The recent overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad's regime by rebel forces in Syria marks a pivotal moment in Middle Eastern geopolitics. While the transition has been relatively smooth so far, the International Crisis Group’s latest "10 Conflicts to Watch" list suggests that significant challenges could arise if the transition is not properly managed. Although every country and situation is unique to its socio-political context, there are historical lessons that could be instrumental in ensuring a smoother transition for Syria toward stability.
The scenes of jubilation in Damascus last month following Assad’s fall, along with the immediate governance challenges, echo the collapse of the Soviet-backed government under Dr. Najibullah in Afghanistan almost three decades ago and Libya over a decade ago. I witnessed Afghanistan’s situation firsthand, living with its consequences as an Afghan. Later, in 2012, as head of mission for No Peace Without Justice in Libya, I observed and engaged directly with the transitional council and post-Qaddafi government and civil society.
In April 1992, the fall of Dr. Najibullah's government after 13 years of Mujahidin resistance against Soviet forces and the communist regime in Afghanistan ignited celebrations among Afghans hopeful for freedom, peace, and stability. The regime’s collapse in the last month was swift, with government forces often surrendering their posts. Rebel forces moved into cities and eventually reached the gates of Kabul. An interim government—as part of Peshawar accord-- had been negotiated months earlier in Pakistan among various factions, promising a shared role for eight armed groups. When leaders of these factions arrived in Kabul from Pakistan, they were greeted with public cheers. Abdul Rahim Hatif, the speaker of parliament serving as the acting president, handed over power to Sibghatullah Mojadidi, symbolizing a formal transfer of authority. This marked the end of Cold War rivalry in Central and South Asia, as the U.S. and the Soviet Union (which had dissolved the previous year) withdrew their competing influences. Shortly afterward, Kabul’s notorious prison was opened, releasing political prisoners who had endured years of torture. Families celebrated their return with tears of joy, and a general amnesty was declared. The initial phase of the transition unfolded without major trouble, with the transitional government set to serve for three months.
However, euphoria was short-lived, and the subsequent political and security developments became a nightmare for the public. The factions, each backed by a regional actor, soon turned on one another, becoming tools for proxy wars and engaging in a brutal struggle for territorial control and political power. These groups further fragmented into local warlords who ruled districts and provinces. Within a year, civil war claimed over 60,000 civilian lives in Kabul alone. The chaos paved the way for the Taliban’s rise, turning Afghanistan into a haven for international terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, which eventually orchestrated the September 11, 2001, attacks.
Libya serves as a more recent cautionary tale. The Libyan uprising against Qaddafi coincided with the mass protests against Assad’s regime in 2011, inspired by the Arab Spring. Within eight months, Qaddafi was deposed, and the National Transitional Council (NTC), formed early in the revolution, took charge of interim governance. The NTC comprised representatives from various Libyan regions and sectors, including former government officials who had defected, academics, lawyers, and activists. Members of the council made a noble pledge not to seek office in the first elections. They oversaw the first parliamentary elections on July 7, 2012—less than a year after Qaddafi’s fall. These elections, the first democratic ones in Libya in over four decades, saw high voter turnout and were deemed successful. The 200-member General National Congress (GNC) replaced the NTC, tasked with appointing a prime minister, forming a government, and drafting a new constitution.
However, the rush to elections failed to address the fundamental issue of armed groups and their external supporters. Efforts to disarm these groups were slow and lacked innovation, relying heavily on routine UN-standard procedures for DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration). The push for early elections overlooked the critical need to establish some level of order and rule of law as a prerequisite for a successful electoral process.
Regional proxy conflicts deepened divisions among revolutionary factions. Some militia groups adopted radical Islamist views, and territorial disputes intensified. The GNC faced internal divisions, militia violence, and political instability, hindering Libya’s transition to a stable democratic state. The initial optimism of the 2012 elections waned amid the complexities of unifying a country emerging from decades of authoritarian rule and civil conflict. The hopeful young generation and civil society I encountered in 2012 soon lost faith in the process, with many fleeing the country for safety. The prolonged power struggle and external interference exacerbated instability. Libya became a hotspot for radical foreign fighters, including ISIS affiliates, further derailing efforts to establish a unified government.
The defeat of stability was tragically snatched from the jaws of victory for the Libyan people.
