The Enduring U.S. - Taiwan Partnership

>> Admiral Ellis: Good afternoon and welcome to this webinar. It's our honor and privilege today to welcome Bi-khim Hsiao, Taiwan's senior diplomat and representative in the United States. She assumed the position in July of 2020 and prior to that was a senior advisor to the president at the National Security Council of Taiwan.

And she remains, as we all know, a trusted confidant of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen. In fact, Representative reminded me that we last met at dinner at the president's home during our visit to Taiwan in August of last year, she served four terms in the Taiwan legislature, representing overseas citizens and then the constituents of Taipei City and Wylan county through different terms.

For many years, she was a ranking member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and previously the chair of the USA Caucus on the Legislative allum. Today's event is organized under the project of Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific region, which is also subordinate to the Global Policy and Strategy Initiative, which we have renamed from the former national security venue that it was known as before.

The GPS initiative uses the initials of our long ago mentored former Secretary of State George P Shultz. And that's intentional because one of the things that Secretary Shultz used to remind us of was the value of trust. And in fact, trust, he said, was the coin of the realm in any discussion or conversation.

And certainly our guest today, though a recent piece in the New York Times reminds us that she can't use the word diplomat on her license plate in Washington, is described as one of the most effective of that genre in Washington, DC. I recently returned from the Indo Pacific, and it was reminding, I reminded myself on the airplane as I reviewed and prepared for today's event that this is a critical time, not just in the Indo Pacific but around the world.

We're seeing a resurgence of overt nationalism, the actions of despots that are taking place in places like Ukraine, and a general rise in tensions around the world. But as I walked the Auckland, New Zealand waterfront a couple of weeks ago, I stumbled across, as I like, to some of the historical monuments in any town that I visit.

And there was one to those from the Auckland services on the waterfront that had lost their lives in World War I. And at the bottom of that was a quotation that says a country which defends its liberties in the face of tyranny commands the respect of all such a country does not perish.

I think that's appropriately and apt as we think about today's conversations about the tensions that we see in the region and certainly around Taiwan specifically. It's a great privilege to have the representative be Bi-khim Hsiao with us today. And I would like offer her an opportunity to make a few comments, and then the floor will be open to a conversation shared by all of us.

So thank you very much and welcome.

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Thank you. Well, thank you, Admiral Ellis and all of you here for this opportunity to engage in discussion with the faculty and outstanding students of Stanford. I think the last time I was here was at least 20 years ago. I think it was in the year 2000, when Taiwan just had our first ever transition through elections.

And we were in a transition period. And since it was the first time ever, nobody had experience in what transitions were about in a modern democracy. And my good friend of a long time, Larry Dimon, invited me here to have some engaging conversations with some scholars and practitioners who did have some experience in transitions on all parts.

So that's 23 years ago now, but glad to be back and to have this opportunity. I think today I just say I'm not prepared. I know this is an academic setting. I'm not prepared to do any lecturing, but I wanted to just say a few words about the Taiwan us relationship and our priorities in forging this partnership.

And then I'd be open to having some interacting discussions with all of you. The Taiwan-US partnership, there's so much happening in our relationship, but I'd like to talk about it in three general categories. The first is our security partnership. The second part of it is our economic relationship.

And the third part involves our broader international engagements and Taiwan's desire to be more involved in the international community and have that space on the security front. There have been some recent watershed moments that have defined a greater urgency in our society about the need to invest more in our own security.

One of the first was, I think, Hong Kong, the deprivation of basic rights in Hong Kong, especially in a context in which the PRC government had used Hong Kong as a formula, as a model for what they had in mind for Taiwan, the so called one country, two systems formula.

But violation of the longer term commitment to maintaining the basic political freedoms in Hong Kong and deprivation of some of those rights has a very strong impact in our society. And I think the second watershed moment has been the tragic, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. A year ago, we in Taiwan didn't imagine that our futures, our fate, would be so linked to Ukraine.

But I think that has also highlighted the danger of authoritarian closed regimes or closed decision making leaders who are determined to use force to achieve personal legacies. And that has tragic consequences on the civilians and people of all parties involved. But I think it has also generated a very strong sense of urgency in our society that while we seek peace we never want to see the tragedy of Ukraine from being repeated in Taiwan.

But at the same time we need to be better prepared for a worst case scenario. So the third part of the watershed, I talk about these in moments but it's an ongoing process. I think the way we have observed the enclosing restrictive leadership space in China, the party Congress, the dramatic removal of any dissenters in the public policy space inside China, handling Covid.

The very dramatic U-turn and Covid restrictions and then the opening process, that, I think has demonstrated to us again reminding us the importance of having that basic right to the freedom of speech in a public policy process. And the fact that China's space for free speech is becoming more and more suffocating and restrictive towards its own people, I think is also quite alarming to the people of Taiwan.

So we are determined to strengthen our security. Our partnership with the United States is critical to that. The United States support for Taiwan self defense is enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act and the six commitments of George Shultz era of diplomacy, and the former California president, Reagan. But the Taiwan Relations Act is unique in itself.

It's a partnership. It's an international partnership that's governed by domestic law, and that is also a very unique characteristic of the relationship between Taiwan and the United States. But it does create some parameters and space for security cooperation. I am not talking about many details of that cooperation here, but just to say that it is deep and we are certainly expanding in the opportunities to fortify Taiwan's self defenses.

The second part of our broader relationship involves economic and commercial investment trade partnership. And we just concluded a very meaningful round of trade negotiations with USTR, and hoping that these negotiations will lead to a broader bilateral trade agreement. The USTR at this moment is not seeking trade promotion authority, and this is not specific to Taiwan.

I think it's a function of the broader american public attitude towards international trade agreements and views on how that affects the domestic american economy. But we welcome the USTR's initiative that they call Initiative on 21st Century Trade, a long name for this agreement. We are addressing many areas including labor rights, the environmental standards, digital economy, anti-corruption, SME's trade facilitation.

