China Unveiled: 30 years of Business Insight with Joerg Wuttke

>> Elizabeth Economy: Welcome to China Considered, a podcast that brings fresh insights and informed discussion to one of the most consequential issues of our time, how China is changing and changing the world. I'm Liz Economy, Hargrove Senior Fellow and co-director of the US-China in the World program at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

Today I have with me, Joerg Wuttke, who is a partner at the consulting firm DGA Albright Stonebridge. But he's also spent more than three decades working in China, most recently as the vice president and chief representative of the powerhouse German chemical company BASF. And for much of that time, he was president of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China.

Joerg, thanks so much for joining me today.

>> Joerg Wuttke: Wonderful to be with you.

>> Elizabeth Economy: So you actually started working in China in 1988 for ABB, a Swiss-Swedish engineering and power company. That was really a pioneering time for multinationals in China. Can you give us a sense of what it was like to be living and working in China during those sort of early years?

>> Joerg Wuttke: Well, it was the best and the worst of all times. It was really pioneering days because 88, I came for the first time in 82. I was there moonlighting a bit in 87 for, at that time, BBC, then later ABB and 88 to June 89 was just fantastic.

I mean, the cultural life was so rich. You had spectacular TV programs. It was very open discussion. Of course, then June 89 happened and the whole house came crashing down. That's why I also left in summer 1990, because business absolutely took a major hit and only recuperated when Deng Xiaoping took his 1992 Southern Tour.

So 88 to 90, it couldn't be more different in these years. But again, you experience a China which was very poor, which was humble, and people were super curious. And that's very different from today. Nobody's humble anymore and few people are curious in China.

>> Elizabeth Economy: But how was it sort of establishing the venture in terms of just setting it up?

And were there rules and regulations? Was there a lot of corruption? What was sort of the business environment for you early on?

>> Joerg Wuttke: It was mostly trading, it was mostly exporting to China, selling into China, very little investment, because the law was not really there. And China was very reluctant to open the door for foreigners.

They felt like foreigners take advantage. Again, the Chinese interlocutors were very inexperienced and the market was very, very small. So ABB, at that time was selling switch yards, everything around a power station, also some train components. And that's what China needed gradually. But of course, it was all about negotiations about payment terms and so forth, investment, in essence, only started in the mid-90s.

>> Elizabeth Economy: Okay, so let's talk about then, sort of moving forward from that late 80s period through to today. What did you see were sort of the major inflection points or shifts in the business environment for multinationals? Were there certain moments in time when things just seem to open up or close down?

How did the environment change, you know, over the course of the sort of three decades or more that you were there?

>> Joerg Wuttke: I left in September 1990. It was grim, depression was really in the economy and in the mindsets of people. Foreigners did not really look at China as a possibility anymore.

It looked all very grim. And I came back in March 93, and of all cities across Shanghai, which at that time was sort of the vanguard in opening up China again, it's all down to one man, Deng Xiaoping. And I recall how I was invited by the mayor to see the Shanghai of the Future.

It was March 93 and it was in a huge warehouse in Pudong. Nothing around it, only mud. And there was an incredible city built out of wood, carved out of wood. And I said to my assistant, let's go. This is crazy, this will never happen. Now of course, not only did it happen, it happened faster than I thought it would be.

And that has never left my mind that actually when the Chinese puts their mind to it, it's going to help, it's going to develop. And that's when actually investment started. China was discussing then in late 90s, the accession to WTO, there was a better legal framework. China actually came out of the Asian financial crisis much better than all the other countries.

Japan took a hit. So in a way, China all of a sudden looked cool and looked much better. Courtesy also that the others actually had really problems. And then of course, nobody looked back until recently, it was just the wild 90s.

>> Elizabeth Economy: And if you had to sort of pick a time that you thought was the most challenging, putting aside Covid, which we want to talk about in a few minutes, was there a moment where you felt like, this is really difficult, this is just not working?

Was there a particular challenge that you faced where you felt like BASF, because by then you were working for BASF, right?

>> Joerg Wuttke: Yeah.

>> Elizabeth Economy: You've left that you felt like, this isn't really going to work for us here?

>> Joerg Wuttke: Well, 89 was really difficult. June 89, we had to withdraw people.

We had to close down construction sites because of the shooting in Beijing. And basically getting these construction sites up and running to negotiate with the Chinese on these situations where we had to catch up, it was really difficult. And I will remember these long night sessions that we had.

