece, the island would cut across the virtual maritime Dalaman-Darnah axis that connects Turkey to Libya.
Accordingly, Franco-Turkish competition has now moved next door to Turkey, where Paris has responded to Ankara by throwing military support behind Greece, and also partnering with European Union (EU) members Cyprus and Greece to legislate sanctions against Ankara in Brussels.
To add to Franco-Turkish rivalry, the two countries also have opposing views of regional governance. Whereas Ataturk’s Turkey was the epitome of French-style secularism that envisions keeping religion out of politics, Erdoğan’s embrace of political Islam is the antidote to it—and Paris fears Turkey spreading this style of politics regionally from Syria to Libya to the rest of North Africa.
Conclusion: Erdoğan’s “Empire”
As of 2020, Erdoğan’s foreign policy has had mixed results. He is often at odds with various NATO allies, most notably France. He has failed to shape the outcome of events in Syria, where his opponent, the Assad regime, has overwhelmed Turkey-backed rebels, with support from Russia and Iran. He has also failed so far to shape the outcome of the conflict in Libya to Turkey’s clear advantage.
In both conflicts, Erdoğan’s policies have also resulted in geopolitical troubles, putting Ankara at odds with Turkey’s adversaries: Moscow and Tehran in Syria, and Cairo, Paris, Abu Dhabi, and Moscow in Libya. To alleviate his challenges in Libya and Syria alike, Erdoğan has decided to make deals with Putin, but is also becoming ever more reliant on the Russian leader to achieve his goals in both places, and now potentially also in the South Caucasus.
Rising tensions between Turkey and Greece are alarming. For the time being, these tensions seem to have subsided thanks to German and NATO mediation, and I do not expect NATO allies Greece and Turkey to go to war.
Similarly, I do not anticipate NATO allies France and Turkey entering into conflict. I do, however, believe that Ankara and Paris will continue to compete for power and influence around the Mediterranean Sea.
It is fair to say that Erdoğan’s policies have not made Turkey a star-power nation in the Middle East: In 2020, Ankara is also left with no Middle Eastern friends—with the exception of Qatar and non-state Hamas. What is more, Turkey faces a number of adversaries in the Eastern Mediterranean, ranging from form France to Greece to Egypt.
But, as an astute politician, Erdoğan deserves credit for his canny ability to line up Turkey’s broader national security interests in Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, and elsewhere—also thanks to his desire to get along with Putin.
Overall, whether Erdoğan can continue to play his game in the Eastern Mediterranean depends on the health of Turkey’s economy. Since 2018, the economy has shown signs of weakness, including currency crises and a 2019 recession. If Turkey suffers an economic meltdown, it will be hard for him to maintain Ankara’s current stance in these areas. He will have to turn his attention to the country’s domestic troubles.
Otherwise, expect Erdoğan to continue to play an interventionist role in the Eastern Mediterranean for the foreseeable future.
SONER CAGAPTAY is the Beyer Family fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. He has written extensively on U.S.-Turkish relations, Turkish domestic politics, and Turkish nationalism, publishing in scholarly journals and major international print media, including the Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, New York Times, Jane's Defense Weekly, Foreign Affairs, Atlantic, New Republic, and Newsweek Türkiye. A historian by training, Dr. Cagaptay wrote his doctoral dissertation at Yale University (2003) on Turkish nationalism. Dr. Cagaptay has taught courses at Yale, Princeton University, Georgetown University, and Smith College on the Middle East, Mediterranean, and Eastern Europe. Dr. Cagaptay is the recipient of numerous honors, grants, and chairs, among them the Smith-Richardson, Mellon, Rice, and Leylan fellowships, as well as the Ertegun chair at Princeton.