Agriculture, that's always a sticking point in trade negotiations, and many areas of interest. So it will be rather comprehensive, although we'd look forward to opportunities to further expand on that. In addition to the trade relationship, we are engaged with the US through an annual economic prosperity partnership dialogue with the State Department and multiple agencies in Taiwan.

And we have addressed some of the economic strategic questions like supply chain security, investment screening, energy security, collaboration, and cultivating talent needed in the future of industry. Many areas of mutual interest. Another part of our relationship involves mutual investments. American companies have a sizable presence in Taiwan and are continuing to expand their investments in Taiwan, especially in the field of technology, acknowledging Taiwan's exceptional record of very effective, efficient, and competitive manufacturing in technology,.

I strongly believe that Taiwan and the US are force multipliers in terms of putting our talent, our resources, our technologies together to advance human progress instead of using technologies as a tool of control over our citizens. And so it is, I think, paramount that we work among like minded partners to strengthen and deepen those economic ties, which is what we are doing now.

On the investment front, one of Taiwan's most important companies, TSMC, a chip manufacturing company, just announced that it will expand their investment in the United States, Arizona specifically, to a $40 billion manufacturing facility. And once that goes through it, most likely for a short period of time, will be the largest ever foreign investment in the United States.

So it is significant in its own right. But I think it also demonstrates the continuing collaboration, mutually beneficial support, as Taiwan seeks to expand the global footprint of our manufacturing capabilities and contribute to reliable supply chains on a global level. On the third category, that is the broader space that we desire for Taiwan's international participation.

It's very broad. We will be continuing our work on education initiatives. We have some projects with. With Stanford, with a number of american institutions, but we'd like to further deepen that. A lot of my colleagues in government in Taiwan have been beneficiaries, like me, of a good american education.

And we seek to offer Taiwan as a destination for studying Mandarin or for learning about Asia and also technology in an environment that is also equally respectful of academic freedom as you cherish here in the United States. Other areas of involvement, public health. Taiwan continues to seek participation in international organizations such as the World Health Organization and other organizations like ICAO, which involve civil aviation, safety, and Interpol, which involves transnational collaboration and fighting crime.

We intend to continue to be a force for good and are grateful for the consistent United States support for Taiwan's international participation. Where international organizations remain restrictive of Taiwan's formal status and involvement, the US and Taiwan have collaborated to establish what we call GCTF platform, global cooperation and training framework.

Thank you. It's been a long day.

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Well, GCTF is a platform where we collaborate on a series of global issues where Taiwan can contribute meaningfully as a force for good in public health, in women's empowerment, in digital economy, SMEs and climate resilience. We've held a series of activities and workshops around the world, and in recent years, we've welcomed the addition of Australia and Japan as partners in GCTF, where we are able to collaborate internationally as a way of sharing Taiwan's experience, but also in helping Taiwan gain knowledge and experience from other partners around the world.

So we continue to look for space there. And we're grateful that in addition to executive branch support for Taiwan, Congress has been especially vocal about supporting Taiwan's international space. So, last year, there was a resolution supporting Taiwan's WHO participation that passed a 425 to 0 votes. And anyone observing American politics know that having zero on one side of the voting dynamic is very rare.

And we're truly grateful that the interest in supporting Taiwan is bipartisan. It crosses the domestic political spectrum here in the US. And in my line of work, I maintain a very careful balance of engagement between Congress and the executive, but also between the different political parties, as well as between government and the broader american public.

So that's kind of a snapshot of our broader partnership between Taiwan and the US. And to conclude, I just want to say that a lot is happening in an unprecedented way. Our relationship is stronger than ever, thanks to not only the political support inside the Beltway, but to a broader sector of interest where our shared values as well as shared interests frame the strong partnership between our countries.

And by values, I mean freedom, democracy, human rights, respect for rules in the global system. And by interest, I'm talking about stability, peace, and also prosperity for our people, and, of course, fair opportunities for our people to pursue what they believe is progress in society. So I'm just gonna stop there in terms of my opening remarks, and I'd welcome discussion on any of those topics as well as beyond.

Thank you again for this opportunity.

>> Admiral Ellis: Well, thank you. That was a marvelous beginning. And teed up a number of issues of ongoing interest here, both at Hoover and the broader group that has joined us for this conversation. Karas, would you have any initial comments?

>> Speaker 3: No, I think we've got such a great group here today, many of whom I recognize as students, present or past.

And so it's wonderful to see such a great Stanford student representation here today. The ground rules for this, we are recording this. It is on the record, so when you post questions to the ambassador, we'll post a recording of this online. And so she's in a position where she has to be diplomatic, as usual, to answer these.

But we invite questions on any subject. And to kick us off, I'm gonna exercise moderator's prerogative here and ask the first question. But after I do that, I invite you all to raise your hands, and I'll keep a queue here. We've also got an online audience with us, a few people online.

If you'd like to enter your question into the Q and A box on the Webex, I'll monitor that as well. And the last thing to note is microphones. If you could speak clearly into the microphone so that our online audience can hear your question. So let me ask a kind of general question since you're in Washington now, you've been there a couple of years about US Taiwan cooperation.

You've been in politics and government long enough to see several cycles in US-Taiwan relations going back to the early 2000s, both in the ruling party and when you were in opposition. And many people in both the US and Taiwan now describe relations today as the best that they have ever been between our two sides with close and meaningful communication and assistance.

Do you agree with that? And if you could improve one element of the bilateral relationship today, what's something we both need to work on?

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Yeah, well, I can say with confidence that our relations are certainly stronger than ever. There's certainly room for improvement. And I'd like to share with you my own analysis on why relations are so strong right now.

I think, first of all, it's a changing strategic environment, a growing awareness of the challenges that Taiwan faces and the need to work with Taiwan to deal with some of the global challenges. US-China competition is broad. It's a hybrid competition. Taiwan is not reflective of all of the complex elements of that competition, but we do have a role to play in part of that.

And so there is a lot of interest in engaging Taiwan. Everywhere I go, our friends are saying, what can we do to help you? And I think that interest level is very high. My task is to channel that energy and goodwill in the most productive ways possible in advancing our relationship.

