Syria’s Earthquake, Normalization, And Frozen Conflict: The Syrian Opposition's Views On The Current Crisis

>> Russell Berman: Good morning, thank you for coming. My name is Russell Berman, I'm the director of the working group on the Middle East and the Islamic World at the Hoover institution. And I'm delighted that you can join us today for this session on Syria's Earthquake Normalization in the Frozen Conflict, Syrian opposition's views on the current crisis.

Welcome as well, doctor Bader Jammuz and Joel Rayburn, a good friend. We'll have a discussion between Bader and Joel, and then there'll be questions and answers afterwards. Syrian conflict has been going on for more than 12 years now and shows little sign of reaching its end. For more than a dozen years, the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad has waged a brutal war against the majority of the Syrian population, starting with a military crackdown against what began as a civilian protest movement.

Assad's war has yielded many war crimes, the destruction of large swaths of the country, the arrest and disappearance of more than 200,000 Syrians into his jails. The use of chemical weapons, the forced displacement of more than half the Syria's pre war population, and a massive humanitarian crisis. The conflict has also witnessed the intervention of most of Syria's regional neighbors into the conflict in some way.

The rise and fall of an ISIS caliphate, the outbreak of Iranian-Israeli war on Syrian territory, and most recently, the growth of the Assad regime into one of the world's major narco states. In short, the conflict has been a disaster both for Syrians and for international security. For more than 12 years, the Assad regime's abuses and policies earned it international pariah status.

In recent months, however, there has been a trend among some Arab capitals to reverse their stances toward the regime and begin to normalize their relations with him and his regime. Despite the unwillingness to halt the war or to cooperate in a political resolution to the conflict. This Arab normalization trend has diverged sharply with the hardening isolation of the regime in Europe and the United States.

In Europe, courts have begun to prosecute the Assad regime for war crimes and other atrocities, indicating that the European countries will not entertain normalization of the regime anytime soon. In the United States, the picture has been more mixed, with the Biden administration seemingly reluctant to be as heavily involved in Syrian affairs as its predecessors.

But with Congress sticking closely to a policy of pressure against Damascus. While these policy developments were taking place, millions of Syrians suffered from the February 6th earthquake that left large portions of the opposition held northwest Syria and of adjacent Turkish provinces devastated. Tens of thousands of Syrians living in northwest Syria or living as refugees in Turkey were killed or injured in the earthquake, with hundreds of thousands more left homeless.

Against this backdrop, where is the Syrian conflict headed? And in particular, what is the Syrian people's reaction to these events and policy changes? What impact, if any, is the Arab country's normalization trend having on the ground among Syrian communities? And how can we assess the United States government's responses to these developments?

To explore these and other related questions, it's my pleasure to introduce our two speakers. Doctor Bader Jammuz is a founding member of the Syrian National Council since 2012, and the Syrian National Coalition served in numerous positions within the Syrian opposition. Doctor Jammuz, the current president of the Syrian Negotiations Commission, is a prominent lecturer in many international, regional, and local conferences, forums and workshops.

At the level of leaders and specialists in public and private international institutions concerned with the Syrian and regional affairs in diplomatic, legal, media, human rights, and humanitarian aid. Joel Rayburn is a retired US army officer, former diplomat with more than three decades of experience in the US military, intelligence community, the White House, State Department, and Congress.

His career includes roles as us special envoy for Syria, special advisor, excuse me, to Senator Bill Hagerty of Tennessee. Senior director at the National Security Council, and author of the US Army's official history of the Iraq war. He is co-founder and director of the American Center for Levant Studies.

Bader let me ask you to begin with a statement, please.

>> Badr Jamous: Thank you very much, Rossell. I am really happy to be here today to discuss the Syrian situation and normalization and the earthquake. Thank you for all of you and for this, as you know Hauberk and for my old friend Joel.

Let me start with why we are here. We started the trip to understand what's going on around in Europe. We had a visit to Brussels, Berlin, Paris, and also to some Arab capitals, Doharia, Cairo, and also to Ankara. We are trying to understand what going on so quickly.

Normalization for free, it will kill the political process. We understand any normalization without a solution, without a political solution, without the implement the 2254 resolution. It means more complicated, more refugee, more not stability in Syria, and more keep Syria situation long and long. So, we talked to our Arab friends.

We are in Washington since Monday. We met with the American administration to understand what their position. Which of course in the statement they are keeping, that they are not supporting the normalization and they still keep the political process under the 2254. They're still supporting the Syrian people, the Syrian opposition.

All this is very nice, but we need more to see in reality, we need to see more pressure in the capitals who are making normalization for free. We need a view to the American said the retirement of the US view, we need to see a clear view to the Syrian case.

So this why we are here. We met with the said department, we met with the congressman. We are trying to explain to them that our Syrian people, they are refusing this normalization. They will not go back home. They don't believe this regime without a political solution, without the implement 2254 it's not will be a solution in Syria.

So, we see that more and more refugees traveling outside of Syria, traveling even not the poor people, we see that middle class and even the rich people that are selling their houses in the mosque, they lost hope for any solution. It is very dangerous when we see the Syrian again lost hope.

When we even we didn't have result, when the CC working constitution committee it was giving some hopes even to the Syria people. Maybe soon it will be a solution. But after, when even the CC or constitution committee stopped, so the people they lost in hope. And after that we see quick normalization.

We don't understand, Why? What the result now to change the policy for Arab state or other state. We are changing their policy in Syria. We don't understand what their view. We try to understand from their side. But really for me, I met with them, I didn't understand why they are doing this now.

And what the result? Nothing changed from 2011. The regime started to kill the people. The 100,000 detainees, million refugee. The regime, he didn't change his policy. So why they are changing their policy in the Arab League or in the international quarantine. So this is the message. We try to explain also to our friend in Washington.

The decision is not in the SNC. Even if we go unsigned, it's nothing because million of Syrian, they are refusing this regime. So even we cannot go. Even if you have any idea, if you don't have give like a guarantee for the people about their future, future of their child, they will not go home.

So we need to have reality political solution. It's given to the Syrian people safety to go back home for the detainees, for the transition. If you don't have transition in Syria and you cannot build future of Syria, so that means no Syria. So this is the more dangerous.

See, we are now twelve years waiting. We have million of Syrian refugee in Turkey, in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Jordan, and in Europe, and even United States, maybe a small way. But we have here also some refugee came to the United States, to Canada. So what the future for?

See, these are big questions for all of us. All of us believe all Syria now I know from all the area of Syria, even in the regime, they need a political solution. They don't believe this regime. Today, the iranian militia they are controlling Syria. Bashar al-Assad, he not control Syria.

He cannot make any solution. Even in his area. We can see south of Syria, Daraa, after they take him from the Russia and the regime. We see how many militia, Iranian militia in the border of Jordan, Captagon increased thousand time export of Captagon. So the regime, he uses Captagon to put Russia in the Arab state and the other state.

So I don't want to talk a lot. Maybe you can give also Joel about and we can-

>> Russell Berman: Yes.

>> Badr Jamous: Thank you.

>> Russell Berman: Thank you, Joel, please.

>> Joel Rayburn: Now, I think the corollary, so what Badr is talking about, the Syrian opposition and the Syrian public trying to just understand the motivations, rationale, the decision making process and the Arab capitals toward normalization.

I think a lot of us are trying to understand the different policy making processes, the different decision making processes within the different parts of the us government as well. It's been a little inscrutable. But I think after a little more than two years of the current administration, we can now there's some strong judgments that we can make.