So 89 with ABB definitely was the worst period that I negotiated ever in. The second was in 9798 Asian financial crisis, BASF I joined them in late 96, basically decided to have a $3 billion project developed in Nanjing which was incredible. It was basically viewed as are you crazy?

Because the economy around China went down in flames. The market had no real regulations to deal with monster projects like that. And of course a headquarter nervous and the capital markets got very nervous. What are you doing there? And that's when I learned entrepreneurial spirit. The CEO at that time and the Asia board member Mr. Hamreich, who actually employed me in 96, they showed how it is possible in a situation like that to develop a project.

And it worked out. It's now by far one of the most profitable operations that BASF has globally. It's a 50-50 joint venture. Also something interesting, most people say joint ventures never work. So in a way you all of a sudd that if you have a long term vision and if you actually see the fault lines of the economy, the market development, if you hang in there and if you do the right things, invest when nobody's investing, buying cheaper machinery, you actually can get going.

So in a way I'm sure this these days will not repeat themselves anymore, but it is just something about entrepreneurship.

>> Elizabeth Economy: So okay, let's just drill down on that for a minute because you know the investment environment you're suggesting was quite different in China from what maybe you would experience in Germany, for example.

Can you talk a little bit about what that entrepreneurial spirit meant like on the ground, what is it that you had to do to get the venture up and running?

>> Joerg Wuttke: Well, first of all, you had to find the right people. We were lucky to have an empathetic, very, very considerate, along German, an engineer who really had lots of patience.

Lucky to actually have a company that can sort of scan the operations back home, who is a possible person. People underestimate the importance of individuals in situations like that. The second is just to be convinced that basically the market is gonna be there, you just have to hang in there and just do it.

Strategy has to be right, but then also tactics has to be right. And at that time. It was primarily also reaching out to the Chinese leadership. It was our patron at that time was Prime Minister. He looked after BSF, he wanted the project. He came to our headquarter in Germany and we basically then had a gentleman who helped us to find the confidence to do this $3 billion project, while the capital markets actually looked at BSF as if they have lost their marbles.

So in a way, the other one is, of course, to have a joint venture partner that you can trust and trust building takes a long time. You just don't get it right away in particular, not with a state run enterprise. And trust is, again, human to human. It's about the chairman of Sinopec at that time who actually when this whole Sinopec in the Northwest Petrochina was falling apart and then got regrouped, put together.

He came to Germany in order to tell the top management and the stakeholders guys the market is good. So in a way, at the end of the day, it boiled down to people to people that actually got projects going despite very adverse circumstances.

>> Elizabeth Economy: And without saying whether you actually had to pay anybody any bribes, were you approached to sort of pay people off?

We hear a lot about corruption in China and sort of endemic corruption. And obviously, Xi Jinping, current leader has had an ongoing anti corruption campaign, one that seems to have no end even now, 12 years into it. How important was sort of navigating that corruption over the course of your time there?

>> Joerg Wuttke: In the electrical engineering businesses was really difficult for many reasons. This area was quite corrupt in the early 90s in particular. And the second is it was tax deductible in Germany, so it was actually legal. So in a way, that was a dark period it and I will cover it in my forthcoming next year autobiography that I was so happy then to leave that business and go to chemicals, go to a company that never used a single agent.

Staying away from middlemen or middlewomen, it's just trying to have a direct contact with decision makers. And that was kept in the 27 years that I was heading this office in Beijing. Again, you have to have the guts and then also, of course, the systems in order to stay away from these kind of people.

And the system means that you have to have very good compliance teams, you have to good education of your people, because there's always the occasional procurement office corruption scandal. But once it sort of gets into the headsets of people in the government or with business partners, that BSF is not to be bought.

You cannot actually get business. If we pay customers, for example, or if a client's suppliers give us money for these huge projects in order to get favorable treatment, you actually are steering a ship which is in smooth and very nice waters. If you don't do this, you are subject to corruption campaigns to basically fashionable areas where this guy goes out, this guy goes in, and then all of a sudden you have been connected with the wrong person.

So if you stay away from that and you keep it this way, actually, you're pretty in safe hands. It's not easy though. 

>> Elizabeth Economy: So let's fast forward to today or just a year or two ago. Most of us here in the west experienced China's COVID lockdowns, you through news reports or through videos on the Internet.