The second reason why I think relationship is strong is the people of Taiwan, what the people of Taiwan have accomplished mainly in our own democratization. Being one of the most open democracies, ranked by Freedom House and other international institutions as one of the most open democracies, respecting a lot of the values that I know a lot of students cherish here on campus too, and social justice and gender equality and many other areas.

And Taiwan has also been a responsible player on the global level, contributing to the global fight against Covid-19 also playing a constructive role, role in all the other public policy issues that I just mentioned, where we seek to expand our space for participation. Taiwanese people are extremely generous, always willing to help a lot of sympathies, for example, toward the people of Ukraine and offering a lot of humanitarian assistance to the people of Ukraine.

I think a third factor is in trust. I think the administration has a lot of trust in the leadership of Taiwan, in President Tsai, in her determination or her commitment to maintaining the status quo. That is a commitment to, while we will not provoke, neither will we bow to pressure.

Very calculated, cautious effort to fortify our democracy, fortify our defenses, and also to continue enhancing a responsible role for Taiwan, contributing to the regional and global good. So I think those factors do contribute to a very strong partnership where we have more space to develop relations on all fronts and in the second part of the second reason.

I'm sorry, I just neglected to mention that, which is a very important aspect. I think the world has come to realize the importance of Taiwan as an economy, as a responsible contributor to global, stable supply chains, reliable and trusted supply chains as well, and technology sectors. Disruptions of that were highlighted during Covid, and I think a renewed appreciation of the positive contributions of Taiwan have also generated tremendous interest and goodwill in supporting the broader partnership.

 

>> Speaker 3: All right, thank you. Let's open it up. If you have a question you'd like to pose, we'll start with David Fedor, one of our members of the Hoover community here.

>> David Fedor: Thanks, my name is David Fedor. I work here at Hoover on energy and national security issues.

Thank you ambassadors. Just building off your comments just now and where you concluded, there's really sort of wonderful levels of attention and support in Washington and among the American elite for the US-Taiwan relationship. Today, I think probably more op-eds have been written about Taiwan or about semiconductors or about security issues in the last six months than in the past ten years combined.

I'm also interested in the visibility and the mind share of the broader American public towards Taiwan and understanding the role that Taiwan plays in the world and its industries. Are there things that, shoes that can still be that overturned? What more can be done, not just in the government relationship, but in the people to people, civil sectors, or even business sectors, you think, to strengthen those organic ties between the general populace, the people of the United States, and the people of Taiwan.

Do we need a new hit tv show, for example, just be creative.

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Well, there's certainly a lot more we need to do to engage the broader public from coming from democracy. As a former ex politician myself, I especially feel strongly about grassroots engagements, engaging with the people and not just with the political elite inside the Beltway.

And that's why cherish opportunities to venture outside of the beltway to engage the American public in a broader sense. But specifically, Admiral Ellis just mentioned his trip to Taiwan, and that's why we also want to be very open to students, visitors, and interested parties to come and visit Taiwan.

To gain a better understanding of the broader diversity of our society and what we represent and how our interests are aligned. I think that's an important process, of course, in the broader sense, not everybody travels abroad, so we continue to engage heavily through the public media space in any opportunity we have.

I think, engaging with the broad spectrum of elected representation inside the Beltway, from my perspective, is also an opportunity to see who they represent and what are the questions coming to us, what are their concerns? And, you asked about what more can be done, and one of the key obstacles I've been facing has been, for example, on trade, that the United States public or the American people have certain views about foreign trade.

That creates perhaps some obstacles for us to work on key market access issues in our negotiations. And I think we need to engage more broadly on that front to highlight how our trade partnership is mutually beneficial. And I've used the word force multipliers in the technology space, but I think it also applies to the broader economic space as we deepen our engagements.

I think it works for both of us as well as the workers in both our societies.

>> Speaker 3: All right, great, thank you. I've got quite a list here now, if you'd like to be added to the queue, just raise your hand. We'll go with this gentleman, and if you could introduce yourself as well.

 

>> Michael: Hi, ambassador, my name is Michael, I'm a junior studying international relations here, thank you for joining us. My question is related to a paper I read from someone at Hoover back in 1991, Professor James Morrow, who describes asymmetrical alliances where one party receives security, but they have to give up significant right to determine their own future.

And so far, that's been stable, but I'm wondering, with succession and with the evolving trilateral relationship, if you see this asymmetry as being stable, and also if this is kind of the perception within Taiwan or if it's seen as more of a symmetrical relationship. But thank you so much again for your time.

 

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Well, thank you. You cited a study from 91, and I must say that for decades, we have maintained a status quo across the Taiwan Strait that may not be satisfactory to either side. But it has produced an era of stability in which the people on both sides can interact and engage, and where the two sides have had dramatically different political systems as well.

I think from Taiwan's perspective, as I said, it's not satisfactory, but there are also constraining realities of the strategic circumstances that we have to acknowledge as we seek a greater space responding to the desires of the Taiwanese people in determining the course of our future. My president, as I said, is committed to the status quo.

I think the main challenge we have, as Secretary Blinken highlighted a few days ago, his concern that China is not happy with the status quo. And I think that is the key challenge ahead of us. And that is why we feel there has to be consistent messaging in terms of communicating with the Chinese leadership that we are living in modern 21st century.

 

>> Admiral Ellis: Where a rules based international order serves all interests, and the use of force is never an option to resolve disputes in the modern day world.

>> And we certainly will do what we can to preserve the stability that is so important to the peace in the region.

You would use the word asymmetric, that is of tremendous interest, and it has become a key word in the security sphere. Taiwan is in no way seeking an arms race, we're not in a position to engage in an arms race with the PRC. And instead, we are focusing on asymmetric capabilities that are more cost effective, highly survivable, mobile.

Some of the systems have proven quite effective in the Ukraine situation, but it's not only about arms and acquisitions. It's also about the reform of our own defense concepts, decentralizing command so that we also have that element of mobility and survivability in our defenses. We also are learning from Ukraine that we are in need of involving a whole of society effort in our self defenses.

