Central Bank Communications

>> Steven Davis: Welcome to a special edition of Economics applied at Jackson Lake Lodge in beautiful Wyoming. With me, is Mary Daly. She's president of the Federal Reserve bank of San Francisco and also a member of the Federal Open Market Committee, or fomc, which sets monetary policy for the United States.

 

We're here at the Jackson Hole Monetary Policy Symposium. We're both attending and we're delighted to be in this setting. Behind us you can see the glorious Teton Mountain Range and a sliver of Jackson Lake, and if you squint, you might even see some wildlife passing by as we speak.

 

 

>> Steven Davis: So welcome, Mary. It's a pleasure to be here with you in such a fabulous setting.

>> Mary Daly: Likewise. Glad to be here and love the view, so. It's terrific.

>> Steven Davis: Yes. Okay, so you gave a really interesting speech a couple months ago on central bank communications about monetary policy, and I wanted to ask you about that.

 

And just to set things up, I think you started off the speech or pretty early on, noting that central bankers have a duty as public servants to be transparent about their actions and accountable for them. So I think you took that as a premise. You also stressed that the purpose of central bank communications is to improve understanding of monetary policy.

 

And so am I on the right page so far?

>> Mary Daly: Completely, and on the duty thing, if I may just add to that, the American people should expect us to be accountable for our actions, but to be accountable for our actions, we have to be transparent about what we intend and that those two things go together.

 

I think it's a responsibility of public service. If we do our job well, people understand they can make better decisions in their lives and even help us with the achieving our goals.

>> Steven Davis: Yes. So all that makes perfect sense. I'm bought into that. But as you know, well, the best way to communicate about monetary policy is far from obvious and gets into a lot of deep waters.

 

And in fact, the way that the Fed communicates about monetary policy has evolved greatly in recent decades. So can you just kind of recap for us briefly, you know, what that evolution has looked like in the United States in recent decades, you know, what the big changes were and what the reasoning was behind them.

 

 

>> Mary Daly: Absolutely. And I think it's useful to start with the beginning of central banking for all countries was communication is bad, don't communicate, because if you communicate, you take your tools away, you can't be agile, you won't surprise anybody. And the idea was surprises are what help with transmission of monetary policy.

 

We've come a long way since then, but we started with what I would call Toes in the water. So the first thing we did under Greenspan was release a statement, an FOMC post meeting statement, that said, here's what we did. Remember, it was like blowing smoke up a chimney.

 

And you had to read it from.

>> Steven Davis: Interest rates in the late 80s, early 90s.

>> Mary Daly: Yes, that's way back. It's honestly, for most of the Fed history, communication zero. It's only recent history where communication has started to blossom and we know how to use it as a tool and we're continuing to learn.

 

So first thing you do release a statement. The next thing though, under Chairman Bernanke, really, is to start using communication as an effective tool. Not just telling people what you're doing right after the meeting, but actually using it as a tool. So thinking about how do I communicate to the public?

 

Ben Bernanke famously went on 60 Minutes in, the financial crisis and said, here's what we're doing, here's why we're doing it, here's why it's important to you. But communication is not just one off.

>> Steven Davis: This is like this old idea of don't tell people what you're doing or how you reach your decisions.

 

We flipped 180 degrees from that. But what motivated that change? What led to that change?

>> Mary Daly: Well, research. First of all, you're academic, we're both researchers that the scholarship was telling us that we were actually not doing as well as we wanted to because we were surprising people all the time.

 

And you know, people want to make mortgage decisions, business decisions with a sense of where things are going. If you won't tell them where they're going, it's hard to make those decisions.

>> Steven Davis: Maybe surprise has some advantages, but the people who are being surprised, the businesses.

>> Mary Daly: They didn't like it.

 

 

>> Steven Davis: They didn't like, they didn't appreciate it all the time.

>> Mary Daly: And I think also the research was starting to reveal that not only is surprising people not maybe the best in public service, but you're actually not even enlisting the public to help along your goals. Inflation is a great example.

 

If they know the Fed's going to work to bring inflation down, then they don't expect inflation to continue to rise and they will not raise inflation expectations, which actually helps us achieve our 2% target more quickly.

>> Steven Davis: So communication gives you potentially extra tools.

>> Mary Daly: Exactly.

>> Steven Davis: For implementing the kind of monetary policy and achieving the kind of monetary policy objectives you're after.