I think the first thing is, as Badr mentioned, the Biden administration has had a rhetorical commitment to the same goals as the previous two administrations. But they've had virtually no plans or implementation of policies to achieve those goals. It's been very much a hands off approach. I was involved in a more hands on approach from the previous administration.

But I'm not alone. The Obama administration was extremely active in the syrian crisis as well, really all the way up to the level of secretary of state Kerry, who was, who invested a lot of time in trying to get to diplomatic solutions. And we don't have that now on the diplomatic side.

There's no real effort to try to hold together an international policy. So that's the first aspect that I would say it's as though the energy behind the stated US policy has dissipated, and almost dissipated from day one of the administration, I'm disappointed to say. Now, I would say that this is in sharp divergence with what we're seeing in the US Congress.

I worked in US Congress for most of 2021, for Senator Hagerty, had a lot of involvement with the Foreign Relations Committee, foreign affairs committee on the House side as well. So I could tell both from my time as the Syria envoy and in Congress that the level of frustration with the Assad regime and its allies in Syria and beyond Syria was only rising.

So there was not a weakening of the policy position on the congressional side. And we've seen that a pressure policy toward the Assad regime for the objectives that were set out in the Caesar Act in December 2019 is still very much there. And it's near universal. This is a strong bipartisan trend in the Congress.

That has not gone away at all. I mean, my judgment, having worked in Congress for a little while and interacted with them a lot, is that it's never going away. The congressional stance toward Assad and his regime is permanent. It's indelible. It is irreversible. So what we have then is we have a Congress.

I think that, and particularly we're seeing initiatives come out of the House. You've seen the statements from House leadership, bipartisan leadership, statements from Senate foreign affairs leadership, foreign relations leadership, which is bipartisan. Almost every one of these statements of congressional intent is strongly bipartisan. That is going to lead to legislative initiatives that are going to essentially solidify in us law a us pressure policy and a us isolation of the Assad regime.

And measures that I think are meant to deter normalization, to deter a rehabilitation of Assad in the international sphere. That's coming from the Congress. So it's not just that, first and foremost, Congress is on the same vector that it has been while the Arab capitals are moving in a different direction.

This is a big problem for us relations with the arab capitals. And it may be that in the us relations with particular bilateral relations with certain arab capitals, Syria is not top of the list, but it's not at the bottom of the list either. And it's going to be a factor that is going to create severe tension, I think, in us relations with some of our closest arab partners.

It's corrosive to US-Arab relation, US-Gulf relations in particular. So that's a divergence. There's also a divergence between Congress and the administration because Congress is becoming more active on its consistently hard stance against the backdrop of an administration. Administration that is not implementing the policy, it's not implementing congressional policy.

What this is gonna lead to, and we're seeing signs of it already, I think, is a congressional intervention in the implementation of us law concerning Syria. You're gonna see Congress, I think, take steps that are going to mandate the executive branch in the implementation of a Syria policy.

So now we have a tension also between Congress and the executive branch. At the same time, I think there's more we're starting to see. One of the most serious trends that doesn't get talked about, although it's been referenced in European media outlets. Is that the Europeans are on a trend of war crimes investigations, indictments and trials of senior Assad regime officials for the massive crimes against humanity and atrocities.

 

>> Russell Berman: For example.

>> Joel Rayburn: For example, I mean, we've already seen convictions of sort of mid level Assad regime, military intelligence people, security people. Most recently, we've now seen an indictment of Ali Mamlouk, who is effectively the number two guy in the Assad regime for his involvement in war crimes and torture and so on.

Jamil Hassan, who is another very senior regime of a figure, also indicted multiple times, multiple European courts. I think, at this stage, we know how seriously the EU countries take International Criminal Justice. That will be a policy constraint, it will be impossible for a European government that is prosecuting the Assad regime for serious war crimes to then normalize with the Assad regime.

So what we are seeing is an isolation policy, a pressure policy in Europe toward the Assad regime being hardwired in through the criminal justice system there. So once again, we have the European countries moving in this vector while the Arab countries moving this vector. That will create tensions in relations between the Arab capitals and the European capitals as well.

So we're at a divergence right now, we can explore, I think, the reasons for that maybe a little later in the conversation. But the last thing that I would say is in response, why has there been a stampede of normalization lately in the Arab capitals? To be honest with you, I think some of the decision making circles that wanted to move forward on a normalization policy in the Arab capitals, used the earthquake aftermath as the cover for pushing forward, for accelerating normalization policies that they already wanted to pursue.

And they did it in the name of humanitarian relief. In actuality, the normalization is gonna undermine the humanitarian situation in Syria by making the regime stronger, for example, the international relief that flew into Damascus, essentially the bulk of it, went through two different channels. One Asma al Assad's kleptocratic NGO, the Syria Trust for Development, which is just a cover for the Assad regime to gobble up assets inside Syria and to divert humanitarian aid.

And the other is the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, which is run by Khaled Hboubati, who is a former nightclub owner, buddy of Bashar al Assad, who is essentially another kleptocrat whose job is to divert international aid. That's where the international aid going into Damascus is flowing through, it's the most direct diversion of international aid yet.

So it's actually undermining and detracting from the credibility of international humanitarian assistance. So, but this is what's been done in the aftermath of the earthquake, what the US administration's response to this has been not just passive, but I think has been tacitly in approval of these normalization steps.

What we're hearing from sources in the Arab capitals is that, when they've floated to the us administration the idea that they might normalized with the Assad regime, they've been given essentially a green light. They've been given a tacit green light privately, in public, we've seen worrying statements such as, the State Department messaging that.

Well, if you're going to normalize with Assad, at least try to get something out of it, as though this is a business deal as opposed to a problem for international security. So I think, unfortunately, to circle back around to where I started out at the beginning of these comments is that the US administration has played a very negative role.

I think, Perhaps to a great degree, inadvertently or unintentionally, but to some degree, I think there has been some attitude inside the administration that it's actually in US interests to have the Arab states normalize and just to get the Syrian issue off of the table as a problem for the US to handle.

I'll stop there.

>> Russell Berman: Well, thank you for that setting. It takes us from US policy to Europe policy to the earthquake implications and back to the US. But I want to come back to Syria, but what is normalization supposed to mean? And could it work?

>> Badr Jamous: This very good question, the question is it how they are doing?

It will work, in reality, it's not work, what they are doing. So is it Assad controlling the, even the state of Syria today? He's not controlling the state of Syria, Syria controlling by Iranian, by Russian, by militia, by corruption. So even if Assad, I don't say about his criminal why they are doing this.

But even we are talking it's worked. If it is work, the normalization, we are sure that we work because nobody can push the million of Syrian to go back to Syria without change in this regime. We are talking about Lebanon for example, we have one million Syrian in Lebanon, in the more bad situation.

I think you hear in the news what's going on now in Beirut, in Lebanon for the Syrian refugee, they are in the more bad situation but nobody coming back. And we know who are controlling Lebanon, it means not states who are far away from the regime. So the regime is controlling Ibn through Hezbollah and through the alliance in Beirut and in Lebanon.

But also the Syrian, they are not going back from there. If we are talking about camps, for example, Yarmouk camps with the more bad situation in the world, nobody coming back. If is it the syrian, why they are not coming back? I know many of those people, they have houses, they have land, they have their business in Syria but they are worried about their safety.

Nobody can guarantee their life to go back to Syria. So the questions if it is normalization, anybody work for normalization without a guarantee for the Syrian people. Solution transition more more change in Syria, future of Syria, if don't see like this. I know the Syrian people in all the territory of Syria, in the regime area in northeast or northeast, nobody want to see the normalization like this.