So we will continue on this pathway of being a proponent for peace and stability, for the status quo.

>> Admiral Ellis: But also, since we're in a very volatile neighborhood, the need to put those defenses in place so that we can prevent the worst case scenario from happening.

>> Speaker 3: Great, next, we'll turn to Tiffany.

 

>> Tiffany: Thank you.

>> Speaker 3: If you could introduce yourself as well.

>> Tiffany: Thank you, Ambassador Hsiao, for joining us today, it's my honor to be here. So I'm Tiffany, I'm currently a third year PhD student here, I think, I sort of have a more general question. You mentioned how the importance of education in Taiwan's international participation.

So I sort of, my question is that it's my 7th year in the US now and four year undergrade, three years grade school and what I learned here and what I see here is that these US students are not afraid of participating in public affairs and voicing their opinions and involvement with the government.

So my question is that as a Taiwanese student here at Stanford and as a Taiwanese student general in the US, what would be your recommendation? In what way can we contribute in the sector of education as a student here, yeah.

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Well, first of all, I want to say that the opportunity to study abroad is a very precious opportunity.

And I think for many Taiwanese people, including myself in the past, the chance to study here and to broaden my exposure and connectedness with other international students on an American campus is very important. I think it is also something that should be encouraged among the Chinese youth from China, because China remains a very closed system in the sense of expressing the freedom of expression, as well as the opportunity to organize in any meaningful way that could influence the course of domestic politics.

In terms of Taiwanese students here, there's, I think, three tracks in our broader engagement on the education front. The first involves the cultural and language understanding, bringing more of American and international students to Taiwan, understanding Taiwan, learning the language, feeling the culture, understanding the people of Taiwan. And through your engagements as students here, you're also being that kind of bridge in understanding Taiwan, I think that's very important.

The second piece of it, I think, involves the STEM part of our exchanges, and interactions. A lot of the Taiwanese industry leaders, including the key leaders in Taiwan semiconductor industry, we're students here many years ago and a beneficiary of the resources available in a very free, open, and innovative society.

And it's in our interest to keep that space for innovation open. And I think there are some new opportunities for collaborating to cultivate the talent we need for future industry and so that is another track in terms of our collaboration. There are a number of new institutions in Taiwan, that are developing very targeted courses towards the semiconductor industry needed, and they are looking for opportunities to collaborate with American partner universities and institutions.

The third, broader part of our Engagement, education engagement, I think, involves the public space, having the Taiwanese students present here as contributors. Also, eventually, some stay here and become Taiwanese Americans and become leaders in different sectors. You're also the face of Taiwan. And if I may share an anecdote back during the days when I was a student myself.

It was during the time when Taiwan was going through tremendous transition from a one party, long martial law state to a modern democracy. And in 96, we were having our first ever presidential election, and the PRC decided to fire missiles to.

>> Speaker 3: Jim knows something about that.

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Yes.

 

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: You were quite involved during those days, and a lot of Taiwanese students in the United States organized networks, and that was, you are all living in a different age. But in 1996, that was like the initial phases of the presence of the Internet. Businessweek did a special article titled Taiwanese Fighting Fire with Wire, and the Taiwanese students in the United States collaborating to share information, to advocate for peace, to protest, to build those networks of visibility, highlighting Taiwan's democratic transition, the need to support that.

I think that was quite an experience, that I was part of that generation. And I think there are many more challenges today in a hybrid way that we need to face, especially in the information space, in the cybersecurity space, in the public narrative space. We often use the phrase cognitive warfare in Taiwan and this is a psychological war that no government can fight alone.

It requires a very robust civil society, it requires actors like you who are educated, informed students to work together in collaboration and media literacy in encountering disinformation, but also in highlighting the need for the survival of Taiwan. And I also want to say that as students studying abroad, you will have many opportunities to also engage with students from China, from other places.

And ultimately, the survival of Taiwan's democracy is probably the best chance that there will be true freedom in China as well and I think we have a shared interest there. And through opportunities to engage, I think that point has to be highlighted.

>> Speaker 3: Powerful words, next question is from Charles.

 

>> Charles: Hi, I'm Charles, I'm a graduate student of the East Asian studies program, I'm also a student of Kairis course, Taiwan's democratic transition. And I have a question that, what could the world community, especially the United States, to do to ensure the peace across the Taiwan Strait? Thank you.

 

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Well, that is the perennial question. What more can be done? I think, as I've said, ultimately we seek to preserve peace, to deter any possibility of conflict. And our deterrence involves at least three components. One is strengthening Taiwan's own defenses, our own determination, to defend. The second part involves US support.

The third part involves international response. And I think through the unfortunate evolution of the Ukraine crisis, we are all learning lessons. We're hoping everyone learns the right lesson that serves to prevent that from happening again. Let me first talk about the international response. The need to be well coordinated, to have consistent messaging.

That force is not an option. That's not how the modern day world functions. The message that there could be potential, and very severe consequences on the party that initiates the use of force to change the status quo. In terms of us support for Taiwan, I think politically it's important to demonstrate to the people of Taiwan that we are not alone.

I think the Taiwanese, in any circumstance of bullying, the victims of bullying, are often put in isolation. They're marginalized. They are prevented from engaging with others in the community. But I think it's of paramount significance that there is a clear message to the bullies that Taiwan is not alone in this, and there is a shared interest in the stability of the region.

The other part, of course, involves extensive coordination and fortifying our defenses. And I don't intend to go into much detail on that in this particular setting, but to say that under the framework of the Taiwan Relations act and the six assurances, there is a lot to be done.

 

>> Charles: Thank you.

>> Speaker 3: Thank you. Next we have Professor Jason Wong.

>> Jason Wong: Hi, Mr. Hsiao. Thank you very much for coming to Stanford. I'm professor of health policy here, and my question is related to what role might Taiwan play in enhancing global health security? So I say this with three reasons.

Since the century, 21st century, there's already been three majority epidemic and pandemic arising from China, SARS, Avian flu, and most recently Covid-19. Taiwan currently has approximately a million people actually going back and forth between Taiwan and China. A lot of these people have information about infectious disease arising from different parts of China, including doctors going over to China to treat patients in the weekends.

