Turkish President Recep Erdogan is hardly what his fellow NATO leaders would call a loyal ally. Although Turkey has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since 1952, under Erdogan’s leadership it has edged closer to Russia in recent years. In 2017, Turkey placed an order for Russian S-400 surface to air missiles, resulting in suspension from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program and U.S. sanctions against the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries, a civil institution that manages the acquisition of military equipment. In 2019, Turkish forces invaded northern Syria to strike at the Syrian Democratic Forces, an ally of the United States in the war against ISIS but which Erdogan’s government claims is affiliated with the Kurdistan People’s Congress (KGK—formerly the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, or PKK), a terrorist group that has been at war with Ankara since 1984. This action led to further U.S., Canadian, and European Union sanctions and an arms embargo against Turkey. Since the start of the Ukraine War, more than 150,000 Russians have flooded Turkey and many have opened businesses there, giving a distinct Russian tint to Turkey’s larger cities. Turkey has become an economic and financial refuge for Russia, an essential outlet to the rest of the world as U.S. and European sanctions begin to bite deeply.
Geography explains why Turkey has survived as a NATO member despite its precarious balancing act. It is the critical bridge between the Middle East and Europe. The Bosporus and Dardanelles straits connect the Black Sea with the Mediterranean. Turkey borders Syria, Iraq, and Iran to the south; Armenia and Georgia to the east; Ukraine and Russia (across the Black Sea) to the north; and Bulgaria and Greece to the west. Hotspots abound on its borders; Turkey and Greece share little affinity for one another despite belonging to the same military alliance. Turkey is positioned in a dangerous neighborhood, which offers its leaders both challenges and opportunities.
The Ukraine War shows this tension in stark relief. Turkey has armed Ukraine with Bayraktar TB2 drones, while ameliorating economic conditions on both sides of the conflict by negotiating a deal to allow Ukrainian grain to transit into the Mediterranean and by purchasing Russian oil and gas, albeit at a deep discount. On the other hand, Turkey delayed the entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO, playing hardball in an effort to force the Nordic countries to crack down on KGK/PKK emigres who live in the two states and prying F-16 fighters out of the Biden administration (to replace the cancelled F-35 contract). Playing hardball against the rest of NATO also burnished Erdogan’s nationalist credentials and helped him win a tough election in May.
While he remains in power, Erdogan will continue to execute a difficult balancing act to squeeze the most he can from all the players in the region. But Turkey’s relationship with NATO, the EU, and the United States offers significantly more than its relationship with Russia. Although Ankara can be a difficult partner, for the foreseeable future Turkey will remain tied, however precariously, to the West.