So all the Syrian even I know and we are in connection with the Syrian people even in Kridaha, in the city of Bashar al Assad. We are talking. To them, all of them, they are worried about all this because they see that they are keeping the militia controlling Syria, Iranian, Mafia.

So, today we don't have state, we have Mafia state, we have Captagon state, we have Militia state, we have Iranian state, but we don't have Syrian state. This very big question for all the capitals who are making normalization. So when we are talking to the Arab state, which some of them, they are doing this normalization long time ago under the table.

They use the earthquake now to bring up the table. So it's not new for us. We know that some capital, they are long time trying to do this normalization. They are supporting the regime under the table. Now, when the earthquake came, they used the earthquake to go up in the table.

They are using the interest of the CRM B ball, which is not our interest. Maybe their interest, maybe their exchange between some solution and other place. They want to sell it in Syria, but for sure it's not for the interest of the Syrian people. So we want a solution.

We need very quick solution. Of course, Syrian people, they are tired. We need to go back to Syria. We need to build our Syria. But we know that we have to build it in the right way. It means you need to see the future of Syria for our child to explain to people to go back from all the country around Syria, for example.

Of course I know that's the Arabian Syrian, in Europe, they will not go back, but in Turkey, in Iraq, in Jordan, in Lebanon, in Egypt. So, they will go back and they will find the solution. And we are talking here about 13 million Syrians, they are in North Syria, or in Turkey, or in Arab capital.

 

>> Russell Berman: So what would have to happen in Damascus for those refugees to want to return?

>> Badr Jamous: You mean without a transition?

>> Russell Berman: What transition would happen?

>> Badr Jamous: Of course, if no solution, if you push these people to go back, so we lost a lot of these people. Today, we don't know 100,000 of detainees.

Where is it? So this question, if we don't know all these 12 years, where our detainees, where our people who are arrest all these years, who can give guarantee for anybody to just go back to Syria? So, of course, you are wishhing them to die, wishing him to kill under the regime.

So, any country they will do that, it will be like partner with Bashar al-Assad to kill the Syrian people.

>> Russell Berman: Joel, Bata describes Syria as a Mafia state, a Captagon state, and one that is effectively occupied by Iran. Why does the administration want to encourage normalization with this state of affairs?

 

>> Joel Rayburn: I don't think the administration broadly wants to normalize with Assad. I think most of the US government institutions are committed to a policy of opposing Bashar al-Assad, even if it's not an active pressure policy, at least a nominal policy against Assad. I think there are some folks who are still committed to the idea of detente with the Iranian regime and its allies in the Middle East.

And they view an end of a pressure policy against the Assad regime as part of that detente. That halting the act of pressure against the Assad regime would help to set the stage for some kind of opening between Washington and Tehran that would solve our problems a la Nixon, and the Chinese, and the Soviets in the early 70s.

I think this is deeply misguided. It's doomed to fail. It's already been tried before and failed. But I think there are some folks who are at a decision-making level in the Biden administration who are committed to that. They're committed even now to reviving the Iran nuclear agreement and as an entree to, as I say, a detente relationship between the Iranian regime and the United States and Assad as a satellite of the Iranian regime.

Well, just in the same way, this manifested itself at the very beginning of the Biden administration, when one of the first policy decisions they made concerning the Middle East was to unilaterally lift the foreign terrorist organization designation of the Houthis in Yemen. It was done in the name of humanitarian access to Hudaydah Port.

In actuality, it was done as a goodwill gesture to the Iranian supreme leader to try to set the stage for a return to US-Iranian talks that would lead to essentially normalization between the United States and Tehran. I think the Biden administration still quietly is committed to try to seek normalization with the Iranian regime.

And normalization with Assad is one of the waypoints toward that broader normalization. So these people, this group, I think sees a normalization between our Arab allies, essentially, and the Assad regime as something that can help set the stage, diffuse regional tensions, and set the stage for normalization between the United States and Tehran.

I think this is fantastical, actually. It's highly unrealistic because of the nature of the Iranian regime under supreme leader of Khamenei. This is a regime that's more interventionist in a destabilizing way beyond its borders than ever before. The Iranian regime has intervened than the Ukraine war. It's intervening crisis outside of region, and it's not gonna stop.

So, I think this is the reason though I think. That's the internal decision-making rationale behind the lack of action on a pressure policy against Assad. Frankly, that was the same attitude that was there in the late Obama administration from 2013 to 2016. While the Obama administration was also looking for a normalization with the Iranian regime by way of the Iran nuclear agreement the first time.

And there was a divergence within the Obama administration in the same way, while you had Secretary Kerry spinning his wheels, try to come up with nationwide ceasefires with Lavrov. Then you had another part of the Obama administration that was wanting to pull punches to put the brakes on a pressure policy against the Assad regime, which left Secretary Kerry with no arrows in his quiver to try to enforce ceasefires and into the conflict and a political solution in Syria.

We're back in the same place. It's just that this time in the US administration, unlike in the Obama administration, there's no secretary Kerry out there visibly trying to use diplomatic means and a diplomatic process to get to and into the conflict and to get the Assad regime to change its behavior.

The other rationale from the Arab capitals, though, there are two rationales from the Arab capitals to explain their side of normalization, which I think the US administration also tacitly encourages. The first is the Arab capitals say, well, a reason for Arab normalization with Assad is that the Iranians, the Russians have influence in Damascus, but there's no countervailing Arab influence.

There's no competition with the Iranian and Russian influence in Damascus. So we, the Arab capitals, need to get back into Damascus to compete against Iranian and Russian. Influence, of course, what that works down to is, who can buy Bashar al Assad's favor? And then you're in the same blackmail extortion game as the Arab world and the rest of the international community had to play with his father, Hafez al-Assad for three decades, over and over again.

As, for example, Henry Kissinger had learned to his chagrin. The second rationale, which is that Captagon is being dumped into Saudi Arabia in particular, having a very corrosive effect on Saudi society. And so, Assad is the one who can solve that for the Gulf. This is, in other words, it's making a deal with the arsonist to put out the fire, which, of course, is the same regional policy, the regional strategy that Bashar al Assad inherited from his father, Hafez Allah said.

Create problems in the region around you, and then present yourself as the solution. So if the Arab capitals are gonna come down, if the Gulf capitals in particular, are gonna come down to the issue of Captagon. Just as their driving factor, all the other problems that the Assad regime presents will continue unabated.

State sponsorship of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, the war crimes and atrocities, as well as the vast humanitarian crisis. So I think that none of the rationales, neither on the US administration side nor the Arab capital side, do these rationales actually make sense. And they've all been tried before and failed, but that's the situation that we're in right now.

 

>> Russell Berman: Okay, I wanna clarify, Joel, because you've been very precise in your characterization of US policy. In the Congress means bipartisan support for accountability in Damascus for political transition, there's no doubt about that. And even in the administration, the executive branch, there's still significant sectors that support that position.

But somehow, there are some influential voices that are still pursuing the JCPOA, that are still pursuing rapprochement with Iran. Does this mean, is it fair to say then, that arguments for rapprochement with Iran is prepared to pay the price of ignoring the human rights violations and the crimes against humanity in Syria?

 

>> Joel Rayburn: Well, that's absolutely right, because otherwise, for the last two years, we would have seen a pace of sanctions against the Assad regime under the Caesar Act. Or other associated authorities that we saw in the previous administration, some of which I was implementing. Instead, the sanctuous pressure against the Assad regime in the name of human rights dropped off to a trickle in January 2021.

