Introduction
The era of Great Power competition and confrontation has returned. The United States and its Western friends and allies face an increasingly hostile and assertive alliance of The People’s Republic of China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and their surrogates. The danger of direct military confrontation with these belligerent forces is significant and growing.
To protect America and American interests in this dangerous era, the U.S. military must be capable of decisively defeating modern, well resourced, very capable adversaries. Equally important, the U.S. military must be seen by likely enemies to be capable of decisively defeating any adversary, thereby deterring aggression and preventing war.
To be judged capable of defeating armed aggression, U.S. military forces must demonstrate an ability to apply military power around the globe in ways that adversaries can neither match nor endure. To do this, the U.S. force must transform. It must transform what it fights with, how it fights, and how it organizes to fight. A key part of this transformation will be using newly proven and still emerging technologies in ways that generate orders of magnitude more combat power than does today’s force.
An essential part of this transformation must be making the nation’s Army much more lethal, sustainable, and rapidly deployable than it is today. A key to achieving that objective is to make fundamental changes to the Army’s principal source of lethal combat power—the Field Artillery—and radically rethink its role in land combat.
Radically Rethinking Field Artillery in Modern Combat
U.S. land combat is predominately executed by Combined Arms Teams which combine infantry, armor, artillery, and aviation elements to accomplish specific missions. These teams “Fire and Maneuver” to win tactical engagements and battles large and small; i.e., they maneuver to deliver lethal fire against enemy forces, and they deliver lethal fires to create opportunities to maneuver.
This “Fire and Maneuver” construct is the foundation of U.S. ground combat. The number and nature of “Fire and Maneuver” options available to Combined Arms Teams are largely determined by how precise and accurate or imprecise and inaccurate the team's Field Artillery fire is—and conventional Field Artillery is woefully imprecise.
The mainstay of U.S. Field Artillery is cannon fire which mainly consists of exploding 155-millimeter projectiles. Fired at maximum ranges, conventional cannon artillery has a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of more than 250 meters.[1] As shown in Figure 1, CEP is the distance from a target at which 50% of fired rounds will land beyond, and 50% will land inside of the intended target.
Figure 1
This CEP of 250 meters is five times the 50-meter kill radius of standard U.S. 155 mm projectiles.[2] In practical terms, this means that every conventional round fired has a greater than 50% chance of landing too far from its target to kill or damage it. In fact, only 25% of rounds fired will land within 100 meters of a targeted aim point; fewer still will land within 50 meters—about 12.5%.[3]
This lack of precision is not due to human error. It simply reflects inaccuracies inherent in shooting unguided projectiles 20-plus miles through constantly changing weather conditions into varying terrain––from weapons systems whose performance characteristics change with every round fired. Simply put, the standard Field Artillery system used today is too inaccurate to rapidly deliver the precise, deadly fires that modern ground combat requires.
Figure 2
Figure 2 shows a standard dispersion pattern for cannon artillery. As seen, a small minority of rounds impact close to the target, with only about 12.5% of rounds landing close enough to seriously damage or destroy the target being engaged.[4]
Field Artillery in Modern Combat
Despite its inherent imprecision and large dispersion patterns, history teaches, and modern conflicts confirm that Field Artillery is very often the decisive element in ground combat at all levels of war. In the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, Field Artillery fires routinely decide the outcome of small unit engagements, large scale tactical fights, operational level battles, and strategic outcomes.