 

 

>> Mary Daly: Absolutely. And does so with less pain and discomfort because people aren't surprised and they're helping along the way.

>> Steven Davis: Okay. And then I want to tie back to something you said earlier, but I think this is part of the thinking as well, that secrecy, as opposed to transparency is not very conducive to accountability.

 

 

>> Mary Daly: It's not conducive to accountability. And you know, you can see this in any part of life, but in central banking you see it in high relief. A strong relief is that it's not conducive to accountability, which means you're not gaining trust. And if people don't trust you, then you, what you say doesn't matter.

 

And so you want to be conveying things that people can trust and believe, especially on inflation. We're going to get inflation to target. We're going to do so helpfully and gently so that we don't break the labor market. We want people to know that. Well, then they have to have high trust.

 

That means you have high accountability.

>> Steven Davis: Right.

>> Mary Daly: It's the right thing to do, but it's also the effective thing to do.

>> Steven Davis: So you remind me. George Shultz, former Treasury Secretary of the United States, among many other important roles, said many, many times, trust is the coin of the realm.

 

He was often talking about the national security arena, international relations, other aspects of economics. But you're saying trust is also the coin of the realm for monetary authorities. Because then when, if I get, correct me if I'm wrong, because then when they make pronouncements, it will be credible and people will make decisions based and take actions based on those pronouncements.

 

 

>> Mary Daly: Absolutely, that's exactly right. The coin of the realm is the way I often put it, it is the coin of the realm. Ultimately, if you don't have that, then all other things are harder and less effective.

>> Steven Davis: Okay, it is interesting. You and I are economists, we're professional researchers.

 

Even over the course of my career, you're younger than me, so maybe not over the course of your career, it's just startling, the 180 degree shift in how we think about the way, the Fed. But most leading central banks nowadays, how they try to communicate about their policies.

 

 

>> Mary Daly: Well, I can just offer this. In 1996, I started the San Francisco Fed in September. I'm a new rookie economist. I was told early on we're an organization that does a lot and says Whittle. And so now we're an organization that tries to do a lot, but says a lot as well.

 

And the balance is, the one we have to always achieve is to what extent are we saying a lot and conveying a lot? Where's the clarity here.

>> Steven Davis: Yeah, exactly. So that's a great segue to just what I wanted to ask you about next. I mean, there's the issue of clarity.

 

And is that sometimes impeded by saying too much?

>> Mary Daly: It is.

>> Steven Davis: And having too many talking heads. So can you speak about that?

>> Mary Daly: I don't know if it's about the number of people who are talking or the number of things we're. But I do think that we have to collectively decide as a group what is our main goal.

 

So I think one of our main goals is transparency, but the second one should be clarity. And if we're adding a lot of noise and no one understands what we're saying, I think that's a problem, or if we're communicating too strongly a view only to find out that, we didn't have clarity at all.

 

We had the confusion. So thoughtful communication for its own sake is not a goal. Communication for the sake of the public, that is a goal. And I think it's not, it's not just too much, it's the quality.

>> Steven Davis: And just, just to help people appreciate how subtle this is, let's go to the issue which you did talk about in your speech.

 

A bit about precision of pronouncements, about where the Fed thinks the economy is ahead of you, where it thinks its own policy actions are heading. That, that turns out to be pretty tricky. So I want to get your views on that. Is there too much precision right now in the current regime?

 

And maybe, maybe I should back up a step and ask you to explain what is the current regime through which the Fed communicates about monetary policy.

>> Mary Daly: So we have many features that we use many tools. So we release a post FOMC statement. The chair gives a press conference after each meeting and goes through what the statement meant.

 

Four times a year we do the summary of economic projections where particip project their views on the economy and the interest rate path. And we also go out and speak. I'm talking with you, many of my colleagues are talking about the economy. So we're all out there conveying.

 

The chair talks regularly. So we're talking about these things. Where the challenge comes I think is that the world we're sitting in today is highly uncertain. So for us to be overly precise about what we will be doing a month from now, six months from now probably would be non additive.

 

To use a non economist thing, it wouldn't be very helpful. People are locked into that view only to find out the world evolved differently.

>> Steven Davis: So should I infer from that that you have serious reservations about the current structure of the summary economic projections?

>> Mary Daly: I don't mind them.