You lived through COVID in China. Could you talk about the impact on your life, on the life of the international business community? How did it affect your sort of daily life and the sort of life of your business?

>> Joerg Wuttke: Well, I was in two important positions as heading BSF in Beijing, as well as chair of the European Chamber.

So I couldn't just leave the country and then go through two, or three, or four weeks of quarantine to come back again. So I was three years stuck in China and the last year I was stuck in Beijing, I couldn't leave Beijing. And we had a situation where it was emergency upon emergency.

I mean, on the one hand, communication to members of how to navigate that situation. Then on the side, I had to buy 160 million masks for BSF on behalf of Angela Merkel and stuff like that. Every day was nerve wracking in a way. But again, 2020 second part, 2021 was the best year ever in business.

Turnover was incredible, because the world needed electronics and healthcare equipment from China. And then, of course, we went into 2022 and then, of course, Shanghai was setting the stage lockdown and then daily testing. And at the end, it became insane. The kind of effort the Chinese government did in order to actually keep COVID out, though the game has changed with a totally different virus.

I was writing a letter to the Vice Premier Hu Tung Hwa, that got leaked on purpose by the State Council to initiate discussion. And I could sense that there are so many decision makers in the Chinese government that are against zero COVID, but it came from the politburo.

And then at the end, basically, it was policy. And until the 7th of December, it was then basically a country which was under tremendous lockdown. Then it opened the floodgates and you know what happened? Million people possibly died. So it was bizarre. And I think during this process, a lot of psychological damage happened, particularly for people in Shanghai, particular also for the economy.

And it was overlaying also the other challenges that China was facing. A real estate market, which was overblown, was deflated and then crashed, in essence. And then the world doesn't need necessarily all these medical equipment, electronics. So in a way, we came back in 2023, first quarter, and thought, okay, come back story as usual.

There was a brief restocking and then we were on a plateau. Nothing really happened, not in economics, not in politics. In October 2022, this infamous party congress triggered this point that actually reforms are not gonna be around the corner. The leading out of Hu Jintao was the visual about the old days are gone.

And then ever since, China's economy has been limping along. And it's just amazing to see that instead of the past where Chinese government could step in fast and fix it, we are now seeing band aids that are handed out for amputations.

>> Elizabeth Economy: So that's a great visual, band aids for amputations.

So to what do you attribute sort of the failure of the Chinese government to come in and actually just as you say, resolve the issues, clearly they know what the problems are. I mean, many of these problems are long standing. It's not like they're facing new issues. So what do you think is the holdup here?

What's preventing them from taking the kinds of actions that you and I know a number of Western and even Chinese economists have been proposing?

>> Joerg Wuttke: Well, I mean, my position paper, I think the last one I launched in September 2022 was ideology trumps the economy. They're boxed in.

>> Elizabeth Economy: This is a European chamber position.

>> Joerg Wuttke: That's right, that's right. And I made it a point of that they have boxed themselves in. The success story that was justified in 2021 turned out to be a disaster in 2022, but they couldn't change the position on that one.

So they carried on with a policy, which definitely was not fitting that particular virus that was not circulating anywhere in China, but then came like a tsunami across this country. So in a way, it is something where I can sense that the working area there is sub director generals and division chiefs.

Definitely knew that there was something not very well in its development, but at the same time, at the very top, I think it's one of these downsides of having an echo chamber. They believed the propaganda, they believed the data set that they believed is the right situation. So it was all about success, success.

And then at the end, the question is, who is going to talk to the Emperor to say, we have a bit of a problem.

>> Elizabeth Economy: And do you think there's anybody in the leadership that can talk to the Emperor and say, there's a problem, you have no clothes?

>> Joerg Wuttke: Well, it's a group. Yeah, well, it's a group of people that definitely are creating this echo chamber. And it's three or four of them. I would say there are very smart people in the leadership. Definitely in the countryside, in the provinces Chongqing, Shanghai, Xinjiang has great party leaders. But I guess that the system is now so clearly focused on we follow the Xi Jinping line that they don't dare to waver and change from that. The corruption campaign goes on. You never know if that's really because people are corrupt or basically they get pushed aside. So in a way, there is this echo chamber.