And it's never really come back, which what we're describing here, what I'm describing and you've gotten onto is, this is a Middle East policy by stealth. It is not stated publicly because it's indefensible. The stated policy is not the same as the implemented policy, and the implemented policy can't be acknowledged publicly because it can't withstand scrutiny.

And you have also therefore, never seen a confirmed official in the executive branch go to Congress in a hearing, an oversight hearing, and explain, this is our policy. Our policy is to seek normalization with the Iranian regime via the revival of the Iran nuclear agreement in some form.

And as part of that, our policy is to tacitly approve normalization with the Assad regime as setting the stage for a broader detent between the US administration and the Iranian supreme leader and his allies in the region. You have never seen anyone speak that either publicly in the media or to Congress, because they know that it would be batted down immediately.

But that is in fact their position.

>> Russell Berman: Bado, you've been here in the United States for a week or so, you've met with people in Washington, tell us, what do you want from the United States? What US policy would you like to see implemented?

>> Badr Jamous: Of course, we need more clear position, we need to see Caesar Act for some solution in the countries who are supporting or making normalization with the regime.

We need to see more clear position in the 254 support more to the UN Syrian envoy, not to keep him like working, he does know how to do his job. He needs also support from the state and the security council, United States the most important on this. We need support to the Syrian people today.

Also, opposition, they need the support. We see Bashar-al Assad in many capitals coming, we need to support also the Syrian people and the Syrian opposition to be more stronger, to more represent the Syrian people. So all of this we are asking Said Bertram to our meeting them last week with the congressman, with our friend here in Washington.

So this is very important. Of course, we need also a strong message to the capitals who are doing the normalization for free. How we are saying without a transition, without 2254, implement 2254. So they have to send a strong message to this capital. Why are you doing this?

For what? We need really process to be, we need a solution for Syria, maybe international conference for Syria to push the Implement 2254. Because we cannot just keep it now for 12 years off, from 2012, now 11 years resolution Geneva and from 2015, 2254 and nothing, no any result.

Zero result for all the political process, because there is no really power pushing to implement this 2254. So all this, I think we need to do with the United States, with the EU capitals, with some Arab capitals, with other states who are working with Turkey. So all of this capital they have to work altogether to implement 2254, without this, no solution in Syria, no back to the refugee, no future of Syria.

If we don't see that, that means the conflict of Syria, it will be continuous more and more time, and all this will affect the Syrian people more and more.

>> Russell Berman: Are you getting productive support from the EU, from the Europeans?

>> Badr Jamous: Yes, we visit Basil, thy also send the message after our meeting with them about three no, normalization, key to keep sanction also, and no infrastructure in Syria.

All this, we need to see all capital they are doing the same. We need to put all this pressure in the regime and the alliance of the regime to help to implement the 2254 revolution.

>> Russell Berman: Regarding Europe, Joel, before you mention the divergence between Europe and the Arab states because of the court proceedings, could you elaborate on that, please?

 

>> Joel Rayburn: Yeah, I think, well, first of all, and I have some involvement with the effort to support International Criminal Justice against war crimes and other atrocities in Syria. Ambassador Stephen Rapporte, who's here in the audience today, has been working on this even more. So there is ambassador rap actually is the one a who has a very extensive History in international war crimes prosecutions, ambassador pointed out that the sheer amount of evidence of the Assad regime's war crimes.

And crimes against humanity far exceeds what the international prosecutors had to prosecute the Nazi leaders at Nuremberg. So, even the prosecution we're seeing in Europe are significant, but I think they're just the tip of the iceberg. Because there's a vast amount of evidence that's going to make its way through the criminal justice pipeline in European courts, both national courts and international courts, that's gonna continue to go.

The practical effect of that, when you start getting criminal judgments, they can be accompanied by civil judgments, they can be accompanied by cases in European courts. That will look for injunctions to freeze Assad regime or associated assets in the European jurisdictions while those cases are going forward. You could wind up with Gulf commercial assets or Gulf investments in Europe, Gulf owned assets in Europe being frozen while these court cases are being adjudicated at some point in the next few years, I think this is likely to happen.

This should be a warning, I think, to the Gulf capitals in particular, that normalization and association with the Assad regime can get their assets attached to court proceedings against the Assad regime in Europe. And that'll have a major impact on both European and Gulf policy when it starts to happen.

 

>> Russell Berman: If the court proceedings end in where you predict them to end, that would not only be a warning to the Gulf capitals, but it would seem to put the Europeans, in effect, at odds with aspects of US foreign policy.

>> Joel Rayburn: Yes, yeah, well, with the implementation of US policy, it won't put them at odds with official US policy, and it won't put them at odds with the laws that are being promulgated from Congress.

So, the European Union right now is effectively implementing the Caesar Act far more energetically than the United States executive branches.

>> Russell Berman: One more question about the international setting, what role is Russia playing in all of this?

>> Joel Rayburn: Here again, we have something that baffles me, we have an international consensus, certainly a transatlantic consensus, to try to pressure the Russians because of the invasion of Ukraine, the continued conflict and atrocities in Ukraine.

And yet Vladimir Putin's top Middle Eastern client is getting a free pass almost, what it essentially means is that rather than viewing, I was the military strategist, national security strategist. If I'm wanting to put geopolitical pressure on Russia, I'm going to look at Russia's crucial allies around the world.

And I'm gonna see what pressure tools I have against Russian involvement directly in those countries or indirectly to pressure Russia's allies, to put pressure on, essentially Vladimir Putin's international alliance, international coalition. It makes perfect strategic sense to pressure the Assad regime in order to raise the cost to Vladimir Putin of keeping Bashar-al-Assad afloat.

By going the other way, by normalizing with Assad, or by declining to enforce us law to pressure Bashar-al-Assad, the Arab capitals in the United States right now are essentially paying for Vladimir Putin's Middle East policy. They're underwriting Vladimir Putin's Middle East policy at a time when we're ranged against Bashar-al-Assad.

Look at the investment the United States is making against Putin's military adventurism in Ukraine, yet we're essentially assisting him and preserving his position in Syria, makes no sense. It makes no sense.

>> Russell Berman: Let me thank you both and turn now to the audience, and we have a microphone here, so please, right here.

 

>> Betsy Dribbin Gutman: Thank you, Betsy Dribbin Gutman, Multi-faith Alliance, I wanted to ask about more on Captagon, the Levant has been flooded with it, and it is clearly a bargaining chip in efforts for normalization. The countries are very interested in Assad stemming this tide. But how realistic would it be considering that Hezbollah, the Mafia, and there are so many elements, and now it's up to about 6 billion or more in terms of revenue, is this even realistic to try and use this as leverage, thank you.

 

>> Badr Jamous: Thank you for this question, and I think this very important question for the Arab state who are thinking that they can stop the Captagon gone if they will make normalization with the regime today, the kept alone, it's bring billion dollars to the region. And this mean not to Bashar-al -Assad directly one of this, but it means how we say Mafia, It's Hezbollah, it's Iranian militia.

It's Maher al-Assad, the brother of Bashar al -Assad and Bashar Assad by himself, so now they see the more easy money coming to the Captagon and the Captagon it was resolved, that's all country how they are thinking coming to the mosque. So it's not full stop, they will use it like nearly all the time, maybe they will do it maybe a little to show that we are trying to fight the Captain world.