 

I think the narrative around them has gotten a little misconstrued. So we send out, I have a phrase that I use regularly and it's those summary of economic projections are as good as the day they're printed. And what you really want to take from them is how are overall reacting?

 

Because, we write down something about the economy and the evolution of monetary policy based on the best information we have and our expectations of how it will evolve tomorrow. A different data point could come out, a different shock could hit the economy. We're going to have to adjust.

 

So what is, I think unhelpful is that that gets set up as for strong forward guidance when it's actually not meant to be.

>> Steven Davis: Okay, but then should the, should the Fed move away from point forecast Maybe express ranges or should it have contingent forecasts? Because you know, I know sophisticated market participants know that monetary policy is contingent.

 

 

>> Mary Daly: It's contingent.

>> Steven Davis: What's going to happen, what data comes in and so on. But there is this anchoring feature as I perceive it. You can tell me if you disagree of the summary economic projections that some sometimes leads market astray and sometimes has proved to be a challenge for the Fed to work around.

 

Do you agree with that character?

>> Mary Daly: You know, I do agree with that characterization. I think it's been beneficial from a transparency perspective. But it does. The communication of it does get locked in and then it's. We don't. Our hands aren't literally tied because importantly we can react to the economy and we do.

 

What's, what's tied up a little bit is the communication. And that's back to this idea of how do you convey clarity and especially how do you convey clarity of how you'll respond in a time period when you don't have perfect clarity about the data? And that's harder. And I think you were exploring, as the Chairman said, we are exploring all types of ways to communicate.

 

In one of our monetary policy framework conferences public conference we had Ben Bernanke talk about scenario analysis. This is a thing that all central banks, or many of them are grappling with. How do you convey the uncertainty and the wide range of possible outcomes while you remain sensible enough that a person can follow what you're talking about?

 

 

>> Steven Davis: Yeah. The scenario analysis that Ben Bernanke is proposing is a form of contingent. It is contingent statements about the future rather than point projections.

>> Mary Daly: It is, and one of the things you'll see, and if I just, I'll take 10 seconds here, is that many of us right now are talking about scenarios.

 

If the economy does this and tariffs prove to be a persistent effect on inflation, this would require this. If the labor market falters, this will require this. If things evolve with a little bit of an effect on short term inflation and a softening labor market it will do this.

 

I think that is the communication. It's very unsatisfying though to some people who want point clarity, but point clarity itself can be a distraction.

>> Steven Davis: Yeah, well, I'm sympathetic to this moving towards more contingent scenario based statements about what the Fed plans to do. That just seems like a more grounded recognition of the world in which we live.

 

 

>> Mary Daly: I would agree with that completely. And you know the FOMC is going to be taking up these issues. We're coming out with our framework review results. But then we'll Also continue to think about communication. I think one of the bigger lessons I've learned over my career as a in central banking is you can never say you're done on communication.

 

There's always a way to get better, to refine the message. It's also state dependent or contingent in certain moments. Strength and clarity, that precision is required after the pandemic, after the GFC. In other times, sometimes less is more and that's an important feature.

>> Steven Davis: And the way we communicate amongst not just the Fed and everybody else, but amongst all of ourselves, with the rise of the Internet and social media has also changed the landscape for communication.

 

 

>> Mary Daly: Absolutely.

>> Steven Davis: I wanted to tie again two strands of our conversation back on this precision point from a different angle than transparency and clarity which go back to our discussion about trust. So one argument, and I associate this argument with Larry Summers. I wanted to get your reaction to it, which is too much precision about what the Fed plant is going to do in the future can actually undermine the Fed's credibility and the trust that flows from that because inevitably sometimes you, because the world is uncertain, you don't follow through on these point projections at least.

 

What's your view about that argument?

>> Mary Daly: In the speech you referenced I talked about how precision after the GFC was really important because it helped us be moving markets to know that we were going to do low, lower, for longer to support the economy. But then we use some of the aspects of that precision guidance in September of 2020 which turned out to be a communications challenge for us once the inflation started picking up and was rising so rapidly we had to offset it with aggressive rate hikes.

 

When I look back on that and say what's the lesson we learned from that from my vantage point? I wanted to ask you about that. Already pre-empted it. My lesson there is that really you have to have state dependent contingent communication and the precision we were trying to offer was actually becomes a burden down the road.

