The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan last year officially ended the wars of 9/11, along with the struggle to nation-build and implant democracy in the heart of the Islamic world. While unhappy with the way the withdrawal was implemented, Americans largely applauded the end of the so-called War on Terror. The American body politic, which was never really asked to sacrifice much in pursuit of victory in Afghanistan and Iraq, had tired of “forever wars,” conflicts with nebulous goals and no clear path to victory. Having spent well in excess of $1 trillion on these wars, Americans are ready, in the words of President Barack Obama, to “nation build at home.” The United States, it seems, would rather fight culture wars at home than the more violent kind overseas.
The United States has been through this cycle before. After the doughboys redeployed at the conclusion of the “War to End all Wars,” Americans took the phrase seriously and retreated into their isolationist shell in the Western Hemisphere, theoretically protected by two great oceans. In the 1930s the U.S. Congress passed three Neutrality Acts to prevent the country from being accidentally pulled into conflict, as many Americans believe had been the case in 1917. The America First Committee, a political organization dedicated to keeping the United States out of foreign wars, held enormous political clout. Despite these manifestations of public unwillingness to venture abroad “in search of monsters to destroy,” by the end of 1941 German submarines and Japanese carrier aircraft had convinced the American people of the need to secure their vital interests overseas.
The end of the Cold War in 1991 likewise sent the American people in search of a peace dividend. Poorly designed expeditionary operations in Somalia led to the withdrawal of American forces after a street battle in Mogadishu in October 1993 resulted in the death of nineteen U.S. servicemembers and the wounding of seventy-three others. Peacekeeping operations in Bosnia were designed with an expiration date to assuage the concerns of the American people of the U.S. Army getting bogged down in a quagmire of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.
The attack on the United States on 9/11 changed this mindset. U.S. presidents kept American forces in Iraq for eight years and in Afghanistan for twenty, making it the longest war in U.S. history. Although it seems now as if internal divisions and compassion fatigue rule out sustained military operations abroad, this is only because the nation’s vital interests do not appear to be in jeopardy. No matter how divisive U.S. internal politics appear to be at present, a foreign attack has the way of concentrating the mind of the American people on their collective security.
If and when that day arrives, the United States has the wherewithal to fight its opponents to the ends of the earth and beyond. Potential opponents would be well advised not to mistake the fractious nature of American politics as a lack of national vitality, or the current budget woes as an inability to fund U.S. national defense. Before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, German and Japanese leaders doubted the ability of the United States to create and sustain armed forces for a long war. The ruins of Berlin and Tokyo in 1945 were a testament to their lack of faith.