But we are see the Captagon, the Jordanian to the North Syria going to Europe, we see all every day in Italy, in Athena, it's not just in the Arab state, so they can use it and they are also trying to use the refugee. Now, we know that they open also some offices in Damask to help the people who want to go refugee to Europe, they will send in the summertime thousands of people to Europe to put Europe in the Russia.

That they have to make normalization with the regime to stop this refugee from Syria, so we think that the Captagon will continues, that's why we are saying that the normalization is not will work. Because they will not take back anything the Arabs save for this normalization, they don't stop Captagon, they cannot take Hezbollah and the militia out of Syria, they are controlling Syria, they are giving now when in the difficult time of Iran.

Now they are winning in Yemen, in Syria, in Lebanon, so nobody fighting with Iranian now, as before it was somebody fighting with Iran, and now the Iranian become more and more stronger. And the militia of Iran, they are bringing huge money to the Captagon, why they have to stop this business.

 

>> Joel Rayburn: So also, from an American standpoint, saying that Maher al-Assad, Bashar's brother is the Captagon kingpin of the Middle East. The idea that the Assad regime can be an ally in shutting down something that itself is doing is crazy. I mean, in American terms, it would be like saying, gosh, we're the state government of New Jersey, and we're having such a problem with our waste management contractors.

Let's go do a deal with Tony Soprano to help us solve our waste management problem, this is the. And once you give in to the extortion, you're with the guys who control. Who control it. You're trapped forever. You're in there forever. And if Assad ever wants something else, if they do this deal in the name of Captagon and Assad says, all right, we'll do counter drug enforcement here in Damascus.

That is, we'll just tell our people to shut, to slow down the production the next time there's a dispute between Damascus and Riyadh. It's going back up. It's going back down. It's like Hafez al Assad. Hafez al Assad was the guy who originated all these ideas. Look, it's the militants in Lebanon.

It's the military, we'll put it in. And they control the dial. When you're in that relationship with them, that you're just gonna be trapped forever. It's silly, what we should have done however. And I think one of the things that Riyadh is responding to is that this problem has been coming for several years.

We've known since. I mean, it was a red alert by 2020, by the spring, summer of 2020. You guys remember when the news broke that there was a shipment of captagon that got confiscated? Massive shipment of captagon got confiscated in Italy, and it came out of Latakia Port.

And the media said, well, here we go. ISIS is exporting the Jadi drug to Id no. Everyone in Syria knows ISIS ain't exporting nothing from Maher al Assad's port in Syria. So we knew right then we should have ramped up enforcement right then, international drug enforcement right then.

The problem has gone on for three years without a proper US and international drug enforcement response. The Captagon act, which come from French Hill got through the last Congress, it was very slow in the Congress approving that. And when they did approve it, a lot of the enforcement mechanisms, such as kingpin designations, were pulled out.

So in the absence of, and Captagon, I think, would not be that difficult to shut down using international law enforcement. We have the infrastructure and also shutting down the money because this is black money that has to be turned into gray money that has to be laundered into white money.

And we can stop that if we put enough attention to it. We haven't done that for three years. I think in the absence of that kind of response, the Saudis decided to go make a deal with Tony Soprano to stop the waste management problem. So I think part of it, it's on us.

We have not responded to this crushing concern of our allies in the region and left them without an alternative. I don't wanna excuse all their policy because I still think it's a horrible policy, but that's one of the rationale.

>> Russell Berman: But when you describe Hafiz, as I said, turning, speaking up and down on drug flow, it indicates that this is not just the business.

I think we should recognize international drugs as part of global hybrid warfare. Yeah, that Captagon in the Middle East is like fentanyl here.

>> Joel Rayburn: Well, with Hapazah Assad, it wasn't drunk so much as it was militant activity, militant proxy activity, rockets, assassinations, car bombs. He could turn it up and he could turn it down.

That was his PKK reason.

>> Russell Berman: We had another question here.

>> Anas Abda: Thank you.

>> Joel Rayburn: And this is, it can wait, this is Anas Abda, another member of the Syrian.

>> Anas Abda: Yes, I'm a member of the Syrian negotiation commission. When we talk to Syrians inside and outside Syria, they tell us that the normalization is a policy of appeasement.

And history tells us very clearly that it did not work in the past and it will not work now and it will not work in the future. Normalizing with a regime that is giving unlimited material support to Iran and its terrorist organizations and militias can only empower Iran, not only in Syria, but also in the region.

It will be a big present to Putin, to the Russian diplomacy as well. But most important of all, it will kill any hope of reaching a political solution in Syria. Now, my question is, why all these very clear reasons for such an appeasement policy is not registering either in the US or in the international community.

I mean, are we missing something as Syrian opposition, or is there something wrong with this world? Thank you.

>> Russell Berman: Thank you. I thought you'd like to respond.

>> Joel Rayburn: Well, Russell, why don't. What are your thoughts on that?

>> Russell Berman: Well, Joel, you've described fractures within the implementation of us foreign policy and that some are pursuing this elusive Iran deal Still, they're prepared to pay the price of Syrian suffering in order to sign a treaty in Tehran.

I think that's elusive. I think it's illusionary. But I understand that logic. Beyond that, I can only agree with you that from a US point of view, from the standpoint of US national interest, it makes no sense to support a de facto pro Putin policy. This is aside from the morality of the abuses that's going on, aside from the needs of the Syrian people for a cold US foreign policy.

This makes no sense because we're engaged in this global competition that has become a hot war in Ukraine right now. And this normalization is one piece of the puzzle that would support the other side. I add to that what I find particularly appalling is the human rights dimension to it.

I know that there are reasons to make realpolitik arguments and not wax too moralistic, but nonetheless, the United States has a foreign policy committed to support of human rights. This administration in particular has presented itself as the one with human rights at the core of its foreign policy.

And nonetheless, you have the human rights violations of the century going on in Syria right now. And the State Department, the White House just don't care. It's appalling. Another question.

>> Mohammed: Thank you so much, Mohammed, with the Syrian American Council and the American Coalition for Syria. I have a question, a quick question for Bedev.

So when you raise your objections with the State Department and ask for a clearer position or normalization, etc., what was the reception like? What was their response?

>> Badr Jamous: Thank you, Muhammad. Ahmad, we are hearing from them the same, what we are hearing before that we are still in the same position.

We are no normalization. We are supporting that 2254 so this, it's okay. But in reality we need more stronger messages mean we don't see this stronger with the UN, for example. We don't see this with the Arab Aliyaz. We don't see this with the other capitals who are trying to, how many of here say saying that this normalization does not bring the political solution, they don't bring any hope for the Syrian people.

So why we are losing time? The question now, how long we will wait Lost in time until we would have a political solution or solution for Syria. We have huge number of child without schools. You can image what that mean for the future. You're asking about this organization Daj or apparently the CU, you understand what mean a huge number of hundred thousand of child without education.

Or you are pushing them to the killer who are killed their fathers or mother or about their family. So, today, we have to innocent message that we are trying to be traveling around the capital to explain to everybody how long you will keep the Syrian files open. You will receive many problem, not just the Syrian people.

It's for all the international community. Today the Syrian people lost hope with the international community, lost hope with the all our friend. They see the Russian and the Iranian, they are fighting with the regime. They are making result in power with this regime. And our friend, we all our international committee, EU, American, Turkey, some Arab friends with us from the beginning of the revolution.

Where they are today, they are changing all of them. They are trying to change their policy in the way of Russian and Iranian policy in Syria. And this is very dangerous. And again, it's not we want, you in Syriawe don't have opposition and regime. We have a people, we have million of people, they refusing this.