The third reason is that most recently there's been shown that even wastewater from airplanes, if you test them, you could see all sorts of viruses. You could test up to 200 viruses at the same time. I think Taiwan plays potentially a strategic role as a sentinel note to inform healthcare experts globally on what's happening because of the lack of transparency currently.

 

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Thank you. It sounds like you answered your own question.

>> Jason Wong: Role Taiwan might want to play. I think it's an opportunity.

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Well, I think, and I want to thank you also for your commitment to bridging some of our health expertise between Taiwan and Stanford, but also with the broader world.

I know you had extensive discussions with our vice president on this previously, and I think we are looking for more opportunities to meaningfully contribute to global health. You highlighted some key areas and indeed Taiwan, given our. I think we were better prepared for COVID than most other countries around the world for the simple reason that we painfully suffered from SARS early on.

We all learned from these very painful, tragic incidents. You've highlighted some serious epidemics of the last century. Taiwan has established. We do carefully monitor what's happening on the infectious disease front. But this is a challenge that no single country in the world can cope with. It does require a very tight network of international cooperation.

It requires transparency in our respective health systems. It requires inclusion. And that is why it's all the more important that Taiwan be given some space to work with others in the World Health Organization.

>> Speaker 3: Next, I have Seamus.

>> Seamus: Hi, I am Seamus. I am a student of public policy here at Stanford.

My question has to do with the economic relationship. You brought up US public support for domestic production and barriers to trade, causing challenges for that economic relationship. I'm curious how, in that context, what your view is on the recent IRA and CHIPS Act that the US has passed?

 

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Well, the CHIPS Act was welcomed by industry in Taiwan, especially those industries that are seeking to expand their operations here in the United States. It is assumed that they will also benefit from some support through the CHIPS act. I'm looking forward to the rolling out of the application process, I'm told sometime in the coming weeks where our industries can find opportunities of greater support.

But I must say, though, Taiwan will remain, and I've said this on many occasions, that Taiwan will remain indispensable and irreplaceable as a key node for the global semiconductor chip industry for the main reason that we have a relatively comprehensive ecosystem in Taiwan. It's not a matter of subsidizing one company, two companies.

We have an ecosystem of hundreds of companies that make what everybody sees, TSMC, the success that it is today. That is everyone from the chemical suppliers to the designers, the fabless chip designer companies, the testing, the packaging, the entire ecosystem. I don't see that entire ecosystem being replicated anywhere else in the world in the near future.

I think Taiwan will maintain a competitive edge and a lead. I think we support our industry's global expansion to the extent that that also supports their access to some niche markets where there potentially maybe. More expectations that some of the key technologies used in sensitive areas would be made in the USA and that if Taiwanese companies can also capture that market.

I think it will also contribute to our broader interest in being a reliable and trusted partner. So, one aspect that usually I don't talk about it extensively in academic settings, it's more of a nitty-gritty legislative and policy issue. But I think the current tax regime in the United States really doesn't favour a fair opportunity for Taiwanese companies.

And so we are actively working on pursuing what we call avoidance of double taxation agreement. And as the phrase says, it allows our companies to function in both Taiwan and the United States while avoiding repetitive. And unnecessary taxes that are disincentivizing some of the movement of industry as they are looking for more global opportunities.

 

>> Speaker 3: Well, you may not talk about that often at academic settings, but you are at the Hoover Institution, which is long taken a keen interest in tax policy, so this is a good place to bring that up. Next, I've got Jason on the left.

>> Jason: Hi, ambassador, this is Jason La, I'm a doctoral candidate in political science, I'm from China and I studied in Taiwan while I was also in college.

So, my current research is on the Chinese bureaucracy information flow within the bureaucracy. So, my question is, we see in recent years, there is an increasingly pronounced position in the US government in separating the Chinese people and the Chinese Communist Party. You also mentioned the future of Taiwan's prosperity and survival might also have some shared interests with true freedom in China.

So, my question is, what do you see the potential of interactions between Taiwanese community or Taiwanese representatives in the United States with the Chinese diaspora, particularly those pro-democracy diaspora here in the United States? And what levels, in what capacity, formal or informal, should there be any interactions? Would you encourage any?

What is your thought about it? Thank you.

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Well, for decades, there has been informal interactions, I think there have been a number of Chinese democracy activists from way back in 1989 who have been exiled or living abroad as part of the broader diaspora. Who regularly visit and engage with Taiwanese people, and I think we also had a very challenging process in terms of our own democratization process, and we have a lot to share.

But ultimately, true and sustainable democracy has to come from within, and so I think a public engagement process is necessary. And as I watched some of the news reports of the white paper protests among youth inside China as well as abroad on campuses across the United States, you start to see.

Although I think it's quite limited, and in small pockets, but nevertheless, there is also an interest in freedom of speech. There is acknowledgement that freedom of speech is not just an ideology, it has consequences for humanity. And I also see some pockets of hope there for understanding each other in terms of our shared desire for freedom.

But it's not an easy process, and I continue to be a proponent of broader engagement between the diaspora, the Taiwanese people, and the Hong Kong activists or the students from China in a broader sense. And the challenges that we all encounter are formidable, and it requires as many allies and like-minded friends as possible.

 

>> Speaker 3: All right, next, I have David.

>> David: Great, thank you, ambassador, for being here, I'm David Jaffe, I'm a first-year law student in the law school over here, I was also a former student of Professor Templeman's, and I'm also from Arizona. So, I was really glad to hear you talk about the recent TSMC investments in our community, so thank you for mentioning that, and I have two related questions about that facility, if that's okay, Professor Templeman.

 

>> Speaker 3: Yeah, please.

>> David: So, to start, the investment in our community from TSMC was already gonna be big, billions of dollars because of the Chips and Science Act. It only got bigger, which was really, really great to see this major foreign investment in Arizona. Unfortunately, the Chips and Science Act was one of those pieces of legislation that, as you mentioned, too often doesn't have a zero on one side of the vote count.