 

Not in terms of what we can do. As you remember, we raised the interest rate rapidly so we weren't tied up, but the communication was tied up. And I think you could look back on inflation expectations drifting up and people saying well we're just not going to react until unemployment comes down to a certain level.

 

That ultimately taught me that too much precision, even in these times that feel like a complet crisis may actually be suboptimal be the something you don't want to do. So thinking carefully about what you're trying to do and recognizing you have a lot of uncertainty. I'd say the same thing applies today.

 

The world's very uncertain right now, so if we over communicate precision, we're likely to find ourselves at odds with the data.

>> Steven Davis: Okay, so two things. One, I hear you saying you're actually making a pretty subtle point about precision, which is you're not just. You're saying that the optimal level degree of precision in monetary policy pronouncements is itself state contingent.

 

 

>> Mary Daly: It is.

>> Steven Davis: It may have been very different in the midst of the GFC than what it probably, according to your view, might better have been in 2021.

>> Mary Daly: Yeah. And let me just offer I didn't know that back then, but I now have learned that, right?

 

 

>> Steven Davis: So you've learned.

>> Mary Daly: I've learned, and I think that's how we all learn, right, is that it turns out that, that it wasn't really great for the moment we faced. Of course, we hadn't had a moment like that since the 80s and 70s, so we didn't know it would come.

 

But you've got to allow yourself the opportunity to plan for all the range of things that could happen.

>> Steven Davis: Well, but how did the Fed. Okay, so you're implicitly, I think, acknowledging, at least with the benefit of hindsight, a misjudgment or a mistake in how the Fed communicated around 20.

 

Well, let me say this is my view. So just your view, I understand.

>> Mary Daly: I don't wanna impugn that all my colleagues here, but I do regret it, I do regret.

>> Steven Davis: So then how, I want you to tell me how is it that the Fed got to that point?

 

Do we need, do we need internal reforms in the Fed? Do we need just a rethinking of our intellectual frameworks? I want to take it beyond just that particular episode. And what can we learn going forward that would make the Fed more intellectually and adept so that it could engage in the right kind of contingent policy analysis?

 

 

>> Mary Daly: I think that's a great question. So let me answer it. How I've been thinking about it. The first thing that comes becomes clear, I've worked in the Fed for quite a while, most of my career. What I've learned over time, and we're like all other humans and agencies and academic researchers, we often study and fight the last war.

 

So if the last war was the gfc, then you study and fight. What remedies do you have for that? But ultimately you apply them to something that's completely different, a global pandemic that's really challenging to do. And so what's the reflection? New shocks can behave differently and leave yourself some latitude.

 

You know, I went back and read how the FOMC, I was there. But it's useful to remind yourself how Ben Bernanke the FOMC had charted the course. They didn't do it with a light switch. Right. They didn't say, I know the problem, let me do it. They did toes in the water.

 

And when you do toes in the water, you learn more over time. I think that's a useful thing. Step wise. Right? Step, function, kind of test and go, test and go. So that's one lesson.

>> Steven Davis: That's when you're operating in a world that you don't fully understand, that's a sensible strategy.

 

 

>> Mary Daly: The second, I think, thing that's important to recognize is we were not the only group doing this, but we did it as well, is that we've come out of a decade of low, neutral rates of interest, low global inflation, fighting inflation from below our target, trying to push it up.

 

So that gets in your mind as, we want to make sure we guard against deflation that could come out of this situation as it had come out of the great global financial crisis. But there were also the other side of the risk. We just hadn't experienced them for 30, 40 years.

 

 

>> Steven Davis: So let me pick up on that because, you know, I think we were fortunate that Ben Bernanke was Fed Chair at a time when an intimate knowledge of what had happened in the 1930s.

>> Mary Daly: Exactly.

>> Steven Davis: Was inside the Fed Chair's head. But I think there's a larger point.

 

My perception, I want to get your reaction to this is that Ben Bernanke aside, that maybe there's not enough broad sweep, historical expertise within the Federal Reserve System and a little bit more would help us engage in this kind of thinking that you're advocating. So one do you agree with that?

 

 

>> Mary Daly: Well, I agree with the statement that we need, all of us, and I would say academic economists, policy economists, Fed economists, all of us need to really interrogate past history. I think that's a place where any one of us could be more. I mean, if you look at the research publications, I spent a lot of time looking at those, they tend to be from the last war or something new that's happening, you know, AI or something.