So it means not just if the opposition accept or not accept. So it means not up to us. We are just trying to see what the Syrian people they need. We see, and you see all of you how many million Syrian they are refusing this all normalization or anybody will go to normalization without to find the solution to the Syrian people.

They will refuse it. They will keep fighting by all the way to stop all this normalization. And they will not go back to Syria. And they will try to be traveling refugee to all the world to sending messages that we have a killer in the mosque is kill us.

And they don't want to change their policy. All this will be.

>> Russell Berman: Comment here please.

>> Tifa al Qambar: Tifa al Qambar, the answer to the normalization with Asma al Assad is very clear. The stated policy of the current administration is to appease Iran and normalization with Iran or appeasing Iran is a message getting to the gulf.

And I remember I was working with the late Ahmed Shalabi. In 1998, President Clinton sent Kofi Annan to Baghdad to open relations between the United States and Saddam. And Kofi Annan smoked his cigar and said this is a man we can work with. What stopped President Clinton from normalizing with Saddam was the Liberation Act.

Which came timely at the same time, which is in October 1998, which basically created a new culture of prohibiting any normalization between the US and Saddam. My question to you is, is there a possibility for the US, sorry, for the Syrian opposition, I mean, I learned from the Iraqi opposition, Washington, what matters, nothing else.

Europe, nobody can do anything to dictators. And have you worked or tried to do something? And I encourage you to push US Congress for something similar to the Iraq Liberation act. We can call it the Syrian Liberation act. Thank you.

>> Badr Jamous: Thank you for your question. Of course, we are working at the Syrian, yes, probably are working here very well.

We had a meeting with them yesterday, and we are trying to work together on something similar like this. We have to push in the Congress. We have meeting today after also our meeting here, we are going to Congress. So we believe that the United States is most important capital, but also we have to work with other sources because what we can say everywhere we are going we see the same question.

We don't know the American policy. And here we hear like this and Arab said we're hearing like this and Turkey we hear like this. So there is no clear policy in just message the Arab send me. So I agree with you. We have to work more and more in Washington.

This why we are here today, and we will try to be more and more here. And this question not just for the Syrian opposition. The Syrian, they are working. Believe me, there are a hundred people that are working in Washington. All of them, maybe they are not in the same opposition, but they are all of them trying to send the same message and pushing the American administration and the Congress to have similar like what you see, that you say.

 

>> Russell Berman: Joe, well, you were protecting some legislative action, weren't you?

>> Joel Rayburn: Yeah, I think it's coming. First of all, I think Congressman French Hill's Captagon Act last year requires the executive branch to develop a strategy for countering Captagon and then report back to the Congress on the progress.

That strategy, it doesn't give new authorities to designate Narco traffickers, kingpin and so on. I think this year in this current Congress, you'll see that added to the Captagon Act, it will have its own teeth the way the Caesar Act does. Secondly, I think you'll see legislation. I think members of Congress are not blind.

They can see what's happening with the Arab capitals. They don't like it. They want to send a strong signal. They've been doing that in public messaging. I think you'll see legislation that will also mandate a US policy position toward normalization. And third would be something that I saw in my own time in the Senate is there has been working, let's call it a Caesar 2.0.

There's the Caesar Act, which was first drafted more than four years ago. Gosh, more than five years ago now in its initial state, it needs to be updated. There have been some enforcement areas that need to be updated, and those have been bouncing around the halls of Congress for a couple of years now.

And I think in this Congress you'll see it submitted, certainly in the House, potentially in the Senate. So those are the thrusts, I think, of the legislative intervention that I think we're gonna see in Syria policy coming from Congress in 2023, or certainly in the term of this current Congress.

 

>> Badr Jamous: Here

>> George Seifel: George Seifel, representing citizens for secure and Safe America and the Assyrian Democratic Organization. First of all, thank you for what you've done here. This is wonderful. And I'd like to thank Dr. Beta Jammos, Dr. Anslobdein, my dear brother Brahim for traveling here and lobbying the US government and Congress and the State Department on behalf of Syria.

I had two full questions, one for you, one for you, actually. My question is, Dr. Beta Jamos, I know you are working in meeting with the Arab states in discussing the situation. What are you hearing from them regarding the normalization? And I know you're pressuring to stop it, but what are you hearing back?

That's my first question. Second question to Joe, and that is you brought up the Caesar Act. The Caesar Act so far has been implemented to a degree. The greatest part of it that's being implemented right now is that the banking system is still prohibiting the transfer of nature.

Future amounts of money into the government of Syria, so it's prohibiting these normalization acts to help the regime a little. But the Iran nuclear deal is still not there, we are not pushing to it, and it's surprising that this administration hasn't yet. However, the news that we're hearing is that Iran is reaching 85%, at reaching its nuclear capacity.

And the bombs that are dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were at 80%. So do we see that the more Iran advances its nuclear program, that that could put pressure on the US government to normalize relations with Iran and therefore help the Assad regime, Thank you.

>> Badr Jamous: Thank you, George, you know, we visit, I told you, visit some Arab capital, which we of course respect this capital.

They help us a lot, all this time, 12 years they were in our side. We are with big respect for them, but we have different view, what we are listening from them, it means the Arab, the Syrian intersect. We are worried about Syria and we have to be how my friends will say that the Iranian and the Russia there, we have to be also near to the state and we have to show our power inside Syria.

And we are worried about Iranian power inside Syria, and what we are doing is for the interest of the Syria. So of course I told them, can you show us how you can do that, where, for example, where the refugee can you send it back? Where the detainees are you talking with the regime about implement 2254.

So nothing clear, so this what we are warning that's running quickly for normalization. And we don't see any initiative, for example, you don't like 2254, you can put in the table different payback and you can. Okay, invited us to discuss with you what we can do, what we cannot do.

But to see like this very quickly, we need to invite you to the Arab League meeting to see that some leadership in the mosque or you see Bashar, I said in other capital, so it's not work. It means you are just sending wrong message to the Syrian people, for the people they are seeing that you are.

Forget about the Syrian people, you are doing your interest. So to be clear with you, I hear from them, not like some interesting word for the Syrian people, we are working for Syria. But in the result, I don't see that, we don't see any favor until today what that means by they are working for the Syrian.

 

>> Joel Rayburn: Charlie, before I turn to your wrong nuclear program question, I just wanna on the issue of the prohibitions on financial transactions with Damascus. Unfortunately, in the immediate aftermath of the February 6 earthquake, the US administration issued a very broad general license that allows unfettered and unvetted financial transactions to go to Damascus for six months in the name of earthquake, immediate earthquake relief.

There are some problems with this, first of all, there's no mechanism to ensure that that's not dirty Assad money going in or out. Secondly, and there was no mechanism whatsoever, it was a free for all, essentially, it was toxic waste being dumped into the river. Secondly, it was going into Assad regime banks that have no presence in the most heavily affected areas, which are in opposition hill territory.

So money that would go into Damascus, there's no onward point for it to actually go to Jindaras, for example. The third thing is, the whole world knows that pays attention, that the Assad regime manipulates exchange rates or they scam fees off the top of every wire transfer that goes into Damascus.

So even earthquake relief transfers were subject to that same manipulation by the regime, which means a windfall for the regime. Fourth, is no one asked the Syrian people whether this was a good idea, no one asked the Syrian-American community or Syrian opposition whether it's a good idea. They just did it within three days of the earthquake, so the bottom line, and then also it's a six month license for immediate earthquake relief.