It might change in 2027 when the kind of leadership under Xi Jinping might be exchanged with a more open minded generation. Because also keep in mind this leadership is socialized during the Cultural Revolution. And that is something which then will face people that have been studying abroad, speak foreign languages, are technocrats, totally different mindset.

So I hope that in 2027 we see a change.

>> Elizabeth Economy: Okay, so there's also been a kind of drop off, a fairly significant drop off over the past few years in foreign direct investment and foreign venture capital coming into the country. I know that when I traveled to China, a year ago August with the secretary, US Secretary of Commerce, all of the Chinese leaders were saying how much they wanted foreign investment backed.

They were welcoming multinationals. What's your sense for the degree to which the Chinese leadership is prepared to take steps to get multinationals back investing and doing more business in China? Is this a serious sort of issue for them? Are they taking it seriously? Or is this something where they're just kind of saying these things, but they're not really prepared to take the necessary steps?

>> Joerg Wuttke: I noticed a difference in the countryside and in Beijing, the capital, it's in the countryside, people really want to have foreign investment. They go the extra mile in particular cities like Chongqing, for example, Shenyang really was rolling out the red carpet. But there's so much they can do if the policy out of Beijing comes you have to have self reliance.

30% of products in hospitals are supposed to be Chinese brands, not just manufactured goods made in China, but actually domestic brands. It's something which actually really undercuts these efforts of mayors and party secretaries in the countryside. It's a big scheme, it's a big plan that Beijing wants to impose.

And so, yes, there's a lot of Sunday speeches in Boao, China Development Forum. We want more but at the same time we have 6, 8% of all the issues in the European Chamber position paper and hey, we talk about 1000 cases on 430 pages. 6 to 8% are being resolved every year. So the book is swelling and we hear these speeches and the word that came up a couple of years ago, I mentioned that in a press conference, is of promise, fatigue. But the situation has in this far also changed that. If you have a very closed market, very difficult market with a very strong economic growth pattern behind it, you still hang in there and you have a certain optimism.

Now you have a market access problem and an economy which is limping along. And another economy which is less incredibly strong, like the US and like India coming up, all of a sudden you've got choices. And I think that's what some leaders, particularly in the countryside, realize is foreign investors have choices.

And that's why we see less and less in equity investment and less and less in real investment. And when you look into the European dataset, 66% of European investment into China comes from German companies and half of that from three car companies. So in a way, it becomes very top heavy.

And the SMEs are basically putting everything on hold.

>> Elizabeth Economy: Yeah, so what does it take to be successful in this environment? You're painting a pretty bleak picture, which is one I have to say I hear echoed by companies in the United States. And now you're working with US Companies as well.

So I think you're probably hearing the same things. There's a lot of symmetry between what the European Chamber presents in terms of how its companies are feeling about what's going on in China and what the US chamber presents. I've always been struck, frankly over the years by just how closely the percentages match, both in enthusiasm and then lack of enthusiasm.

But I guess I'm just wondering, is there still room to be successful? What is it you talked earlier about, you got to hang in there, have a long term vision. Are those still things that can see companies through or is this a really just a fundamentally different time where companies are just really reevaluating their entire investment?

Sort of thinking around China.

>> Joerg Wuttke: Yeah, what has changed is definitely the economy is not as strong as it used to be. Certainly not 5 and 6 and 7% more. 1 or 2 or 3% at best. Second, you have massive overall capacity. By the way, I covered that topic in 2016 as well as and 2009.

Overcapacity in China is not a bug, it's systemic. And of course then lots of people make lots of stuff, but nobody makes money and it has a deflationary impact that is not very helpful for European investors and companies doing business there. Again, you have self reliance. And on top of it, Chinese companies are just very strong in development, not necessarily in research.

We have incredible leapfrogging in technologies among Chinese machine builders, chemical companies, and then of course the famous electric vehicles. And so what does China offer us now? Well, it offers us pockets of growth, but it still offers us what I would call the China fitness club. It has incredible deep bench of very good engineers.

50 out of 100 top end engineering universities globally are in China. In chemicals, it's about 46 out of 100. So in a way, even if you don't sell in China, you are very well better positioned if you actually manage to develop in China. The other thing is that you learn speed.

Again Germany, it might take 24 months to get stuff out of the lap and in China's 15 months because the customers are more risk savvy and are more demanding. So what we should not underestimate is the fact that even with a very dire economic background, you can still develop a lot of product in China.