Russia–Ukraine also confirms that conventional cannon fires are rarely rapid and accurate enough to decide fights quickly. Instead, reliance on conventional cannon artillery to decide engagements and battles is a recipe for battlefield stalemate and for sliding into wars of attrition and exhaustion. These are exactly the types of wars the United States seeks to avoid.[5]
The Army's Transformation Mandate
For a decade, Army leadership has mandated that transforming how the Army fights is an urgent, non-negotiable priority. But the Army hasn’t met this mandate. While there have been significant technological innovations, a review of the most recent doctrinal publications shows that the Army operates essentially the same way it did 40 years ago. It organizes in roughly the same way and employs the nearly same operational doctrine.[6] Most technical advances have been appliquéd onto longstanding structures and tactics. And as Theodore Tropp and others note, militaries that simply insert new technologies onto existing force structures and doctrines do worse than fail to capitalize on the battlefield potential these new technologies promise. They actually diminish the operational dexterity and power of the formations using them.[7]
One enterprise the Army can undertake immediately to achieve its mandated transformation is radically rearm, reorganize, and redoctrine the Field Artillery, especially cannon artillery.
Precise Cannon Artillery
The U.S. Army has already developed and fielded artillery weaponry that can dramatically improve the speed and power with which Combined Arms Teams engage enemy forces, and help achieve the transformational advantages required to prevail in 21st Century warfare.
Two examples of this weaponry are the M982 Excalibur artillery round and the M1156 Precision Guidance Kit (PGK). These two developments eliminate cannon artillery’s imprecision/dispersion problems.
Fired at its maximum range of 22 miles, the Excalibur has a CEP of 4 meters and has a greater than 95% probability of detonating within 10 meters of a designated target.[8] Artillery rounds fitted with the PGK and fired at maximum range of 20 miles have a CEP of 50 meters.[9] The battlefield consequences of this improvement in accuracy are potentially revolutionary. A Combined Arms Team that uses Excalibur ammunition can bring accurate, deadly fires to bear at unprecedented speed with unprecedented combat efficiency.
Consider, for example, an attack against an enemy platoon of about 30 soldiers. Figure 3 illustrates:
Figure 3
Using conventional artillery ammunition, a Field Artillery unit would need to fire 43 rounds (4,800 lbs.) of ammunition to have a 57% probability of destroying an enemy platoon. The engagement would take about 30 minutes and require at least 6 howitzers and 34 soldiers. Firing Excalibur, that same artillery unit would have a 95% probability of destroying that platoon by firing just 3 rounds (324 lbs.) from one gun, requiring 5 soldiers.
The operational and logistical impacts of this improved capability can be enormous. Operational impacts will most likely be realized in terms of increased operating speed and the enemy’s morale destruction. A unit that can threaten an enemy's destruction 10-fold faster than is currently possible gains decisive physical and psychological advantages over that enemy.
“Speed Kills” is an adage that speaks to the decisive impact of being able to repeatedly start and complete a tactical cycle or multiple tactical cycles faster than one's enemy. Being able to constantly outpace one’s enemy with deadly fires and disorienting maneuver generates a battlefield confusion that leads to cascading degradation of the enemy’s ability to fight. All our likely adversaries speak to the decisive advantages that superior battlefield speed generates. For example, China’s new operational doctrine declares that war is a contest of “speed (and)… combat efficiency.”[10] Precision artillery ammunition creates an ability to generate operating speed and battlefield agility that current indications show China’s People’s Liberation Army and other modern forces will almost certainly be unable to match.
The logistical impact of precision artillery is equally important. In Figure 3’s platoon scenario, the U.S. Combined Arms Team destroyed an enemy unit using only 7% of the amount of conventional artillery required. Furthermore, the enemy’s destruction required only 16% of the number of howitzers, 15% of the soldiers, etc.
At the small tactical level, this battlefield “savings” is locally important. At the operational and strategic levels, it will likely be decisive. It’s a near certainty that U.S. ground combat operations will be expeditionary in nature and take place on foreign shores. Thus, every instrument of war and soldier required to prosecute an overseas fight must be transported into the theater. This creates SLOC (Sea Lines of Communications) vulnerabilities, port vulnerabilities, Ammunition Depot vulnerabilities, Main Supply Route vulnerabilities on land, etc. Every tool that helps reduce logistics vulnerabilities that must exist throughout a theater of war can be decisive in increasing theater and national strategic force options.