 

But no one's going back and restudying, the Great Depression. And so you get something that looks near the Great Depression, right? So I was giving a talk about Ben honoring what he had done during that time at the AA meetings. And one of the things I realized is where are the new monetary policy economists studying the old things and how are they preventing the new shocks that could occur with the old history we have?

 

So I think it's a broader call because ultimately, sitting at the Fed, you can't have expertise across the full range of things you will encounter. And that's why you can't sit in a, an echo chamber of your own, you know, locked up in a room. You have to ask people like yourself, but why?

 

This is why Jackson Hole is so important, right? We come, we hear from others. You don't see any Fed people up there presenting except the chair. You see people learning from the debate. So I would call it for all economists and all people who study history. Let's, let's understand more of what's possible and not focus on the last risk, but the full range of risks.

 

 

>> Steven Davis: Okay, I want to see if there's anything else you want to get on the table. Now, Mary, we're going to talk again tomorrow so we have a chance to reflect on Jay Powell's remarks tonight. But, anything else you want to leave us with right now?

>> Mary Daly: I'll leave you with this, only that and look forward to talking again tomorrow.

 

The thing that's really important is when we do these kinds of postmortems look backs, people forget that the reason we're looking back is because we need to get ready for the future. And I think it's really important that this is, remains a dynamic process. It's, it's less about mistakes to just point them out and more about what do you learn that you can do better with in the future.

 

Right. We want to do better in the future. So I look forward to talking.

>> Steven Davis: And this is not just an academic exercise.

>> Mary Daly: It's not.

>> Steven Davis: A lot that rides on getting monetary policy not perfect, that's an unattainable goal, but improving it. Improving it.

>> Mary Daly: Exactly.

>> Steven Davis: Okay, thanks Mary.

 

 

>> Mary Daly: Thank you.

>> Steven Davis: Great conversation.

>> Mary Daly: That was great.

>> Steven Davis: I agree, thank you.

>> Steven Davis: Mary, welcome back.

>> Mary Daly: Thank you.

>> Steven Davis: We have had the privilege of listening to Jay Powell deliver one of the most important monetary policy speeches of the year. I think you could fairly say, maybe that's even a slight understatement here at the Jackson Lake Lodge for the annual Jackson Hole Monetary Policy Symposium.

 

So I want to just first ask you, what did you take away from the speech? How did you interpret the message? Going back to our earlier discussion about the importance of Fed communications, how did you interpret the message that Jay Powell was delivering?

>> Mary Daly: Well, the chair delivered a balance of risk speech.

 

He said here's what's important to us, our dual mandate goals. We're focusing on the employment side of our mandate because we have to balance those risks against the inflation side of our mandate. Laid out how important inflation expectations are, how important it is to get into the labor market early, not let it get to a point where it's struggling.

 

And that means we are going to have to make data dependent trade offs on our policy. So I thought it laid out a lot of flexibility for us to go forward depending on how the data evolved.

>> Steven Davis: Okay. Yeah, that's sort of how I took it, especially beyond the next couple of months.

 

 

>> Mary Daly: I think that's right.

>> Steven Davis: That left a lot. It's basically, we're gonna see what happens and we're gonna behave appropriately. But then let me ask you, and again, this is even more closely connected to our earlier discussion about central bank communications. What does it look like, the market?

 

What was the market's interpretation of the speech and was it exactly in line with your interpretation?

>> Mary Daly: Well, the markets took it to be much more of a commitment, which I think is always whenever you say commitment in central banking, and we didn't make the commitment. It's probably a mistake.

 

But I do think the markets got a little ahead on believing that a rate cut is right around the corner, maybe at the next meeting. And I think that's because we had a poor jobs market report, a reasonable inflation report that was located with the tariffs and goods inflation but not much other place.

 

And they probably overestimated what that's going to look like. But ultimately we're going to get another report on inflation, another report on the jobs market, and we will then have to wait and see how the economy evolves. And as you said, and I agree completely, the chairman left out, left a lot of room for us to react as we should to accomplish our goals.

 

The other thing I would ask Steve, if I may, is that, you know, I don't just look at how the markets react. I actually look at how our boards and councils and public react and they seem a little more understanding that this is a balance of risks.

>> Steven Davis: Right.

 

That's right. Wall street is not the economy. Economy.

>> Mary Daly: It's not the economy.