Syria now stands at a similar crossroads. Amid a landscape of diverse and often competing factions, the coalition of rebel groups—including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian National Army (SNA), the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and the Southern Operations Room—has demonstrated a rare unity of purpose in their effort to topple Assad's regime.
The swift appointment of Mohammad al-Basher as interim prime minister and the formation of an interim government are positive steps toward governance. Efforts such as deploying uniformed police from Idlib to establish law and order in Damascus and operationalizing civil services are critical.
However, the situation remains precarious. Clashes between groups, particularly the SDF and SNA in northern Syria—each backed by foreign powers—as well as the presence of foreign fighters and local commanders, signal that challenges persist. The fragility of the situation is evident given the groups’ divergent political ideologies and histories of territorial disputes and resource competition. The decentralized leadership during the rebellion hindered national-scale coordination. Yet, the December 24, 2024, agreement to dissolve all armed factions and merge them into a unified structure under the Ministry of Defense represents significant progress. It indicates that many faction leaders are rising to the challenge of national-level responsibilities.
This agreement, while promising, requires careful and strategic nurturing. A major threat to its success lies in the conflicting interests of regional and international actors who back various factions, creating a persistent potential for proxy wars. Such competition risks undermining the Syrian people’s hard-won victory. While it would be unrealistic to expect these actors to fully suspend their pursuit of influence, their actions must be carefully monitored and held accountable for any destabilizing effects. The transitional government, led by Mr. Sharaa, bears the burden of navigating these external pressures while safeguarding Syria’s sovereignty and mitigating the impact of foreign interference on the country’s fragile recovery.
To that end establishing a robust political coordination mechanism inclusive of faction leaders and civil society organizations, including those representing refugees and the diaspora, is essential. A balanced civilian and military representation in this mechanism, such as a high council, could foster constructive dialogue and aid the transition of rebels into civilian roles.
Foreign Fighters: a threat for long term stability
The involvement of foreign fighters in modern conflicts is not new. Syria, like Afghanistan and Libya, currently hosts a range of radicalized foreign fighters embedded within various factions.
During the 1980s, men from across the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond flocked to Afghanistan to join the fight against Soviet forces. For many, this was not just a political struggle but a deeply spiritual undertaking—a jihad. These fighters left their homes driven by faith, ideology, and the allure of battle, believing their efforts were a sacred duty.
The largest contingent came from the Arabian Peninsula, particularly Saudi Arabia, where fiery sermons and mosque rhetoric portrayed the Afghan resistance as the ultimate test of faith. Among these fighters were figures like Osama bin Laden and clerics like Abdullah Azzam, whose impassioned speeches framed Afghanistan as a symbol of global Islamic unity.
From Egypt came ideologues, many veterans of struggles against authoritarian regimes in their own country. Groups like Egyptian Islamic Jihad saw Afghanistan not just as a battlefield but as a crucible for shaping the future of political Islam and a platform from which to challenge their own governments. These fighters –at the time, supported, trained and armed by the U.S. as part of the cold war rivalry, brought back with them military expertise and revolutionary visions aimed at transforming the broader Muslim world.
Men from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, and Yemen joined for diverse reasons—redemption, adventure, frustration with their own authoritarian governments, or deep religious conviction.
Afghanistan became the first chapter of a larger story for many. The Soviet withdrawal was celebrated as a divine victory, but many fighters carried the scars and radical ideologies of war back to their homelands. Some, like Osama bin Laden, stayed behind, sowing the seeds of future conflicts. Their actions reverberated far beyond Afghanistan, shaping history in unexpected ways. Similarly, in Libya, foreign fighters from Tunisia and elsewhere joined Islamists in places like Misrata, where, in 2012, I observed the rapid emergence of radical groups with extremist ideologies reinforced by the presence of these radicalized foreign fighters. These groups later contributed to the derailment of Libya’s transition to stability and democracy.
Today, this pattern has reversed. Radicalized fighters from Afghanistan, Central Asia, and beyond have made their way to Syria and the Arab world, bringing military training gained in conflicts involving the Taliban and IS province of Khurasan/Daesh. They aim to "liberate" their brothers in a new theater of war. Social media from recent weeks highlights the presence of fighters from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and even Uyghurs from China in Syria. Their extremist rhetoric, especially against religious minorities, raises concerns about sectarian violence and the risk of Syria becoming a new breeding ground for radical ideologies and their operations. Intelligence reports from Afghan authorities, which I was privy to in 2017-2018, revealed that some of these groups --who later moved to Syria-- harbored ambitions extending far beyond the countries where they were operating. They called for rebellion and the establishment of “true Islam” in Central Asia, advocating for the overthrow of regimes they regarded as non-Islamic and authoritarian.