Data from the Russia–Ukraine war illustrate these points. Thus far, both sides of the conflict fired—and continue to fire—incredible amounts of cannon artillery. Russia has fired 20 million artillery rounds while Ukraine has fired over 10 million. In tonnage, that’s 1.25 million tons of artillery for the Russians and 620,000 tons for the Ukrainians.[11]
But that’s only a part of the logistics bill that relying on conventional artillery creates. Artillery tubes wear out and must be replaced at a fairly rapid rate. Cannon tubes last about 2,500 rounds.[12] This means that in 2½ years Russia has had to replace about 10,000 artillery tubes and Ukraine 5,000. These are just parts of a logistics burden imposed by the requirement to field, sustain, and maintain Field Artillery systems that consume 3,000,000 rounds per year and more.[13]
The logistics burden of relying on, but being unable to produce sufficient conventional artillery ammunition has translated into several periods of operational paralysis.
The Operational Penalty of Imprecision
Consuming colossal amounts of artillery ammunition has substantially dictated the tactical, operational, and strategic pace and nature of the Russia–Ukraine war.
Forces which rely on massed artillery fires operate only as fast as their ability to position howitzers, establish local ammunition distribution points, and position ammunition haulers and other support. At the tactical level, this imposes a slow and deliberate pace which creates multiple opportunities to disrupt preparation and execution.
At operational levels, where major battles and campaigns are conducted, the requirement to position large ammunition stockpiles has severely limited both sides’ ability to shift rapidly from defense to offense or exploit breakthroughs or other opportunities. Feeding their insatiable demand for artillery ammunition has cost both Russia and Ukraine major opportunities.[14]
Strategically, options have been severely restricted by an inability to replenish artillery ammunition stocks. Russia purchases from North Korea, China, etc. Ukraine’s ability to stay in the fight and wage a defense is determined by their ability or inability to persuade supporters and allies to meet Ukraine’s almost bottomless demand for artillery ammunition.[15]
At key junctures Russia and Ukraine both became partially paralyzed by artillery ammunition shortages. And rather than exploiting narrow windows of opportunity to attack and finish an exhausted opponent, they were forced to resort to defensive stalls while awaiting replenishment.[16]
As already noted, switching from conventional “dumb” artillery rounds to precision ones creates opportunities to reduce all of these ammunition driven drags by orders of magnitude.
Reorganizing and Redoctrining
To fully capitalize on precision artillery’s revolutionary potential, the U.S. Army should begin experimenting with dramatic changes to its organizational structure. For example, it’s entirely reasonable to explore eliminating Field Artillery as a separate Army branch—especially cannon artillery.
If a single howitzer with a crew of 5 firing precision ammunition can deliver more destructive power than an entire howitzer battery of 6 guns, the need for the howitzer unit is probably outdated. The ideal would be to make a cannon an organic part of an Infantry or Armor battalion. This would be similar to battalion and company level mortars which are organic components of Infantry and Armor units.
The logic continues that if Field Artillery company sized units (batteries) are obsolete, there is likely no need for their parent battalions. If individual cannons can fire at unprecedented speed with unprecedented precision, and generate unprecedented destruction, while maintaining unprecedented levels of safety for friendly forces near a targeted area, it is entirely reasonable to contend that the demanding staff work required to integrate artillery fires into a scheme of “Fire and Maneuver” is no longer required. Advances in Information Processing have given company level units the ability to manage information loads that previously required full Fire Support Coordination staffs, and the Army should explore capitalizing on that development.[17]
Transferring cannon artillery’s combat capability to Infantry and Armor units is consistent with the Army’s futures concepts which advocate that to the maximum extent feasible, required combat assets should be integral elements of the formations most likely to employ them.[18]
Eliminating cannon artillery as a separate Army branch may very likely offer great opportunity to divert monies and other resources that are now spent maintaining what increasingly appears to be an obsolete organizational structure. Twenty-five thousand to 35,000 soldier slots might be transferrable to other combat arms branches. Likewise, the funds spent to acquire cannon battalions could be diverted to efforts that would accelerate and broaden the Army’s required transformation.
