Welcome to the Hoover Institution’s briefing on national security. In this issue we are looking at the importance of public and private funding of quantum computing in a technological race with China and Russia; a change in the established military doctrine; Narendra Modi’s third term at the helm of Indian politics—but with coalition partners; the lack of commitment for Ukraine and Russian gains; Europe’s need to create a complementary organization to a US-led NATO; Chinese leaders’ rocky road; and the need for America to lead the charge to save Ukraine. Finally, we highlight from the Hoover Library & Archives the World War I Dutch artist Louis Raemaekers.
FEATURED ANALYSIS
Outthinking the Competition
In the battle for defense technology resources, Gary Roughead, the Robert and Marion Oster Distinguished Military Fellow, argues that quantum computing must not be neglected in favor of artificial intelligence. As Roughead writes, “It is in the interest of America’s national security and technology leadership to increase funding for quantum computing technology research and development (R&D) now.” Quantum computing complements and amplifies AI, and the United States must think and act strategically. Russia has invested millions and China billions, and, as Roughead says, the race is on. Roughead outlines a way forward for the United States: “A meaningful way to accelerate quantum computing adoption is to deepen the engagement of national labs with their expertise in utilizing HPC [high performance computing] resources towards strategic and scientific goals with committed American quantum computing companies, both large and small.” It is early days yet to see the promise of quantum computing, but Roughead cautions, “As the past is prologue in American innovation, don’t discount the small agile mover. They are the ones who enabled America to shape the world.”
Offense vs. Defense
In careful detail, Jacquelyn Schneider traces the development of military doctrine in response to changes in technology. At the dawn of the information age, the US military quickly employed the new advances to enhance offensive actions. Now, Schneider asserts, “the last twenty years of counterinsurgency and now a dogged digitally enabled trench war in Ukraine demonstrate how these same technologies may advantage defense.” Yet will the military establishment embrace that strategy? Schneider delves into the sources of the initial cult of the offensive, revealing “the power of organizational politics and strategic culture over shifts in technological capabilities or even the agency of individual commanders.” The major pivot to defensive strategy occurred in the early 1970s when Gen. William DePuy, looking at the 1973 Arab‒Israeli War, concluded that a modern battle is “too lethal to risk offensive action.” Moreover, electronic warfare became a significant form of combat power. Yet, DePuy’s approach was quickly overwhelmed by an “Army seeking a new proactive identity.” “Defense is what the adversary does; the American military seizes the initiative and dictates the battles it fights.” In Ukraine and elsewhere, that approach is being tested, and a defensive strategy may, once again, be advantaged by cutting-edge technologies.
A Wily Player in the Great Game
Hoover visiting fellow Sumit Ganguly gives an overview of India’s June elections. At first glance, it appears it will be business as usual with Prime Minister Modi winning a third term. But this time he will have to oversee a coalition government incorporating two regional parties. “The reality of a coalition government will undoubtedly limit Modi’s domestic agenda, but it is unlikely to alter India’s approach to foreign policy,” Ganguly writes. With a clean bill of health from the Indian Election Commission, Modi’s critics internally and externally have been reassured that democracy is alive and well in India. However, a major opposition leader was jailed during the elections, released, and then returned to judicial custody, so India’s democratic path isn't as smooth as New Delhi wishes its citizens or the world to believe. Whether Harris or Trump wins in November there will be little policy change. Both want increased defense sector cooperation and will continue to pressure India to stand firm against China’s approaches. Although negotiating with Modi presents challenges to the United States and other Western countries, as Ganguly writes, India “is far too consequential a market, too crucial to breaking supply chain bottlenecks, and too important a player in perhaps the world’s most strategically fraught neighborhood.”
Bear Repellent Needed
In his essay, Hoover senior fellow Russell Berman argues for the profound importance of preventing Russian gains in Ukraine. The world order—solidified during the past half century and guaranteed by American power and will—is being eroded. As it stands, there is no conclusive win in Ukraine for either side, and the support from the Biden administration has been insufficient to bring Kyiv to victory. There is “no evidence of a commitment to win the competition with Russia.” And losing Ukraine, as we did Afghanistan, “would represent an enormous blow to American credibility as a force for security and stability across the world.”
Europe—Home Alone?
Hoover senior fellow Timothy Garton Ash writes, “as today’s Russian president, Vladimir Putin, advances from the east and the US presidential contender Donald Trump threatens to withdraw from the west, it’s time to revisit the idea of Europe defending itself.” There is precedent for this strategy. In the 1950s a European Defense Community was proposed but Europe opted instead to join NATO. Parallels exist, particularly Russian aggression and the level of engagement required by Germany. But it would be of a different, more complicated composition. Garton Ash states that it would be “a European defense community with a lowercase ‘d’ and ‘c,’ connecting European, bilateral, and national capabilities to the existing military operational core in NATO.” The basis of NATO is credibility, and Garton Ash argues that Europe cannot depend on Trump to respect Article 5. The answers are increased weapons and ammunition to Ukraine, boosts in members’ conventional defense, and nuclear deterrence. Garton Ash concludes, “Gaullists and Atlanticists should seek common ground, understanding that a more European NATO is the only credible military core of an effective European defense community today.”
Dragon’s Breath
In his address of July 14, Hoover visiting fellow Matt Turpin assesses Communist Party policies in China. The economic liberalization introduced by Deng Xiaoping and continued in the 2013 Third Plenum has run its course. When Xi Jinping encountered instability, reforms were abandoned. In 2024 the problems are much worse. Shifts in supply chains, demographics, and the international environment are all negatively impacting China. Turpin asserts that “this is a do-or-die moment for the Party.” “If they cannot restore confidence in their economic competence, then things will get much worse for the Party.” He further concludes that Xi’s late reversal on COVID-19 policy is evidence of his stubborn dictatorial tendencies and inability to turn things around. And with regards to China’s neighbors, “Beijing’s own policies are creating the containment that they so fear.”
Leading the Cavalry Charge
Hoover national security visiting fellow Jakub Grygiel argues for more decisive American support for Ukraine that would allow for “one last serious chance at victory—defined … as a sustainable restoration of roughly its 2021 borders.” This requires “a large infusion of weapons” with no restrictions on their use. Thus far, the West has failed to give Ukraine the means to win, and, the author argues, “A long war of attrition is likely to end in Ukraine’s collapse.” Moreover, such a strategy “will keep [the] United States bogged down in a war without a path to victory.” In the meantime, China and Russia benefit from such volatility. Western military production is ramping up to the extent that by early 2025 enough ammunition could be provided for Ukraine to go on the offensive. And Ukraine, the author asserts, is a key part of Russia’s imperial ambitions. Without it, “Russia is only an Asian power, swiftly losing ground to China.” For all these reasons, “it is time for the next U.S. president to take decisive action.”
HISTORY IN FOCUS
From Hoover Institution Library & Archives: Dutch artist Louis Raemaekers (1869‒1956) has been called the Great Cartoonist of the Great War. His searing indictment of German wartime atrocities earned him immense fame and political influence on both sides of the Atlantic. From 1914 to 1918, Raemaekers published more than a thousand cartoons, reproduced in hundreds of newspapers. After the armistice, Raemaekers used his art to champion the League of Nations and later to sound the alarm against German and Italian fascism. The Hoover Library & Archives holds a significant collection of Raemaekers's works. Explore the Raemaekers collection finding aid and digitized posters featuring his artwork.
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