A commander from Katiba Imam Bukhari, a group that splintered from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and has operated in Afghanistan since 2011, recently appeared in a video speaking in Uzbek. He celebrated the “freedom of Sham [Damascus] for all Muslims,” and in a separate video, he described their presence in Syria as a religious duty while addressing a congregation in a mosque. A former Afghan deputy head of intelligence, tasked with profiling foreign fighters, noted that this group almost disappeared from northern Afghanistan following a major military operation in 2013.
In another video, an Afghan rebel surrounded by other foreign fighters congratulated the leadership of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Taliban) from Syria. Dari- and Pashto-speaking fighters along with other foreign fighters from Syria pledged allegiance to Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada via phone. Another video shows a rebel with an AK-47 inscribed “Soldier of Tajikistan,” celebrating what he called a “victory in Sham.” Additional footage shows Uyghur fighters calling themselves “Mujahideen from eastern Turkistan” speaking to a congregation in the city of Latakia, one of them says they “ have been in Syria since 2012” and shall continue to “support Levant and beyond.”
On December 23, 2024, in the Christian-majority town of Suqaylabiyah in Syria's Hama province, masked militants set fire to a recently installed Christmas tree in the main square. This act of arson, occurring just before Christmas Eve, sparked widespread protests among the Christian community, who feared for their religious freedoms under the new Islamist-led government.
HTS officials attributed the incident to foreign fighters and reported that the perpetrators had been detained.
These acts are so far very limited but are indicative of the fact that the presence of these fighters could threaten to undermine efforts to build inclusive governance in Syria and could potentially mirror the destructive aftermath of foreign fighter involvement in particular in Libya.
Speaking to journalists, Ahmad al-Shara’a (Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) addressed the issue, asserting that foreign fighters who aided the revolution should be celebrated. He suggested like other countries who grant permanent residency to migrant who stays long in their country, it was not “impossible” to integrate them into Syrian society as they “share Syrian values.” He later appointed some of these fighters, such as Saifiddin Tojiboev from Tajikistan, to government positions, including the army.
Exact numbers of foreign fighters in Syria remain uncertain but are believed to have declined from their 2018 peak to a few thousand today. During the 1980s Afghan war, over 20,000 foreign fighters arrived from the Middle East and North Africa. Many later destabilized their home countries, sought refuge in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, or fueled regional conflicts. In Libya, foreign fighters from 16 countries, primarily Tunisia, were estimated to number between 5,000 and 6,000 at their peak.
The Assad regime once relied on the Fatemiyoun Brigade, comprising Afghan Shia fighters organized by Iran. At their peak, these fighters numbered around 12,000 but declined in later years. Following Assad’s fall, many were stranded in Damascus before eventually being evacuated to Iran.
While Mr. Shara’a downplayed the current number of foreign fighters, their potential to derail Syria’s fragile stability remains undeniable. This is evident from Libya’s experience, where foreign fighters became major sources of factional fighting as well as regional and international tension. Syria cannot afford to repeat this.
Recent decreases in the fighters' social media activity, with the exception of Telegram, may suggest efforts by the transitional government and HTS to control their public engagement. However, a long-term solution is crucial. Syria’s new government must begin registering foreign fighters and their affiliations, potentially using biometric data so a proper record of them is established. Monitoring their activities and relocating them from areas populated by religious and ethnic minorities is essential.
The disarmament and reintegration program must include these foreign fighters. One incentive for their participation could be engaging their countries of origin to obtain conditional amnesty for them in exchange for written pledges of nonviolence at home and abroad. While controversial, this could significantly reduce these fighters’ resistance to a program of disarmament and subsequently remove threats to Syria’s stability. Success would require regional and international intelligence cooperation with Syrian authorities to assist them in this effort.