And some of the members of Congress who voted against the Chips and Science Act, well, in that no tally was every single Republican who represents Arizona. Every single member of Congress from Arizona who's a Republican voting against the bill, and it seemed fiercely partisan legislation that was only going to benefit Arizona and Taiwan.

I'm wondering, does the Taiwanese government or the leaders of TSMC have any concerns about the future of Arizona's relationship with Taiwan? Knowing that so many of our political leaders are choosing partisan politics over this really, really important development in our community. And so piggybacking on that, Arizona has also gotta water crisis, gonna run out of water within the next few years.

And it seems like in the next couple of days, the federal government's going to impose mandatory water cuts on our state, in addition to California, Nevada, New Mexico. But looks like Arizona is gonna get the short end of that stick, and these TSMC facilities are gonna use a not-insignificant amount of water.

And while I am super excited for these facilities, there are members of our community who aren't, are there any concerns about the water future in Arizona from the Taiwanese government and TSMC? So, one question about the partisan politics dogging the TSMC facilities, and the other question about the water future for these facilities.

 

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Well, water is critical to the industry, I had, it's a question that I ask Arizona local officials every time I visit, so will there be enough? As far as I know, the TSMC has included in their broader investment a very aggressive effort in water recycling, the reuse of the water resources.

And I think that will help to ensure that water is not wasted. It is a very precious natural resource, that it is always reused and put to the best use on the second aspect of your politics. Look, as a foreign diplomat, I don't really get involved in discussions.

But I can say that we're not unfamiliar with political differences. As an ex elected politician myself, there have been times where I've been extremely frustrated like why are they opposing this? It's for the good of the big picture, why don't they see this and that? And that is always frustrating, but it's a part of our democracy and the presence of diversity.

I think the debate on the CHIPS Act was some of it involved, should the taxpayers be supporting corporations? Do you need a debt ceiling in the United States? How should resources be channeled? How do you choose one industry over the other? I think these are very legitimate questions and in the process of coming up with this policy, but now that the Chips act has passed and there will be resources available, we certainly hope that they will be used in the most effective way that supports the sustainability of this particular industry and especially, well, the taiwanese companies that have a strong interest in that, too.

 

>> Speaker 3: Thank you, great. Next question I have is from online and I will give Jim the last word here. We have about a half hour left and I've got about six questions to go. So just to give you an idea of the pacing here, the question from online is there's obviously close collaboration, as we've just been talking about, in the semiconductor and supply chain, in that industry between the United States and Taiwan.

Are there examples of other technology markets where you can see our two countries working more closely together in the next few years in AI or cybersecurity, electric vehicles and so forth. What are your priorities as a representative to the US in terms of promoting industrial cooperation?

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Well, you just named them.

 

>> Speaker 3: Okay, there we go.

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Truly knowledgeable, EV's AI, cyber, but I wanna add also the 5G telecommunications industry or trusted 5G networks and also another area and that is our defense industry. As much as various acquisitions are very meaningful for us, we also wanna have the ability to produce the technologies needed in our modern defenses inside Taiwan where we have confidence in control of the supply chain and the production pace in Taiwan.

And so some cooperation in terms of TPT or technology transfers or Taiwan being, having that accessibility towards some key technologies that would also help to fortify our defenses is an area of interest. Everywhere I go in the US, state governments. I meet with state legislators, governors, businesses. Every state says, I want the chip industry.

And they say, why did you go to Arizona? And every country that engages with Taiwan, they come to Taiwan and say, we want the chip industry. And the Japanese, the Indians, Germans, the Lithuanians, and the CHIP industry is a very complex industry. And I think I made the point earlier that the comprehensive ecosystem that exists in Taiwan is not easily replicated, but another part of that is the need to cultivate the talent.

And I think there are a lot of opportunities for collaboration with our friends here, especially in distinguished institutions like Stanford where we can be those force multipliers in cultivating the necessary workforce for the future of these industries. And when I'm asked about everybody's talking about the CHIP sector, I said, well, Taiwan is more than TSMC.

We have many other competitive, reliable partners and companies and we are not just the chip sector EV's. We are in batteries. We are 5G, we are AI, we are cyber, we are a lot. We're also agriculture, that's always overlooked. Yeah, selling our pineapples and flowers in the American market, but we try to highlight the broader spectrum of opportunities to enhance our trade commercial partnership too.

 

>> Speaker 3: Great, next, we've got here and I apologize. I've forgotten your name already.

>> Julian: No worries. Hi, ambassador. My name is Julian. I'm a third generation Taiwanese American, also a student at Palo Alto High School nearby.

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Wow.

>> Julian: So probably the youngest person in this room.

>> Julian: I had a question, which is at a conference in this room where professor Templeman moderated yesterday with professor Aram Hurd.

She mentioned that Taiwan has recently been trying to move to an all volunteer force or an AVF for its military and ditching conscription. As a male Taiwanese citizen, I do truly wanna go back and serve my year. I'm just kind of curious about for the future of joint Taiwan US defense initiatives.

Does Taiwan still trying to do more of an all volunteer force or shortly shift? Just is there like a balance that Taiwan as a government is trying to reach?

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Well, about 20 years ago, the Taiwan government started venturing into a focus on an all volunteer military force.

And by all volunteer, we mean recruitment and professionally paid career military and there are pros and cons in every system. The pro would be they are truly professional. They have extended periods of service, familiarity, well-trained, better paid career officers as well as our soldiers. At the same time, over the last 20 years, the conscription service has been shortened.

And recently we announced that we will revisit and extend the training period for our conscripted for Taiwan. Right now, the current law is that all young men in Taiwan must serve, at the moment, four months, but it will soon be extended to one year and we have announced that.

We feel that the global geo strategic changes require an enhanced training for our conscripts. If we look at South Korea, Singapore, Israel, other countries who also have a broader conscription program, we know that four months isn't enough and that is why we are extending. Other training to more adequate levels.