You can unlearn how to build cars and you can develop mobile phones on wheels. You can develop chemical sites that are nowhere else to be built but in China, because there are half of the Chinese global customers are there. And the other one is of course the designability.

China has very funky ideas, very good designers. And just if you go to Rockville Montgomery, where I wanted to buy a BMW and the guy said, you're German, you should buy the new 7 Series made in Germany. I said, yeah, it's made in Munich, but it's designed in Shanghai.

>> Elizabeth Economy: So in a way it sounds almost like you're suggesting that Xi Jinping's idea of dual circulation. Is working right? This idea that you can innovate, manufacture and consume largely within China, you're still gonna export, there will be a few areas of import of capital and know how.

But for the most part you're developing an entire market that is sort of designed to produce, to consume within China. Is that, am I getting that right from what you just said?

>> Joerg Wuttke: Well, you have one foot on the gas pedal and the other foot on the brakes.

So in a way his policy actually brings the focus on resources again, the government help. But also helps in order to have the Chinese companies competing based on customer changes at the same time, foot on the brakes. Because it's more and more difficult for Chinese private enterprises to operate here, then you have a brain drain.

You have lots of people, particular Chinese top end engineers leaving China. So in a way the picture generates a lot of smoke and a lot of noise. But as a matter of fact they could do so much better if they would focus again on what they did best from 2000 to 2020 or 2015 is let the Chinese entrepreneurs develop stuff.

So in a way we still see pockets of development, I mean CATL, BYD, FA and so forth. But at the same time you can clearly see where the loans are going, you can clearly see who's going bankrupt. Soes get the money and the private enterprises go belly up.

And that is not what brings you innovation that Xi Jinping wants. And on top of it, it's all about manufacturing, as if China doesn't produce enough already.

>> Elizabeth Economy: So let me just pick up on this last point that you made about the sort of the brain drain because China is experiencing a significant loss of expert in the expert community.

And you are a prime example, someone who left just this summer after so time in China. But I think others too who really had a deep commitment to the country and to the sort of economic opportunities in China. And just this year, last year, all of a sudden there seems to be this exodus of foreigners.

And as you're suggesting of Chinese, is there something in particular that's driving at this moment? Is it just this post Covid sort of realization that this is a difficult time and it's not gonna get better? Or is something else going on that sort of producing this groundswell of people leaving the country?

>> Joerg Wuttke: Well, there were not many people to leave China in the first place. We did a survey in 2021 and showed that there are 60,000 Europeans, including children, living in China. So you could fill the bird's nest and still have space for the Brits. And so in a way, I would say in Guangdong and In Southwest China, 2/3 of expats left also, not only because it fel.

It doesn't have the right system anymore. The hospitals are not up to it. The schools were shrinking, schools in kindergarten, foreign schools, kindergarten were closing. But also, yet the feeling is like it's no fun anymore. China was a lot of fun all the way until Covid and then it became the stifling country that also was approaching everything in your life with surveillance.

So it wasn't that good anymore and you had other choices again other countries were doing quite well, opening up faster, having better economy. And then on top of it, of course, you have Chinese leaving. It might be a trickle, but it's a couple of 10,000 very rich Chinese.

My neighbors in Beijing, one third of the houses was dark at night. Many of them left for Singapore, Thailand, Tokyo or United Emirates because they were fed up, fed up with political surveillance. And secondly also they just wanted to make money elsewhere and not be afraid about common prosperity, that maybe the party that has talked about it is reaching for their pockets.

And these are actually the catalysts in the Chinese economic development that are missing right now. So in a way it's still, it's a rich country when it comes to brain power, but boy, it could do so much better.

>> Elizabeth Economy: It sounds like a lot of self inflicted wounds here from the top leadership.

Okay, so let's just do a quick lightning round. Let me get your take on a few questions, if you had to have one must read book or article on China, aside from all of your excellent EU chamber reports, what would it be?

>> Joerg Wuttke: Besides your own book list, of course.

Yeah okay, thank you. I would say that Kevin Rudd just brought out a fantastic book about Xi Jinping's thinking. It's not an easy read, but he makes it easy for you. You can read the first two or three chapters and the last two or three chapters in between you have to digest a lot of Marxists.