>> Steven Davis: It's just a very particular part of the economy that warrants a lot of attention, gets a lot of media attention, but it's not the economy as a whole.

>> Mary Daly: Absolutely.

>> Steven Davis: Important to remember that.

 

So I very quickly had time to look at the media response, only looked at the Wall Street Journal article about Powell's speech and how the market reacted. So I'll note that S&P 500, if I remember right, it might have been The Dow up 1.5% in the wake of Powell's speech.

 

And then the characterization of the article is the market saw Powell's speech as validating, I think they used that word, validating their expectation of a rate cut in September. And you're saying, if I hear you correctly, no, it wasn't that strong. Because it still depends on key statistical reports that come in and what you hear formerly from the, you know, the many, many contacts that not just you, but the other regional Fed banks.

 

That's part of your job. You're out there talking to people all the time.

>> Mary Daly: All the time.

>> Steven Davis: Trying to supplement the hard data with the soft information.

>> Mary Daly: Especially a turning point or a transition point in an economy if you only rely on the hard data, you're often behind.

 

 

>> Steven Davis: Behind the curve.

>> Mary Daly: You're behind the curve. So you have to reach out, you have to talk to businesses and communities and workers. We're doing all of that. And as we do that, we're going to put all this together and go to the next meeting and, and ultimately make data dependent policy decisions that I think again, the chair laid out nicely how we think about it, laying out our reaction function, not a preset plan of how we'll act.

 

 

>> Steven Davis: But it does seem, you can tell me if you disagree. It does seem like the way the market reacted to Powell's speech, which as I said before, looks like they interpreted a part of his speech as validating their expectations of a rate cut in September. If that doesn't happen, making an even already politically challenging environment more politically challenging.

 

And I understand that the Fed is not looking at the politics when it makes its decisions, but nonetheless, nobody likes to get the kind of heat that the Fed has been under recently. I just wonder what you think about that.

>> Mary Daly: You know, ultimately the way that we've always worked, and I think the way that we should work in maintaining what Congress gave us in our independence is do the job, do the job well, hold yourself to doing the job.

 

If it's challenging well, that's what we get asked to do. That's what you get paid for, so to speak. But ultimately it's what, it's the privilege of serving and it's the responsibility of serving. So we'll make the decisions like we always do. And I think the chair conveyed that in the speech.

 

 

>> Steven Davis: He was very forceful.

>> Mary Daly: He was forceful. And I think each of us who sit around that table come in with an understanding that we are charged with a job. We have to do that whether people are. We're popular or not popular. We're getting pressure, no pressure.

 

And we have to just make the decision that is right for the dual mandate goals we've been given.

>> Steven Davis: Right.

>> Mary Daly: So I am thinking right now about the data, the people we talk to, the businesses we talk to, and how to best get to that price stability, full employment nexus that ultimately we call the nirvana.

 

You know, that's what people want. They want to not think about inflation, they want to not think about the job market. They just want to have their careers, raise their families, you know, work in their communities.

>> Steven Davis: Your job is to pursue your mandate in the best of your abilities.

 

Ignore the political noise. That's what you're set out to do. But it's the communications is also there. The communications about what you're doing, why, what you're trying to achieve, how you assess your own performance, that's still a challenge.

>> Mary Daly: It's always a challenge.

>> Steven Davis: It's always a challenge.

 

Maybe more so now than most times. But it may be more so now.

>> Mary Daly: But my own assessment is that the reason it's harder now is because our goals are in trade off, not because we're facing political pressure. It's really because we have above target inflation and a labor market that we don't want to see falter.

 

That's always hard to convey to the public when we're in the for the listeners, when we're in the divine coincidence where our one tool serves both purposes. Well, that's a wonderful place to be. We're not there.

>> Steven Davis: So we're in one of those times now where the full employment part of your mandate is in some tension with the price stability part of your mandate.

 

That's what makes the job harder.

>> Mary Daly: That does make the job harder. But again, we're up to the task. That's central banking. That's being a policymaker in any central bank and at the Fed. And we're up to the task, we're resolute to get both of them done.

>> Steven Davis: Okay, well, on behalf of all the workers and consumers and employers in the economy, good luck in doing your job well.

 

 

>> Mary Daly: Well, thank you very much.

>> Steven Davis: Thanks, Mary. It's been a pleasure.

>> Mary Daly: Mine, likewise.