Given the widespread presence of armed groups and weapons, prompt disarmament is critical for Syria’s future stability. On December 21, Ahmad al-Shara’a and Syrian faction leaders reportedly agreed to dissolve all armed groups and integrate them into the Ministry of Defense within six months. However, a national-level disarmament plan remains undiscussed and poses immense challenges due to regional variations and local dynamics. The Syrian context may necessitate initiating a disarmament program without delay. The euphoria of victory, coupled with the hope for long-term stability and the exhaustion from years of war, creates a psychological window of opportunity where armed individuals may be more willing to relinquish their weapons. However, as time passes and the benefits expected by those who were part of the struggle fail to materialize, the reluctance to disarm is likely to grow, making the process increasingly difficult.
Therefore, a swift, community-driven disarmament process should replace complex, drawn-out UN procedures. The United Nations and Syria’s authorities must adopt creative approaches to mobilize support for disarmament and reintegration. Success hinges on a two-track strategy: 1) political negotiations for a comprehensive settlement and the creation of an inclusive national council, and 2) robust U.S.-Turkey negotiations to address ongoing clashes between the SDF (supported by Turkey) and SNA (supported by the U.S.). They must also agree on a set of coordinated steps to facilitate a controlled disarmament process. These steps should be supported by guarantees from both Turkey and the U.S., ensuring their commitment to a mutually agreed-upon roadmap for managing the situation between the two groups. Their roadmap should integrate into Syria’s national disarmament strategy.
In this fluid environment with numerous armed actors in control of different areas of Syria, close coordination among regional and international stakeholders is essential to prevent the outbreak of conflict. A high-level coordination group, led by deputy foreign ministers of the key actors in the region and beyond, should meet regularly to ensure consistent dialogue. The United Nations should take the lead in these efforts. Additionally, creating an early warning system to identify and address tensions proactively could help prevent conflicts from escalating further.
The United Nations’ reputation among some Syrians has suffered due to what many describe as inaction or inefficacy in addressing expectations and alleviating their prolonged suffering. This sentiment is particularly strong among individuals directly affected by missing relatives and those who have experienced human rights violations.
However, the call by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, Geir Pedersen, for the conduct of fair and free elections has been welcomed by many. It is essential, though, that the United Nations avoids pushing for a rushed electoral process before adequate institutional capacity and safeguards are in place. The UN's experiences in managing elections in Afghanistan and Libya serve as cautionary tales.
A critical lesson is the importance of resisting the temptation for premature elections. There must be a balance between the urgency for democratically elected leaders and the establishment of robust institutional frameworks that safeguard the integrity of the process. Securing short-term democratic legitimacy, even when the public is eager to exercise their long-denied right to vote, must not come at the cost of long-term institutional credibility and democratic accountability.
Finally, the UN can rebuild trust by collaborating with Syria’s civil society to address past injustices. Empowering local human rights organizations rather than replacing them is vital. Syria’s future social stability depends on strengthening its independent human rights movement, which has already demonstrated remarkable professionalism in documenting abuses during the conflict.
The civil service sector, a cornerstone of Syria’s workforce and economy before the war, must also be prioritized. Overstaffing, low productivity, and corruption plagued the sector under Assad, but restoring its functionality is essential. Paying civil servants promptly will help prevent social unrest, sustain health and education services, and lay the groundwork for broader reforms. The recent decision to increase the salaries of civil servants by 400 percent in the short term is a significant step toward reviving the civil service sector. However, it carries potential long-term fiscal and budgetary risks, particularly if it fosters dependency on aid from regional actors. To ensure sustainability, programs for restructuring, resizing, and revising salary scales must be approached with care. These efforts require comprehensive studies of the sector’s needs, with a primary focus on achieving efficiency in delivering public services. Additionally, adopting a customer-service-oriented approach from the outset could serve as a crucial strategy to address the varied expectations and needs of Syria's ethnically and religiously diverse population effectively. Thoughtful planning and inclusivity will be essential for creating a resilient and effective civil service system.
To achieve this, international contributions should avoid favoritism toward specific factions in charge of regions of Syria. Instead, pooled resources managed by impartial organizations like the UN or World Bank could ensure efficient allocation for salaries and essential services through a balanced national mechanism.
A key aim of all these measures must be stabilizing governance and fostering trust between the population, groups and the transitional authority.
Nader Nadery is a senior fellow at Wilson Center, visiting fellow at Hoover Institutions and associate fellow with the Asser Institute.