But it is, I think, the best book about where China's coming from and definitely where China's heading. So if you actually are able to deal with political language, then read this book clearly. And the best article is written by my friend from Rhodium, Logan Wright. The article is called Peak China and he clearly lines up where the problems are and that we have to be realistic that China will not bounce back and will basically limp along.

He has a great data set in there. I think these two books are just reality checks. So there are too many people out there who want to see the good news or want to see China cracking and crashing. These two basically are individuals that see China as it is.

And that's why I can recommend these, this book and this article.

>> Elizabeth Economy: Terrific, so what do you miss most, and least about your time in China now that you've been out for. I guess it's been, what, four months or so since you left?

>> Joerg Wuttke: Four months, exactly. So, yeah, well, 35 years was a long time and I was really lucky getting into China when China took off.

And I wouldn't say I left before China lands, but definitely heydays were until I would say 20, 21. I left but I missed the most food, of course, the Chinese cuisine. That is really a challenge in Germany as well as here, despite the fact that you have very good Chinese cooks.

Let's see if Rockwell can swing the needle but the other one is definitely friends. I was back in Beijing in November. I met lots of friends, I was catching up. But it was a strange visit because in a way, I saw my old city again, where I lived more than 32 years, and I was not coming home.

I was on a visit, and I felt like that. And the thing I miss, definitely will not miss, is this surveillance thing. At the end I took it personal that the Financial Times, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, all these print papers came in bits and pieces. And then we had the idea, the FT correspondent, Joe and myself, that maybe we should cover my house.

There's a Weekend edition on House and home where basically he featured me with furniture, but I could actually say what I thought about China. And sure enough, the sensor did not look into the Weekend Edition House and home and there it is.

>> Elizabeth Economy: I'm gonna be looking for that now.

I missed that one. So that sounds great. Okay what China issue do we not know enough about? Like what? What are we missing here outside the country? What don't we really understand about the country?

>> Joerg Wuttke: That the Party is not the country. It's the people. It's the culture, it's the civilization.

Certainly the party has done a lot of good since Deng Xiaoping came into office. But again, it's the people. So read, read novels, read, look at the culture of China, go into museums, visit China, try the food. And don't always think that whatever you hear about China, all this party slang and jargons, that is China, it's much, much more than that.

>> Elizabeth Economy: Completely agree with you. Last question. How likely are we to see a new opening or a breakthrough in EU China relations, particularly with the return of President Trump in the United States? There's a lot of, I think, hope in Beijing that this is going to give a new life to EU China relations.

What are your thoughts?

>> Joerg Wuttke: Well, on a scale to 1 to 10, I give it a 0. I see no chance. Definitely it's first of all, China has little to offer. We can see that in the so called negotiations on these EV tariffs. Second, the mood in Europe has changed.

Ukraine war is to be blamed on that. And then Trump will definitely not give the Germans and the French wiggle room in order to do a separate deal with China. So the relationship in the next four years between Europe and China will be very much under Trump's shadow and let's see how we come out of that.

But certainly I don't expect anything. It's very sad to say. As a European and especially someone who was in a prime position in order to steer business. I still hope that we in Europe remain open to Chinese investment, which is quite different from the United States. I hope that China realizes that it cannot cause a rift between us and the United States, something they are so skillfully trying every year.

But again, I don't know, maybe it's just a moment of depression, but I see no chance.

>> Elizabeth Economy: Okay, well, on that somewhat dark note, let me thank you, but also say I'm very much looking forward to your autobiography. Do you have a title or.

>> Joerg Wuttke: Not yet? Not yet.

In a way it is really covering my parents already as refugees from the eastern part of Germany, growing up in a small village in southwest Germany. And then ending up as chairman as an illustrious guy in Beijing and now even coming to Washington. Sometimes I wonder what happen happen to me.

>> Elizabeth Economy: Well, I can't say, but that we are extremely grateful to have you here in the United States. Jorg, you are a true international asset, I would say so. Thank you for taking the time to speak with me. And I look forward to featuring you again when your book comes out.

>> Joerg Wuttke: Thank you.

>> Elizabeth Economy: If you enjoyed this podcast and want to hear more recent discourse and debate on China. I encourage you to subscribe to China Considered via The Hoover Institution YouTube channel or podcast platform of your choice. In the next episode, we'll be diving into the world of US China technology competition with Jimmy Goodrich, one of the US's leading experts on China's semiconductor industry and technology strategy.