The Problem with Precision Artillery
Skeptics will rightly claim that precision munitions like Excalibur require communicating with a GPS constellation, and that communication links are fragile and susceptible to disruption. They are correct. In fact, the Ukrainian Army has essentially stopped using Excalibur rounds because their kill rate fell to a low of 10% due to Russian GPS jamming and other measures. But that does not mean that precision artillery is perpetually doomed.
It is the nature of war that every new system and operating method will be forcefully countered—especially if they prove successful. It is also the nature of war that every counter can be counteracted—especially if the value of the operating system or method is of high value. Precision artillery is that high value system. In fact, the U.S. and others are developing and beginning to field counter-counter measures that will enable Excalibur and PGK to operate as designed and required. Measure, Countermeasure, Counter-Countermeasure are normal unavoidable steps in fielding and exploiting new technologies.[19] Effective Russian countering of Excalibur and other precision rounds is temporary, and definitely not disqualifying.
Furthermore, every military asset brings vulnerabilities to a fight. In the case of conventional artillery ammunition, the vulnerability is tied to the requirement to produce, transport, store, position, reposition, and secure tens of thousands of tons of explosive, very dangerous ammunition.
Skeptics will also rightly contend that Excalibur rounds are incredibly expensive compared to conventional ammunition. Again, they are right. Excalibur currently costs about $100,000 per shell. Conventional ammunition costs around $3,000 per shell. But these cost differences don’t accurately reflect the cost of killing an enemy soldier or destroying their equipment. Taking into account the full system cost of destroying an enemy asset, the conventional shell cost soars to over $350,000 per enemy platoon or communications van or radar, etc. The full system cost to destroy those same assets with precision ammunition is roughly the same.[20]
Bottom Line
The United States Army stands at a crossroad. It has a clear requirement and directed mandate to transform the way it fights. Meeting that mandate cannot be accomplished by inserting new technologies into existing organizations and operating doctrines. To capitalize on the extraordinary potential offered by new weapons and support systems, the Army must explore dramatic, even radical changes to how it fights and how it organizes to fight. It should begin with radically rethinking the Field Artillery.
Mike Combest is a retired U.S. soldier—and Field Artilleryman. He served on active duty for 32 years, with assignments to every type of cannon artillery unit the Army had. While on active duty, Mr. Combest served at every tactical unit level from Platoon to Field Army; his staff assignments ranged from battalion level to Headquarters NATO and Department of the Army. Mr. Combest has been assigned and deployed as an artilleryman to every continent minus Antarctica. His military education includes the United States Military Academy, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, and the U.S. Army War College. He and his family currently reside in North Carolina.
[1] LTC Mike Milner, “Precision Strike Association Excalibur Overview,” Slide No. 6.
[2] David Hambling, “U.S. Marines Test Ultra-Destructive New Artillery Round,” Forbes (February 22, 2021).
[3] Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery (U.S. Army Field Manual 6-40) (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, U.S. Marine Corps, April 23, 1996), Paragraph 3-5b. Note: Figure 3 is derived from Figure 3-9 from Paragraph 3-5b.
[4] M. R. Brady and P. Goethals, “A comparative analysis of contemporary 155 mm artillery projectiles” Journal of Defense Analytics and Logistics Vol. 3 No. 2 (October 4, 2019), 181–185. Also see David W. Webb, “Circular Probable Error for Circular and Noncircular Gaussian Impacts,” Army Research Laboratory MR-830 (September 2012) 2–5.
[5] Gen. James C. McConville, “Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict,” Chief of Staff Paper #1, Unclassified Version (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 16 March 2021), 1–2.
[6] Compare U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, “Operations” dated October 1, 2022, and U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, “Operations” dated May 5, 1986. Also compare U.S. Army Field Manual 3-90, “Tactics” with U.S. Army Field Manual 7-30 “Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized Division Brigades.”