Now, I think the challenge is not just about timing of training. It's about the quality of training. And I think that's what all the youth in Taiwan, including some taiwanese Americans who may also have that obligation, are concerned about. And that is, if you're a young person in Taiwan, you know, starting your life and your career or new families, you want a year in your life to be spent in a meaningful way.

And so the quality of training is critical so that they leave knowing that they are stronger, in a better position to defend our homes and that it wasn't a waste of time. I think that is exactly what we are trying to do now in our own defense reform.

Now, current Taiwan law doesn't require women, although that has been somewhat of a subject of debate. The current focus will continue to be on the men serving the young men serving their military service. And logistically expanding that is a challenge. It's not as simple as, okay, everybody come back for a year.

We need to work on housing. We need to work on a good training program, enhanced pay, connections to their careers, modern technology. It's a very intensive process, and we are singularly focused on that at the moment.

>> Speaker 3: Okay, great. Next we have Laurel.

>> Laurel: Hi, thank you for speaking with us, Ambassador.

So my name is Laurel, and I'm a master's student studying Russian, Eastern European, and Eurasian Studies here. You mentioned that the invasion of Ukraine has been something of a watershed moment in the recent evolution of the cross strait relationship. And it's been mentioned that a lot of op eds have been written about Taiwan in the past year.

But especially a lot of op eds have been written about whether or not the Ukraine comparison is a useful one. I'm wondering, in your own opinion, is there anything particularly right or particularly wrong that a lot of these comparisons offer?

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Well, there have been so many-

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Comparisons, historically, and the geostrategic circumstances are certainly very, very different.

The geography is also very different. Taiwan has a natural barrier of the Taiwan straits. But then the benefit of the situation of Ukraine is that other NATO partners and allies have been helping with supplying, whether it's on ammunition or other humanitarian aid, across the border and in a worst case scenario of an embargo, that will be a very difficult situation for us.

And so certainly, there are some differences. I think we have to be clear eyed about those, but also acknowledge that the fact that certain authoritarian leaders are living in past, centuries ago where personal legacies dominated an agenda at the expense of thousands of human lives, I think is a painful lesson of history.

And it's important that we channel information and messaging in a way that prevents that kind of suffering from being repeated again. So I think as we're making comparisons, I think we also have to find ways in the nodes preventing that from happening. And the consistency of the international message to the leadership of China, I think, is very important.

 

>> Speaker 3: All right, so next, I have got the gentleman next to Laurel.

>> Sengkai: Thank you. Hi, Ambassador Xiao. My name is Sengkai. I'm an undergraduate here studying mechanical engineering and international relations. And I'm sure, like many others in the room, my family are proud immigrants from Taiwan to this country.

So thank you for being here and for your service. You've spoken a lot about the need to maintain the status quo in an increasingly challenging environment. And there are some, such as the former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who suggested frameworks like manage strategic competition to try to reduce tensions.

So my question is, do you think there are any meaningful areas of potential trilateral cooperation between the PRC, the US, and Taiwan that could reduce tensions? And is there any meaningful opportunity for these to become a larger part of Taiwanese foreign policy?

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Well, through my conversation today, I've identified some areas where Taiwan feels that we can be a force for good and contribute meaningfully, including global health, trade, economy.

And these continue to be areas of interest in which we would like to engage across the strait, too. There are multiple agreements across the Taiwan strait that need to be implemented in constructive ways, such as combating smuggling or crime, human trafficking, ensuring that internationally accepted standards of trade or agricultural products is respected.

But I think the main challenge right now is the PRC government is setting political conditions to any kind of collaborative opportunities that would actually benefit the people involved in all parties. And that is a key challenge. And I think we need to find a way to figure into the rational calculations of the PRC leadership.

It's not going to be easy, but we must continue to try.

>> Speaker 3: All right, next we've got this gentleman.

>> Alan: Hi, Ambassador. My name is Alan. I'm a PhD student in biological sciences here at Stanford. Before I ask my question, I also just wanna make the case for biotech as an opportunity-

 

>> Alan: For Taiwan and US collaborators.

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: I'm sorry, I missed that, yeah.

>> Alan: Because Taiwan has fantastic medical public health expertise as well as fantastic health insurance, national health insurance. So I think that's a great opportunity. So my question's actually, completely unrelated to that point. I'm curious about, as we approach one year anniversary of the war in Ukraine, I'm wondering, has the war in Ukraine changed how you approach your job in this past year?

Has it make it easier or harder? And I'm curious, in your interactions with American politicians, congressmen, Congress and officials, has their attitude towards Taiwan changed in response to the war in Ukraine over this past year? Thank you.

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Well, first, thank you so much for reminding me that I've neglected the very important biotech industry and this sector that, again, opens many opportunities for cooperation and where we are also force multipliers.

Yes, the tragedy, the war in Ukraine has definitely had an influence on my work. It has generated much more interest, unprecedented level of interest in Washington towards a situation in Taiwan. And everyone's asking me similar questions. How does the Ukraine situation compare to Taiwan? The same question you asked, how can we prevent that from happening in Taiwan?

How can we be better prepared? What can we do to deter? I think there are a lot of discussions around that. And number two, as I said in the outset, it has prompted a greater degree of urgency in terms of our collaboration in many areas. In any way, it's drawn more attention to Taiwan as well, but it's also made me a lot busier, and I welcome those busy opportunities to broaden our engagement.

Of course, but unfortunately, it's over a very volatile situation that we are facing, and it's also a very delicate balance that we have to achieve.

>> Speaker 3: Next we have behind us, could you introduce yourself?

>> Speaker 16: Hi, I'm study master of law at Stanford. To add on, the question brought about the comparison to Ukraine case.

So when I look to the ICJ proceeding, you can see Ukraine is a member state of United nations. So however, Taiwan is not. So it kind of gets me worried. If any invasions, not the worst case scenario, invasion or violation to Taiwan's sovereignty happen, what would be the possible remedy for us or effective way to hold the perpetrator accountable?

Or in your opinion, how Taiwan can break this judicial barrier in the international stage to yeah, hold, yeah, accountable, yeah?