It would have been one thing to say, well, for two weeks or 30 days, we're gonna do this, but to say we're gonna do it for six months. The inescapable conclusion is that it was intended to punch a permanent hole through the Caesar act, and then that you'll get to six months and then there will be a renewal, an indefinite renewal.

And that this will be the way, this will be the loophole through which the US administration is going to allow the Gulf states to send money to Damascus in the name of earthquake relief or whatever, but also without a definition of earthquake relief, what causes earthquake relief? It's in the eye of the beholder, which means that also it could be Captagon profits that have been in a bank or other exchange house in Dubai being repatriated back into Damascus.

So it becomes a cover for the laundering of Captagon profits that are reaped in Saudi Arabia. That's the problem with general license 23 in terms of congressional intervention. Now this Congress, there's been a backlash against this overbroad undermining of the license that undermines the Caesar Act. I think you're likely to see congressional intervention on that score as well, as for the Iran nuclear program, your question about enrichment?

Look, it's the same dial it's the same, the fatal flaw of the Iran nuclear agreement, there were several, but one of the major ones was that it gave the Iranian regime possession of the means to enrich uranium. And as long as it had that and it was allowed to enrich uranium under the nuclear agreement, then it could dial up or dial down in the same Hafez Al-Assad, Tony Soprano way, and so here we are.

This is, we're at the completely predictable, logical endpoint of the nuclear agreement, which is that the Iranians are dialing up the enrichment level to explore. But also to get close to the nuclear, nuclear weapon capability that they want not to use against the rest of the world, but to use to prevent the rest of the world from supporting the Iranian population against them, which is their greatest fear.

 

>> Russell Berman: Another query here.

>> Chad Brand: Chad Brand sir, mayor, council at Brister Superior, my question for you is, you've been here now for almost a week. You met with congressional offices, you met with state departments, you went on social media and did that to effect. What is your general sense, your takeaway from your time here?

Is there tailwind, headwind, are you feeling more positive about in terms of US policy? Do you have a better sense of what the thinking is about it? You seem to allude that you still don't know what the policy is, I don't know, I don't either. I don't think anyone else in this room does either, but is there any kind of positivity you come out of this heading back for meetings in Europe?

 

>> Russell Berman: Thank you.

>> Badr Jamous: Thank you for your questions, of course, I will not tell you that we are going with big positive, but it was okay that we are sending the right message directly to the right people. We send the message from the Syrian people, from the people who are refusing the normalization.

We send also few of the Syrian people about the American administration, it means we need the Syrian people. Started Dullostop and all their friends and we also are sending this message. They have to work more and more strong with the UN, with the employment 2254, with the Cesar act, with the Captagon.

So we feel our message pass to the right people. We hope to see we will still keep pressuring in Washington through us or through our people here also are working in Washington. We know that many Syrians they are doing great job here in Washington. So also our good friend Jewelry is sending always the right message pushing the administration and many many American and Syrian they are doing great job.

So of course we trying to do our homework and this very important to us and to the Syrian people. We feel that maybe it's some message that's the statement of the barbaric. It was good that been pushing for employment 2254 we are still at the same position. So maybe this again sends in the right message to the capitals who are thinking to do the normalization for nothing and for no political solution.

 

>> Russell Berman: Thank you Harry in the back.

>> Syed Mushtaq: My name is Syed Mushtaq with the Syrian Institute for Progress. I think the US lack of policy in itself is a policy. It's an indication to indirectly hold on to Assad and treat the Syrian policy from the humanitarian aspect, not for a solution.

What's really very alarming is lately we noticed that the administration have been exploring the entrance of clearing the credential of the Al Zhulani who is the head of the Al Nusra or Tahrir Shan. I'm wondering if there is any thought on that and for mister whether, have you asked the administration why they have not appointed special envoy to Syria?

Thank you.

>> Badr Jamous: Thank you for your questions. We asking all these questions and we pushing them to do that because really we need. It was very good job before when what Mister ambassador JPR and our was following the CRM file very strong, very quickly. We were in very close contact with them.

Of course we need that but again it's big questions. Why is it the Syrian file in the top of the United States today is that we know that it's not. We are trying to bring back to make more higher interest of the United States and they have to understand we are in the same wage.

Russian, Iranian, refugee, crypto gun all I think all these interests it's our interest and interest of United States. So we hope to see this soon. We are wishing also in this way.

>> Russell Berman: Joe, do you want to respond to the first part?

>> Joel Rayburn: Well, considering Hayator, Shamdez and Jelani, I just don't see any path to a normalization in them, even more remote than normalization of the Assad regime.

Having dealt with that, I don't think the us national security establishment is ever going to tolerate that because of HTS continued behavior and their associations, their past associations. The Europeans, I don't think, will tolerate it, and the leading arab countries are dead set against it. So I just.

I don't see it as realistic. I know Jelani has occasionally gone on a charm offensive to try to market himself as someone that could be acceptable. And I think also HTS believed and was advised that if, well, if the United States can drop its opposition to the Taliban, then surely they could drop their opposition to HTS.

But look what's happening with the Taliban now. So I think that's whoever on the US side thought that Jelani and the HTS could be rehabilitated like Taliban. Now they're looking at Kabul and saying, well, we don't wanna go down that path.

>> Russell Berman: So, a few more minutes, I'd like to collect a couple of questions, and then I'll ask each of you for a final statement or stats.

So, 1, 2, 3, 4, but quickly, please.

>> Charles Lister: Yeah, I'll try to be quick Charles Lister, a comment leading to a question. I'm gonna slightly disagree with the way that Joel has presented the Biden administration's approach to Syria. Joel described it as a policy of stealth, which would suggest that it's a policy of action, whereas I actually think the Biden administration has a policy of purposeful inaction.

It's an open secret that President Biden, when he came into the oval office two or so years ago, essentially, he issued a directive to his NSC staff, which was, keep the Middle East and its crises off my desk. And as a result of that, we have a status quo policy, which is to reiterate our public positions, but a policy of inaction.

I don't think that the Biden administration is secretly trying to bring the region towards an Iran deal. I think, in fact, it's quite happy to see the region do its own de escalation by itself, without us involvement, without our mediation, without our intervention. So as a result of that, I actually think we're in a harder position.

If it was a policy of action, there are certain things that could be done to try to block it, but when you have a policy of inaction, it's much more difficult. And if Congress is our best chance, I guess my question is mostly directed to Joel here. What can Congress actually do to stop inaction in an administration that shows zero sign of any willingness or optimism that action is actually worth investing in.

 

>> Russell Berman: Okay, thank you.

>> Isham Nishawati: Dr. Isham Nishawati actually one of my question was with mister semi question but before I ask a question is, this is United States of America we promote freedom, democracy and we have great value and principles. How come we took us 12 years so far and without finding a policy for a country and people rebelling against dictatorship and asking for freedom and democracy.

While we in 24 hours we found this we figured out our bodice from Ukraine with the pending Ukrainian for same principles the Syrians are struggling for. This is shame on leadership of this country we gotta be still on unjustive America to not come up with public policy after 13 years.

I mean I just wonder what's missing here in the Syrian case? We are the same people asking for the same demand. I can't find the answer, I love to see here from Mr. Joe Oliver as he actually was a former Syrian boy and I upload what you did in the congress testimony.

You expose President Biden administration giving a green light under the table to other countries thank you.

>> Bassam Sekhar: I'm Bassam Sekhar Syrian Democratic Consul US mission my first question it is you answered part of them. The other part is your visit to Arab countries which are normalization with Syrian regime and what about Ankara, what their response?

