The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders are experts in strategic deception. Dr. Henry Kissinger, America’s primary CCP whisperer for decades, understood this well. He aptly observed that Mao Zedong had “an almost instinctive ability to misdirect his opponent, creating illusions of weakness where the strength lay and vice versa”; and that Zhou Enlai’s brilliance was “in his ability to leave his interlocutors uncertain of his true position, ensuring that China retained the initiative,” and that “China’s intervention in Korea was a masterpiece of strategic deception, executed with precision and patience.” But what explains this CCP strategic wile? Understanding the sources and inner logic for this CCP strategy is crucial for our dealing with the China threat today.
The Chinese Communist Party’s strategic duplicity is profoundly shaped by the fusion of Warring States-era realpolitik with Marxist dialectical thinking. Each of these intellectual traditions brings a unique perspective: Warring States realpolitik emphasizes pragmatism, deception, and unprincipled flexibility, while Marxist dialectical thinking provides a framework for understanding and manipulating contradictions to drive progress. Together, these two perspectives offer the CCP a toolkit of strategies for managing complex and conflicting interests both domestically and internationally, enabling a highly adaptive and multilayered approach to governance that frequently is duplicitous.
The Warring States Period (475–221 BC) taught Chinese leaders that the most effective approach to power was to use deception, exploit weaknesses, and form opportunistic alliances without regard for strict principles or ideological commitments. This period, marked by intense competition and survivalist tactics among rival states, gave rise to a form of realpolitik that valued flexibility and strategic ambiguity as essential to statecraft. In the CCP’s strategy, this ancient pragmatic thinking complements Marxist dialectical principles, which view contradictions as inherent to social and political life and as engines for change.
In practice, this means the CCP can hold contradictory positions—appearing committed to ideological principles while adapting to practical needs—without seeing these contradictions as weaknesses. For example, China’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics” combines market practices with socialist rhetoric, a synthesis that seems paradoxical but is framed as necessary for China’s progress. This synthesis is possible because dialectical thinking allows the CCP to see capitalism and socialism not as irreconcilable, but as forces that can coexist within a managed contradiction, which the Warring States tradition further allows them to exploit through unprincipled pragmatism.
The CCP’s duplicitous approach to international relations is a clear example of how these two traditions combine to support strategic duplicity. From a Warring States realpolitik perspective, China pursues alliances and economic partnerships that serve its immediate goals, even if these partnerships may be temporary or inherently contradictory. For instance, China maintains economic relationships with Western nations, benefiting from global trade and investment––while simultaneously acts contradictorily to the foundational principles of the Western free market system, aligning itself with states that challenge Western influence, such as Russia and North Korea. This duality is made coherent through dialectical thinking, which interprets these contradictions as part of a larger strategic progression toward a more favorable world order.
Dialectical thinking further justifies China’s contradictory alliances by framing them as temporary stages in a long-term historical process. Marxist dialectic views history as a progression driven by class struggle and competing interests, with contradictions inevitably leading to change. From this perspective, China’s engagement with Western economies is seen not as an ideological compromise but as a necessary step in China’s development—a stage that can eventually give way to a more dominant position where China could assert its ideological preferences more openly. Warring States realpolitik, with its emphasis on strategic patience and shifting alliances, provides the tactical means for executing this long-term dialectical strategy through pragmatic, often deceptive diplomacy.
In its domestic policies, the CCP’s strategic duplicity is equally informed by this combination of Warring States pragmatism and Marxist dialectics. The CCP enforces strict ideological loyalty through a centralized, authoritarian system, but it also demonstrates flexibility and adaptability in response to internal pressures. Warring States principles emphasize maintaining control through deception, loyalty management, and exploitation of rivalries, which is evident in the CCP’s handling of internal dissent and factionalism. The Party often engages in campaigns that appear to reinforce ideological purity, such as anti-corruption purges, while also allowing for varying degrees of internal debate and “self-criticism” when it serves the Party’s stability and cohesion.
Dialectical thinking enables the CCP to interpret internal challenges as contradictions that must be carefully managed rather than eliminated outright. For instance, while the CCP publicly stresses unity and adherence to socialist principles, it tolerates certain capitalist elements, such as non-state enterprise, to drive economic growth. This seemingly contradictory stance is framed dialectically: it allows for an economic contradiction that the Party claims will ultimately synthesize into a stronger socialist foundation. Meanwhile, Warring States thinking allows the CCP to employ deceptive measures—such as staged self-criticism campaigns or the selective disciplining of officials—to create an appearance of ideological unity while retaining flexibility in governance.
In contentious issues like Taiwan or the South China Sea, the CCP’s dual influences from Warring States realpolitik and Marxist dialectics is particularly evident. Warring States strategies encourage the CCP to engage in strategic patience, presenting one narrative to the world while gradually advancing its objectives in ways that do not provoke immediate confrontation. For instance, China publicly asserts a desire for peaceful reunification with Taiwan while building military capabilities and establishing economic dependencies that increase its leverage over the region. This patient, incremental approach reflects the Warring States emphasis on long-term positioning through deception and indirect influence.
From a dialectical perspective, these actions are viewed as a necessary resolution of the contradiction between China’s current strength and its desire for a unified territory. Dialectical thinking suggests that, over time, these gradual actions will shift the balance of forces, making reunification increasingly viable under China’s terms. The synthesis of Warring States tactics and dialectical thinking, therefore, produces a strategy that uses ambiguity and duplicity to achieve incremental progress on sensitive issues without triggering outright conflict.
The combination of Warring States realpolitik and Marxist dialectical thinking underpins the CCP’s strategic duplicity by providing both a tactical and ideological framework for handling contradictions. Warring States principles offer a blueprint for opportunism, deception, and shifting alliances, while dialectical thinking provides a theoretical justification for managing contradictions over time, portraying apparent paradoxes as steps in a broader historical process. Together, these influences enable the CCP to maintain flexibility, conceal intentions, and manage competing forces without sacrificing its long-term objectives.
In this hybrid approach, the CCP’s duplicity is not a mere tactic but a calculated, theoretically grounded strategy. This synthesis has become a defining characteristic of modern Chinese statecraft, enabling the CCP to adapt dynamically to a complex world while advancing its power and preserving its rule.
