By Jonathan Movroydis
Dr. Meir Finkel, brigadier general (res.) was an armored brigade commander in the Second Lebanon War and is the current head of research at the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies, Israeli Defense Forces.
In this Q&A, Finkel discusses his recently released book from Hoover Institution Press, Studies in Generalship: Lessons from the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces.
In this in-depth perspective of Israel’s principal military leader, Finkel offers comparative analyses of the role of chiefs of staff, from Israel’s War of Independence in 1948 through the conflicts of the twenty-first century. The book covers six key topics: identifying change in the strategic environment, developing familiarity with all military domains, managing crises with wartime generals, rehabilitating the army after a botched war, leading a transformation in force design, and building relationships with the political echelon.
Studies in Generalship: Lessons from the Chiefs of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces is available in hardcover and e-book formats. Click here to purchase.
Why did you write Studies in Generalship?
Throughout my career, I have seen the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] from various vantage points, from tactical operations to the strategic level.
After commanding an armor reserve brigade in the Second Lebanon War in 2006, I spent seven years as head of the concepts and doctrine department of the land forces in the IDF, which is an unusually long period for a colonel. During my tenure, I researched the conceptual and doctrinal chaos in the operational and strategic echelons and the reasons why the IDF was not prepared to fight a large-scale war with Hezbollah in 2006—in part because for a few years most of its training and resources were devoted to counterterror operations.
I then became head of the Dado Center, a military think tank at IDF general headquarters. Among other responsibilities, I was responsible for developing and running strategic war games intended to challenge the chief of staff’s concepts and attitudes. During my five years in this position, I achieved a deep understanding on what it means to be the IDF chief of staff and the extraordinary authority he possesses. With this experience as my basis, I began writing the book.
Compared with the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff in the United States, whose role is advisory, does the IDF chief of staff fall within the chain of command?
Yes. As I wrote in the book, the IDF chief of staff has the equivalent of the combined powers of George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower during World Word II (In Israeli scale). The former was army chief of staff, and the latter was the supreme commander of allied forces in Europe. The IDF chief of staff is both the builder of the military and its commander in every aspect of force employment. There is no separation. In addition, there are no ministers of the navy, air force, or marines. The IDF chief of staff reports directly to the defense minister. However, when Israel goes to war, it is the collective decision of Israel’s security cabinet.
When was the position of chief of staff created, and how did its authority evolve?
The person who defined and shaped the position as we know it today was Moshe Dayan. He was a dominant figure not only in military issues but also in Israeli politics and society. He was the chief of staff from 1953 to early 1958. Although he was subordinate to the political echelon, nobody at the ministerial level bypassed him without permission to talk with other officers within the IDF.
I wrote in the book that Dayan and his successors have all been very popular figures in Israeli society. Israel is under all types of security pressures, and national defense is always a top national priority. Israeli citizens need to believe that the person who holds the chief of staff position is the most qualified candidate and of high character. Thus, historically, he has had a significant impact on shaping the military’s culture, as well as society at large.
Has the IDF chief’s authority in both military and social matters presented a challenge to elected officials’ and civilian control over the military?
Let me answer that question the following way. First, the IDF chief usually serves a four-year term regardless of which government assumes power. Second, I would say that there are over seven decades of precedent that clearly define his relationship with the political echelon. Even if the IDF chief opposes the opinion of the defense minister or a Knesset member, he won’t engage in a direct political struggle or invite media attention. Nevertheless, IDF chiefs have been clever enough to make their points known to the general public. In the book, I describe a few of such cases, some of which include the political echelon trying to enforce decisions on the military, and others where the generals have enlisted support of policies from the political echelon.
What do you hope readers take away from this book?
Studies in Generalship is essentially about organizational dynamics both within the military and between the military and political echelon, and it is thus my claim that the book is relevant both for commanders and staff officers and for national security decision makers.
When soldiers read history about foreign armies, they typically look for similarities in their own and apply lessons to current challenges. Sometimes it’s the strategy and tactics behind the weapons being used in battle. American officers in the seventies and eighties for example, asked themselves, What can we learn from the IDF’s employment of Patton tanks, Skyhawks, and Phantoms against Egyptian T-Tanks and MIGs in the October 1973 War, so that we can capably defend Europe in future large-scale conflicts? But those lessons are of course not relevant today. My claim here is that when you research organizational dynamics, the lessons are enduring and universal.
The loss of trust between the IDF chief of staff and field generals is a key theme of the book and exemplifies my claim. British prime minister Winston Churchill for example, replaced generals commanding forces on the Western front a few times in Britain’s fight against a German army commanded by General Erwin Rommel. In one of the chapters, I provide test cases on this theme from the 1956 Sinai War, the October 1973 War, and the 2006 Second Lebanon War.
In Israel, IDF’s high-ranking officers are in a never-ending learning process because our forces are deployed all the time and have endured conflict nearly every day since the founding of the country over 70 years ago. We are constantly reinventing ourselves, and the lessons of history serve as our guide.