The first my questions and the second Where you are now for negotiating committee in Geneva, why stop? Thank you.

>> Cameron Chisholm: Thank you, Cameron Chisholm from DT Institute. So you started off by saying you use the term quite often normalization for free. So as you've spoken to different capitals here in DC, what has been your advice or counsel to them on pressure points, on ways to coerce the regime back to the negotiating table?

And alternatively, what would the Syrian people that you represent be willing to offer in exchange?

>> Russell Berman: Thank you. What you can answer and statement then Joel.

>> Badr Jamous: Our offer to the American said the profound that's to bring all the capital who are trying to negotiate with the regime normalization to put in the table to implement 2254.

That means we need to bring all the capital to what we are seeing. That means the regime has many choice. UN, Arab Initiative, Jordanian, Egypt, Ankara. So he playing between all of this. So our advice to put all this material on the table that if he needed a relation with this capital, they have to go to the UN to Geneva to implement 2254.

Without this, all this stabilization it will be nothing. It means just be shame for this capital. So this is our advice to the United States if you don't have other choice, just bring all this, but that we bushing, it's what the meeting in Amman. It's what between the Arab and Turkey and United States, UK, France, Germany.

So we gave them advice, you have to bring back the like before it was like who are putting in the table if the regime needs any relation, he need help, he need early recovery. All these they have to put it in one package that you have to go to the emblem 2254.

Not just to sell one by one it's very important to us, this is why we are pushing to bring back the file to Geneva in the table to implement 2254 under the umbrella of UN. So I hope my answer is clear. I think about Ankara, while we are hearing from Ankara, we have still the same interiors.

They are every way of talking about implemented 2054. Why are dangerous for us, the JepDa meeting it was on the capital. Go with the statement no 2254 no political forces, it means this what we are so worried about it, but we still listen from Russia, from Ankara about implement 2254.

They know that there is no solution in Syria without implementing the refugee. They will not go back, they need to send the refugee, but they know that they cannot send it if there is no political solution. So we are still feel that we are with them in the same way until now, but on the other side, we see the Arab give more interesting offer for the regime without nothing.

You just came back to the Arab League with good normalization with the capital. For that we are so worried, we are trying to bring all this together with the United States to bring back to the table of the UN. Okay, all this, what you need, you can put it in one package.

What do you need? The regime and what we need, all of this capital if they need the solution in the Middle east, they have to implement 2254, there's no other solution, all the Syrian, they need this. Nobody from the Syrian will accept any solution without a transition in Syria, without a guarantee for future of our child and future of all of us.

 

>> Russell Berman: Thank you.

>> Joel Rayburn: So concerning Charles's point, so Charles and I are looking at the same events. I see a little more action. I agree with Charles overall concerning the Middle east. It's a policy that was meant to be benign neglect that was meant to be, let's, let's disengage the policy of disengagement.

However, at the same time, there were some damaging elements of engagement so that I see as more active. For example, a Biden administration envoy worked very hard and is still working to try to encourage Syria's neighbors to do a gas pipeline deal that would involve Bashar al Assad.

And was assuring those regional neighbors of Syria that the Caesar act was not going to be a hindrance. When the Caesar act very clearly is a hindrance, it's explicitly a hindrance that came long before now and long before the earthquake, long before this normalization acceleration. It was exactly the wrong message to send.

Secondly, I think the general license was another active measure that just very strongly reinforced the perceptions that already been created by this pitching of the Arab gas pipeline deal. There have been other smaller elements like that, but they weren't lost on the Arab capital. So I think the Arab capitals actually did see to the extent that there is action from the administration, it's in the direction of relieving pressure on Assad also as well.

The drop off in the enforcement of sanctions, whether they're Caesar sanctions or other sanctions on Syrian regime, has been sharp and it's been a very clear. I take that as an action as well. It's part of a policy of inaction, but it's an action, I don't wanna get into competing administrations.

But before this administration, there had been built and infrastructure inside the executive branch to enforce the Caesar act and other Syria related sanctions. It was dismantled at the beginning of the Biden administration. Let me circle around to reinforce point. The small group of seven countries, three Arab capitals, three European capitals in the United States by the end of 2020 had become a very tight policy coordination mechanism that kept all those capitals on the same sheet of music.

It was discontinued in 2021, and I think there was a lot that was lost because that was a forum where the United States, the European capitalists, could head off at the past normalization outreach. And we did from 2018 to early 2021. Now, Garrett Peterson's proposition in 2019 and 2020 was to try to grow the small group of seven like-minded countries into a forum that could directly support the implementation of 2254.

By bringing in the Russians, bringing in Turkey, bringing in the Iranians, bringing in whoever else needed to be brought into that forum, to have that be the main forum, essentially moderated by him on the implementation of 2254. We never got under the Trump administration to a full acceptance of that format because of the involvement of the Iranians.

We were able to hold our noses because we ourselves have it, we have engagement with the Russians on Syria from time to time. So that wasn't a problem, I think honestly, my preference would be for that kind of forum now, which is an expanded contact group of the countries that really matter.

That could make the implementation of 2254 a reality. I would much rather see that now than everyone going off in their own directions and doing piece by piece deals as mentioned, What can Congress, I'm belaboring this answer, sorry. That's my MO. What can Congress do to stop a policy of inaction?

There are two things. First is just by strengthening the existing legislation, you have a chilling effect geopolitically because you're signaling to the countries that would be acting in violation of the Caesar act or other us legislation that there is a congressional intent against that. And even if you have an executive branch now that's not implementing those laws, you may soon.

You could have a different executive branch at some point in the near future that would enforce those laws. So it has a chilling effect. Secondly, Congress can make some of these. The Congress can remove or reduce the latitude of the executive branch in implementing some of these measures.

As for example, was done with the CAATSA sanctions that wound up being aimed against Turkey for buying the S300 air defense system from Russia. So you could get much closer to mandatory sanctions on some of these things. There are other authorities, there are other places where us law is that way.

And I think actually you're seeing a frustrated Congress is maybe closer to that kind of approach. Why was there inaction on Syria or a lack of decisive action on Syria versus a clear, one of the reasons is that I think people took people in Europe and here both said, look what's happening in Ukraine.

One of the reasons, one of the reasons the Russians have acted with impunity in Ukraine is because they got away with doing that in Syria. So I think a lesson has been drawn. I can't tell you the number of policy folks that I've talked to in Europe and here who said, well, this is what we get.

We're not having stopped this kind of thing in Syria. Secondly, I think honestly, the most effective counter-strategy to the Syrian revolution that Bashar al-Assad had was to take the steps that were needed to try to paint the revolution as an Islamist, a jihadist movement. And he did that himself.

But it was extraordinarily effective to the detriment of the Syrian people. So that in the United States executive branch and in Europe and in the arab capitals, the overwhelming concern in Syria became nothing. A political solution, not the preservation of human rights, but counterterrorism and the infrastructure that grew up in the national security apparatuses around the world to treat Syria first and foremost as a terrorism problem were vast.

And it's very difficult to turn those policies around to say, hang on, let's actually address the root causes of terrorism. It's the Assad regime and its nature and its behavior, very difficult. That was the battle that Ambassador Jeffrey and I and others fought inside the US administration, and we didn't all the way succeed.

I think I'll stop there.

>> Russell Berman: Okay, I think this has been very informative. We've gone over time. Ladies and gentlemen, thanks for joining us this morning and join me in giving our speakers a round of applause.