[7] Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, “Comparative Analysis of Historical Studies” Annex Volume III, “Historical Trends Related to Weapon Lethality: A Report prepared for the Advanced Tactics Project of the Combat Developments Command, Headquarters US Army, under Contract No. DA 30-069-AMC-647(X)” (October 15, 1964), A1–A4.
[8] M. R. Brady and P. Goethals, “A comparative analysis of contemporary 155 mm artillery projectiles” Journal of Defense Analytics and Logistics Vol. 3 No. 2 (October 4, 2019), 176-178.
[9]FY14 Army Programs: Precision Guidance Kit [https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2014/army/2014pgk.pdf?ver=2019-08-22-110521-283]( PGK), 135 and 136.
[10] Timothy Thomas, “The Chinese Way of War: How Has it Changed?” (McLean, VA: The Mitre Corporation, June 2020), 16.
[11] David Axe, “Just three weapons will turn the Ukraine war back around. And the USA is back in the fight.” The Telegraph (March 27, 2024). Note artillery ammunition expenditures vary widely among reliable sources. The 20 million figure cited for Russia and the 10 million for Ukraine reflect an average of multiple sites. Also note that artillery consumption ebbs and flows. The 20 million and 10 million figures reflect changing daily/weekly firing averages.
[12] Alexander Grinberg, “Glass Cannons from Grozny to Mariupol: What Should the U.S. Military Learn from Russia’s Use of Artillery in Protracted Urban Sieges?” Modern War Institute at West Point (February 13, 2023). The 20 million figure cited for Russia and the 10 million for Ukraine reflect an average of multiple sites. Also note that artillery consumption ebbs and flows. The 20 million and 10 million figures reflect changing daily/weekly firing averages.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Abdujalil Abdurasulov “Ukraine war: Shell shortages force us to limit firing, Ukrainian troops tell BBC,” BBC (December 14, 2023). Also see Institute for the Study of War chronological updates. The operational stalling pattern emerges from matching reported ammunition shortages with changes in reported operational types and tempo.
[15] For an example of Ukraine’s reliance on allies to meet its artillery ammunition demands, see U.S. State Department Fact Sheet dated August 9, 2024: “U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine”. See Richard Engel, Charlotte Gardiner, Lelia Sackur, and Mirna Alsharif, “Zelenskyy says Ukraine needs weapons from allies to continue defense against Russia,” NBC News (February 25, 2024); also see: Stephen Grey, John Shiffman, and Allison Martell, “Years of miscalculations by U.S., NATO led to dire shell shortage in Ukraine,” Reuters (July 19, 2024).
[16] See above note 14.
[17] See U.S. Army Futures Command, “The Fiscal Year 2021 Future Study Program: Character of Warfare 2035 Seminar Report” (U.S. Army Futures and Concepts Center Future Warfare Division, January 29, 2021), 6–9. Also see Col. H. D. Tunnell IV, “Command Post Automation,” Military Review (September–October 2022).
[18] U.S. Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1: The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, (December 6, 2018), xi, 19, 44.
[19] Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, “Comparative Analysis of Historical Studies” Annex Volume III, “Historical Trends Related to Weapon Lethality: A Report prepared for the Advanced Tactics Project of the Combat Developments Command, Headquarters US Army, under Contract No. DA 30-069-AMC-647(X)” (October 15, 1964), III-B-1, 2, and 3. Also see Leo Chiu and Christopher Stewart, “ANALYSIS: Off Target—Are Kyiv’s GPS-Aided Weapons Susceptible to Kremlin EW Jamming?” Kyiv Post (May 29, 2024).
[20] Michael Peck, “The cost of key US weapons like artillery shells for Ukraine is soaring,” Business Insider (May 26 2024). This couples with calculating the cost to shoot 43 conventional rounds; deploy, field, sustain, and maintain 6 armored howitzers, Ammunition Support Vehicles, etc.