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Yeah, well, thank you for pointing that out. It's a very important difference. There is no such thing as NATO in our part of the world. Taiwan is not in the United nations.

Both Russia and China have positions on the Security Council permanent members. And I'm not certain that with ICJ and Ukraine being a full member of the international system, that that will by necessity mean that Russia will be held accountable. But still, it is an important venue for generating that international effort to deter such actions from happening.

And I think that's all the more important. When you highlighted that, I think the key point is in generating a greater global interest in maintaining the status quo, in highlighting the necessity of peace and stability in the region. And for that, I have to also express our appreciation of the Biden administration for reaching out to friends and allies and partners.

From G7 statements to bilateral summits with Japan and Australia and others in highlighting that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is relevant for the world, and we all have a shared interest in that.

>> Speaker 3: Jason, you're next.

>> Jason Kim: Ma'am, thank you for your time. It's a privilege to be here.

I'm Lieutenant Colonel Jason Kim. I'm the US Army War College fellow and visiting scholar over at CSAC. And my research is involving allies and partners, coalition effectiveness specifically involving the Taiwan Strait. So my question involves, I'm sure, have you heard with 2023 National Defense Authorization act, there was a provision in there that allowed up to two billion per year for military financing specific for Taiwan.

And we were, as a security cooperation, security assistance professional, we were very happy about that. But later in the omnibus spending bill part, it actually shifted from a set of grants, which would have been great. It turned to loans. And normally, with very, very high income, highly capable countries such as Taiwan or governments such as Taiwan, we normally don't do loans coz they're capable of funding themselves.

So we just want to get your perspective on how kind of it was received specifically with your team being in DC and kind of is there an appetite potentially for Taiwan to at least still pursue those loans and acquire capabilities that are needed in the defense of Taiwan?

 

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Well, I think in the NDAA, we saw some new initiatives, some creative tools. It was such as FMF creating, you're putting some potential tools in place that we could pick up and use in different circumstances. But I think, as you said, Taiwan is a relatively wealthy partner in comparison to some of the other countries that are receiving military financing and grants and whether they're grants or loans.

And we have to demonstrate our own commitment to our defenses. So we have increased our own defense budget by 14% in this new fiscal year. Some of our neighbors have also done so, but again, having tools available for contingencies is having that legislation there, I think, does give us the option of looking into that toolbox and seeing what we can use in different circumstances.

But I think for now, we are continuing to work on fortifying our own defenses through our own commitments and demonstrating that determination to the international community.

>> Jason Kim: Thank you, ma'am.

>> Speaker 3: So I wanna give the last question to Admiral Ellis here, and we've certainly worked you very

>> Speaker 3: Hard over the last hour plus.

So, Admiral Ellis, if you'd like to pose a question, go ahead.

>> Admiral Ellis: Well, thank you. I'd like to go in a different direction than my checkered past might indicate.

>> Admiral Ellis: And focus a little bit on the energy sector since we talked, as you did, about the vulnerabilities and the risks of a blockade or an embargo, and principle amongst them would be the resupply of energy.

We've had experts from Taiwan come and talk from the utility sector and the like and talked a lot about the imports of LNG, the potential for renewables. Nuclear is still an option, but of declining importance, at least in the current atmosphere in Taiwan. But central to all of that, as we're now seeing in Ukraine and elsewhere, is the power grid that distributes it all No matter what the source is, if you don't have a mechanism for getting it to the places that it's needed either for emergency use, for semiconductor industry, for civil defense and the like, it becomes a problem.

I wondered if you could offer some thoughts, just a little bit about energy security writ large and the distribution network and grid more specifically as an idea towards hardening and making more robust and resilience the architecture that Taiwan currently employs.

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Well, thanks for bringing that up. It's actually a major project that we are currently underway, making our power grid much more resilient.

For the past decades as we have enjoyed peace dividends and we have, I should say from a fiscal standpoint, gone the cheapest way, and that is major power centers supplying the entire country through a massive national grid. But I think recently some incidents, including some natural disasters and other accidents has also exposed the vulnerability of the mega grids.

And so we do acknowledge the need for some rapid adjustment in smart grids, localized grids, also diversified delivery systems. So we have conducted some legislative reform in power used to be a state monopoly. Now we do encourage different segments of the private sector to also invest in diverse power supply.

And also we recently liberalized through a legislative process also the delivery of power. It's not just the creation, production of energy, but the delivery system. So, we will have to continue to work on that. The Taipower continues to be the state-supported company that shoulders the bulk of that responsibility is actually making this a top priority right now.

 

>> Speaker 3: All right, great. You can see why Ambassador Hsiao is so well regarded in Washington. I imagine many of you over the last week read the New York Times profile of her that was pretty glowing. And I think she's actually lived up or even surpassed what the kind words in that review.

And so we're very fortunate to have had this opportunity to have FaceTime with you today. And I wanna thank as well our audience for posing such great questions to the ambassador today. I'm gonna turn to Jim in just a moment. I just wanted to also acknowledge the support of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in San Francisco, which helped make this visit possible.

And in particular our longtime partner there, Shannon Xiao, for helping to arrange this visit and for providing such good, consistent advice and support for our program over the years. With that, I will give the last word to Admiral Ellis here

>> Admiral Ellis: Well, thank you personally, Karas, for all your efforts in setting all of this up in coordination with Shannon and the Tecro Team.

Its been a magnificent experience. And I was remiss not at the start in not acknowledging the tremendous role that Larry Diamond has played in this conversation over many decades. You mentioned his name, and I should have at the start. He is the co-chair of the project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific region under the GPS initiative, the former national security task force.

And Larry regrets that he could not be here. Ironically, he is in Washington as we speak. So, but as we are at the Hoover Institution, it's probably appropriate that I end with a bit of a quotation from Herbert Hoover, long gone, of course, but with apologies for your previous positions and occupation.

Herbert Hoover once said that being a politician is a poor profession, But being a public servant is a noble one. And you have certainly fulfilled the second part of that today and through your career. And we are very grateful for your time Ambassador.

>> Bi-khim Hsiao: Thank you.